Union Calendar No. 682

98TH CONGRESS *2d Session*	HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES	REPORT 98-1199

ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1984

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

together with

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL,
Washington, DC, January 3, 1985.

Hon. THOMAS P. O'NEILL, Jr.,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: We are pleased to transmit the enclosed report entitled "Annual Report for the Year 1984 of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 98th Congress, Second Session," together with additional views.

This report sets forth the activities of the Committee for calendar year 1984 in accordance with Section 6(a)(3) of House Resolution 49. The report also makes a number of recommendations to the House of Representatives to control the worldwide problem of drug abuse and drug trafficking as required by Section 6(a)(3) of House Resolution 49.

Respectfully submitted.

Sincerely,

CHARLES B. RANGEL,
Chairman.

Enclosure.

FOREWORD

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1984

COMMITTEE JURISDICTION, AUTHORITY, FUNDING AND ORGANIZATION.

This section addresses the Select Committee's jurisdiction under H. Res. 49 (the Committee's enabling resolution for the 98th Congress), Committee funding, staffing, membership, meetings and rules.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

This section fulfills the Select Committee's responsibility, as required by H. Res. 49, to submit to the House its recommendations for a "comprehensive program to control the worldwide program of drug abuse and drug trafficking." These recommendations draw on the Select Committee's work over the past two years and in many cases reflect proposals made by the Select Committee in other reports and hearing summaries that have been issued by the Committee over the past Congress. The salient points made in the recommendations are summarized below.

Introduction

The introduction to the recommendations notes the shift in emphasis by the Reagan Administration from a Federal drug strategy that maintains equal emphasis on all the elements of narcotics control (prevention and education, detoxification and treatment, international narcotics control, law enforcement, research, and drug abuse in the military) to one that makes prevention and education the foremost objective in our Nation's drug control effort.

The introduction calls for a balanced Federal drug control policy stating, "Our efforts to control drug trafficking and drug abuse will only be successful if we obtain a firm handle on both illicit drug supplies and domestic consumption."

International Narcotics Control

This section states the Select Committee's recommendations as a result of its international narcotics control activities including study missions to Latin America, Mexico, Asia and Europe.

The discussion points to the dramatic increase of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana production in recent years, as well as the increasing availability of psychotropic drugs worldwide. The reports notes that in large part this condition has resulted from a failure of diploma-

cy and calls upon producer nations to develop plans for the elimination of all illicit drug production within a reasonable period of time, and for the United States, industrialized nations, and the United Nations to provide the technical and financial assistance needed to bring the problem under control.

The report then goes on to make a series of recommendations pertaining to the narcotics producing and trafficking nations as follows:

Peru. An expert committee must be established to prepare a plan that will: establish the quantity of coca leaf that is required to meet Peru's coca leaf chewing and commercial needs, the hectares needed and the number of growers required to cultivate this amount; eliminate all other coca production; and begin a program that will eliminate the practice of coca leaf chewing. If a plan is not developed within a reasonable period of time, then implementation of section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act, pertaining to the suspension of aid for failure to progressively eliminate illicit narcotic crops, must be considered.

Bolivia. An expert committee must establish the quantity of coca leaf required annually by Bolivia for legal chewing and commercial needs. This group must also prepare a comprehensive plan to eliminate all other coca production in the country as soon as possible. Similarly, a plan to phase out all traditional coca leaf chewing must be undertaken.

Colombia. A comprehensive plan must be developed to eradicate all illicit coca and marijuana production, curtail the smuggling of coca paste from Bolivia and Peru, seize all illicit processing facilities, suppress internal and external trafficking and smuggling, and immobilize docking sites and airstrips on the north coast.

Mexico. Mexico and the United States should determine the number of helicopters needed to progressively identify and eliminate, on an annual bais, a greater precentage of the poppy and marijuana crop. Cooperation between Mexican police and the Drug Enforcement Administration must be improved both within Mexico and along the border.

Jamaica. A single plan of assistance must be developed that would address the three interrelated problems of agricultural, economic development and narcotics control.

Belize. Cooperative efforts with Belize must be intensified to eradicate illicit marijuana production and prevent Belize from becoming a transit point for cocaine.

The Bahamas. More cooperative enforcement efforts are needed with the United States to curtail trafficking through the islands.

Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, Venezuela. The United States must remain vigilant that these nations do not become processing or smuggling points for coca, cocaine and marijuana from Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia.

Pakistan. Pakistan must prepare a comprehensive plan that will schedule the progressive elimination of all opium production, as well as suppress all illicit opium and heroin traffic in the nation and along its borders, particularly with Afghanistan.

Afghanistan. The United States must use its influence with the freedom fighters to curtail opium production.

Iran. The United States and the West must seek ways to urge Iran to cooperate with Pakistan and Afghanistan in controlling the opium traffic.

India. International drug trafficking organizations are targeting India for supplies of narcotic and psychotropic drugs and as a base for their operations. India, the United States, and the West must carefully watch this situation.

Turkey. Turkey must use its leadership role on the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs to suppress the illicit traffic coming from Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan. Turkey must also improve its internal enforcement activities and drug intelligence collection.

Syria. The United Nations must assure that Syria is controlling heroin production and trafficking within and across its borders.

Lebanon. Any solution to the problem of heroin and hashish production and traffic in Lebanon is contingent upon bringing about a political solution to the turmoil in that country.

Italy. The unrelenting drug enforcement efforts of the Italian authorities must continue, and both the United States and Italian Governments must ensure that adequate resources are assigned to constantly increase these suppression efforts.

Burma. Burma must recognize that the control of insurgency and narcotics control are interwoven. The support of the United Nations and other nations must be sought to end the insurgency in the Shan and Cachin States and create an environment for socio-economic development necessary to end the production and traffic of opium and heroin. Burma must also increase enforcement efforts within areas under its control and along the Thai border.

Thailand. Thailand must prepare and implement a plan that will phase out opium production within five years.

Malaysia. Malaysia should continue to suppress heroin manufacture and traffic within its borders and press Thailand and Burma to address the uncontrolled production within their nations.

Hong Kong. Hong Kong must be aggressive in not permitting its banks to be havens for the laundering of narco-dollars, and it must be conscious of the trafficking threat that exists throughout the colony.

Morocco. Morocco must negotiate a pledge to phase out the illicit production of hashish with Western financial and technical assistance.

Drug Enforcement and Interdicition

The following is a summary of the recommendations regarding improvements in narcotics law enforcement efforts made in the Annual Report for 1984:

—Consideration of H.R. 5990, the State and Local Narcotics Control Assistance Act, should be a top priority of the 99th Congress.

—In order to enhance coordination and cooperation between Federal, State and local law enforcement organizations, the Select Committee recommends that the Federal Government take steps to aggressively ensure that State and local agencies are being properly informed, utilized and given the proper credit

for cooperative initiatives. Further, the mechanism currently in place in South Florida should be implemented in other locations, local law enforcement conferences should be undertaken with more frequency, and the Select Committee should continue to periodically evaluate these efforts.

—Increased use of the military for interdiction and eradication efforts should be explored in depth during the 99th Congress.

—Increased international efforts to reduce the availability of narcotics in the United States must be emphasized by the next Congress.

—The United States Postal Service should be given a mandate to increase its detection efforts to minimize the possible use of the mails to ship narcotics.

—Additional support for marijuana eradication should be forthcoming from the Drug Enforcement Administration in the form of increased funding of the effort.

—In order to enhance intelligence gathering, the expansion of the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) should be explored.

—Review of the forfeiture laws should be undertaken in order to ensure the equitable distribution of seized assets among Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies.

—The resources of the primary Federal drug law enforcement agencies—the Drug Enforcement Administration, Customs, and the Coast Guard—must be increased to meet the growing threat from narcotics trafficking.

Treatment, Prevention, Education and Research

The short introduction to this section notes concerns expressed by State, local and private witnesses before the Committee that the Federal Government has withdrawn from a national leadership role in these areas.

It notes the heavy emphasis on prevention and mobilizing the private sector in the Administration's drug strategy and points out the First Lady's personal involvement in these efforts. It also points out the strategy's emphasis on the responsibility of States and localities to set their own priorities in response to their own local needs, and states the view of many professionals in the field that this policy is little more than a cover for a gradual and continuing abandonment of the field by the Federal Government.

To restore the Federal Government to a position of strong national leadership in reducing the demand for drugs, the report recommends the following measures:

—Increased Federal funding for drug abuse treatment and prevention efforts by States and localities; specifically the report urges that consideration of the State and Local Narcotics Control Assistance Act of 1984 (H.R. 5990, 98th Congress), which includes $125 million a year for 5 years to expand State and local treatment and prevention programs, be a top priority of the 99th Congress;

—Establishment by the Federal Government of a comprehensive national drug abuse information system;

—A greatly increased priority by the Department of Education and the Department of Health and Human Services on drug

abuse education and prevention, including: development and dissemination of effective school-based programs; increased evaluation of State prevention efforts under the block grant to determine the approaches that are effective and to promote the replication of these approaches by other States; and increased dissemination of information and materials to the public;

—A substantial increase in drug abuse research funds, especially in the areas of developing new treatment and prevention techniques, improving delivery of drug abuse services, and improving dissemination of research findings to the field with supporting technical assistance;

—Increased Federal funding for both research training and clinical training; and

—Increased consultation by Federal executive agenices with outside experts in the development of Federal treatment and prevention policies.

Drug Abuse in the Military

To combat the problem of drug abuse in the Armed Services, the Department of Defense and the military services have instituted the following policies; urinalysis testing for drug use; strict enforcement of penalties for drug use and trafficking; mandatory drug abuse treatment and prevention programs; and spearation from service where appropriate. These policies have helped all the services achieve substantial progress in reducing drug abuse in the ranks.

To assure continued progress, the Committee recommends a number of areas that require continuing close attention by the military and the Congress:

—The integrity of urinalysis testing must be beyond question;

—Along with efforts to reduce drug abuse, alcoholism and alcohol abuse among military personnel must be further reduced;

—The worldwide surverys of alcohol and nonmedical drug use among military personnel must continue at periodic intervals;

—Drug abuse treatment, rehabilitation and prevention programs should be widely available in the military; and

—The military's drug abuse prevention efforts must take into account both health and behavioral aspects of susbstance abuse.

ACTIVITIES

This section of the report is a description of Select Committee activities during calendar year 1984. It includes summaries of all hearings and conferences, the international study mission in January 1984, meetings with State Department officials and foreign delegations, activities in support of legislative initiatives, ongoing oversight activities (e.g., drugs in the military, domestic marijuana cultivation, monitoring of Federal programs and activities), and activities in support of national and community-based drug abuse prevention and education efforts. The discussion in the activities section in many cases provides the basis for the recommendations outlined above.

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Union Calendar No. 682

98TH CONGRESS
2d Session

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

REPORT
98-1199

ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1984

JANUARY 3, 1985.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. RANGEL, from the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, submitted the following

REPORT

COMMITTEE JURISDICTION, AUTHORITY, FUNDING AND ORGANIZATION

INTRODUCTION

The House of Representatives in the 98th Congress[1] continued the mandate of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control which was first enacted in the 94th Congress.[2] From its inception more than seven years ago, the Committee's primary mandate from the House has remained basically the same "to conduct continuing oversight and review of the problems of narcotics, drug, and polydrug abuse and control." The Committee was first established by the House in 1976 and has been reconstituted by the 95th, 96th and 97th Congresses.[3]

The Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control is unique because it is the only congressional committee with the broad responsibility and authority to examine the problems of drug abuse and drug trafficking prevention and control in their entirety. The issues involved are extremely complex and cut across a wide range of public policy concerns including law enforcement, the administration of criminal justice, health and health care delivery, environmental safety, education, international relations, national security, and government organization.

[1] H. Res. 49, 98th Congress, adopted Feb. 8, 1983.
[2] H. Res. 1350, 94th Congress, adopted July 26, 1976.
[3] H. Res. 77, 95th Congress, adopted Jan. 11, 1977; H. Res. 13, 96th Congress, adopted Mar. 21, 1979; H. Res. 13, 97th Congress, adopted Feb. 25, 1979.

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The Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control possesses oversight, but no legislative, jurisdiction. The Committee is both a fact-finding and coordinating body. Through its hearings and other activities, the Committee provides an overview of the drug abuse problem, focuses congressional and public attention on critical drug-related issues, and supports actions by the standing committees of the House with legislative jurisdiction for narcotics abuse and control. Although not empowered to report legislation, the Select Committee recommends legislative initiatives to the appropriate standing committees and assists their legislative efforts. To facilitate a coordinated approach to drug abuse issues by the House, the Select Committee's membership included representatives from eight standing committees with jurisdiction over various aspects of drug abuse prevention and control.

Reconstitution of the Select Committee (H. Res. 49)

The text of House resolution 49 providing for the continuation of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control during the 98th Congress is reproduced on the following pages. The resolution passed by a vote of 290–77 on February 8, 1983.

H. Res. 49

Resolved. That there is hereby established in the House of Representatives a select committee to be known as the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control (hereinafter referred to as the "select committee").

FUNCTIONS

Sec. 2. The select committee shall not have legislative jurisdiction. The select committee shall have authority—

(1) to conduct continuing oversight and review of the problems of narcotics, drug, and polydrug abuse and control, including (but not limited to) the study and review of (A) the abuse and control of opium and its derivatives, other narcotic drugs, psychotropics, and other controlled substances, as defined in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, and any such drug or substances when used in combination with any other substances; (B) domestic and international trafficking, manufacturing, and distribution; (C) treatment, prevention, and rehabilitation; (D) narcotics-related violations of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; (E) international treaties and agreements relating to the control of narcotics and drug abuse; (F) the role of organized crime in narcotics and drug abuse; (G) problems of narcotics and drug abuse and control in the Armed Forces of the United States; (H) problems of narcotics and drug abuse and control in industry; and (I) the approach of the criminal justice system with respect to narcotics and drug law violations and crimes related to drug abuse;

(2) to review any recommendations made by the President, or by any department or agency of the executive branch of the Federal Government, relating to programs or policies affecting narcotics or drug abuse or control; and

(3) to recommend to the appropriate committees of the House legislation or other action the select committee considers necessary with respect to programs or policies affecting narcotics or drug abuse or control.

APPOINTMENT AND MEMBERSHIP

Sec. 3. (a) The select committee shall be composed of twenty-five Members of the House, who shall be appointed by the Speaker, one of whom he shall designate as chairman. At least one member of the select committee shall be chosen from each of the following committees of the House: The Committee on Agriculture, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Government Operations, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Committee on the Judiciary, the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, and the Committee on Ways and Means.

(b) Any vacancy occurring in the membership of the select committee shall be filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made.

(c) For purposes of this section, the term "Members" shall mean any Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the House of Representatives.

AUTHORITY AND PROCEDURES

SEC. 4. (a) For purposes of carrying out this resolution the select committee is authorized to sit and act during the present Congress at such times and places within the United States, including any Commonwealth or possession thereof, or elsewhere, whether the House is in session, has recessed, or has adjourned, and to hold such hearings as it deems necessary.

(b) The provisions of clauses 1, 2, and 3 of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives shall apply to the select committee.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS

SEC. 5. (a) Subject to the adoption of expense resolutions as required by clause 5 of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, the select committee may incur expenses in connection with its duties under this resolution.

(b) In carrying out its functions under this resolution, the select committee is authorized—

(1) to appoint, either on a permanent basis or as experts or consultants, such staff as the select committee considers necessary;

(2) to prescribe the duties and responsibilities of such staff;

(3) to fix the compensation of such staff at a single per annum gross rate which does not exceed the highest rate of basic pay, as in effect from time to time, of level V of the Executive Schedule in section 5316 of title 5, United States Code;

(4) to terminate the employment of any such staff as the select committee considers appropriate; and

(5) to reimburse members of the select committee and of its staff for travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred by them in the performance of their duties and responsibilities for the select committee, other than expenses in connection with any meeting of the select committee held in the District of Columbia.

REPORTS

SEC. 6. (a)(1) The select committee shall report to the House with respect to the results of any field investigation or inspection it conducts.

(2) The select committee shall submit an annual report to the House which shall include a summary of the activities of the select committee during the calendar year to which the report applies.

(3) The select committee shall report to the House its recommendations for a comprehensive program to control the worldwide problem of drug abuse and drug trafficking.

(b) Any such report which is made when the House is not in session shall be filed with the Clerk of the House.

FUNDING OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE (H. RES. 446)

Funds for the operation of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control during 1984 were provided in H. Res. 446, the omnibus measure authorizing amounts for expenses of investigations and studies by standing and select committees of the House in the first session of the 98th Congress. Approved March 1, 1984, the resolution included $643,643 for the Select Committee.

COMMITTEE RULES

On March 15, 1983, the Select Committee adopted the following rules for the 98th Congress:

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RULES OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL

RULE 1. GENERAL

The Rules of the House of Representatives, to the extent they apply, together with the following rules, shall be the rules of the Committee.

RULE 2. MEETINGS

(a) The regular meeting day of the Committee for the conduct of its business shall be on the second Thursday of each month while the Congress is in session.

(b) Additional meetings may be called by the Chairman and a regular meeting of the Committee may be dispensed with when, in the judgment of the Chairman, there is no need therefor.

(c) Special meetings may be convened as provided for by clause 2(c)(2) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House.

(d) At least 3 days (excluding Saturday, Sundays, and legal public holidays) before each scheduled Committee meeting, each member of the Committee shall be furnished a list of the subjects to be considered or acted upon at such meeting.

RULE 3. HEARINGS

(a) Members of the Committee shall be advised and a public announcement shall be made of the time, date, place, and subject matter of any hearing to be conducted by the Committee at least one week before the commencement of such hearing, unless the Chairman determines that there is good cause to begin such hearing at an earlier date, in which event the Chairman shall advise Committee members and make the public announcement at the earliest possible date. Any announcement made under this paragraph shall be promptly published in the Daily Digest and promptly entered into the committee scheduling service of the House Information Systems.

(b) Unless authorized by the Chairman, a witness shall not be permitted to testify or present evidence at a hearing of the Committee, and such testimony or evidence may not be included in the Committee hearing record, unless 50 copies thereof have been delivered to the Committee at least 48 hours prior to such hearing.

(c) A Committee member may question a witness only when recognized by the Chairman for such purpose. In accordance with clause 2(j)(2) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House, each Committee member shall be allowed 5 minutes to question a witness until each member who so desires has had such opportunity. The Chairman shall, insofar as practicable, recognize alternately on the basis of seniority those majority and minority members present at the time the hearing was called to order and others on the basis of their arrival at the hearing. Thereafter, additional time may be extended at the discretion of the Chairman.

(d) At any hearing the minority party members of the Committee shall be entitled, upon request to the Chairman by a majority of them before the completion of the hearing, to call witnesses selected by the minority to testify with respect to the subject matter of such hearing during at least one day of hearing thereon.

(e)(1) The Chairman at an investigative hearing of the Committee shall announce in the opening statement the subject of the investigation.

(2) A copy of the Rules of the Committee and clause 2 of Rule XI of the Rules of the House shall be made available to each witness.

(3) Witnesses at an investigative hearing may be accompanied by their own counsel for the purpose of advising them concerning their constitutional rights.

(4) The Chairman may punish breaches of order and decorum, and of professional ethics on the part of counsel, by censure and exclusion from the hearing; and the Committee may cite the offender to the House for contempt.

(f) Any witness may obtain a transcript copy of his or her testimony given at a public session or, if given at an executive session, when authorized by a majority of the members voting a majority being present.

RULE 4. COMMITTEE PROCEDURE

(a)(1) Unless otherwise required or permitted by these rules, one-third of the members of the Committee shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of Committee business. Any Committee member present at a Committee meeting may make a point of order that a quorum is not present, but a quorum shall be deemed present unless a member who is present objects.

(2) Two members shall constitute a quorum for the purposes of taking testimony and receiving evidence.

(b) Meetings for the transaction of business and hearings, of the Committee shall be open to the public or closed, in accordance with clauses 2(g)(1), 2(g)(2), or 2(k)(5) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House. No evidence of testimony taken in executive session may be released or used in public session unless authorized by a majority of members voting, a majority being present.

(c) A vote by any member of the Committee with respect to any matter being considered by the Committee may be cast by proxy if the proxy authorization is in writing, asserts that the member is absent on official business or is otherwise unable to be present at the meeting of the Committee, designates the member of the Committee who is to execute the proxy authorization, and is limited to specific matter and any amendments or motions pertaining thereto (except that a member may authorize a general proxy for motions to recess or adjourn, or for the other procedural matters). Each proxy to be effective shall be signed by the member assigning his vote and shall contain the date and time of day that the proxy is signed. No proxy may be counted for the purpose of constituting a quorum.

(d) Every motion made to the Committee and entertained by the Chairman shall be reduced to writing upon the demand of any member, and a copy made available to each member present.

(e) In the absence of the chairman at any meeting or hearing of the Committee, the ranking member of the majority party on the Committee who is present shall preside at such meeting or hearing.

(f) A complete record of all Committee action, including a record of all votes on any question on which a rollcall vote is demanded, shall be maintained by the Committee. The result of each such rollcall vote shall be available to the public for inspection at the offices of the Committee during normal working hours.

(g) Any member of the Committee may demand and the Chairman shall order a rollcall vote on any matter considered by the Committee.

RULE 5. COMMITTEE REPORTS

(a)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (b), any Committee report shall be approved by a majority of the members voting at a meeting at which a majority is present.

(2) A proposed report shall not be considered in a Committee meeting unless a copy of the proposed report is provided to each member of the Committee at least 5 days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) prior to the meeting.

(b) The Chairman is empowered to obtain the approval of any report in any appropriate manner, including by polling the members of the Committee in writing. In such cases, a copy of the proposed report shall be made available to each Committee member for at least 5 calendar days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) and the approval of a majority of the Committee is required. The Chairman shall promptly notify Committee members in writing of the approval or disapproval of the proposed report.

(c) Supplemental, minority, or additional views may be filed in accordance with clause 2(a)(5) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House. The time allowed for filing such views shall be 3 calendar days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) after approval of a proposed report in a meeting of the Committee or after the Chairman issues a notification of approval pursuant to paragraph (b).

(d) If hearings have been held on the subject matter of the proposed report, every reasonable effort shall be made to have such hearings available to the members of the Committee before seeking approval of the proposed report.

RULE 6. POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEE

(a) For the purpose of carrying out any of its functions and duties, the Committee is authorized to sit and act at such times and places within the United States, including any Commonwealth or possession thereof, or elsewhere, whether the House is in session, has recessed, or has adjourned.

(b)(1) The Committee may require, by subpena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memorandums, papers, documents, and other exhibits and materials, as it deems necessary.

(2) A subpena may be authorized and issued by the Committee in the conduct of any investigation or series of investigations or activities, only when authorized by a majority of the members voting, a majority being present.

(3) Notwithstanding subparagraph (b)(2) of this rule, a subpena may be authorized and issued in the conduct of any investigation of series of investigations or activities

by the Chairman upon the concurrence of the ranking minoirty member on the Committee.

(4) Authorized subpenas shall be signed by the Chairman or by any member designated by the Committee, and may be served by any person designated by the Chairman or such member.

(c) The Chairman, or any member of the Committee designated from time to time by him, shall report on the meetings, hearings or other activities of the Committee to any other committee of the House which has subject matter jurisdiction therein.

RULE 7. BROADCASTING

(a) Whenever any hearing or meeting conducted by the Committee is open to the public, the Committee may permit such hearing or meeting to be covered, in whole or in part, by television broadcast, radio broadcast, and still photography, or by any of such methods of coverage, under the rules established by paragraph (b) of this rule.

(b)(1) If television or radio coverage of any hearing or meeting of the Committee is to be presented to the public as live coverage, such coverage shall be conducted and presented without commercial sponsorship.

(2) No witness served with a subpena by the Committee shall be required against his or her will to be photographed at any hearing or meeting or to give evidence or testimony while the broadcasting of such hearing or meeting, by radio, or television, is being conducted. At the request of any such witness who does not wish to be subjected to radio, television, or still photography coverage, all lenses shall be covered and all microphones used for coverage turned off.

(3) Not more than 4 television cameras, operating from fixed positions, shall be permitted in a hearing or meeting room. The allocation among the television media of the positions of the number of television cameras shall be in accordance with fair and equitable procedures devised by the Executive Committee of the Radio and Television Correspondents' Galleries.

(4) Television cameras shall be placed so as not to obstruct in any way the space between any witness giving evidence or testimony and any member of the Committee, or the visibility of such witness and such members to each other.

(5) Television cameras shall not be placed in positions which obstruct unnecessarily the coverage of the hearing or meeting by other media.

(6) Equipment necessary for coverage by the television and radio media shall not be installed in, or removed from the hearing or meeting room while the Committee is in session.

(7) Floodlights, spotlights, strobelights, and flashguns shall not be used in providing any method of coverage of the hearing or meeting, except that the television media may install additional lighting in the hearing or meeting room, without cost to the Government, in order to raise the ambient lighting level in the hearing or meeting room to the lowest level necessary to provide adequate television coverage of the hearing or meeting at the then current state of the art of television coverage.

(8) Not more than 5 press photographers shall be permitted to cover a hearing or meeting by stlll photography. In the selection of such photographers, preference shall be given to photographers from Associated Press Photos and United Press International Newspictures. If request is made by more than 5 representatives of the media for coverage of the hearing or meeting by still photography, such coverage shall be made on the basis of a fair and equitable pool arrangement devised by the Standing Committee on Press Photographers.

(9) Photographers shall not position themselves at any time during the course of the hearing or meeting between the witness table and the members of the Committee.

(10) Photographers shall not place themselves in positions which obstruct unnecessarily the coverage of the hearing or meeting by other media.

(11) Personnel providing coverage by the television and radio media shall be then currently accredited to the Radio and Television Correspondents' Galleries.

(12) Personnel providing coverage by still photography shall be then currently accredited to the Press Photographers' Gallery.

(13) Personnel providing coverage by the television and radio media and by still photography shall conduct themselves and their coverage activities in an orderly and unobtrusive manner.

RULE 8. AMENDMENT OF RULES

The Rules of the Committee may be modified, amended, or repealed, by a majority of the members voting at a meeting at which a majority is present. Written notice

of any proposed change shall be provided to each member of the committee not less than 3 calendar days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal public holidays) before the meeting date on which such change is to be considered.

Committee Membership

The membership of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control is listed on page II of this report. The committee membership stands at 25 members pursuant to H. Res. 49, 98th Congress. This is an increase in membership on the Select Committee of 6 members over the size of the committee established under House Resolution 13 in the prior Congress. The increased membership in the 98th Congress was designed to broaden geographical representation on the Committee, increase participation of the standing committees, and to accommodate greater participation by members who served as ex officio members during the 97th Congress. As a result of the expanded membership, ex officio positions on the Select Committee were eliminated.

Committee Staff

The Select Committee's average staff level during 1984 consisted of 13 professional staff members and three staff assistants. In addition, the Drug Enforcement Administration detailed an employee to the committee for the 98th Congress to assist the Select Committee on long-term research projects. During the summer months student interns, at various times, joined the staff and assisted the Select Committee in its work. In addition an intern sponsored by the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation became associated with the staff during the summer and assisted the Select Committee in planning its hearing on "Drug Abuse in the Black Community". The Select Committee's printing and editorial needs were handled by two detailees from the Government Printing Office. A complete list of the present staff is listed on page II of this report.

Committee Meetings

The Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control met to transact business on March 6, 1984. At this meeting the membership met to discuss its agenda for 1984. In addition the Select Committee held a press conference on June 19, 1984 at which the committee released its report on the study missions to Latin America and Jamaica (August 6–21, 1984) and to Hawaii, Asia, and Italy (January 4–22, 1984).

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

INTRODUCTION

Throughout 1984 the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control continued its examination of Federal policies to reduce drug abuse and control drug trafficking. Drug abuse is one of the most persistent social problems confronting the United States today. The drug trafficking industry is a multi-billion-dollar-a-year business. This untaxed, underground economy spawns crime, violence, corruption, threatens legitimate business, diminishes industrial productivity and creates a serious drain on our national economy.

Drug abuse is emerging as America's predominant health problem. More than 20 million Americans use marijuana regularly, approximately 8–20 million are regular cocaine users, about 500,000 individuals are heroin addicts, 1 million are regular users of hallucinogens, and approximately 6 million people abuse prescription drugs (stimulants, sedatives, and tranquilizers). Drug use has escalated dramatically over the past two decades, particularly among young people, and remains at unacceptably high levels. It is believed that levels of drug use in the United States exceed those in any other industrialized nation in the world.

In September, 1984, the Reagan Administration issued the 1984 National Strategy for Prevention of Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking. This was the second strategy document issued during the first term of the Reagan Presidency. The first was issued in October, 1982. Both the 1982 and 1984 strategies describe international cooperation, drug law enforcement, education and prevention, detoxification and treatment, research, and drug abuse in the military as parts of a comprehensive, well-coordinated approach to attack drug abuse in America.

Because the 1984 strategy was released late in the year, the Select Committee did not have the opportunity to hold hearings on it before the Congress adjourned. However in reading the 1984 document, a change in emphasis is readily apparent. In prior strategy documents promulgated by the present and prior Administrations the various elements of the Federal narcotics strategy were of relatively equal importance. The new strategy, however, makes drug abuse prevention and education the foremost objective in our Nation's drug abuse control effort. The President himself has underscored this change in emphasis. In his remarks at the signing ceremony for "National Drug Abuse Education and Prevention Week" on September 21, 1984, Mr. Reagan said:

> With all due respect for Attorney General Smith and the Justice Department and all the others in our drug abuse program here, in the attempt to intercept and keep drugs from crossing our borders and coming into the country, I think we all know

that the real victory will only come not when we keep on trying—just trying to take the drug away from the customer—when we take the customers away from the drugs. And that's when we'll win this fight.

The Select Committee has no quarrel with the importance of drug abuse prevention and educational efforts. They are a vital, and important, part of our Nation's efforts to eliminate drug abuse. In fact, the Committee has been concerned for some time that drug abuse prevention and education is not a high budgetary priority in the Reagan Administration. However, the Select Committee strongly believes that all elements of the Federal drug strategy; prevention and education, law enforcement, international narcotics control, detoxification and treatment, research, and drug abuse in the military are of equal importance and must be so reflected in national programs and policies. Our efforts to control drug trafficking and drug abuse will only be successful if we obtain a firm handle on both illicit drug supplies and domestic consumption.

It is with the need for a balanced strategy in mind that we submit the following recommendations to the House of Representatives.

International Narcotics Control

During 1984 the traffic and abuse of narcotic drugs in the United States continued to increase significantly. The sale of narcotic and psychotropic drugs, it is estimated, will gross $110 billion in 1984 and has risen at about $10 billion annually since 1978. In addition to the human suffering, estimates of the social and economic cost of drug abuse, prevention, treatment, related crime, violence, death, destruction, lost productivity and drug enforcement will total $100 billion in 1984. The combination of drugs, crime and violence is considered the number one problem in America by most people.

The major drugs trafficked and abused in the United States continue to be the natural narcotics; heroin, cocaine and marijuana. Practically all of the heroin and cocaine is illicitly produced abroad in a handful of countries with the exception of some important quantities of cocaine and lesser quantities of heroin now being illicitly manufactured in the United States from coca and morphine base raw materials smuggled from the producer countries.

About 87 percent of the marijuana, all the hashish and significant quantities of psychotropic drugs entering the United States are also illicitly produced abroad by a few countries.

This situation exists, notwithstanding the fact that the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 obliges these countries to: (1) license and restrict the legal production, manufacture and distribution of narcotic drugs to medical and scientific purposes; (2) eradicate all unlicensed cultivation; (3) suppress illicit manufacture and traffic; and (4) cooperate with each other in achieving the aims of the convention.

Apologists for the narcotic producer countries state that the cause of the problem is the demand for drugs in what they term the consumer countries. They advocate reducing demand for drugs in the consumer countries as the only sensible solution. Demand reduction is generally pursued through drug abuse prevention and

treatment and involves educating and warning people of the dangers of experimentation with and use of narcotic and psychotropic drugs as well as treatment for the unfortunate victims.

The countries usually identified as consumers are the advanced industrial democracies where their affluence creates a market for all types of consumer goods including narcotics. Foreign traders have always sought these markets; it is understandable the drug traders would, that is where the fortunes are to be made.

Ironically, the consumption of narcotic drugs in producer countries exists at a very high rate and has been part of the countries' tradition for so many centuries, it tends to be overlooked. The heavy consumption of narcotic drugs in the producer countries is further proof that availability is the primary cause of abuse.

Actually, it has never been possible in the 75 years of drug control to demonstrate that measures aimed at reducing demand have ever succeeded. On the contrary, where supply and availability have been substantially curtailed or brought to an irreducible minimum, the so-called demand for drugs and drug abuse has dramatically declined.

The statesmen, doctors and scientists who initiated the movement to limit narcotic drugs to medical usage 75 years ago, based it on a principle which was as true then as it is today. It is, that unfortunately, wherever and whenever there is a ready availability of narcotic drugs in regular supply, there will always be in any population, a sufficient number of misguided individuals present to experiment, use and become dependent upon these substances.

Between 1912 and 1984, during periods of time when international cooperation has been able to control the production, manufacture and distribution of certain or all narcotic drugs through the control mechanisms established by the conventions, we have seen a collapse of drug abuse.

Plain common sense dictates that when drugs are available for abuse, prevention and treatment programs are imperative, but it cannot be demonstrated that they will ever bring about a meaningful reduction in drug abuse until availability is substantially, and over a reasonably long period of time, reduced to a minimum or eliminated.

The narcotic drugs trafficked and abused throughout most of the world originate in about 14 countries as illicit narcotic crops. All of them are parties to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 and have solemn obligations to eradicate that production and, if necessary, seek help in doing so from the United Nations or governments willing to assist. Eradication is the responsibility of the illegal producers; demand and use is created and sustained by their production, it is not the other way around.

The Department of State is responsible for ensuring that the U.S. Government implements its obligations under the international narcotic and psychotropic conventions, and that other governments comply with their obligations, particularly those where an illicit cultivation, manufacturing or trafficking problem may exist and may be affecting or threatening the United States.

Under the aegis of the State Department, financial and technical assistance was first provided to Mexico in 1959, to eradicate illicit opium poppy and marijuana cultivation; and to Turkey in 1968, to

assist that country in gradually eliminating gum opium production. In 1971, impressed by the success of the U.S. Government's bilateral narcotic assistance program to Turkey, the United Nation's Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) was established to assist the governments of countries where problems of illicit cultivation, manufacturing and trafficking existed, but which lacked the resources and technical skills to bring these situations under control as required by the narcotics control conventions. The UNFDAC, between 1971 and 1980 provided assistance at an average rate of $4 million annually for training, research, pilot projects, seed money for crop and income substitution programs, and drug abuse prevention and treatment. UNFDAC estimates it will expend about $8 million annually, from 1981 through the next five years, for similar programs of assistance.

Additionally, beginning in 1972, the U.S. Government formalized its narcotic control assistance program and established a special fund for that purpose. From 1972 through March 1983, $240 million have been expended. The United States narcotic control assistance programs provide a wide range of training and funding for research and developed programs in crop and income substitution, and drug abuse treatment and prevention. They also provide a wide range of narcotic enforcement support, including training, vehicles, aircraft, and communications equipment, to enhance illicit narcotic crop eradication and illicit traffic suppression and cooperation.

All of this technical and financial assistance has raised the competence and capability of the recipient countries to address the drug control problem existing in their territory. But with the exception of Mexico and Turkey, of the major narcotic producing countries, this assistance has failed to bring any meaningful and long-term reduction in the production and traffic of narcotic drugs affecting the United States and other victim countries worldwide. Regrettably, in most of the major producing countries, illicit narcotic production, manufacture and traffic has dramatically increased, such as in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Lebanon, Burma, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Jamaica and Belize, or stayed about the same as in Morocco, Thailand and Laos.

Unfortunately, even in Turkey and Mexico there are some deeply disquieting signs of retrogression in the effectiveness of the narcotic control systems our cooperative efforts brought about with those governments in the early and mid 1970's respectively.

Our failure in bringing under control illicit production and traffic of narcotics, which so tragically affects the United States, has been one of diplomacy. This failure has been due to our reluctance to make compliance with the narcotic obligations of the Single Convention by the traditional source countries, a sufficiently high priority in our relationship with them to cause the necessary corrective action to be taken. Not only have we failed to progress or hold a status quo, we have retrogressed enormously during the past six years. This retrogression will continue unless the United States in concert with our allies, all friendly countries, and the United Nations, comes to a mutual understanding with all the major illicit producer countries on the extent of their problem and what they are required to do under the Single Convention to bring it under

control, particularly the hard political realities of eliminating or eradicating, as necessary, the enormous and expanding illicit cultivation which creates and sustains the current worldwide drug problem. For our part, should the illicit producer countries prepare a plan and commit themselves to phase out their illicit production within a reasonable period of time, the United States, all the developed industrial countries, and the United Nations should be prepared to provide the financial and technical assistance needed to assist the illicit producers bring the problem under control. The actual cost of this, based on the experiences of Turkey and Mexico is modest and reasonable, even more so, when the reduction it brings in human suffering and enforcement and treatment costs are considered.

COCAINE

It is estimated that, at a minimum, 85 tons of cocaine will enter the United States in 1984, compared with 25 tons in 1980. An estimated 8 to 20 million people are now using cocaine in this country. A survey reported in TIME magazine, disclosed that 5,000 people in the United States try cocaine for the first time each day. A recent Ladies Home Journal survey of its readership reported that 32 percent of the 86,000 surveyed under age 25 reported trying cocaine. One out of every four cocaine users now commits crime to support their habit.

All of the estimated 85 tons of cocaine entering the United States in 1984 will originate as raw material or in its final form in Peru, Bolivia and Colombia. There is no commitment by any of these countries to reduce coca production to legal requirements to license and control that production and to phase out all other production, eradicating where necessary. Quite to the contrary, coca and cocaine production is still increasing in all three countries.

During 1984 disturbing evidence has turned up new coca production in Panama and Brazil and illicit cocaine manufacture there as well as in Argentina.

A startling new trend is the emergence of clandestine cocaine laboratories in the United States: Six in 1982; ten in 1983; fifteen through June 1984. Equally astonishing was the seizure of 1.25 metric tons of coca paste at Miami on August 22, 1984. Reports indicate there is so much coca paste available in Peru, Bolivia and Colombia that there are not enough technicians or facilities available to convert it to cocaine. Coca paste, since mid-1983, has been offered at cut-rate prices to operators in the United States for conversion to cocaine.

HEROIN

By mid-1972 through mid-1974 heroin addiction was dramatically curtailed with the demise of the French-Turkish connection. From mid-1974 through much of 1976, heroin supplies from Mexico increased, creating a rise in addiction.

The aerial spraying of poppy in Mexico by mid-1976 through 1979 brought about a decrease in the availability and abuse of heroin. By 1979 supplies from Southwest Asia, mostly Pakistan, erupted. Lesser quantities from Mexico and Southwest Asia remained

steady and a sharply escalating trend in the traffic and abuse of heroin has continued since then. Heroin-related hospital emergencies increased by 71 percent from 1979 to 1983 while heroin overdose deaths increased 93 percent from 701 in 1979 to 1,330 in 1983. Heroin-related purity rose from an average of 3.6 in 1979 to 5.2 in 1983 while the price per pure milligram decreased nationwide.

The National Narcotic Intelligence Consumer's Committee Report for 1983 reports the total quantity of heroin entering the United States in 1979 was 3.4 tons; whereas in 1983, 4.1 tons were brought in.

In effect we are led to believe that the dramatic indicators of a rising tide of heroin availability and addiction has been caused by an increase of imports of just 720 kilos spread over four years.

While data from 1983 and the first five months of 1984 have been released, we are told these same heroin availability and addiction indicators continue to rise. Simultaneously we are told that the level of heroin entering the country and the rate of addiction have stabilized at about 4 tons and 500,000 addicts.

It is not thought that four tons of heroin can support 500,000 heroin addicts annually, particularly when we know that in 1971, the peak year of the "French Connection," documentation indicates an estimated 14 tons of heroin entered the country to support 600,000 active addicts. Given the current high level availability of heroin in Pakistan, Mexico, and Thailand, it is believed, on the basis of 500,000 active addicts, that at least 10 tons of heroin have been entering the United States from 1981 through 1984, particularly in view of the explosive increase in the use of heroin in combination with cocaine.

About 50 percent of the heroin entering the United States originates in the Near East, South Asia region, mostly Pakistan, followed by Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey, Syria and Lebanon. The opiate raw material for this heroin originates in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, and also supplies a small heroin production in Sicily directed to the United States.

About 30 percent of the heroin affecting the United States originates in Mexico where, since late 1982, the quality and quantity of the heroin has increased sharply and this trend continues.

The remaining 20 percent of the heroin traffic comes from Thailand, Burma, Malaysia and Hong Kong, where is it produced from opiate raw materials originating in Burma, Thailand and possibly Laos.

DOMESTIC ILLICIT HEROIN MANUFACTURE

A dramatic development is the seizure, in the United States, of two heroin laboratories in 1983 and three in 1984 to date. Also the largest morphine base seizure ever made in the United States, 91 kilos occurred at Tucumcari, New Mexico, in June 1984 when a vehicle with a lone driver enroute from Lake Worth, Florida, to Las Vegas was apprehended by State Police. Morphine base is the primary raw material for the manufacture of heroin and this was the first significant seizure of this substance in the United States in 40 years. The individual arrested is involved in professional gambling and has been linked to an individual involved in the illicit manu-

facture of heroin at Marseilles prior to 1972, and subsequently at Milan, Italy, in recent years. The emergence of a clandestine cocaine and heroin manufacture capability in the United States is a deeply disturbing trend. Heretofore, traffickers found it safer and more cost effective to produce those drugs abroad.

MARIJUANA

The Select Committee for some time, on the basis of the information available to it, has had difficulty accepting the National Narcotics Intelligence Committee's estimate of marijuana availability and consumption in the United States which was last reported in July 1984 at 12,500 to 15,000 metric tons. For this reason the Committee has consistently reported that from 15,000 to 60,000 tons of marijuana have been entering the country annually and that at least 2,000 tons are produced domestically. On the basis of illicit marijuana production and trafficking data available in late 1984 it is estimated that 30,000 to 60,000 tons of marijuana is being smuggled to the United States annually. This is augmented by about 4,000 tons of domestic production as compared to about 700 tons in 1980.

About 70 percent of the marijuana entering the United States originates in Colombia; 15 percent in Mexico; 7 percent in Jamaica; 5 percent in Belize and 3 percent in all other foreign sources. Domestic production amounts to an additional 13 percent.

In 1980, only two States reported a significant marijuana cultivation problem; in 1981 it was 7; in 1982, 24; in 1983, 36 and in 1984, 48. Of the two States not reporting significant problems, both reported they had eradicated lower levels of marijuana cultivation.

It is estimated that 25 million people in the United States regularly use marijuana and as many as 40 million may be occasional users. The Ladies Home Journal survey reported that of the 86,000 readers contacted, 41 percent of the women under 25 indicated they are regular users of marijuana. Availability is at record levels nationwide as is the THC content of both the foreign and domestic product.

HASHISH

An estimated 200 tons of hashish, the compressed resin of the cannabis plant, is smuggled into the United States annually. From 1980 through 1982 the sources were estimated to be Lebanon, 45 percent; Pakistan, 40 percent; Morocco, 10 percent; all others including Jamaica, 5 percent. Beginning in 1983, largely because of the political turmoil in Lebanon, the hashish total reportedly fell to 150 tons and is estimated to remain at that level in 1984 with 60 percent originating in Pakistan; 30 percent in Lebanon; 5 percent in Morocco; and 5 percent from all other sources including Jamaica.

PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS

During 1984 in addition to the traffic and abuse of the three basic natural narcotic substances, cocaine, heroin and marijuana, there was a widespread and heavy illicit manufacture, traffic and

abuse in the United States of the psychotropics; PCP, methaqualone, amphetamine, methamphetamine and LSD. In 1983, it is estimated that 6.4 million people abused the various stimulants, depressants or hallucinogenic forms of the psychotropic substances.

In point of requiring hospital emergency treatment for users and reported deaths during the years 1980 through 1983, methaqualone proved the most dangerous in 1980 and 1981 while PCP was the leader in 1979, 1982 and 1983. Amphetamine, methamphetamine and LSD were recorded as third, fourth and fifth respectively from 1979 through 1983 in point of emergency treatment incidents and fatalities.

In recent years, as much as 90 percent of the methaqualone affecting the United States was smuggled from Colombia and to a lesser extent Mexico. It was clandestinely formulated in those countries from chemical precursers originating from legal stocks in the People's Republic of China and Hungary where the control mechanism was inadequate.

International cooperation during the period 1982–1983 with the People's Republic of China and Hungary caused those governments to strengthen their controls. This has dramatically curtailed the diversion and smuggling of methaqualone from abroad. In the United States, legal production was also ended entirely in 1984. The heavy abuse of this very dangerous drug has been substantially reduced due to its lack of availability worldwide. This is regarded as further evidence that when the availability of a drug of choice is substantially curtailed, abuse of it correspondingly declines.

Some methaqualone is also illicitly manufactured domestically. PCP, by all reports, is illicit domestic manufacture, as is the bulk of amphetamine and methamphetamine. However, the former is also illicitly produced in substantial quantities in Mexico for smuggling to the United States and the latter is occasionally smuggled in from Canada.

LSD is of illegal domestic manufacture and is also smuggled in from Western Europe. Although much less in volume, psilocybin, mescaline and liquid cannabis are illicitly manufactured, trafficked and abused in the United States. Liquid cannabis is also smuggled from the hashish producing countries. The total number of illicit psychotropic and narcotic laboratories seized in the United States amounted to 224 in 1982; 226 in 1983; and 130 through June 1984.

Diazepam is the most widely prescribed depressant tranquilizer used in medicine and is the most widely abused psychotropic substance. It is increasingly used as the primary ingredient in counterfeit methaqualone tablets.

An illicit traffic in diazepam as developed, supplied through overprescribing, diversion and smuggling from abroad. Surprisingly, Canada is the primary source of diazepam smuggled to the United States. There is no record of any clandestine diazepam laboratories being seized in this country. Diazepam ranks fifth among all abused controlled substances requiring emergency treatment. However, 72.8 percent of all diazepam mentions were in combination with other substances. For the year 1981 to 1983 inclusive, excluding New York City, deaths related to diazepam abuse averaged 275. However, 97.5 percent of those involved the use of diazepam in combination with other substances. In the New York metropolitan

area diazepam deaths average about 70 per year from 1981 through 1983.

The combining of alcohol with narcotics and psychotropic drugs as well as with other medicines and chemical substances during 1983 resulted in 25,751 hospital emergency treatments and 905 deaths. The most commonly encountered controlled substances found in combination with alcohol requiring emergency treatment were: (1) diazepam, 3,891; (2) barbiturates, 3,392; (3) marijuana, 2,520; and (4) heroin, 2,102. Deaths occurred as follows: (1) heroin, 358; (2) barbiturates, 321; (3) diazepam, 84; and (4) codeine, 80. Obviously combining any depressant substance with alcohol which is a depressant is far more lethal than combining alcohol with non-depressant substances.

1983 reported drug abuse deaths

1. Heroin	1,188
2. Diazepam	340
3. Cocaine	280
4. PCP	217
5. Barbiturates	124
6. Methamphetamine	60
7. Methaqualone	45
8. Amphetamine	44

1983 reported drug abuse hospital emergencies

1. Heroin	12,456
2. Cocaine	6,893
3. PCP	6,123
4. Marijuana	5,509
5. Diazepam	2,191
6. Methaqualone	1,988
7. Methamphetamine	1,860
8. Amphetamine	1,694
9. Barbiturates	1,443

A table showing the numbers of narcotic and psychotropic laboratories seized domestically from 1981 through June 1984 is listed below:

DOMESTIC ILLICIT NARCOTIC AND PSYCHOTROPIC DRUG LABORATORY SEIZURES

	1981	1982	1983	June 1984
Drug type:				
Methamphetamine	89	132	122	79
PCP	35	47	47	8
Amphetamine	14	18	25	10
Methaqualone	13	7	11	3
PCE	0	1	1	1
P2P	0	6	7	5
PHP	0	0	2	0
DMT	0	1	1	0
MDA	0	3	5	0
Psilocybin	0	0	2	1
LSD	4	0	0	0
Mescaline	1	2	0	0
Cocaine	5	6	10	15
Heroin	0	0	2	3
Methadone	0	1	1	0
Hashish oil	0	0	4	1
Other hallucinogens	10	0	0	0

DOMESTIC ILLICIT NARCOTIC AND PSYCHOTROPIC DRUG LABORATORY SEIZURES—Continued

	1981	1982	1983	June 1984
All others	12	0	0	0
Total	184	224	226	130

RECOMMENDED INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES

Effective action, in relatively few countries, against the production and traffic of opium, heroin, coca, cocaine, marijuana and hashish would have a great impact on the drug abuse problem in the United States by dramatically curtailing supplies available to users and potential users, necessarily reducing the addictive and other social problems associated with drug abuse.

It is true that determined drug abusers could switch to other illegal substances like domestically manufactured pills, but we have the capability on our own to effectively suppress that illicit manufacture and traffic. If only the heroin, cocaine and cannabis traffic from abroad could be cut substantially; the gain to the Nation and to millions of potential victims would be incalculable.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Peru

Coca leaf produced in Peru is the raw material responsible for about 45 percent of the cocaine entering the United States; of that cocaine, about 15 percent is illicitly produced in Peru.

In Peru, for almost six years, the government has been proposing to initiate crop substitution programs and enforce its prohibition against the illicit cultivation of coca carried out in six different sectors of the country. Because of the enormous increases of coca production in the Upper Huallaga Valley and because significant production in that area was not traditional, as it has been in the other five areas, the Upper Huallaga was singled out as the area to commence crop substitution and begin eradication of illicit cultivation.

However, to date, notwithstanding the fact that the United States has made available $15 million in law enforcement assistance for a coca control and eradication program known as "CORAH," Peru has failed to commence the eradication program it proposed to implement in 1981.

Beginning in mid-1983 and to date, an experimental coca eradication program cut down about 1,600 hectares of aged coca bushes no longer providing worthwhile yields. Simultaneously about 6,000 hectares of new coca bushes were planted in the Upper Huallaga where production is conservatively estimated to total about 25,000 hectares.

An agricultural development project, known as "PEAH," also funded in 1981 by the United States, in the amount of $18 million, designed to provide agricultural research and extension help to increase opportunities for transition of growers to other crops, has not gotten beyond its initial experimental phase.

A series of guerrilla attacks in the Upper Huallaga has shut down the U.S. supported Peruvian crop substitution and coca eradication effort.

On the evening of April 18, 1984, the Mayor of Tingo Maria in the heart of the Upper Huallaga Valley was shot to death by two men in front of his house. He was the President of the Coca Growers Association and his death has been reported as directly related to the production and traffic of coca. That same evening, a group of about 70 armed men attacked the "PEAH" zonal office in the town of La Morada, about 25 miles northeast of Aucayacu where the "PEAH" headquarters is located on the west side of the Huallaga River. The facilities at La Morada along with a project financed tractor, farm implements, trail motorcycles, and other U.S. AID financed equipment were dynamited and destroyed. Fortunately no project personnel were there at the time of the attack.

The same groups then attacked three rice farms near La Morada that were working with "PEAH" as demonstration farms and destroyed a pickup truck and other equipment. One farmer watched the attack while hiding in the brush nearby.

A different group attacked the "PEAH" extension facilities at Pucayacu, also on the evening of April 18, and destroyed the facilities and other equipment. Pucayacu is about 18 miles north of Aucayacu on the east bank of the Huallaga River. No one was hurt since the personnel had returned to Aucayacu in the afternoon regarding it as too dangerous to remain at Pucayacu overnight.

Over the weekend of November 17, 1984, a band of about 50 narcotic traffickers armed with submachine guns raided a "PEAH" crop substitution facility at Monzon about 40 miles from Tingo Maria and murdered 19 Peruvian agricultural technicians.

It is difficult to know whether "narco-terrorists," a name given to hard-line armed illicit coca growers and traffickers defending their activity against government intervention, are responsible, or whether the Shining Path guerrillas have moved into the Upper Huallaga to recruit the "narco-terrorists" as allies. The hard fact on the production and traffic of coca and cocaine in Peru is that in five coca growing sectors of the country, no commitment has been negotiated nor has anything been done to control the massive and increasing illegal production of coca and cocaine.

In the sixth section, the Upper Huallaga Valley, a commitment was made over six years ago to phase out coca production, $33 million was allocated in crop substitution and law enforcement support, and now even before a start has been made, the program is shut down and the problem of the production and traffic of coca and cocaine continues to increase throughout Peru.

Recommendations

1. The constantly increasing illicit production and traffic of coca, coca paste and cocaine is steadily undermining the ability of democracy to survive in Peru. A realistic recognition of the depth of this problem and a broader, more comprehensive program of support and assistance by the United States is needed both to bring the production and traffic of coca and cocaine under control and to save democracy.

2. The Department of State should organize a small expert committee that would cooperate with a counterpart group organized by the Government of Peru. The joint expert committee should seek to accomplish the following:

In accordance with the provisions of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, Peru should without delay prepare a plan that will—

A. Establish the quantity of coca leaf that is required to meet its own current coca leaf chewing needs and those of the international pharmaceutical and flavoring extract markets.

B. Establish the hectares needed to produce these legal coca requirements and then limit licenses to the number of growers necessary to cultivate the number of hectares that are needed.

C. Progressivly eliminate all other production of coca by the voluntary compliance of growers or by eradication, if necessary, as soon as possible.

D. As soon as the quantity of coca necessary for chewing, legal pharmaceutical, and flavoring purposes is established, the Government of Peru should initiate a program to progressively eliminate the practice of coca leaf chewing by December 1989 as required by Article 44 of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961. Coca leaf produced for chewing could then be commensurately reduced as required by the Convention.

The fact that Peru did not face up to its obligation to phase out coca leaf chewing beginning in 1964, but continued to produce large quantities of coca to sustain this harmful public health problem, is the genesis of the current uncontrolled production and traffic of coca in Peru. Now the practice of coca leaf chewing has to be phased out, not only for the health and welfare of the pitiful users of coca, but also to reduce coca leaf production to lessen the risk of its diversion to the illicit traffic of coca ostensibly produced for chewing.

It should be noted that all countries that ratified the Single Convention, and which had at the time permitted: (1) the quasi-medical use (eating) of opium; or (2) opium smoking; or (3) the use of cannabis for non-medical purposes, have under Article 40 ended those practices.

3. At such time as the Government of Peru proposes and commits itself to a plan which provides for reducing the licensed cultivation of coca to a level commensurate with legal requirements and which also provides for the progressive elimination of illicit coca cultivation within a resonable period of time, the U.S. Government should commit itself to providing the financial and technical assistance that may be required by Peru, in the fields of agricultural development, administration and law enforcement, to limit coca production and traffic of coca, coca paste and cocaine.

4. On the basis of the Peruvian commitment and program to bring the coca problem under control, the U.S. Government should urge other American states, which are seriously victimized by coca production in Peru, such as Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Chile, to assist Peru along with the United States to the extent their financial resources will permit. The Western European countries, which have also become victims of this problem, should also be urged to join in this assistance to Peru. The narcotic control

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organs of the United Nations and the World Health Organization can also provide valuable technical assistance support to Peru to enable it to bring its coca production and use problem under control in compliance with its obligations to the Single Convention.

Further delay and continued failure to control coca by Peru will bring an increasing illicit production and traffic of coca and cocaine in the country. This will, on a worldwide basis, increase the availability of cocaine, lower the price and spread the use of the substance.

On the other hand, by addressing the problem, Peru will improve the health of its people, bring stability to the countryside and create an environment for agricultural and industrial development and progress, supported by foreign assistance and international corporate investment.

5. If the Government of Peru continues its failure to prepare and implement a plan to reduce the licensed production of coca to legal requirements and ensure effective control of that production and the progressive elimination of the illicit cultivation of coca within a reasonable period of time, a decision would have to be made as to why the provisions recently amended to Section 1003(a), Section 481(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 USC 2291(a)) by Senator Hawkins and Representatives Zablocki, Rangel, and Gilman, pertaining to the suspension of assistance for failure to progressively eliminate the illicit production of narcotic crops, should not be implemented.

Bolivia

The problem of the illicit production of coca leaf in seven large sectors of Bolivia, its clandestine conversion to coca paste and a portion of the latter to cocaine continues to expand at a rate of 10 to 30 percent annually. Coca production in Bolivia may be responsible for 40 percent of the international cocaine traffic. The illicit production and traffic of coca and cocaine under the aegis of ruthless and greedy drug traffickers are dominating the life of the country and undermining the ability of democracy to survive. The U.S. Government must find a way to assist the Government of Bolivia find its way out of the nightmare of coca and cocaine production.

The Government of Bolivia signed four project agreements on August 11, 1983, with the United States. Bolivia committed itself to initiate a program in the Chapare region to gradually reduce coca production to what is required for legitimate purposes and to phase out and eradicate as necessary all other cultivation.

About $7.5 million was allocated by the United States for the agricultural and law enforcement support of this program. Nothing in the way of implementation was carried out for one year. Finally, over the weekend of August 11, the Bolivian Government moved 310 policemen and 1,200 men of their Army, Navy and Marines in to occupy the Chapare region under orders to implement a full range of suppression actively against illicit coca and cocaine production and traffic. As of this writing, no coca eradication has taken place in the Chapare, where coca and cocaine production continues to increase as it does in the six other regions of Bolivia.

However, two large cocaine laboratories, 860 kilos of coca paste and 40 kilos of cocaine, were seized and several important arrests made in the Beni region to the north of the Chapare during the week of August 20.

Recommendations

1. The Department of State should organize a small expert committee that would cooperate with a counterpart group organized by the Government of Bolivia to establish the quantity of coca leaf required annually by Bolivia for its legal chewing, pharmaceutical, and flavoring extract market. The joint committee would then prepare a comprehensive plan, to eliminate as soon as possible, throughout the country, all other coca not required for legal purposes.

2. The Committee could then begin developing appropriate programs to gradually eliminate coca chewing in Bolivia by December 1989 in accordance with the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961. This is a subject which apparently no one in Bolivia wishes to discuss. As in Peru, it is the root of the disaster which is now upon us. Coca leaf production, ostensibly carried out to supply the so-called harmless chewing of the leaf, began supplying the illicit traffic 25 years ago. While the chewing consumption was stable, more and more was grown, ostensibly for chewing, but actually to supply illicit manufacturing and trafficking markets.

The chewing of coca leaf is a primitive, antiquated, debilitating practice, harmful to the individual and the public health and has considerable genocidal overtones. It is time this practice be addressed, particularly in Peru and Bolivia.

Colombia

About 75 percent of the cocaine entering the United States is clandestinely manufactured in Colombia from coca paste smuggled from Peru and Bolivia where it is converted from coca leaves produced in these countries. Since 1981, Colombia has brought on line its own coca leaf and coca paste industry to augment the raw material supply from Peru and Bolivia. It is estimated that Peru and Bolivia each supply about 45 percent of the total coca paste processed in Colombia, with the remaining 10 percent now coming from domestic coca leaf production.

The clandestine production of marijuana in Colombia is also responsible for about 70 percent of the marijuana entering the United States.

Following the assassination of Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, Colombia, beginning in March 1984, finally mounted an aggressive campaign that seized 47 cocaine laboratories, and about 14 tons of cocaine and coca paste, resulting in 1,425 arrests through August 1, 1984. Most arrestees have been released due to insufficient evidence, a chronic problem of Colombian drug enforcement. The continuing inability or unwillingness of the Colombian Government to effectively prosecute the vast majority of illicit cocaine manufacturers and traffickers whom they arrest in flagrant violation of their narcotic laws is discouraging.

No commitment has been received from Colombia to eradicate the illicit production of marijuana and coca leaf. There has been a token program to manually eradicate marijuana for a number of years, but it has been inadequate and production has continued to increase.

During 1984 Colombian authorities report that, of the 44,000 hectares of marijuana cultivated, about 1,500 hectares were destroyed manually. During July the Colombian Government began testing the aerial spraying of marijuana with the herbicidal glyphosate. This was followed by an operational program where about 3,000 hectares were eradicated before the 1984 crop was harvested.

Prior to 1980 significant coca production did not exist in Colombia, but by then Colombian criminal organizations had developed and rapidly expanded coca leaf production in the southern departments of Cauca, Putumayo and Narino and the eastern plains departments of Meta and Vaupes. As with marijuana cultivation, a token manual eradication program has been carried out which has been ineffective and coca leaf production continues to expand in Colombia and is now thought to total about 20 thousand hectares compared to 15,900 hectares in 1983. The State Department is assisting the Colombian authorities find a herbicide which will be effective in eradicating coca without causing adverse environmental effects. These efforts have been underway since 1982 and it is disappointing that, given the advanced state of herbicide technology, a suitable chemical cannot be agreed upon, particularly when coca cultivation in Colombia is increasing at about 25 percent annually.

What is of concern is that over the seven-month period that the reported increased enforcement activity has taken place in Colombia, there has been no diminution in the availability of cocaine and marijuana on our streets. Further, there has been no sign of any decrease in the smuggling of cocaine and marijuana to the United States from Colombia.

The failure of the Colombian Government to close down the clandestine airfields and docking sites used to load aircraft and vessels particularly along the north coast with marijuana and cocaine for smuggling to the United States, is most disappointing. This activity, if anything, seems to be tolerated by the Government of Colombia. It has never been seriously addressed, yet it is a choke point where aggressive enforcement could dramatically curtail drug smuggling to the United States.

Given the quantities of cocaine and coca paste and the number of laboratory facilities that have been reported seized, it is very difficult to understand how the cocaine being smuggled from Colombia to the United States is undiminished if it is not in fact continuing to increase. We also note that during this same period, seizures of cocaine coming from Colombia, have been of record high levels in West European countries.

It is thought that until such time as the uncontrolled production of the coca leaf in Peru, Bolivia and Colombia is brought under control, we are not likely to see any decrease in the illicit manufacture and traffic of cocaine directed to the United States.

Past experience indicates that only by substantially eliminating narcotic raw materials have we been successful in dramatically, and over the long term, reducing the availability of heroin and co-

caine. Unfortunately, in Peru, Bolivia and Colombia, coca leaf production is still increasing and there is no structured program in any of the three to progressively eliminate it.

On November 14, following the announcement by President Betancur of his granting the request of the United States for the extradition of six major Colombian cocaine traffickers, a threat was made to the American Embassy that for every Colombian extradited, five Americans would be executed. While no traffickers have been extradited yet, on November 26, a car loaded with a powerful bomb was exploded in front of the American Embassy at Bogota killing a Colombian woman and wounding eight people.

When the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control met with President Belisario Betancur on August 16, 1983, in the course of their study mission to Colombia, he made the point that "while agreements to cooperate already existed, they needed to be improved upon and our cooperative efforts speeded up." He said, "the Government of Colombia has no issue with a foreign country more important than this." President Betancur also said that when he met with President Reagan in December 1982, they had agreed that the drug problem is serious and that it must be attacked at the root and that they had asked Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Lloreda to work out a comprehensive, full plan of attack. This has not been done. The Select Committee supports this proposal and has been urging that "the United States in its narcotic control assistance to the Government of Colombia must develop an orderly, comprehensive approach to identify with that government what is needed to be jointly accomplished and how to go about doing it." This has been lacking in U.S. Government narcotic control assistance to Colombia which goes back more than ten years, yet during that period of time and to date the drug problem has gotten progressively worse.

Recommendation

1. To implement the wishes of Presidents Reagan and Betancur for the development of a full and comprehensive plan to bring the illicit production and traffic of marijuana, coca and cocaine under control in Colombia, the State Department should organize a small expert committee that would cooperate with a counterpart group organized by the Government of Colombia.

The joint committee of experts would assist Colombia to find a way to develop a comprehensive program that would enable it to eradicate the illicit cultivation of marijuana and coca; to curtail the smuggling of coca paste and base from Bolivia and Peru; to effectively detect and seize the illicit processing facilities used to produce coca paste, cocaine and methaqualone; to suppress the internal and export traffic of these substances; to immobilize the clandestine docking sites and airstrips in the northcoast region used to load vessels and aircraft smuggling marijuana and cocaine internationally; to expand and intensify its ability to arrest, convict, and incarcerate drug traffickers, particularly the major violators and financiers; and to cooperate more effectively with the narcotic enforcement agencies abroad of countries being affected by drug smuggling from Colombia.

Mexico

There is agreement both in Mexico and the United States that the availability of Mexican heroin has increased noticeably since late 1982. The quality of this heroin in the way of purity and texture is also reported to have been improved. Increases in the quantity and quality of Mexican heroin have to be taken as indications of an increase in illicit opium production and heroin manufacture in Mexico.

Estimates of the percentage of heroin supplied to the United States from Mexico from 1979 through 1984 fall between 30 and 40 percent. This is a period of time when all indicators point to an upswing in overall heroin availability, largely due to increasing supplies from Southwest Asia, particularly Pakistan. It should be noted Mexico has maintained its 30 or 40 percent share of a steadily expanding volume of heroin into the United States since 1979.

Following progressive annual increases in poppy eradication from 1976 through 1978, this leveled off in 1979. From that point on it is thought the Government of Mexico had not been able to increase the percentage of the opium crop eradicated. There is evidence that from 1979, opium production in Mexico, has on an annual basis, increased gradually as growers moved to widely dispersed small plots.

Mexico's domination of the marijuana market in the United States from the early 1930's through the mid-1960's was at least 95 percent. Up until the mid-1960's, marijuana smuggling from Jamaica had been insignificant, but from that point on, held to a 5 to 10 percent share of the United States market. Beginning in the early 1970's, Colombia became a new source.

Beginning in late 1975, the Mexican Government began using helicopters to spray marijuana cultivation with the herbicide, "Paraquat." By mid 1976, a sharp decline in the volume and percentage of the market share of Mexican marijuana became evident. By 1981 Mexico's share of the illicit marijuana traffic to the United States dropped to about four percent. In 1982 it increased to six percent, in 1983 to eleven percent and in 1984 to fifteen percent.

Recommendations

1. In the course of its Study Mission to Mexico in August 1983, the Select Committee learned that the growers of poppy for opium were dispersing their fields and decreasing the size of the plots to evade detection. Marijuana growers were reported to be moving their cultivation to new areas outside the range of the Mexican Government's aerial patrols to detect and eradicate it.

The Committee was concerned with those developments and recommended that the Department of State assist the Government of Mexico develop, as soon as possible, the capability to survey the extent of opium and marijuana production in its territory via high altitude aircraft or satellite. This would be for the purpose of detecting and pinpointing cultivation for eradication, verification of destruction and measuring whether production is increasing or decreasing annually, and how much may be actually produced. The Committee reaffirms this recommendation.

2. The Committee also recommended that the Department of State should determine as soon as possible whether the number of helicopters, particularly the 33 Bell 206 helicopters used for eradication, are sufficient in number to progressively eliminate on an annual basis a greater percentage of the opium poppy crop. It is recognized that through an effective aerial survey of production they could better identify poppy fields, and that would make for a more effective utilization of the eradication aircraft. However, it just might be that more Bell 206's are needed to increase eradication effectiveness, and a determination on this should be made. The Committee reaffirms this recommendation.

Concern with the possibility of large-scale production of marijuana outside the normal aerial detection range proved well founded when during late November 1984, Mexican authorities, with the assistance of DEA, detected and seized about 10,000 tons of marijuana on five plantations in the northern state of Chihuahua. Investigation indicates that this marijuana was scheduled for smuggling across the United States border in large over-the-road trucks. The vast quantities of marijuana seized and the sophistication of the operation made it clear that Mexican marijuana production has kept pace with the increasing opium and heroin production that became evident in 1982.

The 10,000 tons seized in this operation are seven times greater than the 1,300 tons of marijuana the National Narcotics Intelligence Committee estimated entered the U.S. from Mexico in 1983 and only 5,000 tons less than the total 15,000 tons of marijuana it estimated entered the country from all sources.

The raids in Chihuahua, in November 1984, clearly demonstrate the need for a continuing capability on the part of the Government of Mexico to have an effective aerial detection and eradication capability for opium poppy and marijuana and that the U.S. Government assist the Government of Mexico in fully developing and maintaining the system.

3. The narcotic enforcement cooperation extended to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) by the Mexican Federal Judicial Police (MFJP) during the last 18 months of the Lopez Portillo administration was ineffective. This is a situation that should not have been permitted to exist more than a few weeks, let alone a year and a half.

It does not appear to be a coincidence that during the period of time when there was a breakdown in cooperation between the MFJP and DEA that a marked increase in the availability of Mexican heroin and marijuana developed in the United States. Cooperation between MFJP and DEA is reported to have returned to normal following the inauguration of the de la Madrid administration.

There is a vital need to increase and intensify productive narcotic enforcement cooperation between the MFJP and DEA and that the program of joint prosecutions known as "Janus", which has atrophied, be revitalized. Cases that can be prosecuted should be and cases that can no longer be prosecuted should be closed out. Further a series of new joint prosecutions or "Janus" cases should be initiated to exploit existing evidence that could be used to pros-

ecute and convict major suppliers, heroin laboratory operators and the financial bankers of the traffic in both countries.

4. In Mexico it is not enough for the government to just eradicate the opium and marijuana crops. A vigorous joint narcotic enforcement effort by the MFJP assisted by DEA is needed to develop important heroin arrests and seizures in the traffic directed toward the United States. Clandestine heroin laboratories should be confiscated on a regular basis. The MFJP and DEA should also work together to prevent international traffickers from using Mexico as a transit base to smuggle heroin of European and Asiatic origin, cocaine and psychotropic drugs to the United States because of the ease with which they can penetrate the United States 2,000-mile border with Mexico.

Jamaica

It is estimated that 2,000 to 4,500 metric tons of marijuana are being smuggled to the United States annually from Jamaica. Additionally about two metric tons of hashish (the resin of the marijuana plant) are smuggled to the United States as well as about 1.6 metric tons of high potency hashish oil.

Jamaica is also an important transit point for cocaine smuggling from Colombia. The Government provides reasonably good law enforcement cooperation to U.S. drug enforcement authorities in the development of narcotic investigations of mutual interest. However, Jamaica has for internal political reasons been sporadic in eradicating illicit marijuana cultivation and seizing marijuana being trafficked. It has also not been effective in closing down clandestine airstrips and smuggling vessel loading sites.

Recommendations

1. The Government of Jamaica must prepare and begin implementation of a plan that progressively eliminates the illicit cultivation of marijuana while simultaneously intensifying drug enforcement and smuggling preventive measures. Expanded operational activity with the U.S. drug enforcement agencies could substantially immobilize air and sea smuggling from Jamaica as marijuana production is gradually phased out.

2. Jamaica has been a party to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 since it ratified the treaty in 1962. The Government of Jamaica for over 22 years has been well aware of its obligation under the Convention to prevent the illicit cultivation and traffic of marijuana in its territory.

The Government of Jamaica has expressed its determination to eliminate the illicit production and traffic of marijuana and prevent the country from being used as a transit country for the smuggling of cocaine and other narcotics to the United States and other countries.

Jamaica is now on the threshold of a new era of agricultural and economic development under the Caribbean Basin Initiative.

Because of the relatively compact size of this island nation and the positive attitude of its government, it is thought that a single program of assistance be developed that would address as one, the

three inter-related problems of agricultural and economic development, and narcotic control.

This recognizes that any assistance for agricultural and economic development risks failure without the production and traffic of narcotics being brought under control. Correspondingly, agricultural and economic development will greatly enhance the achievement of lasting narcotic control.

Belize

Within the past three years the Central American nation of Belize has emerged as a new producer of high grade marijuana for export to the United States and as a transit point for the smuggling of cocaine. If the U.S. Government moves with dispatch and skill, it is still not too late working with the Belizean authorities to bring these new problems of marijuana and cocaine smuggling from that country under control. Lack of an effective response by the United States will only result in Belize becoming an increasingly serious drug production and trafficking threat to the United States. As much as 3,500 metric tons of marijuana may be smuggled from Belize to the United States in 1984.

Recommendation

1. The State Department must increase and intensify its cooperative efforts with the Government of Belize to eradicate illicit marijuana cultivation and to prevent that country from becoming an important transit point in the cocaine traffic.

The Bahamas

As the volume of smuggling of cocaine and marijuana by aircraft and motherships from Colombia and Jamaica to Florida has increased, so has the utilization of the Bahamas archipelago increased as a springboard for its introduction to the United States. In the island chain, airdrops or aircraft and mothership unloadings are made for transfer to high speed boats and light aircraft that will make the final run swiftly into a Florida docking site or remote airstrip or airdrop site.

Recommendation

1. Some courageous drug enforcement and interdiction operations are successfully concluded in this never ending traffic. The resources arrayed against the massive air and sea smuggling of marijuana and cocaine into Florida is too little to have any meaningful impact. The Bahamas could be the subject of an air and sea blockade in concert with the Bahamian authorities but this would entail an enormous expense over a long period of time. Smuggling from the Bahamas will only be effectively curtailed when the uncontrolled production of marijuana in Jamaica and Colombia is ended and when coca leaf production is similarly curtailed in Peru, Bolivia and Colombia.

Classic narcotic control doctrine dictates ending the uncontrolled production of coca and cannabis at the source rather than attempting to mount an interdiction effort in a chain of islands as the most practical solution. On the other hand, total cooperative joint oper-

ations with the Government of the Bahamas could provide a substantial reduction in this traffic while steps are being taken to end illicit marijuana production in Jamaica and Colombia and coca production in Peru, Bolivia and Colombia.

Argentina

Argentina is a country of high level technical skills and industrial capacity. It has the capability of either manufacturing or importing all the chemicals needed for the illicit manufacture of cocaine. Illicit traffickers, particularly in Bolivia, have been drawing on the chemical resources in Argentina. There are indicators also as of 1984 that the limited number of cocaine hydrochloride laboratories that have existed in Argentina are now expanding. This is to take advantage of the glut of coca paste flooding the market from Peru, Bolivia and Colombia.

Argentina poses a lesson to experts who advocate concentrating or disrupting illicit cocaine production in lieu of eradicating coca. Should their efforts be successful in Peru, Bolivia and Colombia, illicit cocaine hydrochloride manufacture will shift to countries such as Argentina. Nothing but the eradication of the coca leaf in the producer countries is going to provide a substantial and long term reduction of the illicit manufacture and traffic of cocaine.

Recommendation

1. Full support should be given to the Argentine authorities in their efforts to suppress illicit cocaine manufacture and traffic in their country which poses a serious threat to the United States and the international community.

Brazil

Brazil like Argentina has the technical skills and industrial capacity to very easily become a center for the illicit manufacture of cocaine. It has a common border with the three major coca and cocaine producing countries, Peru, Bolivia and Colombia. Common coca leaf, coca paste and cocaine trafficking activity transpires among Peruvian, Colombian and Brazilian traffickers at Leticia which is an airport and river port hub on the headwaters of the Amazon and where the three countries come together. Should the uncontrolled production of coca continue in Peru, Bolivia and Colombia, it is only a matter of time until Brazil becoms a major manufacturing and international distribution center for cocaine. Brazil also poses a threat as a major marijuana producer, but authorities are addressing that. Additionally, the Brazilian authorities are confronted with evidence of a start up of coca production in remote undeveloped sectors of the country.

Recommendation

1. The U.S. Government must work with Brazil to enlist its support in convincing the governments of Peru, Bolivia and Colombia to eradicate the illicit production of coca and assist Brazil in preventing significant production of marijuana and coca in that country.

Costa Rica

Costa Rica must continue to be monitored as a potential significant marijuana source for the United States. Simultaneously it also has the potential for a role as a cocaine transit point in the traffic between Peru, Bolivia and Colombia and the United States.

Recommendation

1. The good cooperation that exists between the U.S. and Costa Rican drug law enforcement agencies should continue to be developed and improved upon.

Ecuador

Ecuador has been used as a transit center for the smuggling of coca paste from Peru to Colombia and for the smuggling of cocaine illicitly produced in Peru or Ecuador itself to the United States and other international targeted markets. The inability of governments to effectively respond to the increasing production and traffic of coca and cocaine is making this activity more attractive and the small coca leaf and cocaine production in Ecuador is reported to be expanding.

Recommendation

1. As long as the uncontrolled production of coca, coca paste and cocaine continues in Peru, Bolivia and Colombia, Ecuador will pose a threat to the United States as a potentially significant producer and/or transit center for coca, coca paste and cocaine. The U.S. Government must exercise constant vigilance with reference to the potential threat from Ecuador and press for the eradication of illicit coca in Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Colombia to prevent a major illicit manufacturing and trafficking problem from developing in Ecuador.

Panama

Panama because of its geographic position on both the air and sea routes from South America to North America, and its free port facilities has historically been a hub for contraband smuggling including narcotics. Numerous major cocaine seizures made in the United States over the years including a recent seizure of 1.2 metric tons have transited Panama. Reports are received of cocaine laboratories operating in Panama in recent years and a large facility was seized in Darien Province this year. Panama also serves as a conduit for chemical materials to Colombia for cocaine production.

In July 1984, the Panamanian authorities detected and destroyed a large plantation of coca in a remote jungle area of Darien Province adjacent to the border with Colombia.

Recommendations

1. Panama is another country with the potential to increase its role as a transit center for South American cocaine and as an illicit manufacturer of cocaine and grower of coca. The United States must exercise constant vigilance in this regard. Panama as a narcotic threat to the United States will only abate when the uncon-

trolled production and traffic of coca and cocaine in South America is brought under control.

2. Lastly, the United States must intensify its negotiations with the Government of Panama for the latter to take the necessary legal and regulatory measures that would prevent Panamanian banking institutions from being used as a financial safe haven for international drug traffickers.

Venezuela

Venezuela has long been known for its effective Police and Customs services in narcotic enforcement. To date, notwithstanding the fact that it shares a large frontier with Colombia bordering on the major marijuana producing area of the latter country, Venezuela has prevented its territory from being used for transit or illicit production and traffic spilling over.

Recommendation

1. The Venezuelan authorities should remain alert to their vulnerability and cooperate actively in narcotic enforcement with the United States and all interested governments. Hopefully Venezuela will continue to be able to prevent its territory from being used for the illicit production, manufacture and transit traffic of coca, cocaine and marijuana. Venezuela provides an excellent example of how a serious, determined and effective drug enforcement program can be successful.

SOUTH ASIA

Pakistan

The Government of Pakistan in compliance with the requirements of the Single Convention of Narcotic Drugs of 1961, prohibited the production of opium in 1979. However, while it substantially reduced opium production it has permitted it to continue in tribal areas of the country for political reasons. In December 1983 the Government of Pakistan also announced as of that time the national narcotic control laws would be applied in the tribal areas. This was directed specifically at the enormous illicit manufacture and traffic of heroin originating in the area from opium of Pakistani and Afghan origin.

Five years have elapsed since Pakistan banned the production of opium in its territory. Substantial quantities still continue to be produced. This Committee is in receipt of reliable information that opium production in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) agencies where it has been permitted to continue: Khyber, Okakzai, Kurram and South Wazirstan has increased to fill the void created where opium production was ended gradually since 1980.

Recommendations

1. It is time the Government of Pakistan prepare a comprehensive plan for presentation to international donors that will schedule the progressive elimination of opium cultivation providing a

final termination date, which will be accomplished on an annual basis and what international assistance might be required.

2. Pakistan must begin implementation of their national narcotic laws in the FATA to effectively suppress the illicit manufacture and traffic of heroin taking place in that territory, particularly around Landi Kotal and the Khyber Agency.

3. The Committee urges the Government of Pakistan to increase and intensify its narcotic enforcement cooperation with its neighbor, Afghanistan, to enhance efforts to suppress the heavy smuggling of opium and opiates from the latter into Pakistan. A similar cooperative enforcement program should be pursued with the Government of Iran to prevent the movement of opium and opiates from Pakistan into Iran. As all three countries are party to the Single Convention, all have regularly participated in the work of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, and, along with Turkey and Sweden, are members of the Subcommission of Illicit Drug Traffic and Related Matters in the Near and Middle East, thus the mechanism for assisting each other in campaigns against the illicit traffic is well established.

4. There is serious concern with the continuing traffic of hashish directed at the United States, estimated to average about 200 tons annually. Investigation indicates that about 60 percent, or 120 tons, originate each year in Pakistan which has surpassed Lebanon as the leading source. Notwithstanding the re-emphasis against the illicit production of hashish in Pakistan in 1979 by the Hadd Ordinance, substantial production continues to exist. Pakistan must take the necessary steps to eradicate this production and intensify its efforts with DEA to develop important arrests and seizures in this traffic affecting the United States.

Afghanistan

There is a consensus that while substantial quantities of Pakistani opium are being converted to heroin in the Landi Kotal area of that country, the bulk of this heroin is now derived from Afghan opium freely transported in. Afghan opium in very large quantities is also being smuggled to Iran as well as morphine base and heroin derived from it. Much of this is smuggled via Turkey, Syria and Lebanon to Western Europe, Canada and the United States.

The Afghan Government has informed the International Narcotics Control Board that, within country, law enforcement personnel over the period 1979–1983 have seized multi-ton quantities of opium, as well as large quantities of morphine, heroin, methaqualone and cannabis. The abuse of opiates and psychotropic drugs is growing. The Government reports handing down severe sentences for drug violations through special courts. Afghanistan has also continued to regularly participate in the meetings of the Sub-Commission on Illicit Drug Traffic in the Near and Middle East of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs.

Opium is produced in Afghanistan by the tribal units and families of the legendary "Mujahideen" freedom fighters of Afghanistan. Some reports indicate the profits from this opium production and traffic are used to purchase arms and equipment to sustain the war effort against the Soviet occupiers. Other reports indicate it is

nothing more than tribes-people taking advantage of the market for crude opium in Pakistan and Iran.

Recommendation

1. One thing is certain and that is the United States, several Western European and Arab countries are being tragically victimized by opium or heroin originating from opium produced in Afghanistan. The victim countries are the donors of the humanitarian aid sent to Afghanistan and to Afghan refugees who have fled their country. It is time the United States, Canada, Western Europe and the Arab countries begin to demand that the Mujahideen leadership, through their mystical tribal communication networks, put an end to the production of opium, morphine base and heroin in their territory so tragically affecting the countries which are their friends and benefactors. There are also reports that traditional Afghan smugglers taking advantage of both the chaotic conditions in their country and their ability to pose as refugees and travel to Pakistan, Iran and India are using the circumstances to increase opium production in Afghanistan, and also to produce morphine base and heroin and to conspire with confederates in Pakistan, Iran and India to traffic it worldwide. the Mujahideen must use their influence under the Koran to force the ending of opium production in Afghanistan, if nothing else, then as a token of appreciation to their benefactors.

Iran

Following the Khomeni revolution of 1979, the limited legal opium production permitted by the Shah beginning in 1969 rose sharply to an estimated 30,000 hectares.

There are reliable reports indicating that there has been substantial destruction in recent years of opium production detected by the authorities in the eastern and western provinces of the country bordering Afghanistan and Turkey respectively. In the eastern and central provinces heroin and morphine base laboratories have been seized. In addition, opium, morphine base and heroin are reported to be entering the country from Afghanistan, and Pakistan in substantial quantities. This traffic is destined for internal consumption in Iran and westward via Turkey, Syria and Lebanon for trafficking to Western Europe and North America. These trends continue as the Iranian authorities made seizures of ton quantities of opium and morphine base entering their territory from the east as well as heading west. Opium addicts in Iran are estimated at 50,000 and heroin at 100,000.

Recommendation

1. The United States, Canada and Western Europe should urge the Government of Iran to increase and intensify cooperation in the east with Pakistan and Afghanistan to stem the flow of opiates from those countries destined for consumption in Iran and trafficking westwards. Expanded cooperation should also be developed with Turkey for joint narcotic enforcement operations to suppress the movement of opiate raw materials into Turkey. The friendly relationships Iran has always had with its neighbors, Turkey, Af-

ghanistan, and Pakistan, and their joint membership on the United Nations Subcommission in Illicit Drug Traffic and Related Matters in the Near and Middle East is most conducive for developing effective drug enforcement cooperation.

India

India, as the world's largest and now the only producer of gum opium for legal pharmaceutical purposes, has historically been remarkably free of opium diversion and the illicit manufacture and traffic of heroin. This has been largely due to an effective opium production control system.

The Government of India is vigilant in preventing leakage from legal opium production and from the large stockpile of opium production which currently exists. There are also reports of some illicit opium production. In recent years India has been a source for methaqualone originating in or transiting the country. There are indications this traffic has leveled off during 1983.

Because of its geographic location between the two major illicit supply regions of Southeast Asia and the Near and Middle East, India in the last two years has developed into a major transit route for heroin, whereas theretofore only hashish originating in Nepal and Pakistan transited the country.

In Thailand and Burma, there are reports of a new trend in the smuggling of heroin, morphine base, and opium from Burma to India for onward smuggling to Western Europe and North America and consumption in India.

In 1981, nine kilos of heroin were seized in India; in 1982, 29 kilos; and during the first nine months of 1983, 92 kilos were seized. During the same period of 1983, 1.3 tons of opium were confiscated coming from Pakistan, although most of it may have originated in Afghanistan. Two clandestine heroin laboratories were also seized in India in 1983. It is estimated that about one ton of heroin from the Khyber Agency of Pakistan is now entering India annually, mostly for transit to Western Europe and North America.

During the first eight months of 1983 in Western Europe, 50 cases were developed involving a seizure total of 123 kilos of heroin, where the smugglers had begun their journeys in either Bombay or New Delhi. This trend has continued during 1984 and appears to be increasing. At Kennedy International Airport, New York City, on April 9 and 10, 1984, Customs officers seized a total of 40 kilos of heroin from couriers originating in New Delhi. This was the largest heroin seizure made in the United States since 1974. The principals of the organization originating in New Delhi were also apprehended. They were delivering the heroin to associates in the United States, who had immigrated from India.

The Government of India is greatly concerned with these developments and is carrying out a vigorous suppression effort and cooperating with other concerned governments affected by this traffic.

Recommendations

1. There is very great international concern with these relatively new illicit traffic trends occurring in India and the need for that

Government to ensure that its international narcotic enforcement cooperation is brought to maximum effectiveness to meet this threat.

2. Experts believe that because of its geographic location, the Government of India's legal narcotic control system for the production and manufacture of narcotic and psychotropic substances is now being severely tested. Ruthless and resourceful international narcotic trafficking organizations are now targeting India for supplies of narcotic and psychotropic drugs and as a base for their international trafficking operations. The government should ensure that its regulatory narcotic and psychotropic control mechanism remains equal to the challenge.

3. The Government of India should also take measures to provide for more stringent penalties against convicted traffickers and to increase and intensify narcotic enforcement operations in this new and rapidly developing traffic phenomenon.

4. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is assigning one additional agent to the two agents already stationed at New Delhi. Hopefully DEA will follow illicit traffic trends in India closely with a view to further increasing the agent staff at New Delhi, or assigning agents to the Consulate General at Bombay should the need arise.

Turkey

Opium, morphine, heroin base and heroin are being produced in Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan in enormous quantities. While great quantities of these narcotic drugs are being consumed in those producer countries, much of this production is smuggled to Western Europe and North America to create and sustain serious heroin addiction problems. An important route for this traffic is west from Iran via the excellent Turkish highway system or the railroad link via Lake Van. One highway route west is used to bring morphine and heroin base to Diyarbakir in Southeastern Turkey for conversion to heroin. This heroin usually is smuggled westward via Istanbul to Europe. Another route favored by traffickers is via Hakkari along the southern tier of Turkey to the cities of Gaziantep and Kilis where processing laboratories have historically existed. Heroin is produced from the smuggled opiate raw materials and is either moved south to Aleppo, Syria, for smuggling to the west or to Istanbul for the same purpose. Opiate raw materials coming from Iran are also smuggled from Gaziantep and Kilis and nearby Urfa to Aleppo for conversion to heroin in that city for smuggling via Damascus to Western Europe and North America directly or via Lebanon.

The Government of Turkey has vigorously addressed the problem of illicit manufacture and traffic within the country that supplies heroin to Western Europe and North America by increasing and intensifying the narcotic suppression activities of the Turkish National Police, Jandarma and Customs. However, the source of the problem is the unlimited supplies of opiate raw material and heroin entering the country via Iran.

Recommendations

1. The Government Turkey should use its leadership role on the U.N. Sub-Commission on Narcotics and Related Matters in the Near and Middle East to improve mutual cooperation leading to more intensified eradication of illicit opium production and suppression of illicit manufacture and traffic in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. Turkey is a victim of this traffic and its territory is being used for the illicit processing and transit of opium, morphine and heroin from those countries to the west. Turkey is highly respected by its fellow Member States of the Sub-Commission and has a long record of experience and success in active international narcotic control cooperation.

2. The U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs should request the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations to authorize the Secretary General to convene annual meetings between the heads of national drug law enforcement agencies from States in the Near and Middle East, from Europe and from Members of the League of Arab States immediately following the sessions of the Sub-Commission which are held in the fourth quarter of every year under the authority of Council Resolution 1776 (LIV) of May 18, 1973, and preferably at the invitation of a Member State in the European region.

3. The Turkish National Police narcotic enforcement capability has reached a point where it can begin to develop joint prosecutions, with European, United States and Canadian narcotic enforcement services, of Turkish nationals in Turkey who have been identified in prosecutions abroad as participants, suppliers, financiers or directors of a narcotic smuggling operation. The Turkish authorities should make every effort to vigorously prosecute narcotic violators in Turkey on the basis of evidence that can be supplied by Western European and North American narcotic enforcement services.

4. As a start in increasing and improving its narcotic intelligence collection and distribution capability, the Turkish National Police supported by the Jandarma and Customs should increase the volume of information it exchanges annually with all countries related to the problem of illicit narcotic manufacturing and traffic in Turkey. Experience demonstrates that the more information a country such as Turkey transmits to other countries, the more actionable intelligence they receive in return from other countries.

5. Because it is used as a transit country for the processing and movement of narcotic drugs from the Near and Middle East to the West, it is believed that as a means of improving narcotic enforcement effectiveness the Turkish National Police, Jandarma and Customs should increase and intensify their narcotic enforcement cooperation with counterpart agencies in Iran, Syria, Iraq, Greece and Bulgaria.

6. Recognizing that either acetic anhydride or acetyl chloride are chemicals essential to transforming morphine base to heroin hydrochloride the Government of Turkey should have its narcotic enforcement services monitor the movement of this substance within Turkey as a means to detect and seize clandestine heroin laboratories.

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7. Unconfirmed information continued to be received of sporadic illicit opium cultivation in remote areas of the provinces of Corum, Amasya and Tokat which are northeast of Ankara in the direction of the Black Sea. Similar information is received relative to the provinces of Malatya, Elazig and Adyaman in Southeastern Turkey. Legal opium production was ended in those provinces between 1968 and 1970 and licensed production of poppy straw permitted in 7 provinces in the central Anatolian region since 1975 has not been authorized in the six provinces listed above.

The State Department should provide all possible technical and equipment assistance to the Turkish Jandarma to enable it to develop an aerial detection capability to uncover widely scattered illicit opium cultivation that may take place in its territory. The Turkish Govenment vigorously eradicates any illicit opium production uncovered in the country.

Syria

During the period of time prior to 1972, when large quantities of gum opium were diverted from legal production in Turkey, large portions of that opium were smuggled into Syria for conversion to morphine base and transmitted to Beirut or Marseille for the clandestine manufacture of heroin for smuggling to the United States and Canada. Most of this morphine base production in Syria was in the northern city of Aleppo, close to Turkey. To a lesser extent the cities of Hamah and Homs were also utilized for this activity. Now morphine base, heroin base and heroin itself is being smuggled from Southern Turkey. The morphine and heroin base is being converted into high grade heroin at Aleppo, Hamah and Homs. Together with the heroin smuggled directly into Syria from Turkey it is taken to Damascus for smuggling via airline passengers to Western Europe for use there or smuggling onward to Canada and the United States.

Heroin and morphine base from Syria is also being smuggled to Lebanon and Sicily for refining or in the case of heroin for onward shipment to Canada and the United States.

Recommendation

Syria has not been effective in suppressing this recent trend of heroin manufacture in its territory nor of offering the hand of cooperation to the countries affected by this traffic. The United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs should look into this situation as should the International Narcotics Control Board to ensure Syria is abiding by its obligations to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 and urge that remedial action be taken by the Syrian Government to prevent its territory from being used as an illicit heroin manufacturing and trafficking center.

Lebanon

Prior to the chaos and breakdown in public order caused by the sectarian and political warfare that began in Lebanon in 1976, the government had effectively curtailed the illicit manufacture of heroin which posed a constant threat. It never effectively took the heavy illicit cultivation of hashish under control that through all

the strife has persisted. Frequent allegations of Syrian Government tolerance of the hashish production and traffic in Lebanese territory under its control are reported. Of the 200 tons of hashish entering the United States annually, 60 tons or 30 percent reportedly originate in Lebanon.

Obviously any solution to the problem of heroin and hashish production and traffic in Lebanon is contingent upon bringing about a political solution to the tragic events that have transpired since 1976. Certainly the harm the production and traffic in drugs in Lebanon is causing the United States and several other countries is an added incentive for increasing efforts to bring about a political solution in Lebanon.

Italy

The Italian authorities continue to vigorously suppress organized criminal efforts in Sicily and the Milan area to establish illicit heroin manufacturing operations. The three Italian Police Services, the Guardia di Finanze, National Police and Carabiniere, are to be commended for the cooperation they have historically extended to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and its predecessor agencies to suppress the illicit manufacture and traffic in narcotic drugs in Italy affecting the United States.

This unrelenting drug enforcement effort of the Italian authorities must continue and both the Governments of the United States and Italy must ensure that adequate manpower, resources and equipment are assigned to constantly increase the suppression rate against this traffic. Important narcotic arrests and seizures in both countries should be vigorously prosecuted and substantial prison terms meted out to convicted violators.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Burma

The largest opium production in the world exists in Burma where production from 1981 through 1984 has been at 500 tons annually. The major obstacle to the Government of Burma addressing the combined problem of opium and heroin production by insurgent groups in the Shan and Cachin States is its obsessive non-alignment policy.

Notwithstanding Burma's political and cultural preference for non-alignment and isolation, it has an obligation to cooperate under the Single Convention with all governments in campaigns against the illicit traffic of narcotic drugs. Under the Single Convention it can do just that without conflict with its non-alignment policy.

Burma is not maintaining its obligation under the Single Convention to work with and assist its neighbors and other governments suppress the heavy traffic in opium, morphine base and heroin originating in Burma that is seriously affecting them.

Neighboring Thailand and Malaysia are the countries most seriously affected by the traffic from Burma. It addicts hundreds of thousands of the Thai and Malaysian people. It supplies the heroin trafficked through their territory and the raw materials processed

into heroin in their countries for internal consumption and trafficking abroad. Under Articles 4 and 35 of the Single Convention, Burma has a solemn obligation to cooperate with the governments of Thailand and Malaysia to suppress this activity. If Burma cooperated directly in active narcotic enforcement operations with Thailand and Malaysia, they could regularly immobilize clandestine heroin refineries and seize ton quantities of opium, morphine base and heroin. The lack of direct and active narcotic enforcement cooperation by Burma with Thailand and Malaysia is a major impediment to more effective narcotic suppression in the region and worldwide, given Burma's major world supplier role.

Recommendations

1. The Committee urges Burma to develop direct and active narcotic enforcement cooperation with Thailand and Malaysia as a means to stem the flow of heroin and opiate raw materials from Burma to and through those countries.
2. The Government of Burma should seek the assistance of the Government of Thailand to work jointly along the Thai-Burmese border to detect and seize the heroin refineries operated along the Thai-Burmese border.
3. In addition to that critical area, Burma should increase and intensify its narcotic intelligence collection and enforcement efforts within the country to uncover the major organizations responsible for the internal and international trafficking activity and bring them to justice.
4. There are reports that due to the Thai Government's aggressive disruption of the traffic from Burma into Thailand, some of the criminal groups are moving heroin westward into India and Bangladesh for smuggling to Western Europe and North America as well as for consumption in India. The Government of Burma should also develop direct narcotic enforcement cooperation with those governments to stem this new threat to the region and the international traffic.
5. For decades we have been told that the illicit cultivation of opium in the Shan and Cachin States of Burma and its conversion into morphine base and heroin to supply a worldwide traffic was the work of insurgent groups. The problem of the illicit production and traffic of opium and its derivatives has steadily increased. This situation has gone on for over 35 years and the Government of Burma has neither been able to subdue the so-called insurgents or to negotiate some form of agreement for their peaceful coexistence as part of the Union of Burma.

Insurgency does not grant the right to produce and traffic in narcotics. While insurgency is universally recognized as an internal political matter, it ceases to be completely so when the insurgents are a major factor in the international illicit narcotics traffic. This activity is a flagrant and very serious breakdown in the international narcotic control convention system administered by the United Nations and ratified by 134 nations, including Burma.

If, as statements by Burmese leaders indicate, long-term and effective elimination of the production and traffic of opium and heroin in the Shan and Cachin States will only come when insurgency ends, the world community ought to consider helping Burma

solve this problem. Given the fact that the insurgency is responsible for a serious breakdown in the control mechanism of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, the United Nations might be invited by the Government of Burma to use its good offices to define and arbitrate the objectives sought by the insurgents. Possibly concessions could be made by all parties that would bring peace to the area and control of the narcotic traffic. The good will and support of such a United Nations mission by the neighboring countries, Thailand, Malaysia, India, Bangladesh and, most importantly of all, China, is essential to its success.

6. The Government of Burma should seek the understanding and support of its neighbors and all friendly countries to end the problem of insurgency in the Shan and Cachin States through the negotiation process. This would create an environment for the socio-economic development and narcotic enforcement controls in the region necessary to end the production and traffic of opium and heroin so tragically affecting much of the world, but particularly the Southeast Asian countries.

Thailand

In Thailand the United Nations Crop Replacement and Community Development Pilot Program in the northwest opium growing region has identified successful substitute crops and market possibilities for poppy growers. Thai, United States and other bilateral funding contribute to this work.

Up until now there has been disappointment on the part of the international technicians assisting the Thai authorities in this work over the failures of the government since 1976 to phase out opium production as the replacement drops came on line. Reports have also been made that fertilizer provided for substitute crops had been used to enhance opium production. Estimates are that 50 tons of opium were produced in the 1984 crop as compared to 35 tons in 1983. Also permitting villages to continue to produce for their opium abuse needs is contrary to the Single Convention and invites the creating of new addicts or a reversion to commercial production.

The time has come for the Government of Thailand to finalize a plan that will progressively phase out opium production, eradicating where necessary and to wean the village addicts off the drug simultaneously.

Over a two-year period with the assistance of the United Nations Development Program the Government of Thailand put together a "master plan" that called for an extensive program of rural and agricultural assistance which would create an environment where opium production might be phased out. Funding would be provided by interested donors. However, the "master plan" failed to commit the Government of Thailand to a schedule of phasing out opium production and a final termination target date. Potential donors at international meetings have made it clear that they would link future assistance for crop substitution in Thailand to a Thai demonstration that they can prevent opium production in the areas where development is already in place and substitute crops had been introduced.

The long awaited "master plan" to provide for the progressive elimination of opium production in Thailand is now being reworked. Until that is accomplished there is no commitment by the Government of Thailand to a structured program that would phase out the illicit production of opium. In response to constant urging to move forward to reduce opium production, in the final week of the 1984 crop the Thai Army destroyed 100 hectares of poppy out of the approximate 7,000 hectares cultivated. The lack of political repercussions this created, demonstrated that the Thai Government's great concern that phasing out opium production would bring political turmoil in the hill tribe region is not well founded.

Recommendations

1. Thailand must, as soon as possible, prepare and begin implementation of a "master plan" that will phase out opium production within three to five years.
2. The State Department should, as soon as possible, organize a small expert committee that would cooperate with a counterpart group organized by the Government of Thailand to finalize the master plan that would phase out opium production in three to five years. Until now the United States has left negotiations with the Government of Thailand on plans and programs to phase out illicit opium production to the United Nations. Those negotiations since 1976 have failed to obtain a commitment from the Government of Thailand to end opium production. This committee has followed this situation for eight years and believes the time has come for the United States to work with and assist its friend and ally, Thailand, in phasing out opium production in its territory.

Malaysia

During the past decade Malaysia has become a center for the illicit manufacture and traffic of heroin to Western Europe, the United States and Canada. The heroin is produced from opiate raw materials originating in Burma and Thailand. Some of the heroin also originates in those two source countries and merely transits Malaysia. The authorities make every effort to suppress this activity and are reasonably effective. The proximity of unlimited supplies of opium, morphine and heroin base and heroin in nearby Thailand and Burma is responsible for Malaysia developing this problem. An effective solution will not be possible until such time as the production of opium and its derivatives in Burma and Thailand is brought under control.

Recommendation

1. Malaysia should continue to suppress illicit heroin manufacture and to work with other governments to press Thailand and Burma to address the problem of uncontrolled production of opium in their countries responsible for the heavy traffic and addiction to heroin affecting Southeast Asia.

Hong Kong

Hong Kong has posed a heroin threat to the United States since 1950. Opiate raw materials originating in Burma and Thailand

have been traditionally smuggled from the latter country to Hong Kong for conversion to heroin numbers 3 and 4. Most of it, particularly number 3, is consumed in Hong Kong and significant portions of the number 4 type have been smuggled to Canada, particularly Vancouver, and to the West Coast of the United States and as far as New York City. In 1973, the Hong Kong authorities revitalized their efforts and began to more effectively curtail the movement of narcotic raw materials into the territory, while simultaneously reducing heroin manufacture and export. Major criminal organizations that had dominated the traffic were severely disrupted through successful prosecutions. The Hong Kong heroin threat to the United States and other international targets has been restricted by the action of the Hong Kong authorities.

However, in addition to continuing to pose a heroin threat, Hong Kong has continued to be the financial and banking center for international Chinese narcotic traffickers. Many major transactions continue to be reported to be organized and directed from Hong Kong although the narcotic drugs themselves may be processed and shipped from Thailand, Burma or Malaysia.

Recommendations

1. Hong Kong authorities are to be commended for amending their banking control laws in June 1984, to facilitate international criminal investigations. This shall be particularly helpful in narcotic prosecutions. The Hong Kong courts will now assist foreign authorities in obtaining evidence for criminal proceedings in foreign courts where such criminal proceedings have been initiated "or whose institution is likely if the evidence is obtained." Hopefully the Hong Kong authorities will be able to implement this new provision of law in such a way as to have a meaningful impact on prosecutions abroad pertaining to the use of Hong Kong banks in the financial transition related to the heroin traffic originating in Southeast Asia.

2. The numerous offshore islands, coves, and small harbors in Hong Kong make it vulnerable to seaborne narcotic smuggling from Thailand. In addition to sustaining a serious, indigenous addiction problem, these supplies through the aegis of international ethnic Chinese trafficking organizations pose a constant heroin threat to the United States. Hopefully the Hong Kong authorities will continue to be able to ensure that heroin traffic from their territory to the United States does not become significant.

Morocco

Morocco has been a major supplier of hashish to the United States since the late 1960's. Most of it comes directly smuggled into private docks and quiet marinas by sailing vessels, long-range motor yachts and small freighters. Light aircraft equipped for long-range flying also smuggle hashish from Morocco to small airports and airstrips in the Northeast area of the United States. Moroccan hashish and hashish oil is often smuggled by small operators and tourists from Spain or other points in Western Europe, particularly the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Between 10 and 20 tons of hashish, 5 to 10 percent of the total 200 tons entering the United

States annually, originate in Morocco. For at least 20 years Morocco has resisted the pleas of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the International Narcotics Control Board as well as several European nations tragically victimized by this hashish traffic that the illicit production be phased out. Citing political and economic difficulties, the Moroccan authorities have successfully evaded their obligations under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 to suppress the illicit production and traffic of hashish in their country.

Recommendation

1. It is time the United States, together with other interested governments, particularly Canada and several Western European countries, and the U.N. Narcotics Commission and International Narcotics Control Board negotiate a pledge on the part of Morocco to phase out the illicit production of hashish and provide the insignificant technical and financial support that might be needed to accomplish the end of this production.

Domestic Enforcement and Interdiction

The Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control recommends the following improvements in narcotics law enforcement efforts:

1. Consideration of H.R. 5990, the State and Local Narcotics Control Assistance Act should be a top priority of the 99th Congress. This legislation would provide much needed funding and Federal assistance to local law enforcement organizations presently facing difficulties in meeting the demands placed on them by increased supplies and trafficking in narcotics. This legislation would allow the primary law enforcement responsibilities to remain in the local communities while providing Federal assistance to these localities—an action which has been endorsed by many State and local governments. Such a grant program would illustrate a growing Federal commitment to the war on drugs while protecting the autonomy and authority of local law enforcement agencies.

2. In the area of coordination and cooperation, much remains to be done. Local and State law enforcement officials have informed the Select Committee that coordination and cooperation between the Federal narcotics agencies and local law enforcement organizations is not satisfactory. The Federal Government should take steps to aggressively insure that States and local agencies are being properly informed, utilized and given the proper credit for cooperative initiatives. The Select Committee intends to continue monitoring the cooperation coordination issues during the first session of the next Congress. While the situation in South Florida has improved some since the Select Committee's hearings and Law Enforcement Conferences, and is due in large part to the efforts of Representative Tom Lewis in conjunction with local law enforcement officials, the coordination and cooperation situation across the nation leaves much to be desired. In New York, San Diego and the Gulf Coast area of Texas, Federal agencies have not been able

to effectively work with the State and local officials towards a cooperative partnership.

The Select Committee recommends that the following actions be taken to improve the working relationship between Federal and State/local law enforcement agencies:

(a) A mechanism similar to the one used in South Florida to improve cooperation and coordination between Federal and local officials should be used in other locations where there is a strong Federal involvement in the narcotics effort.

(b) Local law enforcement conferences, such as the ones in South Florida, should be undertaken in the San Diego area, the Gulf Coast area and New York in order to facilitate coordination and cooperation, and to publicize the extent of the narcotics problem in those areas.

(c) Periodic evaluations of the cooperation and coordination efforts between Federal agencies, and State/local law enforcement organizations by the Select Committee, with leadership from the Select Committee Members in whose districts these narcotics areas are located.

3. Increased use of the military for interdiction and eradication efforts should be explored in depth during the 99th Congress. The limitations of the posse comitatus doctrine should be evaluated with an eye towards utilizing the military in the fullest possible capacity without impairing military readiness. In conjunction with the military, the Select Committee should explore present and potential opportunities for the military's personnel and equipment to assist in local efforts to eradicate and interdict narcotics.

To assist heavily impacted areas such as San Diego and Honolulu, areas reeling from the effects of Mexican and Asian heroin, increased international efforts must be stepped up to reduce the availability of these narcotics, and additional international pressures should be exerted to stop the production of heroin by Mexico and the Southeast Asian nations.

5. Hawaiian officials should be encouraged to continue successful operations such as Operation Pele which resulted in a reduction in the shipment of narcotics via U.S. mails. The U.S. Postal Service should be given a mandate to increase its detection efforts to minimize the possibilities of shipping narcotics through the U.S. mails. Postal efforts should not be limited to Hawaii, and the success of Operation Pele should be replicated in other areas.

6. Additional DEA support for marijuana eradication should be forthcoming. With a majority of U.S. States participating in the detection and eradication program, $2.5 million for the entire nation's eradication program is insufficient. DEA funding for large growing States such as California, Hawaii, Georgia, Tennessee, Oregon and North Carolina should be increased during the next fiscal year. Additional funding should be provided to the States to enable them to detect indoor growing locations which are becoming more prevalent as the aerial marijuana detection program meets with increased success.

7. In the area of intelligence gathering and sharing, the Select Committee recommends that expansion of the El Paso Information Center (EPIC) be explored. Access to timely intelligence by local law enforcement officials is necessary to ensure success.

8. Review of all forfeiture laws should be undertaken in order to equalize the treatment of State/local agencies with the Federal Government in the allocation of benefits derived from seized assets.

9. The resources of the primary Federal drug law enforcement agencies—the Drug Enforcement Administration, Customs, and the Coast Guard—must be increased to meet the growing threat from narcotics trafficking.

Treatment, Prevention, Education and Research

The withdrawal of the Federal Government from a national leadership role in addressing drug abuse treatment and prevention issues has been one of the most prominent themes of State, local and private witnesses testifying before the Select Committee. While many complaints have focused on cutbacks in Federal funds for drug treatment and prevention efforts, treatment and prevention professionals have also expressed a number of other concerns about the failure of the Federal Government to assist the drug abuse field in meeting its most pressing needs.

Federal policy statements on drug abuse in the past few years have placed an increasingly strong emphasis on prevention and particularly on mobilizing the resources of the private sector, parents and other community groups to combat drug abuse. Through the personal involvement of the First Lady, the Administration has raised public awareness of drug abuse, especially as it affects our young people, and has encouraged increased community action to prevent drug abuse among this age group. The Federal strategy also has emphasized the responsibility of States and localities to establish their own priorities in response to local treatment and prevention needs. Many drug abuse professionals, however view this policy as little more than a cover for a gradual and continuing Federal abandonment of the field.

The Select Committee is concerned that Federal leadership in the area of drug abuse treatment and prevention has seriously eroded. Federal support for drug abuse prevention and treatment efforts have not matched the rhetoric of Federal policy pronouncements. Drug abuse is one of our most serious national problems. Reducing the costly consequences of drug abuse and preventing it from spreading requires strong national leadership and a major commitment of Federal resources. The Federal Government cannot leave the responsibility for drug abuse treatment and prevention to State and local governments and the private sector.

To restore the Federal Government to a position of strong national leadership in reducing the demand for drugs, the Select Committee recommends the following measures with respect to drug abuse treatment, prevention, education and research.

1. TREATMENT/PREVENTION FUNDING

The Committee recommends that a top priority be given to increasing Federal resources to support drug abuse treatment and prevention efforts by States and localities.

Discussion

Under the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Services Block Grant, Federal funding to States for drug abuse treatment

and prevention programs has been reduced by approximately 40 percent. As a result of Federal budget cuts, many States and cities report that they have been forced to close programs, operate clinics over capacity and curtail services to clients. In short, the capacity of the Nation's drug abuse system to provide treatment and prevention services has been reduced, even though the demand for services continues to escalate. Waiting lists for treatment are common in many areas of the country, especially in our Nation's cities that are hardest hit by drug abuse, and resources are not available to meet the treatment and prevention needs of special sub-groups of drug abusers such as adolescents, women and minorities. The system is stressed to the breaking point, and many experts in the field fear that without an infusion of additional Federal support, the national drug abuse system built so painstakingly in the 1970's will collapse.

The Select Committee believes the Federal Government has the primary responsibility to control the supply of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, hashish and other dangerous drugs, many of which are produced in foreign countries and smuggled into the United States. Because the Federal Government has been unable to achieve effective control of the supplies of illicit drugs, the Committee believes the Federal Government must recognize its strong leadership responsibility to provide treatment for the victims of drug abuse and to support efforts to prevent drug abuse.

For this reason Members of the Select Committee introduced H.R. 5990, the State and Local Narcotics Control Assistance Act of 1984, in the 98th Congress. This bill established a program of Federal assistance to help States and localities meet the tremendous burdens they are facing due to drug abuse and drug trafficking. The bill included an authorization of $125 million a year for fiscal years 1986–1990 to support State and local drug abuse treatment and prevention efforts. This assistance was intended to eliminate the current backlog for treatment that exists throughout the country and to further expand treatment and prevention capacity to accommodate the many others who need help and would seek such services if available. The bill will be reintroduced in the 99th Congress. The Select Committee recommends that consideration of this legislation be a top priority of the 99th Congress.

2. DATA COLLECTION

The Federal Government must take the steps needed to establish a comprehensive, national drug abuse information system. Information on the nature and extent of drug abuse, changing drug abuse trends, and the availability and use of drug abuse services is vital in order for policymakers at all levels of government to make informed judgments on the needs that exist and how best to meet those needs.

Discussion

Many witnesses have complained that data currently collected by the Federal Government does not provide an adequate picture of the drug abuse problems in the Nation. For example, the two major surveys the Government relies on to track drug abuse

trends—the High School Senior Survey and the National Household Survey—are not good measures of heroin abuse, which has tremendous social costs and serious implications for treatment needs. While these two surveys generally indicate declining drug use, State and local officials report increasing demand for drug abuse services, and the Federal Government's Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) shows sharp increases over the past few years in the numbers of deaths and emergency room episodes associated with such dangerous drugs as heroin and cocaine. These surveys do not measure populations that frequently present themselves for treatment—high school dropouts and persons without known fixed addresses. DAWN itself has been criticized because of incomplete and inconsistent reporting and also because data is often not available on a timely basis.

In addition, the shift to block grant funding for drug abuse services in 1982 greatly reduced the Federal Government's ability to collect data on drug abuse clients in treatment and on the availability and use of drug treatment services. The block grant eliminated the requirements for States to collect and submit uniform client data to the Federal Government. As a result, one witness told the Committee, the Government is now unable to determine what the latest drug of choice is for the last 10,000 treatment admissions nationally, although the Government can say where the last "outbreak" of 18 cases of measles occurred in the country. The National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) has attempted to collect this type of information from States on a voluntary basis, but many States that are already hard pressed by funding cuts are unwilling or unable to participate without Federal assistance.

It is clear that Federal leadership is needed to establish a comprehensive, uniform national drug abuse information system. The Select Committee recommends that sufficient resources be provided to develop such a system. Congress made a beginning this year. The Alcohol Abuse, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Amendments of 1984 (P.L. 98–509) mandates the Secretary of Health and Human Services to collect data on drug abuse services and clients in treatment. It also requires the Secretary, in consultation with appropriate national organizations, to develop model criteria and forms for drug abuse data collection that will enable States to share uniform information. The 1985 appropriation for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) (P.L. 98–619) also includes a substantial increase for NIDA research activities, and the House report on this measure directs NIDA to allocate a portion of the increase toward establishing a comprehensive system for collecting data on drug abuse and on the availability and use of drug abuse treatment services.

The Select Committee also recommends that HHS and NIDA review current data collection efforts to determine how they can be improved and what additional data are needed to provide as complete a picture as possible of drug abuse in the Nation. The Committee urges the Department to submit its recommendations for improvements, along with an assesssment of the resources required, to Congress.

3. EDUCATION AND PREVENTION

The Select Committee recommends that the Department of Education and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) assign a much higher priority to drug abuse education and prevention. In particular, the Committee believes the two Departments should work together to develop and disseminate effective models for drug abuse education in the schools at all grade levels; the Federal Government should more closely monitor and evaluate State prevention activities under the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Services (ADMS) Block Grant to determine the approaches that are effective and to promote their use by other States; and the Federal Government should increase its efforts to provide publications and other public information and materials on drugs and drug abuse to schools, community organizations and others that request such information.

Discussion

Drug abuse education and prevention are considered by many to be the most promising, cost-effective approaches to the problems of preventing and reducing drug abuse. Because of the great potential of these approaches, the Committee has been disturbed to find that the Federal Government has not embarked upon a comprehensive drug abuse prevention and education effort and that the few programs that are in place lack visibility. The Committee has found that:

—The only drug prevention and education program supported by the Department of Education is a small training program called the School Team Approach. This program provides training and technical assistance to teams of six or seven people from local schools who are then responsible for developing programs in their schools to meet local problems with local resources. The program is funded at less than $3 million a year and provided training to 135 teams in fiscal year 1983. The program is only available to grades 7–12, even though there is ample evidence that children often make decisions about drug use long before they reach the seventh grade. Although the School Team Approach is a proven concept and has been used successfully in various school districts across the country, the program is simply not sufficient to meet the needs of the millions of school age children who would benefit from Federal drug abuse education and prevention programs. The Department needs to be more aggressive in promoting drug abuse education and prevention. For example, the Department could expand the School Team Approach program by helping States develop their own training and technical assistance capacity, using teams that have received Federal training to replicate the process in other schools and school districts within a State.

—There is little evidence of collaboration between the Department of Education and HHS on drug abuse prevention and education initiatives. Because of the Education Department's expertise in working with schools and the HHS Department's expertise in drug abuse and prevention strategies, the two

agencies should combine their talents to produce programs and materials that effectively meet the needs of schools.

—Neither HHS nor Education knows what requirements, if any, the various States have established with respect to drug education in the schools. The Federal Government cannot assist State drug education efforts if the responsible agencies do not know what States require and what the nature of their programs are. The Federal agencies should also be helping States define their requirements for drug education and giving States guidance on program approaches that are effective.

—HHS makes little attempt to monitor and evaluate how States use block grant funds they allocate to prevention activities. As a result, neither the executive branch nor the Congress knows how the funds are being spent or whether they are being spent for programs that work or on programs that are not effective. While the block grant was designed to give States greater flexibility, this lack of accountability makes it difficult to know whether the Government is getting its money's worth. In addition, because there is little monitoring and evaluation, the Federal Government cannot provide adequate guidance and assistance to States so that unproductive approaches can be avoided and productive ones replicated. As Congressman Shaw framed the problem at a Committee hearing with HHS officials earlier this year, the question is whether,

> * * * we have a lot of people out there, a lot of well meaning people, that are reinventing the wheel, and we're coming up with a lot of square wheels that don't work. We've got 50 States plus other agencies that receive direct funding from (the Federal Government). We, quite frankly, are the only umbrella that is * * * in place that can * * * look at the whole field.

—HHS has developed outlines for drug abuse prevention curricula, including educational materials, that are available for schools or teachers that wish to use them. However, it does not appear that these model curricula have been widely disseminated. The Committee urges the Department to make schools aware of these resources and to make these curricula available to interested schools at a reasonable cost.

—Despite the Administration's emphasis on prevention, NIDA's ability to provide public information, materials and technical assistance to individuals and groups seeking such support has been cut back severely. The quantities of popular publications and other materials available to the public from NIDA without charge have been greatly reduced, and the high prices charged for additional copies of publications continue to present obstacles for schools and community organizations seeking informational materials to support local prevention efforts. NIDA has refocused its public education activities over the past two years, experimenting with national media compaigns in an attempt to reach a broader audience. The Committee does not objtect to the use of such techniques but does not believe they should be undertaken at the expense of other, important, public information activities NIDA has traditional-

ly supported and for which there is a continuing, high public demand.

In short, the Select Committee finds and recommends that the Federal Government should substantially increase the resources allocated for the development, testing and dissemination of drug abuse education and prevention approaches and that the Departments of Education and Health and Human Services should collaborate more closely with each other and their counterparts at the State and local levels to expand drug education efforts and improve the coordination of prevention activities.

4. RESEARCH

The Select Committee recommends a substantial increase in the funds appropriated to the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) for the conduct of drug abuse research. Of particular importance, the Committee urges the provision of additional funds to increase research aimed at developing new treatment and prevention techniques and to improve the delivery of treatment and prevention services. NIDA's ability to disseminate such findings to the field and provide supporting technical assistance must also be improved.

Discussion

NIDA has the primary Federal responsibility for drug abuse research, and since 1982, when the shift to block grant funding for drug abuse services occurred, the principal focus of NIDA's activities and the bulk of its budget has been dedicated to research. NIDA's research program has made important strides in understanding drug abuse. For example, NIDA-sponsored research has been responsible for unlocking some of the puzzles about how drugs work in the body and for the discovery of opiate receptors and natural opiate-like substances in the body. NIDA's research has also led to an increased understanding of the serious health risks of drugs such as marijuana, and has helped to document the effectiveness of drug abuse treatment.

A strong emphasis on drug abuse research is essential to acquiring the new knowledge needed for advances in drug abuse treatment and prevention. An effective, well-coordinated research program cannot be carried out by the States and the private sector but needs Federal leadership and financial support.

Unfortunately, NIDA's research budget was cut drastically from 1980 to 1982. This was the result of both cuts in the agency's basic research budget and the loss of other funds (e.g. services monies, transferred to the block grant, and program support funds) which had previously supported a large share of NIDA's treatment and prevention research as well as a good deal of NIDA's epidemiology program. Total funds available to NIDA fell by about 25 percent in this period, a 30–40 percent reduction when inflation is taken into account. Increases in recent years have helped to restore some areas, but NIDA's research activities are still below the level supported in 1980.

The Committee believes that research in the areas of treatment and prevention services should be a top priority for increased fund-

ing. These areas were especially hard hit by the shift to block grants in 1982 that eliminated services monies formerly earmarked for such research. The amount of services research NIDA can presently fund is about one half of what it was prior to the block grant.

In the area of drug abuse treatment, the Committee believes the goal of treatment should be to enable drug abusers to live productive, drug-free lives. With regard to heroin addiction, the Committee recognizes that methadone maintenance has been shown to be effective in helping addicts overcome the problems associated with their addiction. While methadone maintenance will remain an important modality in the treatment of heroin addiction, the Committee believes that increased efforts should be made to develop effective non-addictive substitutes for heroin. The recent FDA approval of naltrexone, a non-addictive narcotic antagonist, makes available a substance that can be an important adjunct to treatment, but naltrexone is expected to be effective for a relatively small group of narcotics addicts who are highly motivated to discontinue their drug use. Much more work needs to be done in this area. As the use of cocaine, both by itself and in combination with heroin and other drugs, has burgeoned in the past few years, the need to develop new treatments for these problems has also increased. Improving the delivery of treatment services must also be given a higher priority. For example, the treatment needs of special subgroups of substance abusers, such as women, adolescents, and racial and ethnic minorities, must be addressed more systematically through research. The increased need for such research is highlighted by the requirement added to the block grant this year that each State allocate five percent of its total annual block grant award to initiate and provide new alcohol and drug abuse services for women (P.L. 98–509, section 103(b)(2)).

Similarly, with the increased emphasis today on prevention, additional research is needed to develop approaches in drug abuse prevention and to improve the delivery of prevention services. The ADMS block grant requires States to spend 20 percent of their block grant funds for drug abuse on prevention activities, but only about 8 percent of NIDA's research budget is allocated to prevention research. States need additional guidance to spend their prevention funds wisely.

To be useful, NIDA's research results must also be disseminated to the field, and technical assistance must be provided to support the implementation of new services. As in other areas of NIDA's activities, funds for these functions have also been reduced or held constant.

Congress has recognized some of these concerns and has begun to address them. The Alcohol Abuse, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Amendments of 1984 (P.L. 98–509), which provides authority for NIDA's research program, revises the Institute's statutory mandate to require that research on the effects of drug abuse on women be given priority. The Act also provides authority for a limited number of projects to develop and demonstrate new and improved methods of delivering treatment and prevention services and disseminating research findings to the public about effective drug abuse services. The Committee applauds these provisions and will work to encourage both Congress and the Administration to pro-

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vide even greater support to meet the research needs outlined above.

5. TRAINING

The Select Committee recommends increased funding for both research training and clinical training by NIDA.

Discussion

The purpose of NIDA's research training programs is to train young scientists for careers in drug abuse research. Maintaining an adequate supply of skilled researchers is critical to continued, high quality drug abuse research efforts.

For 1985, NIDA requested $891,000 for research training, the same amount as appropriated for 1984. NIDA estimated the 1985 request would support 48 trainees. In 1981, NIDA funded 70 research trainees and the number has been declining ever since. Dr. Pollin, NIDA's Director, has told the Committee in the past that he would like to involve more individuals in the agency's research program.

The Senate Appropriations Committee, noting that research grants have increased in recent years while research training awards have declined, recommended an increase of more than $1.3 million over the 1985 research training request to support 89 trainees, 41 more than proposed in the budget. In conference with the House, the research training appropriation was reduced to $1.5 million, still an increase of about $600,000 over the budget request. The Committee supports this increase and recommends additional increases along the lines approved by the Senate this year.

NIDA's clinical training program was phased out in fiscal year 1982 because clincial training support was considered to be a lower priority activity in light of budgetary constraints. In addition, NIDA felt that substantial training opportunities were available that did not exist when the Institute first started to provide support for clinical training development in the early 1970's. NIDA also expected that the States and universities assisted through NIDA's efforts would continue to function productively in this area as Federal resources were withdrawn.

In action this year on legislation to reauthorize NIDA and NIAAA (the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism), the House Energy and Commerce Committee included a provision that requires the Health and Human Services Secretary to make grants to schools of medicine to support clinical training of students in the identification and treatment of drug and alcohol abuse. This provision was added because the Committee was concerned about the adequacy of alcohol and drug abuse education within medical school curriculum. The House passed this provision, and the conferees accepted it with an amendment (P.L. 98–509, section 201(b)), with the instruction that not more than $1 million be made available for such grants in 1985 from appropriations under Section 303 of the Public Health Service Act. In succeeding fiscal years the conferees said they expected separate appropriations to be requested and obtained under this new authority.

The Select Committee supports the inclusion of this new clinical training authority in P.L. 98–509 and recommends increased appropriations in succeeding fiscal years to support such training. A number of witnesses from the health professions who have testified before the Select Committee have expressed concern about the inadequacy of substance abuse training that today's medical students receive and have urged stronger Federal leadership and funding support in this crucial area.

The Committee also believes the Federal Government must provide greater leadership and funding to assist States in meeting their training needs. The operation of prevention and treatment programs requires continuing training to assure the availability of qualified counselors and other staff. Testimony to the Committee indicates that the people who run drug abuse programs are being exhausted and that only a few States have been able to provide training. The need for clinical training is not being addressed by the Federal Government at this time, and States, localities and the private sector alone cannot meet the needs that exist.

6. CONSULTATION

The Select Committee recommends that the executive branch take immediate steps to expand the opportunities for broad public participation by experts outside the Federal Government in the development of policy with respect to treatment and prevention.

Discussion

Apart from the loss of Federal funds, the criticism the Committee has heard most often from treatment and prevention professionals has been the loss of opportunities to participate in policy development. The last two Federal drug abuse strategies have been promulgated by the Administration with little consultation with the State and local officials who must ultimately implement them. By failing to actively seek out the views of drug abuse professionals, the Administration, and the Nation, lost the benefit of the valuable resource that exists in the expertise of drug abuse treatment and prevention experts. The strengths and weaknesses of the concepts embodied in Federal policy have not been tested by the people most capable of doing so. Nor can the Federal drug strategy truly be said to reflect the national consensus of the field. The lack of Federal consultation with outside experts also has resulted in little Federal policy guidance to the field. Without knowing what the Federal Government is planning, State and local agencies and private programs are hindered in their own planning from year to year.

Federal drug abuse policy cannot be made in a vacuum, divorced from the day-to-day problems of program administrators and treatment and prevention professionals. The Federal Government must provide policy guidance to the field and leadership in developing policies that reflect a national consensus of needs and priorities. As one witness told the Committee, leadership ". . . does not require direct management control. It does not require huge staffs. It does require accessibility and a willingness to engage the issues." The Select Committee strongly recommends that the Administration

greatly expand the forums available to exchange views with outside experts on policy options early in the decision-making process and that these exchanges be used to forge a national consensus on the direction of Federal drug abuse policy with respect to treatment and prevention.

Drug Abuse In The Military

Chapter VIII of the 1984 National Strategy for Prevention of Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking is entitled "Drug and Alcohol Abuse in the Armed Forces." The 1984 strategy recognizes the special responsibilities of the Armed Forces for ensuring that the United States has a military force free of the effects of drug abuse and alcohol abuse. The 1984 strategy states:

> Maintaining a high state of readiness in the military requires .. reliable and sensitive system of detection, monitoring, and assessment, incentives for service members to enter treatment and rehabilitation programs, clear policies regarding penalties for illicit drug use, and the discharge of military personnel who no longer have the potential for further useful service.

The Select Committee concurs in this general statement of principle made in the 1984 strategy. Since its establishment in 1976, the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control has been concerned about the critical national security issue of drug abuse in the military. Select Committee surveys in 1978 and 1981 found totally unacceptable levels of drug use by members of all branches of the armed services. These surveys, as well as DoD independently contracted studies, a tragic jet fighter crash in May, 1981, aboard the USS Nimitz in which unauthorized and illicit drug use was found in autopsies, and other evidence of drug use in operational situations, prompted the military to impose stringent drug abuse testing, disciplinary, and prevention and treatment programs in the fall of 1981 and winter of 1982.

The policies instituted by the Department of Defense and the services included urinalysis testing for drug use, strict enforcement of penalties, mandatory drug abuse treatment and prevention programs, expansion of recreational and alternative activities, and separation from service where deemed appropriate. As a result of the institution of these programs, all service branches, the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and the Air Force have made substantial progress in reducing the abuse of narcotic and psychotropic drugs within the ranks.

Notwithstanding this record of achievement, the Select Committee believes that there are a number of areas the Department of Defense and the services must be cognizant of when monitoring and evaluating their substance abuse programs. These issues must also be the subject of continuous Congressional oversight.

1. THE INTEGRITY OF URINALYSIS TESTING MUST BE BEYOND QUESTION

In many respects the exactness of urinalysis testing for drug use is the foundation of the drug abuse detection/prevention programs of all four services. The ability to swiftly and accurately identify substance abusers within the ranks is not only necessary as a deterrence to illicit drug use, but also a key element in the integrity and viability of the disciplinary sanctions and the treatment alter-

natives that are available. Claims of inexactness in the urine testing program could harm the long-term success of the drug abuse prevention programs of all four military services.

Over the past year allegations have been made both within and outside the Pentagon that the urine test for illicit drug use conducted by the military are inaccurate. A panel of Army and civilian experts in toxicology and drug testing legal issues under the Chairmanship of Maj. Gen. David W. Einsel, Jr. was charged by the Army Surgeon General to perform a review of the urinalysis drug testing program. The panel issued its report in December, 1983. It found that although laboratory procedures were in need of improvement in several cases, there was no affirmative evidence of false positive confirmations.

The services have undertaken an extensive review of prior positive findings of drug use to insure strict compliance with standards. In December 1984, DoD will issue a service-wide directive establishing a strict chain of custody rules over urine samples, improved testing and examination techniques, and rigorous "test positive" certification requirements. According to the Defense Department these new procedures will prevent the chance that "false positives" will be used in drug abuse disciplinary actions against military personnel.

The urinalysis drug testing program to identify substance abusers in the military must be closely monitored. The integrity of the program is essential to not only combatting the sensitive national security issue of drug abuse in the military, but also for fairness and equity in the military disciplinary system.

2. ALCOHOLISM AND ALCOHOL ABUSE AMONG MILITARY PERSONNEL MUST BE FURTHER REDUCED

Notwithstanding success in reducing drug abuse, levels of alcohol abuse in the military remain high. While the Select Committee is mindful of the vast social and legal distinctions in controlling alcohol abuse, as compared to drug abuse, the improper and expressive use of alcohol by servicemen carries the same threat to military preparedness, operational readiness and health and welfare as does drug abuse. Although the military establishment is aware of this problem and is developing policies and programs to address alcoholism and alcohol abuse within the ranks, it must begin to move more swiftly in this area.

3. THE WORLDWIDE SURVEYS OF ALCOHOL AND NONMEDICAL DRUG USE AMONG MILITARY PERSONNEL MUST CONTINUE AT PERIODIC INTERVALS

The third worldwide survey of alcohol and nonmedical drug use among military personnel is scheduled to begin in February, 1985. Earlier surveys were conducted in 1980 and 1982. There is approximately a 30-month interval between surveys. The Select Committee is pleased to learn that the 1985 survey, in addition to questions concerning alcohol and drug abuse, will contain questions on smoking and other health-related behavior.

The past worldwide surveys have proved invaluable to the Defense Department, the services, and the Congress in having a complete and accurate picture of drug and alcohol abuse in the mili-

tary, and for guiding the future activities and initiatives of the military in combatting substance abuse and in encouraging health promotion.

4. DRUG ABUSE TREATMENT, REHABILITATION AND PREVENTION PROGRAMS SHOULD BE WIDELY AVAILABLE IN THE MILITARY

Urinalysis and the concomitant imposition of sanctions for improper drug use is only one part of the drug abuse prevention efforts of the military services. Drug abuse treatment and rehabilitation services should be accessible to those with a drug problem, as well as to those who are able and show a willingness, to remain in service. Prevention, education, and reactional activities must be an integral part of the military environment so that servicemen are aware of the dangers of drug abuse and have the availability of alternative activities, particularly while stationed on duty in foreign nations. The Navy, for example, recently published a guide called "Substance Abuse Alternatives" containing a wide variety of programs offered by Navy recreational services for use by all commanding officers.

5. THE MILITARY'S DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION EFFORTS MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT BOTH HEALTH AND BEHAVIORAL ASPECTS OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE

The Select Committee is aware of disagreements within the Defense Department whether drug and alcohol abuse should be a health or manpower function. The Select Committee's concern is not over the location of substance abuse function within the Pentagon's organization, but rather that the drug abuse prevention programs of the military services have an appropriate mix of health and behavioral considerations. The Committee had been assured by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs that while drug abuse prevention will remain a health function, behavioral factors and programs will be part of the overall plan. We are further informed that DoD health and manpower officials will meet regularly in order to ensure that a proper coordination of efforts continue. In this regard, the Select Committee is pleased to again note the inclusion in the 1985 worldwide survey questions concerning smoking and other health-related behavior.

The Select Committee believes consideration of the health aspects of drug abuse, as well as behavioral causes of drug use, must both be part of a successful effort by the Defense Department and the services to eliminate drug abuse in the ranks.

ACTIVITIES

Committee Hearings and Conferences

UPDATE OF 1983–84 FIELD HEARINGS (APRIL 10, 1984)

The Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control held a hearing in Washington on April 10, 1984 to follow-up on the field hearings that were held in various locations across the nation during 1983. The April 10th hearing was designed to provide witnesses an opportunity to update the Select Committee on develop-

ments in their local area which occurred since the Select Committee's visit the previous year including increases in drug availability, instances of cooperation or lack of cooperation between Federal and local enforcement agencies, or recent improvements in the narcotics situation.

Witnesses from New York City, Redding, California, Honolulu, Hawaii, South Florida and the Texas Gulf Coast area were invited to appear with their Member of Congress (all were Members of the Select Committee) to provide the Select Committee with local and State concerns on the worsening narcotics problem. Each panel addressed the issues of supply and demand, public awareness and possible responses to the growing threat posed by narcotics.

New York City Panel:

Chairman Charles B. Rangel.
Hon. Benjamin Ward, Commissioner, New York City Police Department.
Julio Martinez, Director, New York State Division of Substance Abuse Services.
Hon. Sterling Johnson, Jr., Special Narcotics Prosecutor.

Since the 1983 field hearing in New York City, several important law enforcement initiatives had been put in place by the New York City Police Department aimed at closing down the major areas of drug trafficking in New York City.

Congressman Rangel opened the hearing with an overview of the Committee's findings from the 1983 hearing including the following statistics:

> Emergency room admissions for drug abuse in New York City have climbed steadily
>
> While there were 12,000 arrests for drug offenses in New York City—not including marihuana offenses—only 55% of these resulted in convictions, and only one fourth of those convicted received a prison sentence
>
> Two thirds of the prison inmates were drug abusers or addicts, and 20% of the prison population are heroin addicts

Chairman Rangel requested that the local witnesses come forth with suggestions for improving the working relationship between the Federal Government and local agencies, and requested that the local agencies continue to apprise the Select Committee of their concerns and needs.

New York City Police Commissioner Benjamin Ward told the Select Committee that ". . . New York, as well as other cities, does not possess the capability of combatting the availability of illegal drugs . . ." After a period of a relative lessening in the availability on the streets of New York City, the Commissioner predicted that heroin will be on the increase again due to increased supplies. "Heroin, cocaine, marihuana and pills are readily available all over New York City," Commissioner Ward stated. In response to the growing tragedy of drug trafficking and drug abuse, the New York City Police Department put into operation three separate law enforcement initiatives aimed at returning "the streets to the people of the City of New York," said Commissioner Ward. The three initiatives were:

> Operation Pressure Point I was convened on January 19, 1984 on the lower East Side of Manhattan. Undercover agents were sent to the Lower East Side to make drug buys and conduct observations. After the buys, the sellers were arrested and

a uniformed police officer was posted at each location in order to prevent re-occupation by other drug dealers. Operation Pressure Point I has resulted in over 3,860 arrests, and the area has experienced a 51% drop in robberies and a 35% drop in burglaries.

Operation Pressure Point II was undertaken beginning on March 1, 1984 in the West Harlem area of Manhattan, and has yielded 593 arrests to date. As a result of Operation Pressure Point II, a visible reduction in street trafficking has been noticed.

Operation Close Down was put in place in early April, and is aimed at closing down the smoke shops along Wilson Avenue in Brooklyn.

Commissioner Ward expressed concern about the inadequacy of Federal assistance in helping New York meet the challenge of narcotics control. The Commissioner indicated that due to the low level of co-operation between New York City and the Federal Government, especially DEA, he was considering withdrawing New York City personnel from the "Federal Task Force". "I have 90 detectives in there, and they (DEA) have 30. I am contributing three times the manpower that the DEA is contributing to what it alleged to be a Federal Task Force. I am seriously considering taking my 90 detectives out of the Task Force and returning them to fighting quality of life crimes on the street with the kind of success that I was able to achieve in the lower East side and in Harlem . . . I don't understand why New York City should pick up the costs of 90 detectives . . .", said Commissioner Ward.

Julio Martinez, Director of the New York State Division of Substance Abuse Services told the Select Committee that despite the increasing supplies of narcotics available in the Northeast, particularly New York City, the Federal commitment to New York has dwindled. Cuts in treatment, rehabilitation and education have exacerbated the already serious narcotics problem.

Mr. Martinez provided the Committee with statistics illustrating the severity of the problem in New York.

The drug abuse problem in New York has tripled since the early 1980's.

The Federal share of dollars for drug abuse to New York has dropped from $31 million in 1981 to $19 million in 1983 and 1984. This does not include the loss of Federal money in other social service areas including food stamps, Medicaid and entitlement programs.

New York State appropriates $85.3 million for drug abuse treatment vs. the Federal appropriation of $14.8 million.

There were 530 narcotics related deaths in New York City in 1983, representing an increase of 15% over the 1978 figure of 246 deaths. For the past three years, the number of drug-related deaths has remained above 500, and the 1983 figures are the highest since 1974.

Treatment programs in New York State are serving 40,633 people. There are 13,830 people in prevention and education programs.

Mr. Martinez expressed frustration at the Federal budget cuts, and also at the long waiting list for potential treatment clients. As

a result of police operations, such as Operation Pressure Point, addicts seek treatment as an alternative to prison. "Well let me say the inn is closed," stated Martinez, referring to the inability of the treatment/rehabilitation community in New York State to accept any more participants.

Special Narcotics Prosecutor for the City of New York, Sterling Johnson, Jr., commended the New York City Police Department for Operation Pressure Point for keeping the pressure on drug sellers in New York. Stating that the problem of cocaine availability is a severe one, Johnson told the Select Committee that "Coke prices are still declining and purity is rising." In January 1983 a kilo of cocaine sold for as much as $60,000; in September, 1983, the price had dropped to $18,000 per kilo.

Special Prosecutor Johnson re-enforced the need for a strong Federal commitment if New York City is to be successful in controlling narcotic trafficking and abuse. He also suggested that a 'drug czar' be appointed to oversee the implementation of a national drug strategy.

California Panel

Congressman Gene Chappie.
Randy Rossi, Director of the Campaign Against Marihuana Planting, California Department of Justice.
Zane Smith, Jr., Regional Forester, Pacific Southwest Region, Forest Service, United States Department of Agriculture.
Bruce Conrad, Deputy Director, Bureau of Land Management, California State Office, Department of the Interior.

Congressman Chappie told the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control that marihuana cultivation in California is big business, with an estimated value for a single plant of marihuana at $1,200 to $4,000. Congressman Chappie expressed his concern that illegal marihuana cultivation is surpassing the nation's top cash crops in revenues, and is costing local governments significant amounts of time and law enforcement funding to control.

Marihuana cultivation is detrimental to the environment, since the cultivators apply herbicides, rodenticides and fertilizers to their crops without regard to the effects that these chemicals have on the ecosystem, particularly in the National Forests where a large percentage of the marihuana is grown. Six recent fires in Northern California, started by marihuana cultivators in an effort to clear the underbrush, also illustrate the potential dangers facing the forests and wildlife in California.

Randy Rossi, Director of CAMP, told the Committee that the California Bureau of Narcotics and the Drug Enforcement Administration developed training courses to provide local jurisdictions with the expertise necessary to eradicate commercial marihuana growing operations. The techniques used by the growers include camoflaging the plants, greenhouses for indoor growing, and the use of booby traps to keep intruders away from the marihuana plants.

In addition to the environmental damages that marihuana cultivation creates in California, the illegal crop breeds violence and lawlessness among the cultivators. During the 1982 growing season, reported Rossi, 500 firearms were confiscated. 77 percent of the cultivators were armed or employed the use of booby traps. More than 50 percent of the cultivations discovered by CAMP occurred on

public lands or on private land without the consent of the owners. Witnesses indicated that there are 15 homicides per week in Northern California directly related to the cultivation of marihuana, creating extraordinary challenges for local law enforcement officials.

The CAMP Program, which conducted 524 marihuana raids last year seized 270,000 pounds of marihuana. CAMP's basic strength lies in the fact that several Federal, State and local agencies have been working together with a unified plan for action against cultivation. The Federal Agencies of the Bureau of Land Management, the U.S. Forest Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the California agencies of the Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement, the Office of Emergency Services, the California Department of Forestry and the Western States Information Network have contributed significantly to the activities and mission of CAMP. For the 1984 cultivation season, CAMP has been expanded to include 36 counties which have expressed an interest in participating in this year's CAMP program.

In addition to the actual eradication activities undertaken by CAMP, Mr. Rossi told the Committee that a program of deterrence and public awareness was underway. Through programs such as the "Butte County Growers Awareness Program" helicopters routinely patrol cultivation areas in an effort to deter and prevent the cultivation of marihuana on public and private lands.

Despite the successes that CAMP has enjoyed over the past years, the witnesses told the Committee that CAMP was facing extreme difficulties this year. The helicopters necessary for the eradication effort are not available to CAMP this year since the California National Guard helicopters have been committed to the summer Olympics in Los Angeles, as well as to the political convention in late summer, 1984. CAMP has had a satisfactory working relationship with the California National Guard, and despite this conflict with the commitment of resources, CAMP is expected to continue its working relationship with the Guard.

The problem of finding alternative sources for helicopters, or funding for the leasing of private helicopters has been the subject of several meetings between CAMP and Federal agencies. The Department of Defense, Rossi reported, offered assistance by way of the loan of seven HUEY helicopters. However, "the problem is the maintenance costs, the fuel costs, and the piloting costs and the insurance costs would be on the order of $1.5 million," said Rossi. "If we had the additional funding, it would be fine."

Mr. Rossi informed the Select Committee that California Attorney General Van de Kamp and Special White House Assistant for Narcotics, Dr. Carlton Turner, both responded positively to California's request for assistance, yet no financial assistance was promised. Another factor complicating the loan of military aircraft to California by the Department of Defense is the limitations imposed on the military by the Posse Comitatus Act which prohibits the use of military assistance in civilian endeavors.

Zane Smith, Regional Forester with the U.S. Forest Service, expressed concern over the continuing unauthorized use of Federal lands by marihuana growers, and explained the working relationship between CAMP and the Forest Service to the Select Committee. During the 1982 growing season, the Forest Service supple-

mented the efforts of State and local law enforcement agencies by providing 2,400 person days to the California eradication effort. In that same year, more than $290,000 of co-operative law enforcement funds were provided through the Forest Service to local sheriffs. As a result of Public Law 92-82, the PILT (Payment in Lieu of Taxes) Program enables the Forest Service to contribute funding to local sheriffs for law enforcement activities which may take place in National Forests. The Forest Service receives approximately $5 million per year, of which the State of California receives approximately $1 million. Thirty-six separate agreements were made with sheriffs in California for co-operative law enforcement funds this year.

During 1982, the Forest Service confiscated 55,000 plants, and 400 illicit operations were discovered. In 1983, the number of seizures increased to 64,000 plants at 500 sites. One hundred thirty eight arrests were made in fourteen counties.

1984 plans include expansion of the Forest Service's program to involve the Forest Service in detection and eradication in 37 counties, from a previous high of 14 counties.

Zane Smith told the Select Committee that a new project was underway called "The New River Project" in the Shasta-Trinity National Forest where shootings, arson and violence have virtually forced the Forest Service away from managing that tract of land in Northern California. As part of the New River Project eight Forest Service officers and two County Deputy Sheriffs are patrolling the project area in an effort to discourage the illegal use of the lands. The project is expected to last approximately three years, at a cost of $1.6 million.

Bruce Conrad, Deputy Director, Bureau of Land Management's California State Office re-affirmed the importance of the CAMP program, and told the Select Committee that "the growers not only felt the CAMP effort," but also the impact of "the (Select Committee's 1983 hearings) in Redding . . . and I think that they are going to feel quite an impact with an increased support this year."

When asked about the BLM's experimentation with dye markers and odorants for use on marihuana plants, Conrad said that his agency had been working with the State Police in Arkansas to develop a non-toxic dye that contains deer repellant and "smells like rotten eggs." This dye makes the plants "virtually unsmokable. It kills the plant, but yet it doesn't yield a toxic effect." Conrad added that CAMP has plans to test this dye if such an action is approved by the State of California.

The panel of witnesses from California reiterated the need for increased resources for the CAMP program which is considered one of the most successful examples of Federal, State and local cooperation in dealing with the problem of narcotics. Members of the Select Committee assured the panel that every effort would be made to secure assistance from the Federal Government for the CAMP program to carry out its important work.

Hawaiian Panel

Congressman Daniel Akaka.
Michael Lilly, First Deputy Attorney General of the State of Hawaii.
Lt. Charles Wakita, Commanding Officer in Charge of the Vice Section, Hawaii County Police Department.

Congressman Akaka opened this section of the hearing with an update on the narcotics situation in Hawaii, emphasizing the importance of two recent initiatives—Operation Pele and Operation Green Harvest.

Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies co-ordinated their efforts to eliminate the use of the U.S. Postal System for mailing marijuana from Hawaii to the mainland during Operation Pele. Operation Pele involved two phases: the first was an intelligence gathering phase and the second was an investigative phase during which time cases were being built to bring to the Grand Jury. The U.S. Mails, according to Hawaiian Law Enforcement officials, is the largest channel for smuggling drugs from Hawaii to the mainland.

During the course of Operation Pele, Post Offices on the Island of Hawaii (The "Big Island") were instructed to isolate packages which were thought to contain narcotics. Federal search warrants were issued, and the packages were examined. In one Post Office, eighty percent of the packages leaving for the mainland were found to contain drugs. In another instance, 132 packages were set aside for inspection, and every one of them were found to contain narcotics.

Operation Green Harvest utilized Federal, State and local authorities to eradicate marijuana. During this operation, National Guard helicopters were used for the eradication program, and the cooperation between the DEA and the Hawaii County Police Department made Operation Green Harvest a success.

Mr. Lilly, the First Deputy Attorney General of the State of Hawaii told the Select Committee that narcotics cannot be considered a local problem, but must be viewed in an international context. Marijuana is considered to be the number one drug problem in Hawaii, and that State is experiencing difficulty in destroying a significant portion of the marijuana grown there. In 1983, approximately 636,000 pounds of marijuana were seized, representing about 10–12 percent of the State's total crop. In previous years, Hawaiian law enforcement was able to seize up to 20 percent of the total crop.

Hawaiian marijuana commands a high price on the illegal market, bringing in $4,500 a pound. Because of its tremendous profit, Hawaiian grown marijuana is protected vigorously by life threatening booby traps and firearms. Mr. Lilly demonstrated to the Committee the workings of a booby trap recently seized by law enforcement officials after an attempted raid on a marijuana field. The trap consisted of two trip wires hooked up to a 20 gauge shotgun shell which was activated when the wires were tripped. Murders are the common result of vigilant guarding of the marijuana fields.

Hawaiian officials had been pleased with the effectiveness of the Hawaii Narcotics State Wide Task Force which was disbanded in 1982. The Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Attorney's Office, Mr. Lilly's office, the Coast Guard, County Police Departments, the FBI, Naval Investigations Service and the Army CID joined together to establish this Task Force which pooled resources to attack the problem of drugs and marijuana cultivation in Hawaii.

Despite the success of the Task Force, said Mr. Lilly, it was disbanded because its informal nature did not fit into the Federal Government's strategy. Lilly stated that "The national level yanked it because it wasn't as I understand, it wasn't an official Task Force. Didn't fit the definition of an official Task Force * * *. It's unfortunate that DEA pulled their support because the Task Force fell apart as a result." *

The importance of the Western States Information Network was stressed by Michael Lilly, and he urged that the Congress continue appropriating funding for this organization which provides intelligence and information to the Western States in their efforts to detect and interdict narcotics.

Lilly's office was responsible for 1300 drug-related arrests since 1981 and the confiscation of over $200 million worth of narcotics and property from the dealers and traffickers.

Hawaii is in danger of becoming a major heroin transshipment point, particularly for Asian heroin. The shortage of law enforcement personnel as Hawaiian airports contributes to the success that traffickers have had in smuggling narcotics in baggage and in the commercial aircraft. The other Hawaiian islands are prime smuggling locations, and airport monitoring there is insufficient.

Other narcotic problems in Hawaii include the increase in cocaine trafficking, and the proliferation of look-alike drugs and drug paraphernalia. There have been reports of coca cultivation in Hawaii, a development which worries law enforcement officials.

Lilly said that the 'head shops' which promote and sell drug paraphernalia have significantly contributed to the narcotics problem, particularly among teenagers. " * * * if the kids perceive that cocaine use is a joke out in the community, then it's okay. It's a funny thing; it's not something that really deadly serious."

Lt. Wakita of the Hawaii County Police Department reported to the Select Committee that his Police Department is facing some difficulties in detecting and eradicating the marijuana grown in his county. With nine investigators and two supervisors, his department has come to depend upon the helicopter as the most effective tool in marijuana eradication efforts. Since 1978, regular missions have been undertaken to eradicate marijuana. As a result of some effective eradication efforts, cultivators have begun to seek more remote areas for cultivation, and have been successful in eluding the routine patrols.

Lt. Wakita provided the Committee with the results of Operation Pele during which time more than one thousand packages were intercepted. 441 search warrants were issued, and seven hundred pounds of high grade marijuana was seized. The marijuana was estimated to be worth $1.3 million. During Operation Pele, an estimated $375,000 in incoming drugs was seized as well as 45 vehicles valued at $170,000. $14,000 in cash was also seized.

A new and disturbing trend was emerging in the marijuana business, Wakita said. Marijuana was being traded for cocaine instead

*As of September, 1984, both the House and the Senate were urging the recreation of the Hawaiian Task Force, and both Houses added language to this effect in respective versions of the Commerce, Justice, State Appropriation bills.

of cash; "That's why we have so much cocaine coming into our county."

The Select Committee expressed interest in the progress of Operation Wilt, an eradication program which utilized a specially designed diesel oil emulsion to kill the marijuana plants. The emulsion was being used on one quarter of the cane fields in Hawaii County, and the advantage of this diesel oil emulsion was that it did not harm the cane while destroying, within hours, the marijuana plants. With its hundred percent effectiveness rate, the diesel oil emulsion proved cost efficient as well. When sprayed from a special broom in a Hughes 500 D helicopter, the diesel oil emulsion costs $120 per hundred gallons and $500 per hour in helicopter time.

The Select Committee encouraged the continued use of this alternative method of eradication since paraquat was not being used in Hawaii, and since the emulsion method was far less time consuming than manual eradication.

South Florida Panel

Congressman Tom Lewis.
Jim Holt, Sheriff of Martin County, Florida.
Lieutenant John Murphy, Chief of Narcotics Division, Sheriff's Office, Martin County, Florida.
Gary Frechette, Program Specialist, Department of Security, Palm Beach County School Board, Florida.

Congressman Tom Lewis opened the panel discussion with a progress report from South Florida and told the Select Committee that few positive changes had been made since the Committee held hearings in South Florida in October 1983.

Congressman Lewis said smugglers had pushed their operations north, up the coast of Florida, and west to the open rangelands and wilderness of central Florida because of the increased activity of the South Florida Task Force in the lower part of the State. Representative Lewis also discussed the corruption of many residents in Everglades City, Florida, where the lure of great monetary gain and the drug lifestyle created irresistable temptations.

Congressman Lewis also told the Select Committee that "serious gaps in cooperative communication" continue to exist between the Federal Government and State and local officials.

In the area of drug education, Congressman Lewis stated that the work of Gary Frechette, Program Specialist for the Palm Beach County School Board's Department of Security, was invaluable in educating preschoolers about the need to say no to drugs.

Sheriff Jim Holt of Martin County told the Committee that there was not much improvement in the cooperation between Federal and State authorities since the Committee's October 1983 hearing in Florida. In a graphic illustration of the difficulties being faced by the law enforcement community in South Florida, Sheriff Holt reported to the Committee that there were serious problems involving the EPIC (El Paso Intelligence Center) system and the sharing of intelligence among Federal, State and local agencies:

> There are boats that bay off the Bahamas that I feel sure that some of our Federal agencies know about that we never get this information.

> There is another at the EPIC which is out in El Paso, Texas. There is no way a local can get information out of this. If I have a high speed ocean racer within one of my areas, my marinas, that I am very suspicious of, to get this information—if there was ever any information on this person—I have to go into a system in South Florida or in Florida known as BENA, which then is supposed to be able to get into EPIC to get this information back.
>
> This sometimes takes three days, and at night now there is no way, at night, that BENA can get into EPIC. So here we are bogged down on information. This ocean racer can be out over to one of the offshore islands and be back in a matter of three hours with a load of narcotics, and I still wouldn't have any information on him later in the day.

Lieutenant John Murphy, Officer-in-Charge of Vice in the Martin County Sheriff's Office, suggested that a County Task Force be established to assist the local law enforcement officials in dealing with the specific problems of Martin County, Florida. Such a county Task Force could interact in a productive way with the South Florida Task Force and provide a good exchange of relevant information, which would be beneficial to both the Federal and local law enforcement communities. Lt. Murphy added that such a working relationship would go a long way toward stopping drug smuggling in South Florida.

Gary Frechette reported to the Committee on the success of the recent "Chemical People" program, which brought 1900 individuals together in 32 different locations in South Florida. However, Frechette said 1900 people was only a small percentage of the 80,000 students in the West Palm Beach School system. On the second night the attendance dropped to only 700, and at the present time, local Chemical People committees contain only four or five people each.

The apathy apparent at all of the anti-drug programs put on in the schools indicates drug education and prevention is not an issue which most parents want to discuss, and unless a program is made mandatory, there will be no overwhelming interest on the part of the community.

Mr. Frechette also told the Committee that his job was difficult, and that one person spreading the anti-drug message to 80,000 students in 102 schools was almost an impossible task. But, he said, if schools and parents began the anti-drug program at an early age, children would be more responsive to alternatives and more aware of the negative aspects of drug abuse. Mr. Frechette said that the "Naturally High" program as well as the "Only Sick People Need Drugs" program used in the Palm Beach County school system have been successful in illustrating the dangers of drug abuse.

Texas Panel:

Congressman Solomon Ortiz.
Mr. Andres Vega, Chief of Police, Brownsville, Texas.
Mr. David Pollard, Director, Kleberg County Alcohol Office, Kingsville, Texas.

Congressman Ortiz led the panel discussion with a summary of the findings and recommendations from the Select Committee's 1983 hearings in Corpus Christi. After hearing from 27 witnesses

who testified that heroin addiction was growing despite the State's best efforts to stop its illicit importation, Congressman Ortiz stated that the problem was growing more severe in the Southwest United States. Despite the growing problem in Texas, there is no statewide drug abuse education program in the State of Texas due to the lack of funding, and Congressman Ortiz stated that the present border interdiction program has not been effective in stopping the flow of drugs over the border.

An issue of grave concern to the Gulf Coast region is the growing use of inhalants by Mexican-American youths in the Southwest United States. Congressman Ortiz told the Select Committee that the incidence of inhalant abuse in the Corpus Christi area is six times the national average, as reported by NIDA. Even with these severe problems, there is an extreme lack of treatment services in Texas; in Brownsville, Texas, there is no detoxification center to service addicts wishing detoxification.

In response to the need for greater availability of drug education programs, Congressman Ortiz introduced legislation, H.R. 4851 which authorizes $30 million over three years for education programs to assist local education organizations in establishing and improving drug, alcohol and tobacco education programs for elementary and secondary students. The Secretary of Education is also authorized to make grants for establishing procedures and ensuring that funding is used by local educational agencies for drug education programs. Congressman Ortiz said that education is the key to preventing drug abuse in children.

Mr. Andres Vega, Chief of Police in Brownsville, Texas said that depressed economic conditions in South Texas, including the decline in sales tax revenues, the devaluation of the Mexican peso, and the reduction in trade, all led to a reduced operating budget for the police department, which led to increased problems in the narcotics situation.

The police departments are simply unable to conduct in-depth surveillance operations in addition to controlling the abundance of crime in the Brownsville border area. While there is excellent co-operation between the Drug Enforcement Administration and the local police departments, Vega said that there is a serious shortage of manpower which hampers progress. Vega told the Committee that there are four DEA agents and two supervisors responsible for detection and interdiction in the Gulf Coast area. The Police Chief said that the trafficking problem must be addressed at the international level so that effective policies can be made to halt the importation of Mexican heroin.

Mr. Vega proposed a four point plan which, if adopted by the Federal Government would lead to a more effective narcotics program. The plan includes:

1. Federal dollars to be provided to border cities for interdiction purposes. Vega also suggested the formation of regional task forces and urged the Drug Enforcement Administration to assign additional staff personnel and equipment to the Texas region.
2. Co-operation between Federal, State and local agencies involved in the narcotics situation is a must.

3. The U.S. Attorney's Office and the District Attorney must be provided with the necessary resources in order to vigorously prosecute violators in a timely fashion.

4. Narcotics and drug abuse programs should be developed at the elementary school level in order for young people to be aware of the dangers of drugs at an early age.

Mr. Vega expressed frustration at the growing problem of international involvement in the narcotics trafficking business in Texas. He told the Committee that recently 365 pounds of cocaine worth several million dollars was seized and seven Colombians were arrested. Despite the large bond required, the seven men were able to post the bond, and hired the best defense attorneys available.

In closing, Vega stressed the need to fight drugs on an international and Federal level, since the local law enforcement officials were having a difficult time fighting crime and interdicting narcotics.

Mr. David Pollard, the Director of the Kleberg County Alcohol Office in Kingsville, Texas reported that there is a scarcity of narcotics treatment centers in Texas, and added that the low salaries paid to drug counselors and health professionals resulted in turnover of personnel.

The serious problem of inhalant use among young people was increasing with tragic results, including brain damage to the users. Cocaine has become more popular, and Pollard stressed the need for early intervention and increased drug education programs. He expressed concern that drug use is often related to other social and family problems, and said that it is often difficult to bring people into treatment. There is also an increasing problem of pill use among junior high school students, and added to the already rampant problems of marijuana use and alcohol abuse, the severity of the school drug problem is increasingly worrisome.

With approximately 700,000 people in Texas seeking treatment for narcotics abuse, there is a real need to provide extended treatment and education programs to help individuals break the cycle of dependence upon drugs, said Pollard. Without any facilities in the Texas area for detoxification of addicts, there is little hope for an improved narcotics situation.

The increasing availability of Mexican brown heroin is of concern to both the law enforcement community, and to health professionals, both Vega and Pollard agreed.

SOUTH FLORIDA LAW ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE (MAY 14, 1984)

On May 14, 1984, the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control sponsored a conference of South Florida drug law enforcement officials in West Palm Beach. The conference was convened in direct response to the disturbing findings of a Select Committee hearing in South Florida during the previous October. Several local police officials had testified that cooperation, as well as communication, with Federal narcotic enforcement officials assigned to the South Florida Task Force was almost nonexistent, hampering efforts to control the rampant smuggling of marijuana and cocaine into the region from South America. During a follow-up hearing in

April 1984, the Committee learned that the situation had not improved.

Nearly forty local law enforcement officials from ten South Florida counties attended the May conference. In addition, three State agencies were represented, and nine representatives from various Federal agencies including the South Florida Task Force participated. The main purpose of the daylong session was to assess the level of Federal, State and local cooperation on narcotics control and to discuss and recommend ways that it might be improved. Federal representatives were invited so that they might provide some response to the concerns of local and State officials and contribute ideas toward a solution.

The morning session was opened with a statement by Representative Tom Lewis, a Member of the Select Committee from North Palm Beach who hosted the conference. Representative Lewis' remarks were followed by a statement by Representative Benjamin A. Gilman who, as Ranking Minority Member of the Committee, presided over the meeting.

Representative Lewis noted that because South Florida is a gateway for drugs smuggled from South and Central America, there is no doubt that the flow of drugs from these countries will continue to move through Florida if a lack of interagency cooperation persists. In outlining the problem, Representative Lewis warned that, "Unless we can develop an effective strategy with your input, the fight against drug smuggling will continue to remain a series of individual battles fought independently, without the benefit of shared intelligence, shared resources and enforcement assistance." The Select Committee's aim, Representative Lewis said, was to provide the participants with "the proper forum for a frank discussion of the problems."

In his opening remarks, Representative Lewis cited a Select Committee survey of county and local law enforcement officials in South Florida. Those who answered indicated there was a severe lack of communication between them and Federal law enforcement officials. The respondents also made suggestions for what could be done to rectify the situation. The survey is discussed in more detail in the section of this report describing the Select Committee's survey and research program.

Representative Gilman, in his opening statement, noted that what he called the three C's—communication, cooperation and coordination—would have to be the cornerstone of any effective drug law enforcement program. He said those three elements represent a two-way street of mutual responsibility to arrest, to prosecute and convict drug traffickers. He added that the conference was designed "to allow us to talk freely and offer constructive suggestions that we can agree on."

The Members' appeal for an open and frank discussion was not lost on the group. What followed was a lively and realistic assessment of the problem by all involved and some very practical suggestions toward a solution.

A report in the previous day's New York Times (Sunday, May 13, 1984) was used as a springboard for the discussion in the early part of the morning session. The Times article was particularly germane to the topic at hand. Essentially, the Times article detailed a

memorandum sent from Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) head Francis Mullen to Attorney General William French Smith. Mr. Mullen reportedly warned that the "alleged grandiose accomplishments" of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) had begun to "discredit and devalue the efforts of the Administration's other drug-control programs." According to the story, Mr. Mullen also claimed that the "unbridled activities of NNBIS regional coordinators" as well as NNBIS head Admiral Murphy were confusing foreign, State and local law enforcement officials who see "NNBIS encroaching on the mission functions mandated principally to the Drug Enforcement Administration." The story supported earlier assertions by the Select Committee that State and local officials are often confused about which Federal agency is in charge of narcotics enforcement making it all the more difficult for them to know which agency to cooperate with in order to get the job done effectively.

As the discussion proceeded, it became clear that local sheriffs and detectives had little knowledge, if any, about who comprises the South Florida Task Force and NNBIS. A number of local narcotics enforcement officials said they had good working relationships and a good exchange of information with local DEA and Customs officials based on years of personal contacts. Some felt it would be more worthwhile for the Federal Government to provide more resources and personnel to existing drug law enforcement agencies in South Florida, rather than to create new Federal task forces which only caused confusion and added layers of bureaucracy. They also said the Task Force and NNBIS had not contributed substantially to reducing the supplies of drugs on the streets of South Florida, and they said they had not noticed any improvement in the flow and exchange of information reaching their offices after the creation of the Task Force and NNBIS.

Admiral Thompson, Commander of the 7th Coast Guard District and head of NNBIS and the Task Force operation in South Florida, tried to clarify the situation early in the group discussion. He explained that Federal agents attached to existing DEA and Customs offices in the area were now part of the South Florida Task Force and NNBIS and that to the extent local officials are getting information from their established contacts with locally assigned Federal agents, "They are receiving what information we have available from the South Florida Task Force and NNBIS." But even Admiral Thompson admitted that NNBIS is not satisfied with the amount of information that is getting down to local officials nor with the amount of information that is coming up and said, "That is what we need to get better at."

Perhaps the best characterization of the way information flows between Federal, State and local officials came from Captain Richard Guiffrida of the Deerfield Beach Police Department. Captain Guiffirda said the amount of cooperation depends on the relationships that local investigators have with their counterparts in established Customs or DEA offices:

> You can't arbitrarily just pick up the phone and say you are so and so . . . and they are going to tell you what you have to know. You have to have rapport with somebody. . . . Everything that we do with the Federal Government is always on an individual basis.

Further questioning of State, local and Federal officials confirmed that the information imparted by Federal authorities to local officials is very much dependent on the individual personalities involved. Those relationships also have been colored overall by the inherent competitiveness and "turf" disputes that are part and parcel of having a variety of law enforcement agencies, at every level, working toward the same goal.

The basic problem, made clear by the statements of everyone in the group who addressed the issue, is that there exists no institutional method, no vehicle, for the exchange of information, especially from the Federal level down to the locals.

An institutional method for the flow of information from the Federal to the State level was at that time being set up. Mr. Robert Edwards and Mr. James Nursey, both representatives of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), told the conference that FDLE had recently placed an agent and an analyst in NNBIS to act as a liaison. Mr. Edwards said he hoped the recent appointments would bridge the existing gap between Federal and State agents. The State, he said, would in turn act as a focal point for interaction with local agents, thus enhancing two-way communication. Mr. Nursey, however, pointed out that there is an inconsistency statewide in the working relationships between the DEA and FDLE. Mr. Nursey said, "In some parts of the State we work cases very well with DEA. In other parts of the State there are virtually no working relationships with DEA. . . ."

Mr. Nursey also expressed frustration at having to deal with so many Federal agencies responsible for different aspects of interdiction and enforcement. He said:

> You have Customs, you have Coast Guard. And I could go on and on. It is very difficult to juggle all of these various relationships because we are dealing with so many agencies in the Federal level. In addition to all of the various agencies we have talked about, we have the U.S. Attorneys, three of which are in Florida.

According to local officials, the lack of cooperation between Federal, State and local agencies manifests itself in very real lost opportunities. Sheriff Jim Holt of Martin County, addressing Admiral Thompson, said that if he is notified in advance when an attempt will be made to smuggle drugs into his county, he can cover every place a shipment can be dropped or landed within Martin County in a few minutes. He went on to say that on at least two occasions Federal agents lost track of suspect aircraft they chased into Martin County without even notifying his office of the plane's course in advance:

> One time we found the airplane. The other time we never did find the airplane. If we just knew ahead of time this was coming, we could cover it just that quick; and I think every other local agent here could probably do the same thing, if we had some way to get this information from you to us.

The latter part of the conference was spent discussing the problems of sharing equipment and other resources and how to improve the ability of Federal, State and local enforcement agencies to communicate by radio and also how to improve the security of voice communications.

The conference ended with a statement by Fred Phillips, a private citizen from Monroe County. Chief among Mr. Phillips' suggestions were that drug felonies be separated from all other felo-

nies, with new guidelines for sentencing; (2) that an incentive program for narcotics law enforcement officials be established giving rewards to agents catching drug dealers; and (3) that a Florida drug revenue commission be created which would by law convert into cash items such as boats, planes and cars used by drug dealers, and distribute that money where it is needed throughout the State.

Toward a solution of the problems discussed at the conference, Representative Lewis asked Admiral Thompson to take the lead in convening an Ad Hoc Drug and Law Enforcement Liaison Committee, comprised of Federal, State and local officials in South Florida, to discuss ways that coordination and cooperation on narcotics enforcement can be improved.

The conference adopted the following recommendations:

1. A formal structure should be considered to serve as a liaison between Federal, State and local enforcement agencies in Florida to enhance coordination and cooperation in narcotics enforcement (e.g. a coordinating committee to identify and solve problems).

2. If a formal structure, as referred to in recommendation 1, is established, it should give top priority to examining how narcotics intelligence and information can be best shared between Federal, State and local enforcement agencies.

3. The establishment of a Federal, State and local narcotics enforcement resource pool in South Florida or for the entire State should be explored to make resources available on an "as needed, and available" basis to local enforcement agencies.

The Ad Hoc Drug and Law Enforcement Liaison Committee was created, and Sheriff Richard Wille of Palm Beach County was designated as the Committee's Chairman. The composition of the Committee included 16 Federal, State, and local officials, and the first meeting took place in June, 1984.

The creation of the Liaison Committee was commended by DEA's Administrator, Francis Mullen, and Sheriff Wille informed Congressman Tom Lewis that "* * * I can assure you that for the first time in my memory, local law enforcement and Federal law enforcement are really sincere in working together." As a result of the positive attitude of the Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies in the Liaison Committee, local officials believe that cooperation and coordination among them will become a reality.

NEW YORK CITY CONFERENCE ON DRUG ABUSE AND DRUG TRAFFICKING (MAY 21, 1984)

On Monday, May 21, 1984, Chairman Charles B. Rangel, Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, sponsored a Conference of the New York City Congressional Delegation and officials of the Federal, State and local Governments involved in various aspects of drug abuse. The conference gave local narcotic enforcement authorities an opportunity to express to the Federal attendees the need for Federal assistance if they, the local officials, were to make inroads into the drug abuse problems in New York City.

The following Representatives were in attendance: Representatives Charles B. Rangel, Benjamin Gilman, Mario Biaggi, Joseph Addabbo, Gary Ackerman, Bill Green, Edolphus Towns, Stephen

Solarz, Major Owens and Robert Garcia. Also in attendance were the following Federal, State and local officials: Francis M. Mullen, Jr., Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration; Rudolph W. Giuliani, U.S. Attorney, Southern District of New York; Ronald DePetris, Chief Assistant U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of New York; Bruce Jensen, Special Agent-In-Charge, New York Field Office, Drug Enforcement Administration; Lee S. Laster, Assistant Director, New York Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Dennis Snyder, Regional Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service; Ms. Clare Johnson, National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA); Robert Morgenthau, District Attorney, New York County; Sterling Johnson, Special Narcotics Prosecutor, City of New York; Benjamin Ward, Police Commissioner, City of New York; Mr. Michael Maninochio, Assistant District Attorney, Bronx County; Vincent Fay, Assistant District Attorney, Kings County; Kenneth Conboy, Criminal Justice Coordinator, City of New York; Jacqueline McMickens, Commissioner, New York City Department of Corrections; Judge Betty Elleryn, Deputy Chief Administrative Judge, City of New York; Julio Martinez, Director, Division of Substance Abuse Services, State of New York; Father Coleman Costello, Queens County Youth Development Corporation; Levander Lilly, Special Assistant to the Schools Chancellor, City of New York; and Arthur Jaffe, Director, the SPARK Program, New York City High Schools.

This Conference was successful in drawing from the New York City officials a need to reevaluate the shift of enforcement from street level to mid-level violators and once again give priority to street level enforcement as a means of improving the quality of life in New York City. It was suggested this may be accomplished by declaring New York City a drug disaster area similar to South Florida; additionally, there was an overwhelming call for added funds from the Federal Government. These funds would be used to supplement or improve enforcement efforts, relieve court backlogs, and enhance the School-based Substance Abuse Prevention and Education Programs, as well as providing increased funds for drug abuse treatment.

FEDERAL DRUG INTERDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS (MAY 22, 1984)

On May 22, 1984, the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control held a hearing on Federal Drug Law Enforcement and Interdiction. The hearing focused particularly on the functioning and effectiveness of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS). Captain L.N. Schowengerdt, Jr., USCG, Staff Director, NNBIS, briefed the members of the Committee on the operations of NNBIS. The following witnesses testified at the hearing: The Honorable Claude D. Pepper, Chairman, House Rules Committee; John C. Lawn, Acting Deputy Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration; Alfred R. De Angelus, Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service; Vice Admiral Benedict L. Stabile, Vice Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard; and Oliver B. Revell, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The Select Committee had been concerned about the operation and direction of the NNBIS program from the point it was first formed by the Reagan Administration in early 1983. The role and funding of NNBIS had never, to the satisfaction of the Select Committee, been fully explained. Moreover, a January 1984 memo by DEA Administrator Mullen sharply criticized NNBIS and called for its abolition.

On March 23, 1983, President Reagan announced the formation of NNBIS to assist the interdiction of narcotics into the United States. NNBIS is headed by Vice President George Bush, who also chairs the NNBIS Executive Board which includes the Secretaries of State, Defense, Transportation, the Attorney General, the Counselor to the President (Mr. Meese), the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director of the White House Drug Abuse Policy Office. There is also a NNBIS Coordinating Board which is directed by Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, the Vice President's Chief of Staff, and ranking officials from the relevant departments and agencies. NNBIS is described as a coordinating, rather than an operational entity, designed to improve the effectiveness of all Federal drug law enforcement efforts. NNBIS is to coordinate the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence related to drug smuggling. It is also supposed to coordinate the use of available Federal resources for drug interdiction so that they are deployed most effectively against drug smugglers.

In a January 31, 1984, memorandum to Attorney General William French Smith, DEA Administrator Mullen called NNBIS a "liability" and said the alleged "grandiose accomplishments" of NNBIS will become the Administration's "Achilles heel" for drug enforcement.

Some of the serious charges Mullen leveled against NNBIS in his memo were:

> NNBIS has confused the established reporting relationships of foreign, State and local officials with DEA and Customs.
>
> NNBIS officials have interfered in DEA's working relationships with narcotics control authorities in Mexico, Canada, and the Bahamas.
>
> The location of NNBIS in the Office of the Vice President fragments drug enforcement coordination, which is presumably the Attorney General's responsibility. "This will spark further Congressional pressure for a drug czar," he said.
>
> NNBIS is expensive and is diverting Customs, DEA, FBI and Coast Guard resources from many interdiction functions they normally perform.

Congressman Claude Pepper, Chairman of the House Rules Committee, was the lead witness at this hearing. Congressman Pepper decried the Administration's budgetary policies in the area of drug abuse control and prevention. At one point Mr. Pepper called OMB the nation's "drug czar." He stated that truly effective and adequately funded programs of air and marine interdiction are necessary if drug abuse is to be curtailed in America.

Captain Schowengerdt addressed the Committee's concern about the NNBIS program. He described NNBIS as a "coordinating consortium" as opposed to a command agency. Schowengerdt characterized the Mullen memo of January 31, 1984, as dated. He claimed

that NNBIS, as a new effort, was bound to have problems and "growing pains" at its inception. Captain Schowengerdt also stated that NNBIS plays a key role in extending military assistance to civilian drug enforcement.

Chairman Rangel challenged Schowengerdt on why NNBIS was needed as a coordinating body, if Customs, Coast Guard, and DEA were effectively and adequately performing their missions. To support his argument that NNBIS may not be a useful way to achieve better coordination among drug enforcement agencies, Mr. Rangel pointed to the memo wherein Mr. Mullen stated that NNBIS is not making a "material contribution to the nation's drug enforcement effort, nor should it." The Chairman questioned whether a drug coordination unit was needed if the head of DEA was of the opinion it should not be allowed to make a material contribution to the nation's drug enforcement effort. Rangel also told Schowengerdt that NNBIS had confused the relations of State and local law enforcement with the Federal agencies and that the former would prefer to work directly with DEA, Customs and the Coast Guard.

Congressman Gilman concurred in Mr. Rangel's sentiments and urged that the Administration give a better clarification at the local level of what NNBIS is doing and how it is fulfilling its role.

John Lawn, the Acting Deputy Administrator of DEA explained his agency's role in NNBIS as providing and analyzing tactical enforcement intelligence. He attributed the criticisms of the NNBIS program in the Mullen memo to "breakdowns in communication at the time" which have since been addressed. Lawn stated that in the past DEA, as well as State and local police, had inadequate resources to respond to the nation's drug trafficking threat. He indicated that the Administration was now putting more resources into the enforcement and interdiction effort. At this point Mr. Akaka challenged this statement and pointed to the Administration's proposed reduction of 954 Customs positions as undermining the strength of resource commitment to an effective interdiction effort. Admiral Stabile of the Coast Guard conceded that his agency's interdiction efforts will be enhanced by the receipt of new resources and equipment.

Mr. Gilman closed the hearing with a series of questions for each of the agency representatives concerning their budget requests and relations with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

The general conclusion reached by members of the Select Committee at this hearing was that while NNBIS may enhance cooperative efforts between Federal agencies charged with drug enforcement, it cannot be a substitute for the agencies having adequate manpower and sufficient resources to perform their statutory missions. The NNBIS program, at best an ad hoc cooperative device without a budget or command authority, cannot provide long-term border security from the threat of drug smuggling if its constituent units are not effectively programmed.

DRUG ABUSE TREATMENT AND PREVENTION (JUNE 26, 1984)

The Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control conducted this hearing to examine the Federal, State and local perspectives on the issues affecting drug abuse treatment and prevention. The

Select Committee also had been concerned with the efficacy of methadone maintenance for heroin addiction, and wished to explore the issue of Federal oversight of methadone in response to a series of investigatory articles appearing in the *Fort Lauderdale News/Sun-Sentinel* newspaper. The Select Committee also requested an update from Federal representatives about their drug prevention and education budgets, and the direction in which the Federal drug education and public awareness effort was going. The Committee also wanted to examine community-based approaches to drug abuse prevention focusing on a program that has been used effectively in New Jersey.

In his opening remarks, Chairman Rangel stated that he believes that:

> . . . drug abuse continues to be the most important, most serious public health and social problem that our nation faces today. Drug abuse costs our society an estimated $100 billion . . . It is thought that levels of drug abuse in the U.S. exceed those in other industrialized nations in the world.

Illustrating the gravity of the narcotics problem, Chairman Rangel said that from 1978 to 1982, cocaine-related deaths and emergency room episodes rose 300%. Heroin-related hospital emergencies rose 80%, and heroin overdoses increased almost 50% during that same period. In New York City alone, heroin deaths rose from 246 to 528, an increase of 115%. Citing a recent NASADAD survey (National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors), Rangel stated that over 94% of the respondents reported that there was an unmet need for services in their States.

In New York City, Rangel added, 1500 people had been placed on waiting lists for rehabilitation. Federal funding for drug abuse services had declined approximately 40% under the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Service Block Grant, he said. Rangel said the Committee would ask the Federal representatives what their agencies are doing to respond to the growing demand for drug abuse treatment and prevention services.

Lawrence Davenport, the Assistant Secretary for Elementary and Secondary Education in the Department of Education testified that:

> The primary role of the Department of Education in this area (drug abuse) is to provide leadership, training and technical assistance to the school systems for the purpose of developing local school capacity to deal with local alcohol and drug abuse problems using local resources.

The School Team Approach, also known as the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Education Program, is the mechanism by which the Department carries out this responsibility. The program, which was initiated by the Office of Education in the early 1970's, was cited by Secretary Davenport as a successful example of how the Federal Government and local school districts are working together in the area of drug education. "This program has five regional training centers within the program's support project, (and) maintains a national network for training, dissemination and technical assistance. Currently, 500 local schools and State agencies located throughout the country are part of the network."

In response to questions, Dr. Davenport said the School Team Approach provided training to about 140 teams in fiscal year 1983 (the actual number submitted for the record was 135). He said the

total budget for the program in 1984 was $2.8 million with an increase of $130,000 planned for 1985. Each team that is trained by the program costs about $20,000, he said. This amount apparently includes both the actual amount of grants made to teams for travel and other expenses incident to training (an average of $4,245 per team) plus the costs of maintaining the 5 regional training centers.

Dr. Davenport said the teams generally consist of teachers (he later included other school personnel, parents and students) who then devise programs for their local schools. Elementary schools are not eligible to participate, he said. The focus is on grades 7–12.

When asked about information available to the Committee that staff for the program had been reduced from 6 to 1, Davenport said he did not have staffing information available. He said, however, that the number of staff in the program was irrelevant to the Department's leadership. The only function of the staff, he indicated, was to make sure the funds were distributed to the training centers and that the contracts with them were carried out effectively. In a follow-up submission, Davenport said that one person is primarily responsible for administration of the program, with other staff available as needed.

Chairman Rangel took issue with the effectiveness of the School Team Approach and expressed his concern that training teachers to teach drug education in a handful of schools across the country was not the answer. "That's not a Federal education prevention program; that is providing some assistance to teachers," said Rangel. "(If a) foreigner would ask the question, 'Well, what is the Federal Government doing about (drug abuse by youngsters) in connection with education and prevention?' would the answer be that the Federal Government is providing training to teachers on a regional basis?"

Davenport maintained that the Department's effort through the School Team Approach was a significant contribution to school-based drug prevention efforts. In reply, Rangel invited Secretary Davenport to "join with me to visit some of the school districts in the City of New York where clearly we have drug abusers that are youngsters on the street . . . where there is no assistance for them, and I would ask you to ask the principals and the superintendents of schools as to whether or not they are relying on any Federal programs to help." In his follow-up submission to the Committee, Davenport said no teams from New York City had been trained in 1984 and only one had applied for training in 1985.

Mr. Akaka expressed concern that funding for the School Team Approach was not commensurate with the importance of the program, and he raised doubts about the lack of visibility the Administration has given to the program. He also questioned how the program could be responsive to the needs of all the State and local governments if it were true that only one person was in charge of administering the program.

Dr. Edward Brandt, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Health, Department of Health and Human Services, testified that the Department of HHS is working within the Executive Branch as a partner in the Federal strategy and stated that HHS is committed to both supply and demand reduction activities. He told the Committee that in each of the past three years one billion dollars has been spent on

supply and demand reduction efforts, exclusive of block grant funds. For its part, HHS conducts research, disseminates information and supports State efforts in the areas of drug abuse treatment and education through the block grant. Dr. Brandt informed the Select Committee that the President's FY 1985 budget request would fund the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Services Block Grant at $472.3 million. NIDA's research budget would be funded at $63.5 million, representing "the largest percentage increase for any categorical programs in the Public Health Service."

Dr. Brandt illustrated his belief that the drug picture has a "positive side" by pointing out that "two out of three Americans have never used any of the drugs that are abused."

Chairman Rangel viewed this statement as indicative of the severity of drug abuse among Americans, adding that "one out of three are abusers."

When questioned about the effectiveness of the Federal drug effort, Dr. Brandt stated that NIDA's High School Senior Surveys and National Household Surveys indicate an overall decrease in the level of new or current drug use. He said, however, that "adverse consequences associated with drug use continue to increase. . . . Medical emergencies associated with more intense use of (cocaine), including intravenous and smoking, are increasing at an alarming rate."

Addressing the effectiveness of the block grant system, Dr. Brandt cited early results of studies by the Urban Institute and the General Accounting Office that indicated that, "States are effectively and efficiently using these funds to address their own unique health care problems." He told the Committee that because the drug abuse situation varies greatly from State to State and locality to locality, the Administration believes the block grant is the right approach. It allows States to determine their own priorities and allocate funds accordingly.

In the area of prevention, Dr. Brandt said that the twenty percent prevention set-aside requirement in the block grant program had resulted in most States increasing their emphasis on prevention and education programs in a variety of ways. He told the Committee the Department is involved in research to develop, test and evaluate new prevention strategies and to disseminate results to the field. School-based programs, particularly for middle school and junior high students, are the main focus of their efforts although programs for senior high students are also being looked at.

NIDA has refocused its public education activities over the past two years to reach a broad national audience, Dr. Brandt said. Two national media campaigns aimed at parents and young people were developed during FY 82 and will continue through the next year. NIDA has also worked with the National Broadcasting Company and Peoples Drug Stores to reach parents and young people who seek information on drugs and the dangers of drug abuse.

Dr. Brandt said public attitudes about drug abuse were shifting in large part because of the increased scientific evidence about the health risks of drug abuse. He said public attitudes had changed so much in the past few years, "that our citizens now increasingly favor more vigorous enforcement of our drug laws."

Dr. William Pollin, the Administrator of NIDA who accompanied Dr. Brandt, was questioned by Chairman Rangel about the prevalence of narcotics abuse among minority populations. Pollin indicated that abuse among Hispanics and Blacks was still high, and that, "Preliminary data suggests * * * we would not be surprised to see it increase."

With respect to the block grant, Chairman Rangel told Brandt he was sure most State governments would agree with Brandt that they like the discretion afforded by the block grant. "But," he continued, "discretion with reduced funds and competing needs are not exactly what our governments were looking forward to when they supported the block grants." He asked Brandt, "Do you believe that the Federal response to that should be less dollars to deal with the (drug abuse) problem?"

Chairman Rangel also disputed claims by Dr. Brandt and Dr. Pollin, based on the results of Government surveys, that the general trend in drug abuse was downward. He noted the sharp increases in drug-related deaths. He also pointed to the bumper crops of heroin, cocaine, hashish and marijuana coming into the country and indicated that he could not understand how less and less people could be using more and more quantities of drugs. "Somebody must be consuming it," he said.

Mr. Rangel asked Dr. Brandt what Federal resources were available in local areas such as New York which face such intense drug abuse problems. In addition to the block grant, Brandt said the Government, through NIDA, provided technical assistance to States that request it and public information to help educate and organize parents and other concerned groups and community organizations to prevent drug abuse. Brandt stated that "* * * we are, in fact, trying to work with the local officials as they attempt to solve problems that occur in their areas of responsibility, and we will continue to do so." Brandt stressed his belief that the Federal Government should be involved with the States and local governments in order to enable the localities to "decide their best priorities and to follow up." The same Federal involvement was advocated for education programs.

Chairman Rangel was insistent in his view that Federal resources for treatment and prevention are inadequate to help States and localities meet their pressing needs in this area. For his part, Dr. Brandt insisted that, "The job we are doing is improving and * * * it will continue to improve."

In questioning the panel, Mr. Coughlin noted that he disagreed somewhat with the Chairman's view. He commended the First Lady, the President and his Administration for placing "a higher priority on the area of drug abuse than any other Administration in my knowledge, and I've been here for 16 years."

He stated his belief that drug education is a very key part of the solution to the drug abuse problem because, "* * * as long as the demand is there, as long as the money is there,* * * we can do all the interdiction work we want, and there will still be a supply because it's a huge business."

Dr. Brandt told Mr. Coughlin that the Department did not try to monitor exactly how States used the 20 percent of their block grant funds set-aside for prevention activities. When asked whether the

Department of Education or HHS had developed a "canned" model drug and alcohol program that could be tailored for use in school curricula for grades 7–12, Brandt said HHS had developed curricula outlines, including educational materials that are available now for teachers or schools wishing to use them. Mr. Coughlin asked whether Congress should mandate that States use a part of their 20 percent prevention set-aside funds to install this program in every school. Dr. Brandt said the Administration favored removing all of the earmarks from the block grant and letting the States decide how best to meet the needs in their area.

Mr. Coughlin expressed concern that neither the Department of Education nor the Department of Health and Human Services knew how many States require that a certain number of hours of drug education be taught in the schools each semester. He said we should know how much drug education we give to our young people and what the nature of those programs are.

Mr. Hall expressed his doubts about the strength of the Federal effort to prevent and control drug abuse. He also said he was concerned that Federal assistance was not getting down to the people it was supposed to help and that federally supported prevention programs had not been adequately evaluated for effectiveness. Dr. Pollin replied that studies clearly show that treatment is effective for drug users who remain in treatment for any significant period of time.

Mr. Hall asked the witnesses whether there was a need for additional treatment and prevention funds over and above the funding the Departments had now. Dr. Brandt replied that, "At the present time, total funding from all sources is probably not adequate to achieve the whole problem." Dr. Davenport told Mr. Hall that the Department of Education's budget was adequate for its contribution at this point.

The Select Committee Members also expressed concern that the School Team Approach program did not involve elementary schools and was limited to grades 7–12. The Members also expressed disappointment with the decreasing availability of NIDA's drug education publications which provided information to young people and parents.

Congressman Clay Shaw stated his belief that providing drug education was of urgent necessity if the drug problem was to improve:

> They (young people) need to be hit with the hard facts. You know, we get into sex education and we teach them that they can get pregnant. Well, when we're talking about things such as drugs, we have to teach them that they can be killed, and that they can end up as junkies and dependent upon these drugs that can absolutely obliterate their entire future.

Mr. Shaw also expressed concern that the Federal Government does not know what it is getting for the money it spends on drug education. He said Congress needs information from the Federal agencies on what works and what does not work in order to make intelligent funding decisions. He expressed concern that Federal monitoring of State prevention efforts under the block grant was not adequate:

> . . . when we send the money down, . . . we do have a responsibility for accountability, and I think that responsibility comes right back here to the Congress.

We have to know what's working, and there's no sense everyone out there doing something different and having their independence. Even though I'm a great advocate of block grant funds, I think in this instance perhaps we ought to be a little more restrictive somewhat . . .

In summing up his view of the Federal witnesses' testimony, Chairman Rangel noted his serious differences with the Administration's position:

Well, I gather there's a sharp difference as to what the Federal commitment should be . . . and there's a philosophical difference . . . as to whether or not the Federal Government . . . should be able to say that we're there, we're on the front line and we know what we're doing and we're evaluating whether it's working and whether it's not working.

* * * * * * *

Since the facts cannot be disputed that 85 percent of the marijuana is imported to the country, all of the cocaine, all of the heroin is imported, for you to sit there and say it's a local and State problem is consistent with the Administration's view.

But, I seriously differ with you. It's poison. It's coming into the United States. It's coming from foreign countries. It just appears to me to be an international drug trafficking problem, and that the very least, it has to be called the national problem rather than allowing local governments to decide what they are going to do. There's no relationship at all with the Federal dollar that's dispensed in connection with the number of people that are adversely affected. There's no relationship between the monies given and the monies that local and State governments are putting up to try to resolve this problem, and I suspect that there is nothing we can do to change you philosophically, and I guess we'll do the best we can. * * *

The second panel consisted of witnesses expert in the area of methadone maintenance as a modality for the treatment of heroin addiction. The Select Committee had requested clarification from Federal agencies and methadone clinic personnel on allegations concerning the improper use and administration of methadone. These allegations were made in a 1983 series of newspaper articles appearing in the *Fort Lauderdale News/Sun-Sentinel.*

Chairman Rangel introduced the panel: Dr. Daniel Michels, Director of the Office of Compliance, Center for Drugs and Biologics, Food and Drug Administration, accompanied by Dr. James Cooper, Director of the Division of Medical and Professional Affairs of the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA); and Dr. Robert Newman, General Director of the Beth Israel Medical Center in New York City.

Chairman Rangel stated:

As you gentlemen know, there have been any number of reports indicating that there has been a great deal of methadone abuse and that there has been an increasing number of people dying from methadone abuse with other drugs. It seems as though emergency rooms in our larger cities are getting increasing reports of methadone-related deaths.

Dr. Michels of the FDA addressed that agency's role in the regulation of the use of methadone in cases of addiction. He told the Select Committee that both NIDA and the FDA jointly regulate narcotics treatment programs using methadone, and related the history of the involvement of HHS and FDA in the regulation process.

The 1970 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act authorized HHS (then HEW) to increase efforts in rehabilitation, prevention and treatment of drug abuse. It also required the Secretary of HEW to establish medical standards for treatment of narcotics addicts. As part of the FDA's responsibility under the

1970 law, FDA in 1972 published regulations that contained procedures for approval by FDA of treatment programs, mandated standards and established procedures for revoking approval for failure to comply with these standards.

In 1974, Congress enacted the Narcotic Addict Treatment Act, NATA, which provides FDA's primary authority to regulate methadone treatment programs. FDA reviews applicants' (practitioners in the treatment field) qualifications under standards set out by NATA, FDA and NIDA. Practitioners must comply with HHS regulations and register with the Attorney General through the Drug Enforcement Administration.

Michels informed the Select Committee that the FDA and NIDA revised their methadone maintenance regulations in 1980 in order to allow practitioners greater flexibility in the use of methadone, and to increase the effectiveness of methadone maintenance, reduce the likelihood of diversion by patients and establish clearer treatment standards.

Michels told the Select Committee that at the present time there are approximately 600 approved narcotics treatment programs in 41 States and three territories; in addition, FDA has approved 200 hospital in-patient detoxification treatment centers.

FDA conducts on-site inspections of facilities to insure compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements. One-fourth of the total number of programs is inspected by FDA each year, and FDA requires administrators of treatment programs to submit annual reports containing information on the amount of methadone used for treatment, the number of patients in treatment, the number of new patients entering treatment, dosage levels for clients and the number of patients receiving take home medication. The FDA also reviews and thoroughly evaluates reports of adverse reactions arising in patients receiving methadone, alone or in combination with another substance.

In response to the allegations published in the *Fort Lauderdale New/Sun-Sentinel* concerning mismanagement and laxity of oversight on the part of FDA, Michels stated the following:

—FDA has indeed collected, analyzed and acted on drug experience reports for treatment programs using methadone. Since the beginning of the methadone program, approximately 300 reports per year have been entered into the "adverse reaction" reporting system, and have been reviewed and analyzed. FDA has conducted investigations into the likely causes of the adverse effects, investigations which have on occasion, resulted in on-site investigations and follow up.

—FDA disagrees with the contention that methadone has been responsible for the deaths of thousands of individuals. Methadone users tend, by their very nature, to be an at-risk population. Risks include significant mental illness, resulting in suicide, homicide, or other violent deaths. Michels stated that, "In short, the causes of death in these reports may vary, and range from no causal association to methadone use for its purposeful overdose." Oftentimes methadone is listed as one of several drugs used in the overdose.

—FDA has exhibited a great deal of oversight and monitoring of methadone maintenance treatment programs over the

years. Treatment programs are inspected regularly by the FDA, and 130 inspections are scheduled for 1984. FDA works in conjunction with DEA and State agencies to monitor the methadone treatment facilities, and FDA is kept updated and informed on any significant problems discovered during a State or DEA investigation.

—FDA has not relaxed its regulations concerning methadone treatment programs. In an effort to make the regulations more flexible and to make clinical standards more applicable to a variety of program settings, regulations were revised. Performance standards were also revised by FDA to make them clearer and more specific. While the regulations were made more flexible, they were also strengthened by requiring individual treatment plans, the assessment of patients' responsiblities for handling take-home medication, and by clarifying some of the specific requirements for the medical director and program physician.

Michels summarized by stating that, "The current regulations, thus, strike a necessary balance between the risks of diversion and the benefits of enhancing a patient's progress toward rehabilitation, and we believe that these revisions have resulted in increased quality of care."

Dr. Robert Newman, General Director of the Beth Israel Medical Center in New York which has one of the largest methadone maintenance programs in the country, testified that methadone has come under a greal deal of public scrutiny, far more scrutiny than other drugs or other treatment modalities. He stated his concerns:

* * * I think that the real issue is not so much a question of the specifics of how a methadone treatment program should be run; the real issue is why do we tolerate, as a nation, a situation where tens of thousands of heroin addicts, people on the street, shooting up three-four-five times a day, with a very dangerous, potentially lethal drug, which they purchase overwhelmingly as a result of criminal activities committed against the general society, tens of thousands of these people who * * * want treatment and who come and seek treatment are turned away and basically told to wait weeks or months before they can be accepted.

Dr. Newman told the Select Committee that the waiting lists for methadone treatment "are so staggering." At the present time in New York City, 1500 individuals have been placed on waiting lists for treatment. "* * * Only in this particular situation are programs forbidden by the regulatory system from accepting all those who come in," Newman said. "We have got to be able to make treatment available immediately to everybody who wants it and everybody who needs it."

Dr. Newman suggested that a commitment be made to those seeking treatment for addiction, and that more clinics be opened in New York to serve its addict population. Providing the Committee with the example of Hong Kong, Dr. Newman said that other cities can, and have provided their addicts with adequate opportunities for treatment:

* * * in Hong Kong, where they have roughly 40–50,000 addicts, in fact, every single night, on every public t.v. program, they advertise the availability immediately of addiction treatment. They are no smarter than we are. They are certainly no richer than we are. It's just ridiculous that we don't have the same opportunities in this country.

The Select Committee asked Dr. Newman to provide a detailed description of the procedures used in processing methadone cases. Newman said that each applicant is required to sign a consent form indicating that the addict is aware of the problems associated with methadone. Newman said that he strongly believed that the benefits of methadone outweighed the disadvantages since, "* * * there is more evidence of the safety and effectiveness of methadone in the treatment of addiction than applies to virtually any other medication ever approved by our government."

Individual treatment is provided to the addict after acceptance into the program. Short-term and long-term goals are worked out, and Dr. Newman said that, "a great majority of patients do well medically as well as socially * * *"

Approximately 20 percent of the Beth Israel patients detoxify from methadone each year, of which some do extremely well, and some do not. Any decision to detoxify off methadone is made by the patient and his physician.

When asked about the costs of and payments for methadone maintenance, Dr. Newman told the Select Committee that the cost per visit is usually around $14, or about $2,000 per year per patient, and that in a majority of cases the fee is reimbursed by Medicaid. Occasionally, State funds and patient fees account for some of the methadone maintenance costs. For the approximately 7,100 patients in the 23 clinics in the Beth Israel system, the average number of visits per week is "somewhere in the neighborhood of three-and-a-half to four." The waiting list for entry into the program is between 1,000 and 1,500, and the average stay in the program is in the range of two years.

Several members expressed strong reservations about a Government policy of subsidizing a treatment modality that substitutes dependence on a legal narcotic—methadone—for dependence on heroin, an illegal narcotic. They also expressed concern about diversion of methadone and concern that not enough effort was expended on rehabilitating patients and detoxifying them so that they can lead productive, drug-free lives.

Commenting on a statement by Dr. Newman to the effect that relatively few patients are successful in maintaining abstinence after detoxification and that many who leave seek readmission, Congressman Shaw said, "I guess you'd have to consider under your guidelines, success would be permanent addiction to methadone." Dr. Newman stressed the importance of viewing methadone as a medication as opposed to an addictive drug. He said, "We're * * * talking about dependence on a medication which is singularly effective in preventing * * * the host of problems associated with heroin addiction." When asked if heroin maintenance would not provide the same type of reduction in the problem, Newman said absolutely not. He said heroin maintenance would be impractical because heroin has a short period of effectiveness and it would have to be given several times a day. But aside from that:

> We know that maintenance with methadone allows * * * the great majority of patients to function in a self-fulfilling, productive manner. That has not been the experience in those settings where heroin has been given to an addict population. The self-administration of heroin by injection three-four-five times a day is in no way whatsoever comparable to the effects of appropriately administered methadone

in a clinical setting. I think one of the mistakes that is made by journalists, by legislators and by the general public is that they fail to see any distinction between methadone treatment in clinical settings and the use of heroin. Failure to see that distinction means we're never ever going to come to any kind of agreement as to the role that methadone, I feel, has to play as one component to the approach to the problem.

Chairman Rangel countered that:

* * * it's a little difficult for some of us to understand why you don't want to use the word addiction when someone has to constantly come to your clinic and see your doctors and receive a medicine in order to just live some kind of life, and you just don't believe that we should call that addiction.

Addressing the problem of methadone diversion, Dr. Newman told the Select Committee that this issue was not as critical as some believed, and that recent data supplied through the Operation Pressure Point sweep in New York City indicated that illicit methadone accounted for less than one percent of the drugs seized in that law enforcement operation.

As to the lack of effort devoted by methadone programs to rehabilitation, Mr. Rangel said:

We have a program in Harlem Hospital for which they said their job was really not to rehabilitate or to cure, but to keep the level of addiction low so that the people won't be out there committing crimes.

In other words, it was just a way, you know, when you got up to 100–200 dollars a day, you come in and get on methadone and get it back down to 10–15 dollars.

Newman replied that, "My role is as a physician to provide medical treatment that I know is effective, that I know is safe, to those who want and need the services that I can provide." He said the fact that methadone maintenance has the "very, very positive side effects for the general community in terms of decreased crime makes me able to get some modest measure of support for what I do."

In response to allegations that had been raised that methadone caused a lot of deaths, Newman said, "I have never heard of a single case of a death attributed to appropriately dispensed medication." Mr. Michels added that he, too, was not aware of any FDA records of deaths from properly administered methadone.

One issue of concern to several members was the apparent lack of sufficient alternatives to methadone maintenance. Mr. Gilman asked whether Dr. Newman was aware of "any other acceptable maintenance program that could be substituted in place of methadone that is available for the public at the present time?" Newman replied that he was not aware of any such program and added:

I just want to emphasize that I am not suggesting that methadone be supported to the exclusion of any other form of treatment.

There is a need for every single form of treatment that offers any help to the addict population. Methadone simply has to be one of those forms of treatment. There is no other alternative.

The third panel of witnesses consisted of two treatment and prevention experts from outside the Federal Government who testified about drug-free treatment therapies and the impact of Federal policies on drug abuse treatment and prevention efforts. The first witness was Dr. Mitchell S. Rosenthal, a psychiatrist and the president and founder of Phoenix House, a drug-free treatment program based in New York City. He is also chairman of the New York Regional Chapter of Therapeutic Communities of America, which rep-

resents the major drug-free residential treatment programs in New York State, and a director of the National Federation of Parents for Drug-Free Youth. He has been involved in drug abuse treatment for over 20 years.

Dr. Rosenthal discussed the status and importance of drug treatment programs as they relate to the overall reduction of drug abuse in the United States. In his testimony, Dr. Rosenthal discussed the drug-free program of Phoenix House and the overall state of treatment programs with specific reference to the utilization of methadone maintenance. Much of the information centered on the situation in New York.

Dr. Rosenthal presented a bleak picture for New York City. He reported that in the city alone deaths by drug overdose rose 20 percent between 1981 and 1983. Drug-related crime has also increased sharply, he said, and nearly one-fourth of the homicides in the city are now drug-related. The prevalence of drug abuse in schools makes education increasingly difficult to accomplish, and the situation in our prisons and mental health facilities is not much better, Rosenthal told the Committee.

Dr. Rosenthal said the situation was not totally hopeless, however. Through effective treatment, he said, we can see people get well and become productive members of society. Dr. Rosenthal stated that, "With all we hear and see and read about drug abuse, it sometimes seems that the best kept secret in the Nation is the simple fact that drug abuse is curable. Treatment works. And it is not only effective, it is cost effective to boot."

Dr. Rosenthal said studies done by NIDA and by Phoenix House demonstrated the effectiveness of long-term residential drug abuse treatment program where the goal of the program is abstinence. Although many clients drop out before completing a full 18 months or two years of treatment, such programs still succeed with nearly half of those who enter, Rosenthal said. He said that 9 out of 10 graduates from Phoenix House achieve a "best success" during the first year after treatment. That means they use no drugs, engage in no crime and remain in school or employed. More than 75 percent are still "best successes" five years after graduation from the program, and even dropouts—those who stay for at least 12 months—stand a 50 percent chance of achieving a "best success." While admitting that drug-free residential treatment is time-consuming therapy, Rosenthal maintained that it is the most effective and cost-effective treatment for those drug abusers who are most costly to society.

In reply to questions from Committee members, Rosenthal said that about 15 percent of the people who enter long-term residential treatment at Phoenix House complete the entire program which takes 18–20 months. About 50 percent stay for 12 months. He said about 55 percent of the entire Phoenix House budget comes from Federal and State dollars, 25 percent from contributions and the rest from patient fees paid by their families or by public welfare. The annual cost for an inpatient at Phoenix House is roughly $17,000. Only about five percent of the patients can afford to pay the entire cost of their own treatment. The residential program accommodates about 550 clients and has a current waiting list of about 150 people, which means a wait of 2–3 weeks. Rosenthal said

the program frequently operates at 10–15 percent above capacity. He also said Phoenix House accepts all kinds of patients except those with severe medical or mental problems that staff do not feel they can handle or that might pose a danger to other clients. He said the program rarely uses methadone to detoxify entering clients, but he pointed out that because Phoenix House is so well-known as a drug-free program many patients may go elsewhere for detoxification before coming to Phoenix House.

Long-term residential treatment is not the only method employed by Phoenix House. They employ long- and short-term; residential and out-patient; designed for both adolescents and adults. Those associated with Phoenix House have learned that the key to successful intervention or treatment is "a variety of service programs and a careful assessment of client needs and client strengths. We have learned that we can help just about any drug abuser, * * * all kinds of clients as long as they are prepared to quit." Rosenthal emphasized that outside pressures, such as family demands, fear of arrest and fear of losing a job, are important factors in motivating drug users to seek help.

Rosenthal told the Committee that Phoenix House also operates a special residential high school with the New York City Board of Education; a drug education program that reaches more than 35,000 kids a year in the New York City area; and an intervention program for adolescents just beginning to use drugs and their families. He said New York was fortunate because the city and State had acted early and aggressively to support programs like Phoenix House and to build a drug abuse service system unparalleled in the country.

Rosenthal also alluded to the important role played by NIDA in supporting and encouraging the development of the drug abuse field. Dr. Rosenthal further stated that it is "in large measure, because of NIDA's support, that so many inter-city neighborhoods and so many of the Nation's socially disadvantaged are now served by programs based in their own communities." He urged the Committee to support NIDA's status as an independent agency.

Rosenthal told the Committee that the medical profession does not know enough about drugs. He claimed that many pediatricians today have no more than a cursory understanding of drug abuse and as a result often fail to detect it or consider drug abuse in making their diagnoses. Other medical specialties are equally at fault. He urged the Federal Government to require more course work on drug abuse in our medical schools by making this a condition of continued Federal support for medical education.

Rosenthal urged the Committee to recognize the pivotal role of drug abuse treatment in confronting drug abuse. He said we cannot confront the drug abuse problem without adding to the heavy load treatment programs already carry. He said that more prevention efforts were needed, but to the extent that successful prevention programs identify candidates for treatment, the treatment capacity must be there to help them. He also pointed out that recent strict law enforcement efforts in New York had produced more demands for treatment than felony convictions and a waiting list of 1200 people. He praised the drug crackdown but reemphasized his view that our ultimate effectiveness in confronting drug

abuse "rests on our capacity to treat and to cure the individual drug abusers. Thus, our response to drugs can only be as strong as our treatment program," and he urged the Committee to give first consideration to strengthening these programs.

In this connection, Rosenthal told the Committee that funds for drug abuse treatment in New York had been cut five years ago, and Government support since had remained much the same. As a result, treatment capacity had not kept pace with the growing demand, and existing funds were only sufficient to support "bare bones care." He criticized the block grant reauthorization bill then pending in Congress because it included additional set-aside provisions and funding formula changes that would shift funds away from programs and States such as New York where the needs are most severe. He said:

> I do not see the logic of limiting funds for New York and other heavily hit States to increase the allocations for States which do not face the same size problem and which have done nowhere near as much to help themselves.

Dr. Rosenthal concluded by asking the Committee to bear in mind that treatment is the basis of any effective response to drug abuse, resources must be made available to strengthen treatment programs, and additional resources cannot be denied to areas of profound need and supplied to areas where the need is less. In addition, he said a strong and independent NIDA "remains essential to sustaining the effective treatment capacity for the Nation," and the Federal Government should do all that it can to encourage greater understanding of drug abuse and drug treatment by the medical profession. He warned the Committee that half measures will no longer do the job because each year the percentage of the Nation at risk is increasing, and as a result the cost of drug abuse continues to rise.

Under questioning, Dr. Rosenthal addressed Committee concerns over methadone maintenance programs. He expressed the view that methadone has a place in the overall response to certain kinds of addiction, and that it is useful in a time-limited period. Dr. Rosenthal expressed the view that because methadone treatment started as a very medically oriented approach, practitioners often believed that they were dealing with an organic or physical kind of disease, and the analogy was often made in the early days of treatment that giving a heroin addict methadone was like giving a diabetic insulin. He felt, however, that the early focus on long-term methadone maintenance was changing and hoped it would change further. He said our goal should ultimately be to strive for drug-free treatment wherever possible.

Chairman Rangel expressed a number of policy reservations about using methadone, an addictive drug, to treat heroin addicts. He noted that providers normally support what is federally reimbursable and wondered whether methadone has become the treatment of choice as a result.

Dr. Rosenthal responded with an example of his own:

> Let me put it in personal terms. I have three children. If one of my children were addicted, the last choice of treatment for me would be methadone maintenance. If it were the only option available at a particular moment, because that was the only thing that that young adult felt that he or she could use, I would accept that with

great reservation and hope that the treating physician or treating group would be very limited in the amount of time that they would keep my child on methadone. I do not see long-term on-going methadone—as the way for us to be going in terms of public policy or in terms of medical policy. May there be some exceptions to that? Some patients who need to be on for many, many years? Yes, and I think that qualified physicians should make that judgment.

As far as costs are concerned, Dr. Rosenthal said a drug-free program such as Phoenix House becomes far less costly over an extended period because the patient is out of the program much earlier and is drug-free; therefore, he is no longer any cost to the community.

Chairman Rangel wondered whether much of the support for methadone maintenance programs is based on the fact that it results in a reduction in crime, and heroin habits are reduced to dependence on legal drugs? "As long as these people are no threat to society and just a threat to themselves, why not subsidize it. * * * It's better to keep someone subsidized with drugs than to have them hitting you over the head to get the price of drugs."

Despite his own reservations that maintenance therapy may not help a drug abuser learn to deal with life's conflicts without resort to drugs, Rosenthal again said "There are some patients where methadone maintenance may be a desirable treatment for a finite period." He agreed with Mr. Rangel, however, that to a great extent the kind of treatment (methadone maintenance or drug-free) a person receives depends on "which door somebody stumbles through."

Mr. Rangel said that, to him, that was very sad, and what is worse, he said, "There's just no search to find something that could serve as an antagonist without becoming addictive." He continued:

I think what has happened in the last decade, Doctor, is that the modality people have some together and have decided that we all are going to do the best we can with the tools we have to work with, but I still have some deep-seated reservations. Not so much that we have to use methadone, but I just find in recent years, we are saying that there is very little alternative to methadone—that is by those people who are providing it.

Dr. Rosenthal agreed with the Chairman that there were insufficient treatment alternatives available.

The Committee heard next from Mr. Karst J. Besteman, Executive Director of the Alcohol and Drug Problems Association of North American (ADPA). Mr. Besteman's professional career and his position in ADPA uniquely qualified him to testify on the problems confronting the drug abuse service system in our country and the role the Federal Government should play in fostering that system.

Prior to his association with ADPA, Mr. Besteman had extensive experience in the drug abuse field. For over a decade, he managed Federal drug abuse treatment, prevention, research and training programs at the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) and its predecessor agencies. From 1980–1984, he was regional health administrator for the Public Health Service in Region II, headquartered in New York City.

ADPA is a membership association of alcohol and drug abuse professionals and others active in the field. The membership of the association is composed of three councils: a Council of State Authorities, which includes all State alcohol and drug abuse authori-

ties in the 50 States, the District of Columbia and the territories; the Agency Council, consisting of private non-profit, for profit and public programs and agencies engaged in drug and alcohol abuse work; and a Council of Individuals, which represents practitioners and professionals active in the alcohol and drug abuse field. Thus, ADPA represents a broad cross-section of people involved in providing drug abuse treatment and prevention services.

Before getting into his prepared remarks, Mr. Besteman jumped into the debate over methadone maintenance the Chairman and other Members had begun with Dr. Newman and continued with Dr. Rosenthal. Mr. Besteman said the Chairman's concern about continuing drug abuse clients on methadone indefinitely and his concern that the Federal Government was not doing enough to develop drug-free treatment alternatives to methadone maintenance were well taken. He noted, however, that an analysis of clients in treatment done by NIDA several years ago showed that the average stay in methadone maintenance treatment was eight months in areas outside of New York City and about two years for programs in New York City. The longer average stay in methadone treatment in New York he attributed in part to the State's reimbursement system and also to the fact that since the beginning of the use of the drug, New York City has had the vast majority of methadone patients and was more dedicated to its continued use by clinicians there.

He also said that, nationally, professional attitudes toward methadone maintenance had changed significantly since the late 1960's and early 1970's when methadone maintenance was largely viewed as a lifetime therapy. Mr. Besteman told the Committee:

> I don't hear that being said anymore. * * * There is now more of the idea that there is a very, very small group of people who simply can't function without a maintenance drug, and the way to test how small that is, is to keep encouraging the patients to become drug free, and that is more what is actually happening.

He said that methadone is being viewed more as a temporary tool to give an addict "respite from his lifestyle of criminality and rushing from one shot to the other," to "hold him still for a period of time so we can engage with the use of methadone therapeutically. * * *" In this context of using methadone as part of a clear therapeutic plan, he said he thought methadone was safe and appropriate.

Asked whether he thought Dr. Newman's testimony was consistent with the view of methadone maintenance he had just outlined, Mr. Besteman said he thought Dr. Newman was trying to make the more general point that treatment capacity in the United States needed to be made more available. But he reemphasized Dr. Newman's testimony that about 20 percent of Beth Israel's methadone patients were being withdrawn annually, and that the length of stay was about two years, although a small group of patients had been in methadone maintenance over 3½ years and some as long as ten years.

In his prepared remarks, Mr. Besteman expressed grave doubts about the direction, or lack of direction, of Federal policies in the areas of treatment, prevention, education and research. He also voiced a "deep concern" that the national drug abuse treatment

and prevention system built with great effort in the 1970's was "stressed beyond capacity" and "in danger of being overwhelmed."

Mr. Besteman told the Committee that funding cuts to States under the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Services block grant, coupled with moderate inflation, had taken a severe toll on drug abuse programs. He cited a recent survey by the National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors that showed many States making the decision to close treatment programs due to lack of funds. These decisions were being made, he said, despite increased demand for treatment services and the increased availability of higher purity, lower priced drugs. He also warned that, "As stressed and over committed as the drug service network is, it is not feeling the full impact of the demand for services." He noted that many alcohol treatment programs and Alcoholics Anonymous groups are seeing more and more new members who suffer from the use of cocaine and a multiplicity of other drugs.

On the positive side, Mr. Besteman noted that with the passage of the block grant States maintained their drug agencies established in the days of categorical programs. Thus, the State infrastructure was intact and ready to respond should the Federal Government renew its commitment to sustaining an adequate treatment network.

Mr. Besteman said the most damaging result of the shift to block grant funding for drug abuse services had been the withdrawal of the Federal Government from policy and a leadership role. By redefining its mission narrowly as research, he said the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration, which includes NIDA, had withdrawn from considering service and prevention issues. The gathering of data needed to assess trends and develop programs was largely abandoned, he said. Technical assistance was non-existent. "Today," he said, "if a problem is unique to the service network, it is dismissed as a State problem." He charged that Federal policy today was established without sufficient, if any, consultation with non-Federal people who can represent the national consensus of the field. He also said that leadership was needed in the areas of training, prevention, and development of new treatment techniques to meet new problems such as the rising epidemic of cocaine abuse. Leadership, he said, "does not require direct management control. It does not require huge staffs. It does require accessibility and a willingness to engage the issues."

Mr. Besteman reemphasized that studies conducted during the last decade consistently showed that treatment does work, whether drug-free or methadone. He also said that drug abuse prevention and education can be successful, but he discounted single focus drug education curricula in the schools as unworkable. He urged instead that drug education be part of a greater health education effort, beginning in the family and reinforced by the schools, that emphasizes a "total attitude and behavior concern about health" and one's personal responsibility to make healthy, life-enhancing decisions. He said such training must start early because children often make decisions about use of tobacco and alcohol as early as the fourth, fifth and sixth grades, and children who use these substances early represent a much greater risk for later drug use and abuse.

With the above points in mind, Mr. Besteman recommended a number of things the Federal Government could do to provide the leadership needed to help meet the most pressing needs of the drug abuse field. He recommended first the establishment of a clear Federal policy committing the Federal Government to sustain a certain level of treatment capacity in the country. He said that the Government had such a policy for about eight years but it was abandoned with the result that treatment capacity had been eroding ever since. He said that State after State had been forced to cut back, close programs, cut the quality or comprehensiveness of services, do less with the same amount of money. "This has to stop," he said, "because the number of casualties that are coming into the system is going up. * * *"

Second, he said, the Federal Government has to provide leadership in defining adequate treatment services, evaluating new treatment techniques and disseminating such information to the field with supporting technical assistance. He took exception to Dr. Rosenthal's testimony that NIDA had been very active in developing new treatment techniques. "With the exception of a longer acting maintenance drug and a couple of antagonists," Mr. Besteman said, "I know of no new treatment techniques that are being fostered or encouraged by the Federal effort * * *" He said that individual programs simply do not have the funds to test experimental treatments.

Third, Mr. Besteman said the Federal Government must restore its drug abuse information system "to give substance to policy decisions and to guide strategic planning." Referring to the major tools the Government relies on to track drug trends, Mr. Besteman said:

> You heard part of the data this morning from high school surveys. It's not our high school seniors who are coming into treatment, it's our dropouts. They are not part of that survey.
>
> It is not the people who are in the household survey who have permanent known addresses so they can be sampled out of the community; it's the people without permanent residences or living in single rooms that are coming into our treatment programs.
>
> And the data around the casualties in drug abuse have disappeared by decision of this Administration to abandon the very important data set.

He decried the loss of client data brought about by the block grant which eliminated the requirement for States to report uniform information to the Federal Government on clients in treatment. To illustrate the gravity of this loss, he said the Committee could have asked Dr. Brandt, who had testified earlier, where the latest outbreak of measles had occurred in the country because the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta reports an "outbreak" of 18 cases. But, he said:

> If you had asked him what is the latest drug of choice of the last 10,000 (treatment) admissions nationally, there is no answer because the data system has been abandoned. You cannot make informed policy in the response around the treatment system without that information. The Administration cannot make an informed recommendation and we can't intelligently discuss what ought to be the national response because we're all dealing with anecdotal material.

Fourth, he urged the Federal Government to increase its services research activities. He said that most of our treatment lacks specific response to the needs of well-defined patient sub-groups such as women, adolescents, ethnic and racial minorities, and that efforts

to develop programs to meet these populations needed to be continued and increased. He pointed out that the block grant had eliminated from NIDA's budget treatment monies previously earmarked for services research. As a result, the amount of services research NIDA can now fund out of its research budget is less than one-half of what it was a few years ago. Mr. Besteman said the block grant had had the same impact on prevention research. He noted that NIDA is slowly expanding research in both areas within its limited research budget, "but major needs of the field disappeared with the funding mechanisms and the folding of that money into the block grants"

Fifth, Mr. Besteman called for much better policy guidance and development by the Federal Government with more opportunities for outside experts to participate in policy debates. He criticized the Administration for not encouraging outside consultation with experts in the field and for not actively seeking the views of drug abuse professionals in debating the strengths and weaknesses of policy options early in the decision-making process. He said that in the past there were several federally-sponsored forums in which policy was readily debated, but these forums no longer exist. "Now this is a very low amount of money, but a very important way to gain a national consensus of what to do," Mr. Besteman said, but, "It is gone." As a result, he said, "Each formal statement of Federal policy (in recent years) has had less testing of concepts by people directly responsible for the implementation." He said not knowing what the Federal Government is planning in terms of policy leaves States and private agencies unsettled as to what they can plan on from year to year. He recommended NIH-type consensus conferences or annual meetings such as the CDC has with State health departments as two ways to improve the process of consultation.

Sixth, he noted that we are in an era of prevention as a top public health priority. He said, however, that the amount of research being done to support effective prevention efforts was insufficient. He pointed out that States are required to spend 20 percent of their block grant funds for drug abuse on prevention but that NIDA's research budget allocates only about 8 percent to prevention research. He urged more research be dedicated to prevention to give guidance to the field on strategies that work and those that do not. He also urged a higher priority on information, materials and technical assistance to support the Administration's rhetoric on prevention. He said expenditures had remained constant or had been reduced in all the above areas except research, which had not managed any significant real growth.

He also recommended Federal support for clinical training. He said, the people who run the treatment programs were being exhausted and were burning out. He noted that one State now has a counsellor/patient ratio of one counsellor to 100 patients. "Now I don't have to tell you there's not much happening therapeutically in that situation. And that need of the treatment system is simply not being addressed * * * at the present time by the Federal Government." He said only a few States had been able to provide training. "The private sector and the cities simply can't respond to the need at this point."

In closing, Mr. Besteman urged the Committee not to let the drug abuse treatment and prevention network in the country dwindle away from neglect and non-support. He emphasized that failure to reverse the Federal Government's inattention now will require the expenditure of much greater sums in a few years as the problems become worse. "We've got to bring drug abuse back into a priority ranking in our domestic activities, and that's the essence of my statement."

The last group of witnesses to testify before the Committee consisted of a panel of State government and local community witnesses from New Jersey. The focus of this panel was on prevention. They were invited to testify about the New Jersey Statewide Community Organization Program, or SCOP, a drug abuse prevention program in New Jersey that has proven to be effective in reducing drug abuse and other behavior problems among young people.

Mr. Charles Currie, Chief of Prevention in the State Health Department, Division of Narcotic and Drug Abuse Control, led off for the panel. He began by making three points about drug abuse prevention. First, he said, there is a definite need in New Jersey and other States for proven, model prevention programs to reach youngsters. He pointed out that a recent survey by the State Attorney General's office showed considerable drug abuse in the State's schools. He also said the need to prevent young people from using drugs was clear from the extent of the drug abuse problems in the State—35,000 heroin addicts in New Jersey, 12,000 patients currently receiving treatment in the New Jersey treatment system, including 1,000 admitted in the past year for cocaine abuse problems. He emphasized that prevention was especially critical in light of shrinking Federal and State dollars for treatment services.

Second, Mr. Currie told the Committee that the State's prevention efforts are based on the assumption that substance abuse is a community problem. By that, he meant that drug abuse causes problems for the individual abuser; for the abuser's family; for schools that cannot teach students who are high or absent, or that are vandalized by students involved with drugs; for the police; for elected officials and all elements of a community.

Third, he emphasized that a community problem requires a community based response. He told the Committee that New Jersey had developed a community based model for dealing with drug abuse problems in the SCOP program.

The heart of the SCOP program, Mr. Currie said, is to help communities help themselves by helping them to organize effective programs to meet the behavioral problems of their citizens, especially their youth. The State prevention unit helps communities organize "by bringing together their leaders, shaping them into a smoothly functioning team, and through an intense training session, equipping them with the knowledge and skills they need to assess the problems of their community (and) to generate programs and activities that will respond to these problems." In addition to training, the State supports community teams through technical assistance and follow-up, on-site visits.

Mr. Currie emphasized that the State's role was not to develop programs for the communities to implement. Rather, the State's

function is to provide training in a process that communities can use to respond to their own unique needs and problems.

Mr. Currie told the Committee that the State has trained about 120 teams through the SCOP process since 1978, and 60–70 percent of the teams are still active. The average cost to the State of implementing the SCOP program in a local community is about $4,000–$8,000, which includes salaries of State professionals, consultants, equipment, stipends and other costs. The results of the program in promoting healthy activities and lessening behavioral problems in SCOP communities has been substantial, he reported. Absenteeism from school, vandalism and other drug related behaviors have decreased in many cases.

At the same time, he reported that SCOP programs resulted in a number of fiscal benefits, enabling communities to realize substantial cost savings. A cost/benefit evaluation of the SCOP program, submitted for the record, revealed the following kinds of savings to four local comminities:

—increased school attendance with an estimated value of $23,280;

—decreased school vandalism with an estimated savings of $11,000;

—increased volunteer services valued at $17,782; and

—savings on alternative services for high risk youths estimated at $170,400.

"Needless to say," Mr. Currie concluded, "the cost (of SCOP) is relatively modest, the benefits great in terms of decreased human suffering and increased monetary savings."

Following Mr. Currie's presentation, Gale Kavanagh, SCOP Coordinator for the Division of Narcotic and Drug Abuse Control, testified. From her experience working with various communities, she said most communities faced with problems with kids tend to do three things. First, they deny the problem even exists. Second, they admit a problem exists but minimize it and say, "It's not our kids," and "We don't know how to get involved." Third, they wait until a crisis, which catapults people into action with short-lived effect.

She explained that when New Jersey first began getting involved in drug prevention, they had very little money and faced the issue of funding only a few programs or looking for some other approach that might have "a ripple kind of effect" throughout the State. In looking around the State for effective models, they found the community of Bergenfield which had successfully used a community team approach to develop programs to meet some of the issues they were facing with vandalism, school absenteeism and other youth problems. The State decided that the Bergenfield experience was something that could be replicated in other communities at a low cost while giving the communities a real stake in the success of the programs developed.

In contrast to the Federal witnesses who had testified earlier in the morning, Gale Kavanagh stressed the importance of government being accountable to local communities. She said, "I don't think that it is fair to any community, regardless of size and demographics or problems, to simply back off and say, 'It's your problem.' We have a responsibility to provide resources, support, anything that we can do * * *"

Gale Kavanagh described how the SCOP process works. The prevention unit looks for six or seven people in a community who can be brought together as a team. They specifically want representatives from a cross section of the community's leadership, including school officials, police, elected officials, youth, senior citizens and others. The State provides three days of intensive training to each team. The purposes of the training are two-fold: to get a diverse group of people working together as a team, and to teach them how to identify problems in the community and begin to address them. The goal of the training is to have the team return to the community with one concern that they agree needs to be addressed by the community and with a plan of action to address that particular problem.

Ms. Kavanagh said the programs developed through this process are as varied as the communities themselves. The process has been replicated successfully with teams from rural, urban and suburban communities. With a large urban area such as Newark, the SCOP unit will not try to cover the entire city with one team but will start with a smaller community such as the Franklin School neighborhood which Mrs. Josephine Zambrana, another witness on the panel, represented.

Some examples of the kinds of programs developed, which Ms. Kavanagh described briefly, include programs to help first, second and third graders facing problems in school due to family problems or some other crisis; outdoor programs for youth; programs to develop youth leadership skills; programs matching elderly people with youth; and programs matching older youth with younger children.

The most important aspects of the program are that by teaching teams how to start out with a small project, they can see the results of their efforts and acquire the confidence and skills to tackle bigger problems. For the youth involved, they acquire "a sense of being needed and appreciated. We have found that's a powerful antidote to being a substance abuser and any of the other problems that ensue off of that," Kavanagh said.

Ms. Kavanagh said the SCOP approach is not "a panacea or a miracle machine." It is simply one cost-effective approach to drug abuse prevention that works and is cost-effective.

The next three witnesses on the panel discussed the results of SCOP activities in two New Jersey communities and the role of the State Department of Education in fostering drug abuse education and prevention efforts. Detective Sergeant Donald Stumpf from the Juvenile Division of the Bergenfield, New Jersey, Police Department and a member of the Bergenfield SCOP team, discussed Bergenfield's response to youth substance abuse problems. The Bergenfield experience eventually became the model for the New Jersey SCOP effort.

Bergenfield is a suburban/urban community located about six miles outside New York City. Mr. Stumpf said that as a result of the receipt of a $3,000 Federal grant from the Office of Education in 1971, various diverse representatives from Bergenfield received team training which enabled them to develop and mobilize community programs to deal with drug and alcohol abuse. The programs did not deal directly with drug abuse but dealt with sub-issues such

as single parent families, absenteeism and vandalism that are often related to drug abuse by children. Twenty-eight such programs are now in existence in Bergenfield. They are operated without any Federal funds, he said.

He went on to say that it is vitally important to bring people together from diverse arenas—political, school representatives, police, women's clubs—in order to get the benefit of various points of view. By becoming mobile, and developing education programs in schools, it was realized that young people are intelligent enough to be dealt with honestly. By intensifying these programs to include role models and peer counseling, he said the effort can and will be even more successful.

In the beginning before receiving the training, Mr. Stumpf said the Bergenfield community was immobilized by fear, denial, and a sense of hopelessness. As a result of Bergenfield's ten year effort, Mr. Stumpf said drug and alcohol involvement has been reduced by 20 percent; attendance in public schools has increased from 86 to 94 percent; and vandalism and youth arrests have been reduced by 65 percent each.

Sergeant Stumpf went on to say that it is important for each individual community to mobilize, because every community's problems are different and the people in the community are best able to develop their own solutions. In New Jersey, he said, this mobilization has been done. With the cooperation of the State, 100 teams have been trained and are out in their communities developing programs to deal with specific problems they face, he said.

Sergeant Stumpf concluded by saying that communities need to start programs when children are young and not wait until they are high school seniors who are already on drugs. He said most kids want to be responsible, but we give them no chance to do that. Arrests and methadone are simply not the answer. He said the community approach works and is inexpensive.

Josephine Zambrana, a SCOP team member from the Franklin Elementary School in Newark, New Jersey, testified next. Her testimony, as a parent, a member of SCOP and the Department of Research and Testing for the Newark Board of Education, centered around a profile of Franklin School in an effort to highlight unique approaches which can be tried in schools with particular problems. The community consists primarily of poor Black and Hispanic citizens, and is characterized by high unemployment, extreme poverty and widespread drug trafficking and drug abuse. In April 1978, the school was overcrowded and students showed poor results on standardized tests for basic skills in reading and mathematics. The environment was dominated by fear, violence and disruptive behavior, and teachers were constantly harassed.

SCOP became involved, and two teams from Franklin School, consisting of parents, teachers, community people, and policemen, were trained to deal with the problems. Some of the projects developed and implemented at Franklin School as part of the SCOP concept were:

—workshops for parents on legal services, social services, drugs and alcohol, city government, police protection and other issues;

—adult education classes;

—open house nights where parents are invited to talk with teachers and other school personnel about problems their children might be having in school;

—the Franklin School Advisory Board, comprised of representatives of all segments of the community, to identify existing problems, and develop and implement program responses;

—increased student involvement in decisions about the school, in performing certain maintenance activities, and in establishing their own classroom and school code;

—a 24 hour vandalism hotline;

—a newsletter to parents; and

—a parents' handbook.

Mrs. Zambrana told the Committee that the strategies implemented through the SCOP process at Franklin School have resulted in noticeable improvements. Children's scores on standardized tests have improved markedly, school morale is much better, and staff and students have worked together to make Franklin School, "a clean, happy, safe place to come to live and learn." As a result of the increased student involvement in the school, the children have more self-esteem, more ethnic pride, and a greater sense of pride in the school, which in turn allows them "to join hands with others and accept more responsibility in maintaining a positive school environment."

Dr. Walter McCarroll, Assistant Commissioner of Education in the New Jersey State Department of Education and a former school superintendent who was directly involved in SCOP, concluded the panel's testimony. Dr. McCarroll stated that from his experience in implementing substance abuse programs for young people, he was convinced that the only way a successful prevention program could work was if it became a total community effort. On a large scale, he said the same collaborative effort can apply to departments at the State level. He went on to describe some of the programs currently in operation in New Jersey that have been developed jointly by the State Departments of Education and Health.

The first cooperative effort, relating to substance abuse, produced a drug abuse reference manual and planning guide for school administrators. It offers a planning process and outlines the resources needed to set up effective services. It also includes a directory of services available to school districts through the Education and Health Departments and various local and regional agencies.

In addition, and as a companion to the drug abuse reference manual, a manual has been prepared that identifies treatment, prevention and intervention programs in New Jersey and around the country that can serve as models for school districts. The Departments have also offered a series of regional substance abuse planning forums for school districts. The forums are important in that the districts that decided to participate had to make a commitment to developing effective programs now and for the future. Dr. McCarroll said the acknowledgment that the community has a problem is an important first step toward a commitment to develop effective youth substance abuse programs.

Dr. McCarroll said the two Departments had also collaborated on a number of in-service programs to increase the awareness of school personnel about drug abuse problems and provide training

on substance abuse services. Finally he described a program for the 1984–85 school year that will establish pilot substance abuse service projects in a number of schools.

Dr. McCarroll concluded by expressing the view that there are not only important roles to be played by communities and the State, but also by the Federal Government. The Federal role, he said, can be fulfilled in the form of a commitment to programs like SCOP, by providing leadership in coordinating the efforts of States in developing effective substance abuse prevention projects, and by providing funding, particularly in the area of prevention research.

In response to questions about whether the SCOP concept was better suited to some communities than others, the witnesses replied that that had not been their experience. They pointed out that SCOP has been successful in Bergenfield, which is a predominantly white working class suburban community, and also in the Franklin School in Newark in the heart of a poor, minority, inner-city neighborhood ravaged by unemployment, crime, drug abuse and urban decay. Gale Kavanaugh said the commitment of the people involved is the most important factor in making SCOP work. Concern was also expressed that SCOP was only suited to smaller communities or neighborhoods and thus could not be used to address the more intense substance abuse problems that exist in our major urban areas. The witnesses emphasized that SCOP was not designed to deal with the problems of a major city like Newark all at one time. Rather, SCOP was designed to give communities a way to deal with the complex problems of youth substance abuse and disruptive behavior by breaking them down to more manageable size. The SCOP concept, they said, was the beginning of change and the beginning of a process that can be, and has been, replicated successfully in other communities.

The Committee's findings and recommendations with respect to drug abuse treatment, prevention, education and research are discussed in the Recommendations Section of the report.

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL: THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S REPLY TO THE SELECT COMMITTEE INTERNATIONAL STUDY MISSION REPORT, HEARING (JUNE 27, 1984)

On Wednesday, June 27, 1984, the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control held a hearing to examine the issue of international narcotics control. The focus of the Committee's inquiry was upon the methods by which the United States Department of State and the Agency for International Development will implement the conclusions and recommendations made in the Committee's report of its study missions to Latin America and Jamaica in August of 1983, and to Asia and Italy in January of this year.

Appearing before Select Committee Chairman Rangel and Ranking Minority Member Gilman, as well as Representatives Guarini and Ortiz, was Mr. Dominick DiCarlo, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters (INM). Also appearing was Mr. Frank B. Kimball, Counselor to the Agency for International Development. Mr. Kimball submitted written testimony only.

Chairman Rangel in his opening statement noted that, "in large measure the failure of our international initiatives to control the

production of narcotics in the source countries, as well as the trafficking of these dangerous substances worldwide, emanates from the lack of priority the State Department attaches to international narcotics control." He thereafter made the following recommendations:

1. Secretary of State Shultz should begin and continue a dialogue with the Foreign Ministers of the drug producing nations,
2. U.N. Ambassador Kirkpatrick should begin a regular dialogue with other U.N. representatives regarding drug control and,
3. President Reagan should recall all our Ambassadors to the drug producing nations in order to stress the importance of bringing the narcotics plague under control.

The Chairman welcomed Secretary DiCarlo and congratulated him on the occasion of his appointment to the Federal bench. "No one has worked harder and given of himself more, to show the world how concerned this country is regarding narcotics abuse and control . . . You have done the best you could with what you have had to work with."

Mr. DiCarlo in his opening remarks briefly outlined the State Department's strategy for international narcotics control, noting that it involves, "giving priority to increased assistance from, and political involvement by, the international community, greater acceptance by producer and transit countries of their treaty responsibilities, greater awareness by source and donor nations that drug abuse and drug trafficking are not just problems of the United States, expansion of crop control and interdiction, (as well as) linkage between narcotics related economic assistance and production controls."

Mr. DiCarlo stated that, "considerable progress," had been made by INM, but that ultimately, the problems associated with drug abuse would continue until such time as production of narcotic crops was curtailed, "in all key growing areas simultaneously." The problem of excessive production, however, continues in each of these so-called "key" areas, without exception. This, notwithstanding the fact that according to Mr. DiCarlo, "the problem of narcotics is being emphasized as a matter of foreign policy."

The production and import estimates for calendar year 1983 were frighteningly high. The numbers, compiled by the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC), were made public in July of this year.

The estimate is that the aggregate of illicit opium production in Mexico, Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle, and Southwest Asia's Golden Crescent was within a range of 1,532 to 1,922 metric tons, compared to an estimated range of 1,424 to 1,699 metric tons in 1982. The major estimated increase was in Southwest Asia, where the estimated production range for 1983 was 845 to 1,235 metric tons, compared to 700 to 975 metric tons in 1982. Opium poppy production in Pakistan, Thailand and Laos is believed to have declined in 1983, but has the potential of rapidly expanding in each of these nations.

Similarly, production of coca leaf, paste, base and cocaine hydrochloride continued at high levels in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia.

The glut on the market was reflected by declining prices in 1983. The NNICC estimate is that wholesale prices per kilogram declined from $47,000/$60,000 in New York City in 1982 to $35,000/$45,000 in 1983.

DEA reports however, that for 1984, export prices for kilo quantities of cocaine are increasing in Colombia (in a range from $4,000 to $7,000) as a result of the enforcement pressures there. This upward pressure on prices has not been reflected to date in street prices in the United States although wholesale prices are said to be rising, e.g., in Miami, wholesale prices have risen in recent months from a range of $16,000/$22,000 to $25,000 per kilo.

Mr. DiCarlo indicated and the Select Committee recognizes, that there have indeed been successes in what surely must be considered a long-range program for the control of narcotics production and trafficking. New agreements concerning coca production have been entered into with Pakistan, Peru, Bolivia and Colombia.

While there was some increase in Mexican production of opium and cannabis in 1983, discussions with the Mexican authorities regarding eradication are ongoing. Likewise, the Thais and Burmese are exhibiting an interest in increasing efforts to curtail opium production. The Pakistanis too are beginning to move to curtail the production of opium.

However, the effort to stem the flood of illegal narcotics entering the United States must be placed higher on this country's list of diplomatic priorities in order that we may ultimately come to grips with the problem. The tools are available. An amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act has provided for more than a decade, a mechanism for cutting off aid in cases where cooperation by our source country "friends" is not forthcoming. In late 1983 the law was strengthened to require progress against drugs by countries receiving U.S. aid by amending the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 USC 2291(a)), pertaining to the suspension of assistance for failure to progressively eliminate the illicit production of narcotic crops.

However, Mr. DiCarlo in his testimony argued against giving the drug question such emphasis, in the apparent belief that it would overshadow other foreign policy considerations. "We need to have patience and a long-term outlook," he said. "To tell the source countries "Stop or we'll cut off aid and production will end . . . we are not doing that." He emphasized that, "it's dangerous to even try this approach."

Utilizing the approach suggested by Mr. DiCarlo, one of "patient diplomacy," has resulted in far too few successes in this nation's desperate struggle to turn back the invasion of narcotics that threatens us. Indeed, it appears that we have lost ground and will continue to do so unless, in concert with our allies, all concerned countries, and the United Nations, this country comes to a mutual understanding with all the major illicit producer nations on the extent of the problem and what they are required to do under the Single Convention to bring it under control, including the curtailment of the production and trafficking of narcotics in and through their respective borders. Thereafter, should the source nations fully commit themselves to eradicate illicit production within a reasonable time, the United States and all others concerned, must be pre-

pared to provide the necessary financial and technical assistance to these countries.

The actual cost of this, based on the experiences of Turkey and Mexico where the greatest successes have been achieved, is modest. Yet the price we pay in enforcement and treatment costs, as well as in human suffering, should we fail in this effort, is incalculable.

NATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE (SEPTEMBER 18, 1984)

On September 18, 1984, the Select Committee sponsored a law enforcement conference for State and local narcotics enforcement officers. The purpose of the conference was to discuss the status of cooperation between Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies and how it can be improved. Making use of the information and opinions obtained at the conferences held by the committee in West Palm Beach and New York in May, invitations to the national enforcement conference were sent to the chiefs of police from the nation's 50 largest metropolitan areas and the heads of the State law enforcement agencies in each State.

The following State police agencies and metropolitan police departments accepted the invitation of the Select Committee and sent a representative to the conference:

State Police Agencies:

Alabama Department of Public Safety
Alaska Department of Public Safety
Arizona Department of Public Safety
Delaware State Police
Florida Department of Law Enforcement
Georgia Bureau of Investigation
Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation
Kentucky State Police
Maryland State Police
Massachusetts State Police
Michigan Department of State Police
Minnesota Department of Criminal Apprehension
Nebraska State Patrol
New Jersey State Police
New York State Police
North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation
North Dakota Attorney General
Oregon State Police
Pennsylvania State Police
Rhode Island State Police
South Carolina Law Enforcement Division
Tennessee Bureau of Investigation
Utah Department of Public Safety
Virginia State Police
West Virginia State Police

Metropolitan Police Departments:

Austin Police Department
Baltimore Police Department
Birmingham Police Department

Boston Police Department
Chicago Police Department
Columbus Police Department
Houston Police Department
Kansas City Police Department
Newark Police Department
New Orleans Police Department
New York City Police Department
Oakland Police Department
Washington, D.C. Police Department

In addition the following representatives of Federal narcotics law enforcement agencies also attended: Frank V. Monastero, Assistant Administrator for Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration; George C. Corcoran, Jr., Assistant Commissioner of Enforcement, U.S. Customs Service; Rear Admiral Norman C. Venzke, Chief of Operations, U.S. Coast Guard; Floyd I. Clarke, Deputy Assistant Director for Criminal Investigations, Federal Bureau of Investigations; Daniel F. Leonard, Deputy Director, Drug Abuse Policy Office, the White House; Captain L. N. Schowengerdt, Jr. U.S.C.G., Staff Director, National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS), Office of the Vice President.

Also attending were representatives of the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the Police Foundation.

In advance of the conference, the Select Committee forwarded to the participants a list of issues to be covered and discussed at the conference. They were:

1. What are the current levels of cooperation among Federal, State and local narcotics enforcement agencies?
2. How can the present relationships between Federal, State and local narcotics enforcement agencies be improved?
3. What types of assistance from the Federal Government are most needed by State and local narcotics enforcement agencies?
4. How should narcotics enforcement responsibilities be divided between Federal, State and local narcotics enforcement agencies for maximum effectiveness?
5. How can narcotics intelligence and information sharing between Federal, State and local narcotics enforcement agencies be enhanced?
6. How can resources for narcotics law enforcement be better allocated and shared between Federal, State and local narcotics enforcement agencies?

In addition a survey was sent to all agencies invited to the conference to solicit their views on a wide range of issues relating to Federal, State and local narcotics enforcement and cooperation. Some of the more important conclusions that may be reached as a result of the survey are that most of the law enforcement officials who responded believe that:

The Federal Organized Crime Task Force (OCDE) and the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) are considerably less cooperative with them than are the individual Federal law enforcement agencies, and the agencies as a group are less cooperative than the State and intrastate nar-

cotics enforcement groups and the DEA/State/local task forces.

The most pressing needs for Federal assistance to State and local agencies appear to be for funding to support drug law enforcement operations and for improved exchanges of information and intelligence. They believe that they have valuable information and intelligence of a localized or specialized nature that Federal agencies could make better use of.

Although some Federal agencies accept State and local information and intelligence, as well as other types of cooperation and assistance, the lack of appropriate feedback from some Federal agencies is an irritant to the State/local agencies.

State and local priorities should be placed upon improvement of interagency intelligence and information communication, improved funding for law enforcement personnel, and technical support. There was a high level of agreement that use of the National Guard for drug law enforcement support should be either a very low priority or not considered at all.

Federal priorities should be to improve intelligence and information communication with State and local agencies; technical and personnel support to State and local agencies; and centralized coordination of all Federal, State and local drug law enforcement efforts.

Almost all of the agencies agree that they have insufficient budget and personnel to properly carry out their drug law enforcement responsibilities.

In his opening remarks, Chairman Rangel made the following observations:

> Throughout the past year and a half, the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control has conducted a series of hearings and conferences around the country to examine the nature and extent of drug trafficking and drug abuse. In our discussions with State and local law enforcement leaders we have been disturbed by two problems that emerge time and time again. First is the lack of resources to meet the overwhelming traffic in illegal drugs and the massive problems of drug related crime. Second is the need for increased cooperation and communication among Federal, State and local drug enforcement authorities.

Welcoming the conferees, Mr. Gilman also stressed the need for increased cooperation between all levels of government in narcotics enforcement. He stated:

> . . . there is a lack of communication, coordination and cooperation between the Federal Government and State and local law enforcement officials . . .
>
> The simple truth is that we must reverse this trend. You have been invited to this conference to give your views on how we best can accomplish this goal. I urge you to be free and open in your comments, suggestions and criticisms. Only by working together, and receiving input from many sources will we in the Congress be able to develop and act upon recommendations . . .

The conference format led to a lively and unconstrained discussion between the committee and the police officials attending. Some common concerns expressed were the need for accurate, timely intelligence, and the need for a uniform narcotics data collection system. Inadequate resources sharing and irregular levels of cooperation from Federal narcotics agencies were mentioned as the major problem areas.

There was a general consensus that the essential difficulty in the relationship between State and local narcotics enforcement units,

and Federal agencies is not one of a lack of cooperation, but one of insufficient coordination of the narcotics enforcement activities between various jurisdictions. Commissioner Robert Dempsey of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement for example, made the point that State and local agencies do not have adequate input into the development of the Federal drug strategy. If they did, Dempsey argued, the programs and priorities of all levels of drug enforcement could be better focused and managed.

In terms of resources sharing there was general agreement among the conferees that there is a need for the much greater availability of "buy money" at the local level so that better cases can be made against drug violators. In addition, State and local representatives voiced the desire to share in the proceeds of Federal forfeiture when taken against the assets of drug traffickers, particularly when the property forfeited are automobiles and other types of equipment. Chairman Rangel made the point that legislation that would permit State and local law enforcement agencies to share in Federal forfeiture efforts, H.R. 4901, had recently passed the House of Representatives.

Lt. Michael Robinson of the Michigan State Police urged the Select Committee to begin a dialogue with the National Alliance of State Drug Enforcement Agencies, of which he is Vice President. The Alliance is a nationwide network of State drug enforcement agencies whose objective is to foster increased cooperation and communication among State narcotics units as well as have input into Federal policy. The Committee agreed with the idea of working closely with the Alliance, and Chairman Rangel indicated that a close, ongoing relationship with the Alliance could obviate the need to bring State and local narcotics enforcement chiefs back to Washington for another conference.

In an effort to begin this dialogue with the National Alliance of State Drug Enforcement Agencies, the Select Committee's Chief of Staff, John T. Cusack met with the Alliance on October 24, 1984, in Salt Lake City, Utah. The Alliance was meeting there in conjunction with the annual meeting of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. Mr. Cusack had a fruitful discussion with members of the Alliance and indicated it was the intention of the Select Committee to continue to work closely with representatives of State and local narcotics law enforcement.

The Select Committee looks upon the National Law Enforcement Conference as one of its most important initiatives in 1984. One major objective of the conference was to bring together narcotics law enforcement officials so that they could share concerns, ideas, and recommendations with their counterparts, the Select Committee and Federal narcotics officials. This important purpose of the conference was achieved. In addition, the committee looks forward to continuing its dialogue with the National Alliance of State Drug Enforcement Agencies and representatives of local narcotics enforcement to achieve an effective national strategy to combat drug abuse.

DRUG ABUSE AND THE BLACK COMMUNITY (SEPTEMBER 28, 1984)

The Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control held a hearing on September 28, 1984, on "Drugs: The Effects in the Black Community" as part of the 14th Annual Congressional Black Caucus Weekend. The Select Committee has been supportive of the CBC's work in assessing the impact of drugs on the Black population, and in assessing the successes and limitations of the Federal strategy.

Chairman Charles B. Rangel and Select Committee member, Congressman Walter E. Fauntroy participated at this hearing and Federal witnesses included William Pollin, Director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, Francis Mullen, Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, and Clyde Taylor, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters. The Federal representatives presented the Federal strategy which consists of demand reduction, interdiction and source country eradication. The Federal strategy, according to the Federal panelists can be successful only when these elements are working in concert with each other.

Former Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Joseph D. Califano, Jr. appeared on a panel of health experts and advocated the creation of a National Institute on Addiction. He also expressed optimism that the creation of such an institute would study the social and biochemical causes of addiction and directly benefit the Black community.

Also participating in the Black Caucus's session were Dr. Ronald Dougherty, Executive Director of the Benjamin Rush Center, Syracuse, New York; Dr. Flavia Walton, Executive Director, Black Advisory Panel on Drug Abuse Policy; Dr. Dale Masi from the School of Social Work, University of Maryland, and Dr. Lonnie Mitchell, Administrator, Alcohol and Drug Abuse Services Administration in Washington, D.C. These participants stressed the urgency of action which would help the Black community deal with the ravages of drug abuse and addiction, and the need for employee assistance programs, drug education programs and increased drug research that are directly targeted at the Black community.

Charlene Drew Jarvis, member of the D.C. City Council, addressed the issues of drug abuse and addiction in Washington, D.C. and how the District Government is responding.

Chairman Rangel has stated on a number of occasions his belief that the issue of international narcotics production and control should be elevated to the highest national and international priority. He took the opportunity to again express his concern at the CBC session, and urged the United Nations to address at once this important international issue which was directly confronting, and impacting, the Black Community in the United States.

At the close of testimony by the witnesses, Mr. Rangel opened the hearing to questions from the audience to the panelists. What followed was a lively discussion between attendees of the CBC Legislative Weekend and the hearing witnesses.

INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Study Mission to Hawaii, Hong Kong, Thailand, Burma, Pakistan, Turkey, Italy, and Korea

(January 4–22, 1984)

The Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control conducted a 2½ week study mission to Hawaii, Asia, and Rome from January 4 to January 22, 1984, to inspect opium and heroin production and trafficking patterns and efforts to control those problems. In addition, the Select Committee also examined the current levels of drug abuse within the Pacific and European Commands of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. A major issue that the Committee also examined in Hawaii was the domestic cultivation and traffic in marijuana in that State and the efforts by Federal and State law enforcement agencies to combat that growing threat.

The study mission consisted of four members of the Select Committee and four other Members of Congress. Members of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control who participated in the study were Chairman Charles B. Rangel of New York, Ranking Minority Member Benjamin A. Gilman of New York, Representative Daniel K. Akaka of Hawaii, and Representative Frank J. Guarini of New Jersey. Representative Louis Stokes of Ohio participated as a member of the Committee on Appropriations, Representative George W. Crockett, Jr. of Michigan participated as a member of the Committee on the Judiciary, Representative Harold S. Sawyer of Michigan participated as the Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary, and Representative Harold Rogers of Kentucky participated as a member of the Committee on Appropriations.

In addition to Hawaii, the group visited Hong Kong, Thailand, Burma, Pakistan, Turkey and Italy; and met with the heads of state and concerned Cabinet Ministers, narcotics control officials, and law enforcement leaders of each government. In Rome the delegation had the eminent privilege of a private audience with His Holiness Pope John Paul II. The delegation shared with the Pope its admiration for his strong positions against drug abuse and the power and influence of the Mafia in Sicily. His Holiness delivered a special message to the delegation on the threat drug abuse presents to the family and society.

During the study mission, the delegation participated in on-site inspections of poppy cultivation and opium harvesting, as well as opium crop substitution projects, along the Thai-Laotian border. In Pakistan the Members visited crop substitution projects sponsored respectively by the State Department's Agency for International Development in the Gadoon area and by the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters in the Malakand area. In addition, the delega-

tion visited the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) agricultural development project in Buner, Pakistan. The delegation also toured the Nasir Bagh Afghan Refugee Camp outside of Peshawar, Pakistan.

HAWAII

The Select Committee received an extensive briefing from Federal, State and local narcotics enforcement officials in Honolulu on January 5, 1984. The delegation concluded as a result of the briefings that Hawaii serves as a major transshipment center for Southeast Asian heroin entering the United States. To combat this threat, Federal law enforcement presence in the State of Hawaii must be strengthened. Proposed reductions in Customs personnel in Hawaii will have a devastating effect on the ability of the Customs Service to perform necessary inspections for narcotics contraband entering Hawaiian airports and terminals. Similarly, DEA is in need of increased manpower to combat a growing heroin wholesale distribution network reportedly flourishing in Honolulu, and to develop international heroin conspiracy cases based upon information obtained from narcotics arrests and seizures made in Hawaii.

Federal enforcement authorities must be vigilant to insure that Hawaii does not become a transshipment point for South American cocaine destined for the West Coast. While this threat is presently seen as minimal by Hawaiian law enforcement officials, the potential for this to develop exists due to available air transportation from South America via Fiji and Tahiti into Hawaii. The increased pressure being placed on cocaine traffickers in the Caribbean may force them to develop alternative routes for their shipments.

Likewise, Federal law enforcement must give careful attention to the infiltration of Hawaii by foreign organized criminal groups engaged in drug trafficking. The possibility for foreign criminal groups, particularly from Japan, to utilize Hawaii to traffic drugs to the West Coast is increasing. Recent investigations in Hawaii have revealed attempts by some Japanese crime groups to smuggle heroin into the United States.

The cultivation of marijuana is becoming accepted as a way of life in the State of Hawaii, particularly on the outer, rural islands. This illicit activity is creating a massive underground economy that has the potential of corrupting the State. An aggressive Federal campaign is needed, including military assistance and equipment, to eradicate marijuana production in Hawaii. The U.S. Postal Service was identified as a frequently used channel to ship marijuana from Hawaii to the mainland U.S. The Postal Service must reassess its current policies limiting the use of detector dogs to ferret out parcels of marihuana being mailed from Hawaii. The Postal Service, in conjunction with the Department of Justice, should determine when the assistance of detector dogs in postal facilities would be permissible under the current law of search and seizure. The Committee is pleased to note that shortly after it returned to Washington, the Postal Service and DEA announced the completion of "Operation Pelè" which used drug detector dogs to

uncover packages suspected of containing marihuana in U.S. mail from Hawaii. Hopefully initiatives as Pelè will continue.

The Hawaiian State legislature and court system must become more vigorous in combatting the production of marihuana in the State. The existing penalty structure and sentences meted out only serve to foster the permissive attitude in the State about marijuana production.

Finally, drug trafficking intelligence available to narcotic enforcement units in Hawaii must be enhanced. All agencies operating in Hawaii, particularly the Customs Service and the Coast Guard, should seek to obtain more narcotics intelligence from other Federal and/or State enforcement agencies to enhance the performance of their narcotics missions. Top priority should be given to the development of the Long Beach, California center of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) to increase narcotic smuggling intelligence in the Western Pacific.

Hong Kong

After meeting with Hong Kong narcotic abuse and law enforcement authorities, as well as with American Consul General Burton Levin, DEA Resident-in-Charge Robert J. Furey, and other consullate personnel, the delegation concluded that while Hong Kong may not be a major heroin transshipment point to the United States, it facilitates narcotics trafficking by serving as a financial center of this illicit industry.

Acting as the financial and banking center for the Far East, Hong Kong has few foreign exchange controls and has strict laws and regulations guaranteeing the privacy and confidentiality of bank deposits and records. The United States has a great interest in conducting financial investigations of drug traffickers in concert with Hong Kong authorities. However, the present structure of Hong Kong law operates against this type of joint activity. For example, existing Hong Kong law requires a court to court order before a Hong Kong court will subpena any financial records from a Hong Kong bank. This presents difficult problems for United States law enforcement authorities because before an American court can issue an order to a Hong Kong court for execution, an indictment against the accused must already be filed. This obviously frustrates the investigative process. Hong Kong needs greater access to banking and financial records and improved asset seizure laws to make it more effective in the investigation of narcotic traffickers.*

The Select Committee was pleased to learn that the People's Republic of China has cooperated with the Hong Kong Government in improving its border patrols and disrupted a heroin trafficking route from Bangkok, via the People's Republic into Hong Kong.

Although the officials with whom the delegation met seemed to minimize the role played by Hong Kong in heroin smuggling to the United States, some ominous facts do surface that may belie a passive role, and cause greater attention by narcotic intelligence ana-

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*The law has recently been changed. The Hong Kong court will now assist foreign authorities in obtaining evidence for criminal proceedings in an overseas court where such criminal proceeding has been instituted *"or whose institution is likely if the evidence is obtained."*

lysts. Hong Kong's accessible coastline and open ports and borders make it a prime target for smugglers. Further, Hong Kong has a tremendously large addict population and the colony is flooded with heroin, particularly #3 heroin—that which is consumed by smoking. Hong Kong drug trafficking is controlled by local, organized Chinese groups. The close-knit character of the Chinese community internationally can facilitate contact among narcotics traffickers worldwide. That Hong Kong could again develop into a major heroin transshipment center to the United States is a matter that should be closely watched by the Drug Enforcement Administration.

THAILAND

In Thailand the delegation met with Deputy Prime Minister General Prachuap Suntharangkun; Police Major General Chavalit Yodmani, Secretary-General of the Office of the Narcotics Control Board (ONCB) and other ONCB officials; as well as Ambassador John Gunther Dean and members of the American Embassy staff involved in narcotics matters. While in Thailand the delegation participated in a field trip to the Doi Yao and Pha Mon crop control projects along the Thai-Laotian border.

The delegation, while pleased with the progress made by the Thai Government in forcing major heroin manufacturers and traffickers to retreat from Thailand into Burma, concluded that the Thai Government should be moving more firmly to phase out all opium production in areas under its control and in containing the international opium and heroin traffic that moves through Thailand.

During the past three years the Thais have moved very aggressively against drug traffickers along the Thai-Burmese border. During this period of time the Bangkok Government has been able to extend its authority over northern areas that were formerly in control of insurgent groups, some of whom were involved in drug trafficking. As the insurgency problem diminishes, the Thai Government is able to end poppy cultivation in the hill tribe areas. It is estimated that Thailand is capable of producing between 50 and 100 tons of opium annually.

It is reported that 5 percent of the poppy grown in the Golden Triangle comes from Thailand, with the bulk of the remainder cultivated in Burma in insurgent areas beyond control of the Rangoon Government. Thailand's 5 percent, however, was responsible for the estimated production of 35 tons of opium in 1983. In addition, Thailand's excellent roads, communication and transportation system built with U.S. economic assistance, while contributing to economic development, has also facilitated narcotics trafficking. Major trafficking routes exist from Burma through Thailand for distribution to the rest of the world.

Deputy Prime Minister Prachuap emphasized the Thai commitment to the elimination of poppy cultivation in his country but he cautioned that the hill tribespeople in the North have been involved in both insurgency and the growing of opium for many years. He indicated that in the past few years the Thai Government had made many great gains in bringing these people into the

orbit of Thai society and that all this could be lost if the government moved too fast in the total elimination of all poppy cultivation and opium production.

General Chavalit pointed out to the delegation that the Thai Government did not have crop substitution projects in 37 percent of the poppy growing and opium production areas within the Thai territory of the Golden Triangle. He called for increased bi-lateral and multi-lateral assistance to Thailand to accomplish full eradication. The General described a $70 million, 5–10 year crop substitution plan which would be introduced into 8 major opium producing areas. The $70 million plan would mandate ending non-commercial production of opium immediately, then the elimination of hill tribe village consumption, and then finally complete elimination. The delegation took General Chavalit's plan and funding request under advisement and cautioned that the Thai Government should insure that U.S. and U.N. agricultural and rural development assistance should not be used to facilitate poppy cultivation or opium production.

The Select Committee concluded that the Thais must begin to move more firmly to phase out the remaining poppy cultivation that exists in the country. While opium production in Thailand has hit a low point, it could explode dramatically. Most crop substitution projects are only demonstration programs at this point and increased efforts must be directed to finding markets and transportation for the new substitution crops. Similarly, the Thai Government must initiate an aggressive and sustained effort to disrupt opium and heroin trafficking through its territory. This will require increased law enforcement, as well as new conspiracy and asset seizure laws to be utilized against major traffickers.

Burma

On early morning January 12, 1984, the delegation left Bangkok for a full day visit in the Union of Burma. In addition to meeting with Ambassador Daniel O'Donohue and his staff in Rangoon, the delegation also met with Hhin Maung Win, Deputy Minister for Home and Religious Affairs and Secretary General of the Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control; U Thein Aung, Director General of the People's Police Force; U Chit Hlaing, Minister for Foreign Affairs; and H. E. Ye Goung, Minister for Agriculture and Forests.

Burma is by far the largest opium and heroin producer in the Golden Triangle. It is estimated that over 550 tons of opium were produced in Burma in 1983. The major opium growing and heroin refineries are along the Chinese, Laotian and Thai borders in Eastern and Northeastern Burma. These same areas are under the control of various insurgent groups which are fighting the Rangoon Government, and for the most part, are involved in drug trafficking.

The insurgent involvement with drug trafficking creates the "Burmese Dilemma" in its desire to aggressively combat opium production and drug trafficking and seek the assistance of other nations in this endeavor. The Burmese view the insurgency issue as strictly an internal one. The involvement of other nations in that effort, and the concomitant issue of opium control, would un-

dermine Rangoon's credibility with the native populations in the area it wishes to bring under its control. Deputy Minister Hlhin Maung Win strongly pointed out to the delegation that the Burmese Government views the issue of opium production and drug trafficking as separate and distinct from the insurgency issue and that poppy eradication efforts are not seen as viable options until the insurgent areas are brought under control.

Recognizing Burma's strong insistence on non-alliance in world affairs, and its almost xenophobic reaction to requests by other nations to assist it in internal problems, the delegation sought to explore how the Burmese capability to control opium production could be improved with American assistance. It must be remembered that official Burmese policy, as well as Buddhist religious precepts, condemn drug use. The Burmese have put in place an aggressive and successful mandatory drug abuse treatment program for its addict population. If ways can be found to assist Burma in effective narcotics control, the Select Committee believes they have the will to implement an effective program when political conditions permit.

Some areas identified where the United States can assist Burma in its struggle against the dual problem of insurgency and drug trafficking are:

1. Increased resources and equipment to suppress narcotic production and traffic by insurgents should be provided.
2. Burma requires continued U.S. assistance for aircraft maintenance. The greater portion of INM assistance presently going to Burma is for aircraft and aircraft maintenance.
3. Burma's narcotics intelligence capacity should be enhanced.
4. Burma expressed a willingness to explore the use of herbicidal spraying as a poppy crop eradication technique. The State Department, in conjunction with the Drug Enforcement Administration, should provide to the Burmese Government technical, scientific, and other assistance and information it may need to develop a herbicidal eradication program.

Pakistan

From January 14–17, 1984, the delegation continued its study mission through meetings and field trips to crop substitution projects in Pakistan. Our Ambassador, Deane R. Hinton, and his embassy team provided excellent briefings, information and assistance to the delegation. In addition meetings were held with the following Pakistani officials: Chief Justice Abdul Haleen, who was serving as the Acting President of Pakistan in the absence of President Zia; General Mohammed Iqbal Khan, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Acting Chief Martial Law Administrator; Mahud A. Haroon, Minister of the Interior, Roeded Kahn, Secretary-General of the Interior; Mairaj Husain, Chairman, Pakistan Narcotics Control Board; and Lt. General Fazal Haq, Governor of the Northwest Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.).

Pakistan recognizes the need for effective narcotics control. The increase in the number of heroin addicts from practically zero in 1980 to approximately 150,000 in 1983 caused alarm in Pakistan. Reacting to this problem, the government reduced opium produc-

tion from an estimated 800 tons in 1978 to an estimated 63 tons in 1983. This came about as the result of the Hadd Ordinance of 1979 whereby Pakistan ended the quasi-medical use of opium and the production of opium for that purpose in the territory under its control. This action was required by the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 to be placed in effect by December 1979.

Implementation of the Hadd Ordinance was enhanced by agricultural and rural development assistance programs in the Buner Area by UNFDAC and in the Malakand Agency by the U.S. State Department, Bureau of International Narcotic Matters. Another similar project has been launched by U.S. AID in the Gadoon Area in late 1983. Pakistan is committed to phasing out opium production and is preparing to launch a program in the Dir District where 40 percent of the opium in the merged area of the N.W.F.P. is alleged to be produced.

Pakistan's dramatic decrease in opium production has not significantly reduced the problem of the illicit manufacture and traffic of heroin originating in the "Federally Administered Tribal Areas" (FATA). This is because Pakistani narcotic control laws have only recently been extended to these areas, but have not yet been applied. Opium production has continued in the area and there are allegations it has increased. Additionally, it serves as a "privileged sanctuary" for laboratories manufacturing heroin from opium originating in the tribal areas and Afghanistan for export worldwide. Increased opium production in Afghanistan since 1979 has caused Pakistan to become a major transshipment nation for Afghan-produced opium and reportedly some heroin. An estimated 400 tons of opium were produced in Afghanistan in 1983, half of this amount is allegedly smuggled into Pakistan. By 1983, networks of sophisticated Pakistan-U.S. drug trafficking organizations were operating with extensions in Frankfurt, London, New York, Baltimore, Detroit, and Los Angeles. The Pakistanis have not been effective in dealing with this serious international narcotic manufacturing and trafficking problem. The government's performance in arresting and prosecuting major drug traffickers, has been poor. Corruption is an ever increasing problem, and only recently has the government instituted substantial penalties for drug traffickers, as well as for abettors and financiers of the trade.

In meetings with Pakistani officials there emerged a clear recognition of the trafficking issue and the impact of failure to control drug traffic could have on United States-Pakistan relations. Interior Secretary-General Roedad Kahn pointed out to the delegation that the opium production and conversion that takes place in Pakistan occurs in the North West Frontier Province. The N.W.F.P. is organized into "settled areas" where all Pakistani law applies, "Provincially Administered Tribal Areas" (PATA) where Pakistani laws do generally not apply unless ordered so by the Governor of the N.W.F.P., and the FATA along the Afghan border where Pakistani law only applies when President Zia proclaims so.

Since the promulgation of the Hadd Ordinance in 1979, which applied the principles of Islam to narcotics, thus banning the cultivation of opium and the trafficking and use of narcotics, the production of opium had dramatically decreased. The recent decision by the government to extend all the drug laws to the tribal areas,

if enforced, should further enhance the ability of the Pakistani Government to combat the trafficking threat. Secretary-General Kahn of the Ministry of Interior pointed out, however, that Pakistan is in dire need of intelligence to do an effective job against trafficking. Pakistani officials, including Mairaj Husain. Chairman of the P.N.C.B. called for increased assistance from the United States and specifically from Drug Enforcement Administration to assist Pakistani police authorities in building an effective investigative-intelligence network.

The delegation underscored the need to aggressively move against known trafficking networks. It was pointed out to Acting President Haleen that the mere extension of Pakistani law to the tribal areas will not provide deterrence if they are not enforced and that the major trafficking centers of Karachi and Lahore are settled areas where government authority is without question. In a meeting with the Governor of the N.W.F.P., Lt. Gen. Fazal Haq in Peshawar, the delegation again emphasized aggressive law enforcement against both producers and traffickers. General Haq said he agreed this must be done and stated it was his intention to use military courts against apprehended violators. General Haq indicated he has made this intention publicly known and that in the N.W.F.P. one must "back up his words with actions" to maintain control.

The delegation concluded that while the Pakistani Government has made progress in reducing poppy cultivation to date, production could rapidly escalate if enforcement lags or if economic development projects are allowed to deteriorate, or fail to improve the standard of living in the poppy producing areas. Conversely, Pakistan must do a more effective job of controlling opium and heroin trafficking through its country, particularly that which is refined and smuggled along the border with Afghanistan.

Turkey

On January 17 and 18, 1984, the delegation was in Ankara, Turkey. In addition to Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupe' and the embassy team, the delegation met with the following Turkish officials: Prime Minister Turgot Ozal; Ecumel Baratcu, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Necmettin Karaduman, Chairman of the Turkish Grand National Assembly; Fethi Celikbas, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the General National Assembly; General Ismail Selen Commanding General of the Jandarma; Fahri Gorgulu, Director-General of the Turkish National Police; and Ertugul Kumcuoglu, Under Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and Customs.

Since the banning of opium production in 1972 and the subsequent licensing of poppy cultivation for the production of poppy straw for industrial conversion to morphine concentrate under governmental supervision, Turkey has effectively prevented any significant illicit production of opium in the country. While some illicit production of poppy exists in remote southeastern provinces of Turkey, the authorities are eradicating it. The major narcotics problem facing Turkey is the transshipment of opium, morphine base and heroin from Iran through Turkey into Europe and the

United States, and the existence of opium conversion laboratories in Eastern Turkey along the border with Iran and Iraq. The opium, morphine base and heroin that transits Turkey or is processed in Turkey originates in Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan and to some extent in remote areas of Southeastern Turkey.

Since 1980 the United States contributes about $1 million per year in law enforcement support to assist Turkey in combatting illicit narcotics manufacture and trafficking. The delegation expressed concern over not knowing how effective our assistance to Turkey has been because of the absence of intelligence on how much opium and heroin is being smuggled via Iran from the east into Turkey, and how much conversion to morphine and heroin is occurring in Turkey. The delegation stated that the Congress cannot measure what progress our efforts are obtaining in Turkey unless we have an intelligence estimate of the extent of the narcotic traffic moving across Turkey annually.

In meeting with Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, the delegation made the point that Turkey, while shedding its image of the world's leading opium producer should not now allow itself to be labeled the transit center of the smuggled opium and heroin to the west. In meeting with Deputy Secretary Barutcu, of the Foreign Ministry, the delegation inquired if better intelligence concerning narcotics could be obtained from Iran and Afghanistan. Barutcu stated this was a continuing problem in light of the facts that Turkey does not maintain diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, and Iran has not been responsive to its inquiries.

Discussions with Commanding General Ismail Selen of the Turkish Jandarma, Director General Fahri of the Turkish National Police and Undersecretary Kumcuoglu of the Ministry of Finance and Customs centered on the delegation's concern over Turkey being used as a transshipment and conversion center for morphine base and heroin produced from opium originating in Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. It was pointed out by Director General Fahri that notwithstanding the difficulty of patrolling the barren and rugged Turkey/Iran-Iraq border, and the large amount of truck traffic that crosses it, Turkey has been doing an effective enforcement job in making the border a less attractive smuggling point for traffickers. He said reports indicate that an increasing amount of traffic is being shifted southward from Iran into Syria via Iraq. This is somewhat surprising since the smugglers are mostly Iranian and a war between Iran and Iraq has severely disrupted that border. In its talk with Mr. Kumcuoglu the delegation called for more effective customs inspections at border crossings and at airports and sea terminals. The delegation insisted that these latter two points are prime interdiction areas and should be more aggressively pursued by Turkish authorities. The Customs ministry was urged to attempt the use of detector dogs at the airports and seaports to enhance its efforts at those locations.

Italy

The Select Committee concluded its study mission with two successful days of meetings with Italian officials, the American Embassy team in Rome, and an inspirational audience with His Holi-

ness Pope John Paul II. In addition to a productive session with Ambassador Maxwell Rabb and his associates, the delegation met with the following Italian officials: President of the Republic Sandro Pertini, Prime Minister Bettino Craxi, Vice Prime Minister Arnaldo Forlani, Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti, and Interior Minister Luigi Scalfaro. The National Chief of Police, the Anti-Mafia High Commissioner and the Director of the Control Anti Drug Service participated in the meeting with the Minister of Interior. A meeting was also had with Justice Minister Mino Martinazzoli. In addition the delegation had sessions with the Commanding Generals and the staffs of the Guardia di Finanza and the Carabinieri. A meeting was also held with Giuseppe Di Gennaro, the Director of the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), and the delegation visited the Italian Center of Solidarity, a counterpart to the American Daytop Village drug rehabilitation halfway house.

The Italian Government has undertaken an aggressive campaign against organized crime and drug trafficking. The Italians have completed a successful effort to suppress terrorism in the country and is now turning the full weight of its law enforcement establishment against narcotics and traditional organized crime. In addition to narcotic enforcement that had led to the seizure of many heroin conversion laboratories in Sicily, the Italian Government has vigorously enforced the new anti-Mafia laws which resulted in substantial prison terms for members of leading Sicilian crime families, disrupted the entire Mafia hierarchy in Sicily, and led to the pretrial detention of many narcotics and organized crime suspects. As a result of this activity, the heroin traffic from Italy to the Eastern United States has been reduced by an estimated 25 percent.

The Drug Enforcement Administration greatly assisted the Italian Government in this effort. Italo-American cooperation in narcotic enforcement has traditionally been of the highest professional order. This cooperation is scheduled to continue under a proposed joint cabinet-level committee on narcotics and organized crime that is to be established between the United States and Italy. It is envisioned that the U.S. Attorney General and the Italian Interior Minister will be the co-chairman of the group.

Meetings with President Pertini and Prime Minister Craxi convinced the delegation of the commitment of the Italian Government to aggressively fight drug trafficking and to cooperate with all interested governments in this pursuit. Both leaders expressed the need for closer international cooperation as the best protection against the spread of narcotics trafficking. This theme was continued by Foreign Minister Andreotti who called for all nations to increase significantly their contributions to UNFDAC.

The delegation had the esteemed honor of a private audience with His Holiness Pope John Paul II at the Vatican on January 19. In his remarks to the Pope, Chairman Rangel expressed the delegation's deep admiration for the personal stands he has taken against the traffic and abuse of drugs, as well as against the power and influence of the Mafia in Italy. The Chairman specifically mentioned the Pope's strong support of Cardinal Pappalardo of Palermo, who has taken a forthright position against the Mafia in Sicily. His Holiness in a special message to the delegation praised its work and

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voiced his concern over the threat that drug abuse presents to the family and society.

In its final meeting of the study mission, the delegation visited the Italian Center of Solidarity, a drug abuse rehabilitation center modeled after Daytop Village in New York. The delegation shared the experiences of its trip with participants of the center and urged them to continue their own courageous fight against drug abuse.

KOREA

Mr. Gilman departed the delegation in Pakistan and attended the Pacific Security Conference in Seoul, Korea January 19–22, 1984. The Pacific Security Conference was sponsored by the Pacific Community Institute which is headed by former Congressman Lester L. Wolff of New York, a former Chairman of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control.

While in Seoul, Mr. Gilman met with U.S. Embassy personnel to discuss the growing Asian drug trade which is affecting the Asian population, the United States, and American military personnel stationed in Asia, particularly in Korea. Congressman Gilman was informed that the drug problem in Korea had become very serious, and that Korea had emerged as a major narcotics processing and smuggling point in Asia.

The American Embassy works closely with the Korean Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (MHSA), the Korean National Police, Korean Customs, the U.S. Military's Criminal Investigations Division (CID), Office of Special Investigations (OSI) and Naval Investigations Service (NIS) on the drug problem in Korea. However, while in Korea, Congressman Gilman heard from several sources that an additional Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent should be assigned to Korea if there is to be a successful campaign against drugs in that nation.

Congressman Gilman in meetings with U.S. officials was told that methamphetamine and marihuana continue to be the most frequently abused drugs by the military stationed in Korea. There is also some barbiturate use and abuse of over-the-counter drugs, including cough syrup which in Korea contains a higher percentage of codeine than cough medicines available in the United States. There have been some reports of drug trafficking through the APO mail system.

Korea is the largest producer of illegal methamphetamine in Asia, and approximately 90 percent of the methamphetamine abused in Japan comes from Korea. Korea serves as a convenient transshipment point for narcotics coming from other Asian points of origin, including Bangkok. In 1983, 20 kilos of heroin were seized in Honolulu after being shipped through Korea; an additional two kilos were seized in Seoul.

While there is minimal cocaine or heroin abuse in Korea to date, there is a growing middle class with increasing money and opportunities for drug use and abuse. There is a large alcoholism problem in Korea, and health officials fear that there are many potential drug abusers in that nation.

Marijuana grown locally has a low THC content, and is not as popular as other Asian-grown marijuana.

Recommendations made during the meeting were assignment of an additional DEA agent in Korea, the positioning of drug detector dogs at the airports to detect illegal narcotics and increasing the Korean Ministry of Health's staff and equipment budget.

Release of the International Narcotics Control Study Missions Report (June 19, 1984)

On June 19, 1984, the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control released the report of its study missions to Latin America and Jamaica (August 6–21, 1983) and to Hawaii, Hong Kong, Thailand, Burma, Pakistan, Turkey, Korea, and Italy (January 2–22, 1984). The findings in the report were released at a press conference attended by Chairman Rangel, Mr. Gilman, Mr. Smith, and Mr. Lewis. Also attending the press session were Representatives Louis Stokes and Harold Rogers, both of whom participated in the January, 1984 study mission to Hawaii, Asia, and Europe.

In his opening remarks at the press conference Mr. Rangel stated that, ". . . we are unequivocally losing the effort overseas to control the production and transshipment of heroin, cocaine, marihuana, and other dangerous drugs." He pointed out that in large measure our failure in international narcotics control emanates from a lack of priority the State Department gives to drug control generally, and as the major U.S. foreign policy consideration in nations which have not effectively controlled the production and smuggling of illegal drugs. Mr. Rangel identified Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Jamaica, Thailand, Burma, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran as the nations at fault.

In addition to the numerous recommendations outlined in the full report, the Chairman called upon the State Department and the Administration to implement the following initiatives as soon as possible:

1. Secretary of State George Shultz should begin an immediate dialogue with the Foreign Ministers of Western nations which are also victims of drug trafficking, as well as the Foreign Ministers of drug producing and trafficking nations, to determine what diplomatic and economic steps can be taken in concert to achieve more effective international narcotics policies.
2. U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick should begin a discussion on narcotics problems at the United Nations with her counterparts and seek ways for all governments to strengthen the efforts of the United Nation's narcotics control bodies to bring the illicit production and traffic of drugs under control.
3. President Reagan should recall all American Ambassadors to drug producing and smuggling nations to a White House conference and emphasize the importance our nation attaches to narcotics control and the seriousness with which the Congress and the American people are demanding action in this vitally important area.

Mr. Gilman echoed the Chairman's remarks. Speaking of both study missions he stated, "Narcotics production, trafficking and abuse has gotten worse—not better, and the drug traffickers have become more ruthless . . . The production and trafficking in illicit

drugs in the eleven source countries we visited continues at epidemic proportions." He called on the Administration to fully recognize the gravity of the problem and to drastically elevate drug-related issues to a higher priority on its agenda.

Representatives Smith and Lewis both pointed to the Federal interdiction efforts in South Florida as indicative of the fact that while seizures of illicit drugs being smuggled from South America are increasing the availability of marihuana and cocaine in the United States has not abated. Mr. Smith called for increased leadership on the part of the Federal Government to tackle the drug problems; Congressman Lewis said the full commitment of the American public is needed to supply the necessary resources and education to end drug abuse.

The Members attending the press conference called on the Administration to institute more forceful use of the Rangel-Gilman-Hawkins Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act which was passed by the Congress in late 1983. Under this legislation the President is required to suspend military and economic assistance to any nation failing to comply with the Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs. The Single Convention calls for the elimination of all narcotics crops which are not produced for licit or medicinal purposes. The study mission report noted with the exception of Mexico and Turkey, drug producing and trafficking nations have all failed to bring the manufacture and smuggling of illicit drugs under control.

Briefing by Dr. Giuseppe Di Gennaro, Executive Director, United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) (May 8, 1984)

On Tuesday, May 8, 1984, Dr. Giuseppe Di Gennaro, the Executive Director of the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), met with Select Committee Chairman Rangel and Representative Hall. Dr. Di Gennaro is a career official in the Italian Ministry of Justice, and prior to his appointment to the UNFDAC position he was the Italian Representative to the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs for several years.

As the Executive Director of UNFDAC, Dr. Di Gennaro is responsible for the maintenance and development of the Fund, including the approval of projects to be financed by UNFDAC. He was accompanied by Mr. Donnelly A. Sohlin, UNFDAC's Deputy Executive Director. (Mr. Sohlin is a former U.S. State Department employee), and Ms. Vera Gathright of the United Nations Information Center (UNIC) at Washington, D.C.

UNFDAC was created in 1971 to collect and program voluntarily contributed resources for multilateral drug control efforts. The Fund also assists the drug producing nations in their efforts to eradicate or curtail the production and trafficking of illicit narcotics.

The following are the salient points made by Dr. Di Gennaro:

Since the inception of UNFDAC, the total contributions received from 80 governments as well as private sources have amounted to approximately $70 million by the end of 1983.

UNFDAC should be viewed as a clearing house to fund international narcotic control assistance programs for all of those nations having international narcotics concerns. It is then the responsibility of these nations to help develop the agenda and assign the priorities of the Fund.

There are for the first time in a while, some positive signals from Thailand. UNFDAC has had a program there for the last 12 years that suffered from the Thai Government's failure to commit itself to the problem of phasing out opium production. Six months ago UNFDAC completed with Thailand a "master plan" that attempted to address all of the narcotics related problems there and provided a number of projects to be implemented in that country particularly a project to phase out opium production within five years. One country was willing to donate $10 million. However, the Thai Government has failed to adopt and commit itself to the plan. Thailand for internal political reasons still refuses to commit itself to phasing out opium production over a five year period, even though excellent crop substitutes have existed since 1976.

UNFDAC hopes that more projects can be implemented similar to the Buner Project in Pakistan which was the pioneer program leading to reductions-overall from 800 to 65 tons due to opium crop replacement programs. Strong support has been given by the United States which pledged $5 million from the A.I.D. budget for the Dir and Chitral Agency projects. Italy pledged $5 million. The Pakistan Government has been very effective in getting the Fund's programs in place. The governor of the Northwest Frontier, historically a narcotics trouble-spot, has aligned himself with UNFDAC in its efforts to eradicate opium production in his province.

Prerequisites for receiving UNFDAC contributions are 1) the host government's commitment toward a structured obligation as well as 2) a demonstrated ability by that government to control the drug production and traffic in question.

While UNFDAC has had some success controlling poppy production, coca control is a more difficult problem due to the size of the crop as well as the remoteness of some of the locations where it is grown.

All three of the Andean region nations, Bolivia, Colombia and Peru have recently requested assistance in monitoring their coca crop by satellite. UNFDAC is presently considering the request.

UNFDAC has instituted an important pilot project to study the narcotics situation in Bolivia. The Fund's resources are at present not sufficient however.

UNFDAC and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) has an annual meeting in February in Vienna, Austria to discuss the activities and agendas of the two organizations.

Inroads have been made by UNFDAC in Burma with drug control program support contributed primarily by Norway. The problem in Burma is compounded by the existence of the Shan State (a narcotics producing and trafficking state-within-a-state) over which the legitimate Burmese Government has virtually no control. However, $6.5 million was donated toward the Multi-Sectoral Pilot Project, a program, the aim of which was to assist the Burmese in the areas of 1) livestock production, 2) agriculture, 3) treatment of drug addicts, 4) rehabilitation of the addict population, 5) informa-

tion activities aimed at steering the population away from drug use and 6) law enforcement.

Three of these programs, those aimed at agriculture, livestock and rehabilitation, did not work well, so the funding for them was stopped, resulting in more funding for the other three programs. The Burmese Government cooperates fully with UNFDAC.

UNFDAC maintains contact and good relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC). They are presently considering ratifying the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Their attitude is positive.

UNFDAC needs the support of the U.S., not just financial but political as well. Japan only contributes about $400,000 a year. Australia is lending no support. Holland has never worked through multilateral channels and Canada does not contribute a great deal to the Fund.

The CND now has 40 member states contributing, however the representatives from these countries have, as a rule, backgrounds in the health professions only. This makes it difficult to put the issues for discussion on a higher political or economical level. We need more political assistance from the United States in hiring more representatives for the CND from the legal, judicial and law enforcement professions. We have too many pharmacologists now.

The United States is represented at the CND by the Assistant Secretary of State on International Narcotics Matters (INM). Dr. Di Gennaro indicated that he maintains contact with our Ambassador Williamson, the U.S. Representative to the U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna, Austria. He said however that he'd met with Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick once and then only informally.

Dr. Di Gennaro indicated that his background was with the Italian Judiciary, including Supreme Court of Cassation Judge; Appeal Court Judge and First Instance Judge, as well as Director-General for Criminal Affairs at the Italian Ministry of Justice.

UNFDAC's efforts in Colombia suffered a setback with the assassination in April of this year, of Justice Minister Lara-Bonilla who was the contact for the Fund there. UNFDAC has begun to structure a program in Colombia at the time of the murder aimed at rural integration and development. Specifically a small crop substitution program was envisioned in the Southwestern corner of the country in an area of traditional coca production. "We need to get the message across in the rural areas that coca growing is against the law as well as against the weight of public opinion," according to Di Gennaro.

UNFDAC operations aimed at eradication of illicit narcotic production function without many limitations. The spraying of herbicides is available as a possible approach. The host country must only request the support of the Fund and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs must give its approval. The chief limitation thereafter is the money for the operation.

While many UNFDAC projects around the world are small in size, the main thrust of the Fund is to focus the eyes of the world on anti-narcotics efforts . . . it must be viewed as a global campaign.

Meetings With International Narcotics Control Officials

INTRODUCTION

Throughout 1984 the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control met regularly with officials of the Department of State charged with international narcotics control responsibilities, as well as American Ambassadors to narcotics producing nations when they were on tour in Washington. These meetings served to keep the Department, and the chiefs of the American missions in key countries, abreast of the Select Committee's activities in the international area. In addition, these sessions conveyed to both the State Department and the diplomatic corps the Committee's interest, and the concern of the House of Representatives, in specific issues and problems related to international drug production and trafficking.

Additionally in 1984, the Select Committee held 12 meetings with foreign delegations to discuss drug trafficking and drug abuse. While most of these meetings were held with representatives of drug producing and trafficking nations to discuss the progress in drug control in those nations, all of the sessions between the Committee and foreign delegations promoted the Congress' desire for more effective international narcotics control.

STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS

Dominick L. DiCarlo, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (January 27, 1984)

On January 27, 1984, Chairman Rangel and Representative Akaka met with Assistant Secretary of State Dominick L. DiCarlo of the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM), Department of State and briefed him on the Select Committee's recent study mission to Hawaii, Asia, and Italy. The Congressmen described for Mr. DiCarlo their experiences, meetings, and impressions in each of the countries visited during the 18 day investigative trip.

In particular, Mr. Rangel impressed upon Mr. DiCarlo the need for the State Department to be in close communication with Members of Congress, particularly those traveling overseas to narcotics producing and trafficking, countries about the Department's narcotics control programs. Mr. Rangel particularly urged that INM staff travel with congressional delegations destined for narcotics producing or smuggling nations, or at a minimum, offer to brief congressional delegations before they leave for areas of the world involved in drug trafficking.

Mr. Rangel and Mr. Akaka both stressed the need for Pakistan and Thailand to develop comprehensive plans to phase-out the remaining illicit opium production taking place in their countries. Likewise, the Congressmen encouraged Mr. DiCarlo to explore ways in which multi-lateral assistance and influence can be brought to bear on Burma so that nation begins substantially to reduce opium production.

Assistant Secretary DiCarlo in response stated that he found the reports of the study mission's meetings with foreign narcotics con-

trol officials very informative. He indicated that the Select Committee's expertise on the subject of narcotics control greatly impresses foreign governments and in turn assists the State Department in convincing these nations the seriousness with which the Congress treats the subject of drug abuse.

Briefing by Staff of the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, Department of State (February 16, 1984)

On February 16, 1984, the Select Committee along with representatives from the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee met with staff of the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM), Department of State. At that time INM submitted to the Committees, its International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR).

The Department of State's International Narcotics Control Strategy Report was prepared and submitted in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 481, Foreign Assistance Act, as amended by Public Law 98-164, the Rangel-Gilman-Hawkins Amendment. As required by the latter amendment, the Department of State as well as the Departments of Justice, Defense, Treasury, Health and Human Services and the Agency for International Development met with those representing the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Foreign Affairs to review worldwide illicit drug production and trafficking and the policy, programs and role overall of the United States Government in combating the entry of illicit narcotic and psychotropic drugs and other controlled substances into this country.

The report itself consisted of the following sections:

I. Introduction
II. Summary Assessment
    A. 1983 Production Estimates
    B. 1983 Program Developments
III. Review of the International Program
IV. 1984-85 Program Strategy & Budget (summary)
V. Country Reports

Submitted with and made part of this report was the budget request of the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters which provided detail on regional and country strategies, budgets and programs. Also submitted for incorporation, in August of 1984, was the INCSR Mid-year Update which served as a synopsis of the new programs and developments regarding international narcotics production and trafficking for the first half of the year.

Jon Thomas, Assistant Secretary of State-Designate, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (September 12, 1984)

On Wednesday, September 12, 1984, Mr. Jon Thomas, newly appointed Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters (INM) met with Select Committee Chairman Rangel as well as with Rep. Akaka and Rep. Gilman, ranking minority member of the Select Committee. Mr. Thomas assumes the position formerly occupied by Dominick DiCarlo at INM. Accompanying Mr. Thomas from the Department of State were Messrs. Rayburn Hesse, Senior Program Analyst and Edward Fox, Deputy Assistant

Secretary for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs as well as Ms. Nancy Morgan, Legislative Management Officer.

Mr. Thomas indicated at the outset of the discussion that two issues of particular concern to INM were (a) a speech to be delivered by Secretary of State Shultz before the Miami Chamber of Commerce on Friday, September 14, 1984, entitled, "The Campaign Against Drugs: The International Dimension," and (b) the efforts made of late by the Government of Colombia to stem the production and trafficking of narcotics in that country. The Select Committee was gratified to learn from Mr. Thomas that the speech cited above was the end result of a meeting between Secretary Shultz and Chairman Rangel as well as with Rep. Gilman, Rep. Guarini, Rep. Akaka and Rep. Feighan of The House Foreign Affairs Committee in June of this year.

The following are the salient points made by Mr. Thomas in the course of the discussion with Members of the Select Committee:

The speech to be delivered by Secretary of State Shultz on September 14, 1984, reflects some personal thoughts of his on the worldwide narcotics problem. He put a lot of time and effort into the drafting and redrafting of it which shows his heightened concern for the issue. The speech will attempt to show the "big picture" of the problem as well as the highlights and success of the Federal effort. There is also a section on narcoterrorism that will focus on how increased trafficking of narcotics is yet another weapon being used by state-sponsored terrorists of the world. The speech will provide a set of rules and guidelines which the State Department can use in its policy determinations concerning narcotics for some time to come.

Regarding the situation in Colombia, Mr. Thomas reported that in the Santa Marta region the entire marijuana crop has been destroyed using glyphosate spray, despite public opposition to the program that was engineered by the drug traffickers in the region.

In the Guajira region of northern Colombia where a large marijuana crop is cultivated for international trafficking, Mr. Thomas was optimistic that 25% of the crop could be eradicated. In 1985 it is hoped that with the addition of new equipment including a total of nine new helicopters, 60–70 percent of the crop will be destroyed in the region. Subsequent reports indicate this rate of eradication was not achieved.

The production and trafficking of cocaine continues to be Colombia's biggest problem. It is estimated that there are some 17,000 acres of coca presently under cultivation in the country. However, logistic and security problems stand in the way of an effective program to eradicate the coca. Also, an herbicide for coca has not yet been found for use as an effective aerial spray. Scientists are presently experimenting with 6 herbicides which will be tested in the Llanos region in the near future. These are not new herbicides however. If one of the 6 does not work then a new one will be sought.

It is incorrect to attribute the stepped up Colombian anti-narcotic effort to the assassination of the Minister of Justice, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla. The program was in place and moving

before the tragedy, however his death served to crystalize and speed-up the process.

Mr. Thomas feels that enough resources are presently dedicated to the task of ridding Colombia of its narcotics problem.

Ironically, now Colombia is emerging as the leader of the anti-narcotic effort amongst the drug producing nations of South America.

While Colombia's President Belisario Betancur has requested more helicopters, one problem is that there are not enough trained Colombian pilots.

Mr. Thomas concluded his remarks by indicating that he was thankful for the work of the Select Committee. "This Committee," according to Mr. Thomas, "has helped ensure that the drug producing and trafficking nations of the world know that the people of the United States as well as this Government, fully expect them to live up to their obligations, both legal and moral, to work toward the eventual complete eradication of illicit narcotics within and through their borders. The Select Committee has played a major role in whatever progress has been made in the anti-narcotic effort here and abroad."

David C. Jordan, Ambassador-Designate to Peru (February 28, 1984)

On Tuesday, February 28, 1984, the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control met with United States Ambassador Designate to Peru, David C. Jordan, Chairman Rangel presiding.

Chairman Rangel specifically asked Mr. Jordan about narcotics production in, and trafficking from Peru to the United States. Jordan responded that he viewed drug trafficking as a serious policy concern of the United States in its relations with Peru and that Peru shares that concern. Ambassador Jordan went on to state that the coca cultivation issue in Peru is "very complex." Mr. Jordan attributed this complexity to the distinction between the licit and illicit cultivation of coca in Peru; Peru being the only traditional producer of coca for legitimate purposes. At present 14 thousand metric tons of coca are allegedly needed for coca chewing by the native Indian population of Peru and for legitimate export purposes.

Ambassador Jordan stated that the Peruvian Government, in concert with the United States, has undertaken a program to control and eradicate the illicit production of coca. He described the three elements of the program as:

(1) eradication of illicit coca cultivation;
(2) crop substitution, and
(3) law enforcement.

Mr. Jordan states that he would give top priority to narcotics control and to cooperating with the Government of Peru in eliminating coca production.

Further, in response to a question from Chairman Rangel concerning economic conditions in Peru, Jordan volunteered his opinion that high interest rates and a concomitant "capital crunch" have adversely affected crop substitution programs in coca producing areas. He offered the view that tight commercial credit has limited the ability of farmers of coca to undertake the cultivation of substitute crops. The Ambassador expressed the view that Peru

is doing all that it can to control coca production in view of the economic conditions in the country at this time.

Chairman Rangel closed the meeting by reassuring Mr. Jordan that the Select Committee is sensitive to the problems facing Peru and that he can expect the Congress to back his efforts to stem the Peruvian narcotics problem. The meeting was thus adjourned.

M. Peter McPherson, Administrator, Agency for International Development (February 28, 1984)

On Tuesday, February 28, 1984, the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control met with M. Peter McPherson, Administrator for the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.). Attending from the Select Committee were Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman, Ranking Minority Member, and Rep. Frank J. Guarini. Mr. McPherson was accompanied by John J. White, Jr., Special Assistant to the Assistant Administrator of the Bureau of Program and Policy Coordination for A.I.D., as well as by Ms. Charlotte M. Ponticelli, Congressional Liaison Officer for Latin America.

This meeting with Mr. McPherson was prompted in part by one, two weeks earlier, on February 7, 1984, with a Peruvian official. At that time, the Select Committee met with Sr. Fred Coral (see report), the Executive Director of Peru's Coca Control and Eradication Project for the Upper Huallaga Valley (CORAH), and described as "the single key point man in coca eradication," for Peru's efforts to eradicate coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley. It is here that a great deal of the basic ingredient used for the world's supply of cocaine is produced.

Mr. Coral informed the Select Committee that it was his perception that monies committed to Peru's eradication program by the United States had not yet been disbursed and that of those funds supposedly made available by A.I.D., the 47 percent interest, plus an adjustment to account for Peru's 120 percent inflation rate, made these funds (which are funneled through Peru's Agrarian Bank to be loaned to the farmers as a disincentive to the growing of coca) unattractive as a practical alternative to "narco-dollars."

The following are the major points from the Select Committee's discussion with Mr. McPherson;

The coca eradication and enforcement program is under the direction of the State Department Bureau of International Narcotic Matters and is programmed to fund $15 million over a five year period. The agricultural development project to which Mr. Coral referred, is under the direction of AID. AID has programmed $18 million over a similar five-year period to finance a program of combined agricultural research and extension credits. Of the $18 million, $15 million is to be loaned and $3 million is appropriated for an outright grant. Mr. Coral spoke of the program as it existed in 1983. The program had to wait until INM worked out an effective eradication program before the focus could shift to crop substitution. This had taken longer than had been thought. However, there has to date been approximately $9 million disbursed.

The three elements of an effective program to do away with coca production in the Upper Huallaga Valley are:

eradication;

crop substitution, and
effective law enforcement

The organization is now in place to affect a reduction of coca production.

The inflation rate in Peru is 120% so if in fact the interest rate is 80%, this should not result in a decapitalizing effect. AID is not satisfied with this but having some money there is a good beginning. 80% interest when the inflation rate is 120% is still a relatively inexpensive proposition.

Security is the number one problem in the Valley. AID is frustrated by the inability to protect the eradication and substitution effort. The farmers are intimidated and when a police crackdown began there in January (of 1984) four policemen were killed. If the eradication and enforcement elements of the program are not moving forward, the third, crop substitution for which AID supplies funding, cannot continue on acceptable timetables.

Edwin G. Corr, Ambassador to Bolivia (May 9, 1984)

On May 9, 1984, Chairman Rangel and Members of the Select Committee staff met briefly with U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia Edwin Corr. The meeting provided an opportunity for Ambassador Corr to bring the Select Committee up-to-date on the progress being made by the Government of Bolivia (GOB) in implementing the four agreements signed with the United States in August, 1983. Those agreements committed Bolivia to initiate a program in the Chapare coca growing region to gradually reduce coca production to what is required for legitimate purposes and to phase out and eradicate, as necessary, all other cultivation. The United States would provide financial and technical support over a five-year period to help Bolivia achieve this objective. Support would be provided through the Department of State (INM), the Agency for International Development and the Drug Enforcement Assistance Administration.

Ambassador Corr told Chairman Rangel that he was receiving excellent cooperation from INM, and was continuing to work with the GOB to see that implementation was initiated. Two major problems to date were the fact that the Chapare region was under almost total control of drug traffickers who were heavily armed, and that police units designed to take charge of the region need to strengthen their manpower and equipment. He also indicated that future meetings between Secretary of State Shultz and the Bolivian Foreign Minister and Ambassador would address this issue.

Daniel A. O'Donohue, Ambassador to Burma (June 12, 1984)

On Tuesday, June 12, 1984, the Select Committee met with the United States Ambassador to Burma, Daniel O'Donohue. Present were Representative Gilman and Representative Sawyer. Accompanying Ambassador O'Donohue were Peter Lord, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, U.S. Department of State and I. Lewis Libby, Director of Special Projects, East Asia Bureau, U.S. Department of State.

It is estimated that over 550 tons of opium were generated in Burma in 1983, making it the largest opium and heroin producer in

the Golden Triangle and worldwide. The major opium growing and heroin refining areas are along the Chinese, Laotian and Thai borders in Eastern and Northeastern Burma. These "remote" areas however, are under the control of various insurgent groups which are fighting the Rangoon Government and, in many instances, also directly involved in drug trafficking.

The following are the salient points made by Ambassador O'Donohue:

—The U.S. Embassy in Rangoon enjoys good relations with the Burmese People's Police Force. The United States has supplied valuable narcotic intelligence to the police which is in part responsible for the improving relations. The Burmese have recently accepted a U.S./DEA technical team which will evaluate the narcotic enforcement manpower and equipment needs of the police in Burma. The People's Police will also send selected members to this country for training by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

—A problem exists in Burma in that the U.S. has no direct interface with the Burmese Army in illicit opium poppy and heroin refinery suppression activities. The U.S. Embassy in Rangoon supplies all available intelligence to the Burmese police who then pass it on to the Army which carries out raids on the poppy production areas. The Army uses U.S.-supplied aid but the Embassy is as yet, not in a position to ask the Army what their needs really are.

—There have been 2 positive developments of late in Burma. The police and Home Minister have recently agreed to:

1. The DEA training and evaluation program, mentioned above;
2. Consider the U.S. proposed pilot program of aerial spraying of herbicides using "Thrush" aircraft. To date however, the Burmese have voiced 3 concerns;
   (a) The survivability of the aircraft in a hostile area;
   (b) The environmental impact; and
   (c) The impact on the tribespeople in the areas under consideration.

The pilot spraying program would involve a geographically remote area under the control of the Rangoon Government.

—There has been no change regarding the control of the "remote" areas in Burma, i.e. those controlled by the insurgent groups.

—This year's "Operation Mohine," the Burmese Army's annual eradication effort, was aimed at the SURA, Shan United Revolutionary Army, and the SUA, Shan United Army, insurgent groups directly involved in drug trafficking. The operation aimed at the SURA was a disappointment in that the Thais had previously mounted an operation against them. One large seizure was made when a SURA caravan was "hit." The Second phase took place against the Shan United Army, and was the first time in 2-3 years that the Burmese Army has challenged the SUA. From May 10-12 a 3 day battle raged at SUA Headquarters resulting in 9-12 Burmese soldiers dead as well as a similar number on the Shan side. The SUA was able to withdraw, taking most of their equipment and all of the

drugs. Nonetheless the impact though temporary was significant, and gave the traffickers the impression that the Burmese and Thais were cooperating and mounting joint operations. This had not been the case to date. The border between the two is pretty "tight" now but as has been the case in the past, the traffickers adjust.

—There have been no new talks officially, regarding Thai/Burma cooperation although the Thais are keeping a close watch on the border with Burma. The Thais recently mounted 2 big operations in Northern Thailand to keep the pressure on the traffickers.

—Reports out of DEA Bangkok state that seizures of narcotics have been heavy, leading to the changing of the trafficking patterns, however there's been no lessening of drug quantities.

—In one recent Thai police action, 18 people believed associated with the SUA were apprehended. The DEA office in Chiangmai (Thailand) was told that the Burmese would take over the cases of the 18. To date however, they remain in Thailand.

—While it is estimated that production of the opium poppy is up, it is impossible to estimate the yield of the crop although levels should not change drastically from those of 1983, i.e. 300 to 600 tons for the year.

—The United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) currently supplies technical assistance and funding for crop substitution and drug abuse prevention programs to the Burmese.

—The Burmese have instituted a fairly effective eradication program. However, the problem is that the major poppy growing areas are not under the control of the Rangoon Government. Rangoon is reluctant to send its military into those areas where clashes with insurgents can be expected. The Burmese military currently does not have the strength to effectively combat the rebel forces. It is not known, in any event, whether U.S. aid would be welcomed; the Burmese insist on maintaining their non-aligned position. Requests have been transmitted through the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon for small FMS (Foreign Military Sale) program allocations. The U.S. has given the military government in Rangoon $4 million for small arms and equipment. More direct contacts are needed.

—The Burmese Communist Party (BCP) is actively involved in narcotics trafficking and conversion in the areas under their control along the Thai border. They have a strong, dedicated leadership. They have some Chinese amongst their ranks, however the People's Republic of China has cut back on its support for the BCP.

The existence of the BCP along the Sino-Burmese border serves no benefit for the Chinese, as the Chinese do not need the BCP buffer along its border with Burma. The existence of the Shan state however, guarantees the Rangoon Government freedom from friction with China. The Shan is the major producing area for the opium poppy in Burma. There is production also in the Kachin areas under the control of the Kachin Independent Army (KIN) which transports the opium through India.

—The poppy eradication program in those producing areas under Burmese Government control, while relatively small, has nonetheless had a disruptive effect on the traffickers. Without these efforts by the Burmese, the problem there would be much worse.

Lewis A. Tambs, Ambassador to Colombia (September 6, 1984)

Our Ambassador to Colombia, Lewis A. Tambs, met with Chairman Rangel and Representative Gilman on September 6, 1984, to bring them up-to-date on recent developments pertaining to narcotics trafficking in Colombia. He discussed the recent spraying of marijuana in the rugged mountainous terrain of Santa Maria, California and indicated that the Government of Colombia is conducting experimental marijuana spraying operations with the herbicide glyphosate, a weed killer known as Roundup. He also stated that Colombia needs helicopters and radar equipment to help interdict drug trafficking operations and expressed concern at the frequent threats to Embassy personnel by narco-terrorists.

FOREIGN DELEGATIONS

Sr. Fred Coral, Executive Director of the Coca Control and Eradication Project for the Upper Huallaga Valley (CORAH) in Peru (February 7, 1984)

On Tuesday, February 7, 1984, the Select Committee met with Sr. Fred Coral, the Executive Director of Peru's Coca Control and Eradication Project for the Upper Huallaga Valley (CORAH). In attendance were Chairman Rangel, Rep. Gilman, Rep. Lewis, and Rep. Guarini.

Mr. Coral is described as, "The single key point man in coca eradication," under the program to eradicate coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley. It is the goal of INM to eliminate 4,000 hectares of coca using a part of the $3 million allotment targeted at Peru. This is the first ongoing eradication project of its kind in Peru, to be run in conjunction with the Agency for International Development (AID). In the previous year the Peruvians, working without direct United States support eliminated 700 hectares of coca using the herbicide 2–4–D.

Mr. Coral's organization, CORAH, functions under the aegis of Peru's Department of Agriculture and Mr. Coral reports to the Minister of Agriculture. Mr. Coral's office functions by monitoring data received from Enaco, a state-owned enterprise in Peru, which buys those amounts of the coca crop which are allowed for legal use and consumption and grown by state licensed farmers who sell the legal crop to Enaco. Those farmers found to be growing coca and not possessing a license "are candidates for eradication (of their crop)."

The following are the salient points made by Sr. Coral in the course of the exchange:

The help that Peru receives from the U.S. now is small. But we plan to eradicate 4,000 hectares of coca this year. The necessary readjustments in our program are based on previous years' experience. We have to work in accord with our resources and other projects in the area. Last year CORAH

worked independently of the A.I.D. funded program Enaco. We are adjusting to work with all of the other organizations involved in the eradication effort now. We're changing our methods of operation now—we're using 2-4-D manually so we don't have to chop the plant down.

We have established contact with the directors of Naranjillo, a marketing coop (some of the members grow coca in the Valley), who want to eradicate about 3,000 hectares which is grown by some of its members. They can't do the job by themselves because there are other concerns of other crops—they need help.

The Peruvian Government must persuade the coca groups that it is against their best interests and those of their families.

It is a complex problem in Peru—the laws we have now. We have to solve those problems by ourselves—we're convinced eradication won't be effective unless the farmers can change their crops.

We are doing more now to implement eradication but we're faced with financial problems. The Agrarian Bank gets U.S. money from A.I.D. However, the farmers have to pay 47 percent interest on it then the money is readjusted to allow for inflation and the conversion back to U.S. dollars. So the A.I.D. loan which starts in U.S. money with 8 percent interest. However, the inflation rate in Peru is 120 percent (in 1983). Therefore, the farmer pays 47 percent plus an index to inflation. In a practical sense then, no money is readily available for the farmers who cannot afford the loan at such terms.

In all events, no money is dispensed unless eradication has taken place. Toward this end, we have in place 160 Peruvian policemen in the command at UMOPAR, a mobil police unit in the Upper Huallaga Valley.

Mr. Coral concluded his remarks by stating the following:

We feel that the CORAH project was to be used to convince people to stop growing coca--but we're telling farmers that they'll get assistance from the government and that's not happening.

Ejaz Azim, Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States (February 9, 1984)

On February 9, 1984, Ambassador Ejaz Azim of Pakistan called upon Chairman Rangel at his office to inquire as to the Chairman's impressions on his recent visit to Pakistan.

Chairman Rangel informed Ambassador Azim that the Committee was impressed with the commitment of the Government to phasing out opium production in the "Federally Administered Tribal Areas" (FATA) of the Northwest Frontier Province. Mr. Rangel said that Pakistan should make every effort to more effectively cut off at the "choke points" opium, heroin and morphine base entering its territory from Afghanistan.

Chairman Rangel told Abassador Azim that the Committee had learned that efforts to suppress the illicit manufacture and traffic of heroin in Pakistan to date have not been effective and there is a great need for this to be improved.

Mr. Rangel had the video tapes of the Committee field visit to Pakistan run for Ambassador Azim and commended the humanity and generosity of Pakistan in caring for the Afghan refugees.

Dr. Claude Bartolone, Member of the French National Assembly (March 8, 1984)

On Thursday, March 8, 1984, the Select Committee met with Dr. Claude Bartolone, Deputy, Socialist Party, National Assembly of France. In attendance were Chairman Rangel and Representative Gilman, Ranking Minority Member. Dr. Bartolone was accompanied by Judith Oringer, Department of State, Escort/Interpreter.

Dr. Bartolone noted at the outset of the discussion that his interests center on the health care aspects of narcotics abuse. However, as a member of the Narcotics Working Group of the French National Assembly, he remains knowledgeable about the problem overall effecting France.

Bartolone stated that drug abuse is on the rise, especially in the age group 16–23 and that among this group it was especially high in the towns and municipalities between Paris' DeGaulle Airport and Paris itself. Apparently this results from the heavy drug traffic between the two, as narcotics are shipped into and out of the French capital.

Dr. Bartolone indicated that it was difficult to determine the exact number of addicts in France due to the varied sources of information. Yet he suggested that a figure of 2500 addicts for every million and a half people was not an unreasonable estimation. The number of addicts is rising, however, as cocaine and heroin use grows.

This increase in drug use had occurred, even as the French authorities have placed increased emphasis on drugs and shutting their borders to them. Bartolone suggested that although, "it's impossible to stop drugs at (France's) borders . . . we must fight on until action can be taken at the UN."

Dr. Bartolone concluded his remarks by noting the importance of U.S./French cooperation in stemming worldwide narcotics abuse. He suggested too that the Select Committee and the Narcotics Working Group in France, open and maintain regular channels of communication to facilitate the joint efforts of the countries. "If I can return to France with the knowledge that we will continue our interaction with the Select Committee, then this trip will have been a success."

Participants in the International Visitor Program's Multi-Regional Project on Substance Abuse Control (March 13, 1984)

On March 13, 1984, the Select Committee met with participants in the International Visitor Program's Multi-Regional Project on Substance Abuse Control. The delegation which represented nations from around the world was comprised of the following:

Mr. David Burrows, Youth Officer, Ministry of Youth, Sports and Community Affairs (Bahamas).

Ms. Barbara Curtis, Health Education Officer, Ministry of Health (Bahamas).

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Mr. Jacques Violon, Director, National Education, Psychomedical-Social Center, Ministry of Education (Belgium).
Mr. Jorge Blanco, National Director, Department of Preventive Education, National Council of Dangerous Substances (Bolivia).
Ms. Patricia Ackerman-Gainsborg, Department of Preventive Education, National Council of Dangerous Substances (Bolivia).
Dr. Augusto Perez Gomez, Professor, University of the Andes (Colombia).
Dr. Orlando Urdaneto, President, National Association for Psychology, Member, Commission on Mental Health (Colombia).
Mr. Mano Ratinaisiwa, Crime Office, Royal Fiji Police Force (Fiji).
Mrs. Roseanne Perone, Instructor, Psychology and Nursing, Pescia Nursing School (Italy).
Ms. Dorophea McKenerick, Guidance Counselor, Brownstown Community College (Jamaica).
Ms. Paula Atchia, Vice President, Sub-Commission for the Rehabilitation of Drug Addicts, Roman Catholic Diocese (Mauritius).
Mr. Gillian Johannes, Youth Program Coordinator, Community Services Bureau (Palau).
Dr. Josefina Huaman, Professor of Sociology, Catholic University (Peru).
Dr. Juan Miguel Youri, Psychiatrist and Advisor, Ministry of Health, Family Mental Health Program (Peru).
Mr. Rajmund Dabrowski, Prevention Society (Poland).
Mr. William J. Mallya, Senior Instructor, National Social Welfare Training Institute (Tanzania).

Participating from the Select Committee were Chairman Rangel, Rep. Scheuer, Rep. Hall, Rep. Hughes, Rep. Hunter and Rep. Akaka.

Chairman Rangel welcomed the delegation and began the exchange by commenting on the workings of the government of the United States as well as the Select Committee. The Chairman, while noting that narcotics are a threat to our national security, was optimistic that a "new era of cooperation" was developing between the United States Congress and parliaments around the world both of which owe their prime obligation directly to constituencies.

"I never want your countries to learn the lesson that the U.S. has," Mr. Rangel said. He acknowledged however that the problem of narcotics production is due in part to the fact that the needs of the farmers are often ignored; that these people are often merely, "eking out a living as best they can." Mr. Rangel expressed his pride that the government of the United States just does not aim to ban the production of narcotics or to eradicate narcotic cultivation without offering assistance to those choosing to make their livings around the world by growing narcotic crops.

Several of the participants indicated that the economic benefits of drug cultivation as well as the cultural tradition underlying drug production in many of the producing nations, have been and will continue to be the prime disincentives to the eradication of narcotic crops. "Coca is a part of my country's culture and heritage," said Ms. Ackerman-Gainsborg from Bolivia.

"People are making more money by dealing in drugs," said Mr. Burrows from the Bahamas. "For the first time the rural areas

have money and are doing well. To ask the people to give up on (drug production) is difficult," he said. Ms. McKenerick from Jamaica indicated that, "now the people . . . have the money which they would not have if they had to rely on the government."

Chairman Rangel assured the conferees that efforts toward crop substitution programs around the world were nothing more than attempts to "substitute a better quality of life," for the people of the source nations.

Maj. Gen. Mamdouh Selim Zaki, Egyptian Anti-Narcotics General Administration (March 21, 1984)

On March 21, 1984, Major General Zaki, Director of the Egyptian Anti-Narcotics General Administration (ANGA) met with the Select Committee. Present were Chairman Rangel, Rep. Lewis of Florida, Rep. Chappie and a representative from Rep. Oxley's office.

Egypt established in 1929, the first specialized organization for drug enforcement in the world—the General Intelligence Bureau for Narcotic Substances which later became the Anti-Narcotics General Administration.

Gen. Zaki estimated that producers of legal crops in Egypt earn $200.00 per ¼ acre per year while for the same acreage and time period, the illicit cultivators are able to realize $50,000. However, Egypt is predominantly a consumer country. Opium is consumed orally. Methaqualone is a problem and hashish is the most abused drug in Egypt, most of which is smuggled from near-by Lebanon.

There is little illegal cultivation of narcotics in Egypt. Some opium is grown domestically as is some marijuana. Most of the opium brought into Egypt used to come from Turkey. However, Pakistan now produces the bulk of what enters Egypt, with some originating in India, Some opium entering Egypt is produced in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon and also in Syria. There are also heroin conversion labs in the Bekaa Valley which is under Syrian control. Gen. Zaki concluded by indicating that Egyptian/United States cooperation in the war against drugs is good and effective.

Isaac Chang Vega, Attorney General of Panama (March 22, 1984)

On March 22, 1984, members of the Select Committee on Narcotics met with Isaac Chang Vega, the Attorney General of Panama. Mr. Vega was accompanied by his executive assistant, Mr. Raphael A. Arauz.

Members of the Select Committee who attended the meeting were Chairman Charles B. Rangel, Benjamin A. Gilman, the Ranking Minority Member of the Select Committee, and Rep. Frank J. Guarini.

The discussion with Mr. Vega centered around Panama's Bank Secrecy Laws. He stated that the present Panamanian administration recognized that banks have a right to operate in certain ways to protect their clients, but they also have obligations to cooperate with the Government. Mr. Rangel in turn pointed to the negotiations between the U.S. and Panama on a new legal assistance treaty which would facilitate the exchange of banking information in criminal cases as evidence of increased cooperation between both nations on drug smuggling issues.

Congressman Gilman commended Mr. Vega as a representative of Panama on Panama's first contribution to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control. Mr. Gilman remarked that it is very difficult to fight narcotics when such small amounts of money are made available to the U.N. Fund.

The discussion also turned to the amount of drugs trafficked through Panama. Mr. Vega stated that although last year Panamanian authorities seized over 1,000 kilos of cocaine, Panama is one of the few countries in Central America with an effective narcotics control program. He noted that these stringent controls affect tourism adversely, but Panama is not willing to relax these controls. Mr. Rangel inquired if Panama has made any specific requests to the U.S. for assistance in this area. Mr. Vega reponded negatively, but noted that Panama is assessing its laboratory and communications equipment to determine what resources would enhance its narcotics enforcement capability.

The members of the Select Committee were satisfied with the constructive tone of this meeting with Mr. Vega, and the sincerity of the Government of Panama to act to control narcotics trafficking and money laundering within their borders.

Gordon L. Mortimer, Commissioner for Narcotics, Hong Kong (May 1, 1984)

On Tuesday, May 1, 1984, Mr. Gordon L. Mortimer, Commissioner for Narcotics, Hong Kong Government, met with Select Committee Chairman Rangel. Mr. Mortimer was participating in the Executive Observation Program of the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, U.S. Department of State, in cooperation with the U.S. Information Agency.

As Commissioner for Narcotics for the Hong Kong Government, Mr. Mortimer is involved in drug law enforcement (both police and customs), treatment/rehabilitation and preventive education programs. He is also the principle officer responsible for Hong Kong's international cooperative efforts regarding narcotics matters.

The following are the salient points made by Commissioner Mortimer:

> During a 72 hour period in March of 1984, Hong Kong experienced an acute and sudden decline in the availability of heroin. This was due to the seizure by Hong Kong and Thai authorities of a particularly great quantity of the drug in the first three months of 1984. The price of heroin thus skyrocketed and those seeking treatment in available methadone programs (to stem the effects of withdrawal) rose from 6,300 to 10,400 per day. While heroin is currently still in short supply, the number of addicts seeking methadone treatment is down to 9,200 per day. (Note: At the end of December one gram of heroin No. 3 reportedly cost $76 (HK); it is now up to $200 (HK) per gram in some districts of Hong Kong. Also, Thai officials seized another 50 Kgs of heroin No. 4 and 65 Kgs. of heroin base bound for Hong Kong on March 26 which should help keep the pressure on price and supply.)
>
> Drugs when seized in Hong Kong must undergo chemical analysis. In the past a backlog of cases would occur due to the resultant delays in the prosecutorial process. The Attorney

General thus personally sought more chemists to speed cases to trial. More chemists were in fact brought on and the backlog has been cleared.

The authorities must deal with narcotics cases quickly to avoid cynicism by the public.

Cooperation by the Thai government has helped the Hong Kong authorities to a large extent.

The problem in Hong Kong of narcotics abuse has grown steadily worse. Every year almost 1500 new addicts are registered in the 15 to 20 year old age group. The drugs are available so the young people find their way into trouble. Fortunately, more are interested in physical fitness which will hopefully work to check substance abuse.

The United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is holding a conference in Rome during the week of May 7, 1984, with representatives of Western European source nations, with the topic being the diversion of controlled drugs, precursors and essential chemicals from international commerce into illicit channels. It is hoped that a similar conference will be planned for the Southeast Asian nations.

American efforts to combat the narcotics problem in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia generally, are held in high esteem. The young DEA agents working in that part of the world, often under dangerous conditions are doing a first class job and inspire the local enforcement people. The problem calls for leadership. Officials in Hong Kong just hope the United States does not cut back on its commitment there.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has ceased to operate as a significant transshipment point for narcotics bound for Hong Kong from the Golden Triangle.

Recently the authorities in Hong Kong were confronted with a significant increase of marihuana abuse in the English speaking schools with the exception of the American school.

Yusuf Aydin, Deputy Director General, Turkish National Police (May 18, 1984)

On Friday, May 18, 1984, Mr. Yusuf Aydin, the Deputy Director General of the Turkish National Police met with Mr. John T. Cusack, Chief of Staff of the Select Committee. Also present was Mr. James Green, DEA Special Agent-In-Charge at Ankara.

The Government of Turkey has vigorously addressed the problem of illicit manufacture and traffic within Turkey, a country that supplies heroin to Western Europe and North America, by increasing and intensifying the narcotic suppression activities of the Turkish National Police (TNP), Jandarma and Customs.

A system presently exists in Turkey combining the intelligence from Interpol, the TNP, Customs, Coast Guard and the Ministry of Health. The intelligence is just beginning to come in. When it is assessed it will be disseminated to each of the member organizations, like a small-scale EPIC, the narcotics intelligence clearinghouse in the U.S.

The Germans and Austrians can also come to the TNP for intelligence now that there are in place bilateral agreements.

Aydin claimed that there are few heroin laboratories in Turkey, only small primitive operations consisting of a few pots and pans that the Iranians are using to adulterate their morphine base. It is not heroin but morphine base. The problem in Turkey is the transshipment of morphine base through the country on its way to Syria, Cyprus, Greece and Italy. He also claimed intelligence for the past 2 years has been so good that it can almost intercept it before it comes in from Iran. This information was contrary to that received by the Select Committee when in Ankara in January, 1984. There is a lack of intelligence concerning the amount of opium, morphine base, and heroin entering and smuggled through Turkey from Iran, as well as the amount of illicit heroin conversion taking place in Turkey. Upon its return from the study mission the Committee called on DEA to make improvements in this area.

Aydin also asserted that the new trend used by the Yugoslavians and Bulgarians is to have Turkish guest workers deliver narcotics to Germany. He claimed that Turkish names are often involved but it is the Yugoslavians and Bulgarians who are organizing it.

The Director General also discussed the prosecution of Turkish Nationals in Turkey based on evidence developed in foreign countries. Mr. Aydin indicated that this program was working well with both West Germany and the United States. He pointed to action taken on two defendants based on evidence received from U.S. prosecutors right after the visit in January of the Select Committee.

The TNP and Jandarma are effectively utilizing narcotics control assistance funds supplied by the United States. The total amount comes to about $1 million per year used by these two agencies for equipment, training and maintenance. Aydin indicated an additional need for vehicles for under-cover work.

Aydin closed by saying the source of most of the opium, heroin and morphine is the Golden Triangle and Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. Turkish intelligence tells us there are heroin labs in Syria and Lebanon also.

Manuel Ibarra-Herrera, Director General, Mexican Federal Judicial Police (May 22, 1984)

On Tuesday, May 22, 1984, Chairman Rangel and Rep. Gilman met with Mr. Manuel Ibarra-Herrera of Mexico, Director General of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police.

Mr. Ibarra-Herrera indicated that Mexico has tried to strengthen its efforts regarding narcotics control and eradication. About the first of June, 1984 280 additional agents will be placed on duty to monitor the borders.

He stated that in Mexico itself, while the abuse of heroin and cocaine is still only relatively slight, a great deal of marijuana is smoked by the young people.

Mexico is going through some serious economic problems. Last year the Mexican authorities had money to help the farmers grow legitimate crops. Much grain and corn was produced for the country.

This year the same level of support has not been forthcoming to the farmers and therefore a large crop of marijuana and opium is

projected. It is difficult for the poor farmers to turn down the money that they can make in the drug trade. They have even been growing marijuana closer to the U.S. border in an attempt to cut out the "go-betweens."

Mexico is planning operations in conjunction with the DEA. Ibarra-Herrera expressed the belief that although 80% of the drug crop produced in Mexico is destined for the U.S, the problem is nonetheless Mexico's because the wealth of Mexico lies in its youth who are most often the victims of narcotics abuse.

The Director-General closed by stating that Mexico is trying to put an end to the processing of cocaine in Mexico, as well as reducing the amount of heroin entering the U.S. from Mexico. He asserted that Mexico will crack down even harder; not only on the drugs themselves but also on the ether, acetone and acetic anhydride needed to produce the drugs for consumption.

Alvaro Gomez, Colombian Ambassador to the United States (May 22, 1984)

On May 22, 1984, the Colombian Ambassador to the United States, Mr. Alvaro Gomez, met with Chairman Rangel to discuss the Colombian narcotics situation. Accompanying the Ambassador was Mr. Jaime Infante, Economic Counselor at the Colombian Embassy in Washington.

Ambassador Gomez told Chairman Rangel that drug traffickers are gaining influence in Colombia. The Ambassador noted an increase in cooperation among Colombian law enforcement authorities, saying we are discovering the way the traffickers are operating. He discussed some recent law enforcement accomplishments by the Colombian police including a raid on a cocaine refinery on the Yari River, during which about 12.5 tons of cocaine was seized. In total, 16 cocaine laboratories have been discovered since the crackdown on illegal cocaine production began.

Ambassador Gomez assured Mr. Rangel that the Colombian-U.S. extradition treaty will be enforced and narcotics traffickers requested by the U.S. will be extradited. Mr. Gomez indicated that if maximum progress was to be achieved against narcotics traffickers more American helicopters and equipment would be needed. He stated that coca paste enters Colombia from Peru and Bolivia. After processing the refined product departs northern Colombia to the Caribbean Islands or directly to the U.S. He indicated that since Colombia began its crackdown on narcotics traffickers, more coca paste and refined cocaine are moving through Venezuela, and that while a good cooperative relationship exists between Colombia and Venezuelan police officials, the same type of relationship did not exist with Peruvian and Bolivian authorities.

Ambassador Gomez told Chairman Rangel that we have made requests of the U.S. for helicopters; both to spray herbicides and to fight the traffickers. He mentioned that while paraquat works well against marijuana, it does not work well against coca. (On July 5, 1984 the Colombian Government began aerial spraying of the Colombian marijuana crop.) Finally, he indicated that timely, accurate intelligence was needed to enable Colombian authorities to put narcotics traffickers out of business.

Dr. Jiang Bing, Director, Bureau of Drug Administration and Policy, Ministry of Public Health, People's Republic of China (May 23, 1984)

On Wednesday, May 23, 1984, the Select Committee met with Dr. Jiang Bing of the People's Republic of China (PRG). Dr. Jiang is the Director of the Bureau of Drug Administration and Policy, Ministry of Public Health, PRC. Accompanying Dr. Jiang was Mr. Chen Yinqing, Chief, Division of Drug Administration, Bureau of Drug Administration and Policy, Ministry of Public Health, PRC and Mr. Ding Guanqun, Program Manager, Bureau of Drug Administration and Policy, PRC, as well as Mr. Jack Kuo, Chief of the Chinese Translation Unit at the World Health Organization.

Participating from the Select Committee were Chairman Rangel, Rep. Hunter, Rep. Levine, Rep. Guarini and Rep. Scheuer.

The following are the salient features of Dr. Jiang's discourse on the narcotics situation in the People's Republic:

The Chinese people have suffered from the scourge of drug abuse throughout history, especially during the 19th century when the opium trade was forced on China. In an attempt to combat the problem China fought and lost two "Opium Wars" in an effort to end the forced trade in opium.

Following the revolution victory of 1949 and subsequent "liberation," the problem of opiate abuse in China was solved. It took approximately 3 years to overcome the problem, utilizing education programs and a massive antinarcotic movement with the support of the people. Families were encouraged to send addicted members to rehabilitation centers which sprung up around the country. Reeducation and rehabilitation were combined in these centers.

To eradicate the opium crop in the PRC, martial law was used, combined with a program of land reform whereby the government acquired the land and redistributed it to the people. Some opium was allowed to grow for legal/medical purposes.

Three medical approaches are used to treat China's opium addicts:

(1) Chinese herbs to supplement the gradual reduction of the opium dosage
(2) Acupuncture
(3) Psychological treatment

The basic treatment lasts about 20 days.

There is no addiction problem to speak of now in the PRC. There were however, before the Revolution of 1949, approximately 30 million addicts in China. Authorities in China are still on guard for any reoccurrence of the problem. Today, any use of narcotic drugs is illegal except for medicinal use.

Penalties are severe for the selling of or trafficking in narcotics, including life imprisonment as well as capital punishment. There continues to be narcotics traffic through the PRC, especially through the southern provinces such as Canton, destined for Hong Kong.

Narcotics produced and smuggled from Vietnam is a serious concern for China. Opium and heroin originating in Thailand, Burma, and Laos is also a concern.

The PRC has instituted strict controls on the supply and distribution of drugs to prevent abuse. In 1955, China's Department of Health was authorized to oversee and implement the Narcotics Control Act (the Act). According to the Act, only government controlled and licensed manufacturers can produce and distribute licit narcotics. The whole chain of distribution is thereby under government control.

Hospitals must appy to the government in order to obtain supplies of narcotics and are thereafter subject to quotas. Only after government approval of the application may the hospital receive the narcotics. Once the doctor prescribes the drugs, the pharmacist at the hospital may veto the prescription if it is not in proper order. Cocaine, for eye treatment, as well as the opiates are covered by these regulations. There are other acts covering the psychotropics including methaqualone. The entire year's supply of licit opium is 10 to 20 tons for all of the PRC. It is produced domestically in China. There is no import or export of it. Cocaine is used as a local anesthetic in conjunction with eye surgery. Yearly consumption totals about five kilos. Some cocaine is produced domestically but most is imported from France. Pethadine, a synthetic narcotic, is also used in the PRC for medical purposes. Only one factory produces it in China however.

The Chinese stressed the need for better international cooperation, and support the programs of the UN aimed at illicit drugs and their abuse. Dr. Jiang led an observer delegation that went to the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) in February of 1983 to emphasize the need to eradicate poppy cultivation. (Note: This is significant insofar as since being admitted to the UN in 1971, the PRC has yet to ratify the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs or the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.)

There is now no significant narcotics abuse problem in the PRC and thus no narcotics education programs are offered in the schools. There is still some research being conducted, however, in the field of substance abuse.

The PRC exported methaqualone powder (used to manufacture "Quaalude"), freely until 1983. It no longer does so. At present there is in effect in the PRC, a system of strict governmental control on the export of methaqualone which previously has been diverted to the illicit traffic by persons who legally purchased it in China.

Burmese Delegation (July 3, 1984)

On Tuesday, July 3, 1984, the staff of the Select Committee on Narcotics met with a delegation of Burmese officials to discuss the narcotics situation in Burma. This meeting was held with staff because the House was in recess.

Burmese officials who attended the meeting were Colonel Khin Maung Win, Deputy Minister for Home and Religious Affairs, and Secretary of the Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control; and U Thein Aung, Director General of the People's Police Force, and Member of the National Assembly. Other Burmese officials present at the meeting were Lt. Colonel Tha Tun Aye, Commander for Training at Mektila AFB, Burma Air Force; and U Ohn Maungn,

Deputy Commander of the Criminal Investigations Department, People's Police Force.

The meeting was hosted by Mr. John T. Cusack, Chief of Staff, of the Select Committee on Narcotics.

Mr. Cusack opened the meeting by saying that the Members of the Select Committee enjoyed their visit to Burma. He stated that the Members of the Committee understood Burma's internal political position of attempting to quell insurgency in its opium producing areas before it embarks upon opium crop eradication. But, Mr. Cusack also impressed upon the Burmese the notion that the developed countries, such as the United States, wish to assist Burma in every way because they are the most directly affected by opium production and heroin trafficking. Cusack also urged the delegation to seek out cooperative enforcement efforts with neighboring countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore.

The Burmese said that from Washington they are going to New York and while there will meet with Representative Benjamin Gilman, Ranking Minority Member of the Select Committee.

On July 7, 1984, the Burmese drug law enforcement officials met with Mr. Gilman in his Monsey, New York district office. They indicated that their law enforecement agents and military troops have eradicated 11,000 acres of opium poppy in the Shan States, and in one recent operation, they seized five drug laboratories. Opium production is expected to exceed 500 tons.

Heavy fighting exists between narco-insurgents and the Burmese military forces. According to the Burmese officials, its law enforcement and military forces need communication and transportation equipment, especially helicopters; intelligence gathering capabilities need to be improved.

The Government of Burma is looking into the possibility of using the herbicide 2-4D experimentally in aerial spraying against poppy. The delegation also stated that Burmese drug law enforcement officials plan to visit Mexico to review that nation's herbicide aerial spraying program.

Meeting with Burmese Ambassador to the United States, U Maung Maung Gyi (December 14, 1984)

On December 14, 1984, Ambassador U Maung Maung Gyi made a courtesy call on Chairman Rangel to offer his services to the Chairman in connection with the ongoing interest of the Select Committee relative to the production and traffic of opium and heroin in Burma affecting the United States.

Mr. Rangel thanked Ambassador Gyi for his visit and said he was receiving some encouraging reports from the State Department on plans the Government of Burma was preparing for opium poppy eradication. Ambassador Gyi said the plans were moving forward very well and he too was encouraged. Chairman Rangel said he was also encouraged by the strong condemnation of drug production and trafficking being expressed by the Peoples Republic of China and that this is helpful to the Burmese Government in its efforts to suppress opium and heroin production and trafficking by insurgent groups in the Shan and Cachin states adjacent to China.

Chairman Rangel and Ambassador Gyi offered to assist each other in working together with the State Department to bring the

narcotic production and trafficking problem under control in Burma affecting the United States and many other countries.

Secretary of State George Shultz (June 26, 1984)

On June 19, 1984, the Committee released its report on its two international narcotics control study missions to Latin Amrica and Jamaica in August 1983 and to Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Near East and Italy in January 1984.

On June 26, 1984, Chairman Rangel led a Committee delegation which included Ranking Minority Member Benjamin A. Gilman, Representatives Daniel K. Akaka and Frank J. Guarini to meet with Secretary of State George P. Shultz at the State Department to brief the Secretary on the findings of the study missions.

Chairman Rangel supported by his colleagues stressed the enormity of the problem of the official production and traffic of narcotic drugs uncovered in the 10 nations and the territory of Kong Kong visited. They shared their perception that the situation was worsening. They urged the Secretary to increase the attention given to international narcotics control by the State Department and particularly that the failure of a handful of drug producing countries to meet their narcotics control obligations be made an issue of the highest priority in our relations with those governments. They urged that producing countries simply had to be pressed by the State Department and our Ambassadors to suppress the illicit production and traffic of narcotics in their territory affecting the United States.

Secretary Shultz replied that he and the State Department were very much aware of the seriousness of the production and traffic of narcotics abroad entering this country. He indicated that to focus attention on the problem he intended to give a major address in the very near future.

On September 14, 1984, the Secretary of State spoke to the Miami Chamber of Commerce in Miami, Florida on the topic "The Campaign Against Drugs: The International Dimension." In his remarks, Secretary Shultz outlined the Federal Government's five-tiered strategy, of which international cooperation is a major component. Citing examples of international cooperation such as the Colombian decision to begin an aerial herbicidal eradication program for marijuana, Peru's eradication of 5,000 acres of coca, and the government of Pakistan's continuing ban on the cultivation of opium poppy into additional areas of the Northwest Frontier Province, Mr. Shultz said that the Department of State was confident that other nations, for the first time, are beginning to realize the critical nature of the narcotics problem in international relations. "For a long time," Shultz said "foreign government considered narcotics an exclusively American problem. Today, that is changing."

While the reaction to Secretary Shultz's speech was generally favorable, Members of the Select Committee, including Chairman Rangel and Ranking Minority Member Ben Gilman expressed concern about the Department of State's commitment to the issue of international narcotics. In a letter to Secretary Shultz, both Members urged the State Department to take the message of international narcotics to international bodies such as the United Nations "to enable other nations to hear first-hand that the United States

takes the issue of international narcotics very seriously. . . . By putting other nations on notice, in a forum such as the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the ASEAN and NATO Foreign Ministers Organization, the United States would certainly be broadcasting our message to the world."

Representatives Rangel and Gilman said that while they considered this speech a "good starting point" they pledged to continue pressuring the Department of State to maintain high visibility on this issue. In order to "create a climate which is conducive to serious discussions between our nation and the drug producing nations of the world."

The Select Committee's Briefing Book to the House of Representatives on International Narcotics Control

The Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control is cognizant of the fact that drug trafficking in the United States has reached epidemic proportions. It is estimated to be a $110 billion per year business which is compounded by the human tragedy and the economic and social costs it brings to this nation. Drug abuse has escalated dramatically since 1979, particularly the use of cocaine among our young people. Indeed, it is at unacceptably high levels, giving the United States the dubious distinction of being the leading narcotics consumer nation in the world.

With these facts in mind, the Select Committee prepared for distribution to each of the Members of the House of Representatives, its Briefing Book on International Narcotics Control. The Briefing Book was prepared as a readily available reference on the illicit production, manufacture and traffic of narcotics abroad which affect the United States.

The book examines the causes and effects of the phenomenon and briefly describes the types and extent of abuse of the various narcotic and psychotropic drugs. It was designed to assist the membership of the House in communicating with the public and as background material for discussions with foreign officials.

Useful information on the issues and status of drug abuse prevention, treatment and rehabilitation is also supplied, incorporating the findings of the Select Committee obtained at home and abroad through hearings and meetings with Federal, State, local and foreign officials.

Over the course of the 98th Congress, the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control has closely examined and reviewed the diplomatic efforts of the Department of State as well as the effectiveness of the control measures taken by the source nations themselves, to eliminate the illicit production and trafficking of narcotics and psychotropic drugs within their countries. We also monitored all of the various illicit narcotics which effect this nation. This information and data as well as the conclusions that might be drawn therefrom were contained in the Briefing Book on International Narcotics Control.

With the incorporation of periodic updates, it is hoped the Briefing Book will provide a definitive source of information to the Members of the House of Representatives, regarding the foreign

manufacture and trafficking of narcotics, as well as efforts to curb them. The book consists of the following sections:

Introduction
I. Summary
II. The Illicit Production and Traffic of Narcotic Drugs Affecting the United States: Estimates 1979–1983
III. Country Reports
IV. Proposed Corrective Action Initiatives
V. Status of Major Drug Legislation—98th Congress
VI. Treatment, Rehabilitation and Prevention Issues
VII. Major Narcotic Control Issues
VIII. Summary of Foreign and Domestic Narcotic Control Findings
IX. U.S. International Narcotic and Psychotropic Drug Enforcement Cooperation

The Select Committee's Briefing Book on International Narcotics Control was distributed to the House Membership on October 3, 1984.

Foreign Policy Association Debate on "International Narcotics Control: Executive Branch and Congressional Perspectives" (May 17, 1984)

The Foreign Policy Association in its publication, "Great Decisions 84," presented an "impartial background and analysis of eight of the most important foreign policy issues facing the Nation." One of these was the "International Drug Traffic."

Subsequently, the Foreign Policy Association invited Chairman Rangel to appear with Assistant Secretary of State Dominick L. DiCarlo on the evening of May 17, 1984, at a meeting of the Foreign Policy Association at the Hotel Roosevelt in New York City. They were asked to discuss "International Narcotics Control: Are We Winning or Losing?" after which the floor would be open for questions from the audience.

The meeting was chaired by Mr. Archie E. Albright, President of the Foreign Policy Association, and the discussion was moderated by the noted ABC Television commentator, Geraldo Rivera. About 150 guests representing New York's business, academic and diplomatic communities as well as students from area high schools and universities were in attendance.

At the last minute legislation on the floor of the House of Representatives coming up for vote prevented Chairman Rangel from participating in this program. The Chief of Staff, John T. Cusack, of the Committee substituted for Mr. Rangel.

In essence, Assistant Secretary DiCarlo described the policy of the State Department in promoting the compliance of governments

with their obligations under the international narcotic control conventions as watchful waiting for opportunities to provide assistance and support to a country to bring a narcotic crop under control, at a point where the country might be receptive. Mr. DiCarlo thought the United States was winning the drug war because in countries such as Pakistan, Peru and Bolivia a start had been made by obtaining agreement to eradicate the narcotic crops.

Mr. Cusack stated the United States was losing the narcotic control war because of the lack of determined diplomatic negotiations that would oblige narcotic producing countries to phase out their production. In Peru and Bolivia, Mr. Cusack said, the agreements to eradicate only covered one area in each country whereas in Peru coca was grown in five other areas and in Bolivia in six others. Additionally, not even a start has been made in eradication in the areas where agreement was reached and overall in Peru and Bolivia coca production was increasing.

In Pakistan, Mr. Cusack pointed out, the 1979 ban against opium production has been applied selectively and five years after the ban no agreement has been reached to phase out opium production in several of the tribal areas where it remains substantial.

Mr. Cusack reported no agreements have been made with Thailand to phase out opium, Colombia to eradicate coca and marijuana and Jamaica to eradicate marijuana.

Mr. DiCarlo and Mr. Cusack fielded a wide range of questions from the floor covering various aspects of the international production, traffic and abuse of narcotic and psychotropic drugs. The familiar question of whether the supply or demand for drugs is responsible for the problem was discussed. Other than the fact that Mr. DiCarlo felt the U.S. was winning the drug war and Mr. Cusack thought it was not, their responses to the technical and complex issues on narcotics control were basically in agreement. There was no disagreement on the direction in which the U.S. Government was proceeding in narcotics control. However, Mr. DiCarlo maintained efforts were succeeding, whereas Mr. Cusack reported that efforts have not been sufficiently effective to bring any meaningful diminution in the traffic and abuse of drugs and the situation continues to worsen, not improve.

United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs

The Eighth Special Session of the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), met in Vienna, Austria from February 6–10, 1984. Through the cooperation of Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters, Dominick L. DiCarlo, who led the U.S. delegation, Mr. Gilman's statement pertaining to the global dimensions of narcotics trafficking and drug abuse was distributed to the delegates attending the special session.

In his statement to the CND, Mr. Gilman criticized the meager contributions to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC). In 1983, only 28 nations, or less than 18 percent of the 157 member nations comprising the United Nations, contributed or pledged a meager $3,710,259; private contributions amounted to only $255,953 or a grand total of $3,966,212 for a global effort to combat drug trafficking and drug abuse. Last year, only a handful

of nations contributed or pledged more than $100,000 to the UN Drug Fund: Australia, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Some nations that have benefited the most from UNFDAC projects have failed to contribute a single penny to the UN Drug Fund, and other nations have contributed only a few dollars to that organization. Mr. Gilman praised the Government of Italy for its five-year special purpose contribution of $40.9 million for drug-related activities in the Andean subregion of Peru, Bolivia and Colombia.

Mr. Gilman also stressed the importance for the international community to pool its resources, funds and personnel to combat the deadly menance of drug trafficking and drug abuse and to implement the international drug control strategy that was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1981. He also urged the U.N. specialized agencies, including the World Health Organization (WHO), the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), to elevate the problems of drug abuse to a higher level of priority within their own agendas and to devote substantially more of their resources to their own drug-related projects, rather than relying on the scarce UNFDAC dollars that are derived from voluntary contributions of the international community.

Mexico-United States Interparliamentary Conference (May 17–20, 1984)

The 24th Mexico-United States Interparliamentary Conference was held in Washington, D.C. on May 17–19, 1984. The United States delegation, which was led by Representative Kika de la Garza (Texas) and Senator Nancy Kassebaum (Kansas), consisted of Representatives Yatron, Kazen, Skelton, Alexander, Barnes, Lagomarsino, Rudd, Goodling, Dreier, and Bereuter and Senators Dodd, Domenici, Hatch, Hawkins and Bingham. Through the cooperative efforts of Rep. de la Garza and Sen. Kassebaum, Mr. Gilman presented a paper on the bilateral efforts to combat drug trafficking and drug abuse.

In his statement to the Conference, Mr. Gilman commended Mexico for its commitment to eradicating the opium poppy and marihuana. Although the amount of heroin entering the United States from Mexico has been reduced from approximately 75 percent to 34 percent, Mr. Gilman pointed out that recent reports indicate that international drug traffickers are once again looking to Mexico to become a major producer of heroin. Accordingly, he urged the Mexican legislators to help intensify joint efforts to combat narcotics trafficking, especially the Joint Mexico-United States Prosecutorial Program.

With respect to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), Mr. Gilman observed that of the $3.7 million contributed to the U.N. Drug Fund for 1983, the Latin American community contributed only $24,297. He urged Mexico, a contributor to UNFDAC, to exercise its influence in encouraging other Latin American nations to contribute to the Fund.

On three occasions in the 24-year history of this bilateral conference, legislators have adopted resolutions relating to complex issues governing the relations between the two nations, and in all three instances, these resolutions pertained to drug-related issues. In those three instances, Mr. Gilman's papers on drug trafficking and drug abuse were the catalytic force that helped formulate those resolutions. In 1977, the legislators from both nations adopted the Hermosillo Declaration on Combating the Traffic in Drugs at the International Level; in 1982, they adopted the Santa Barbara Narcotics Accord committing both nations to elevate to the highest priority the problems emanating from narcotics production, trafficking and abuse and pledging both nations to develop a comprehensive, coordinated regional drug strategy; and at the 1984 bilateral interparliamentary conference, the legislators adopted a resolution establishing a working group to assist the Conference in its efforts to combat drug trafficking and drug abuse.

According to this 1984 resolution, the objectives of the working group are:

"(1) to carry out all follow-up tasks that are necessary to achieve in both countries campaigns for the eradication of the illicit production of narcotics and the fight against narcotics, so that these would be more effective;

(2) to analyze, as appropriate, existing agreements in order to update them and to place the problem in the context they have established;

(3) to use the findings by the working group to be carried out by both countries, in order to formulate recommendations at the appropriate time, to the agencies of the respective Executives that have the operative ability to implement these recommendations;

(4) to recommend the necessary measures, including, in a major way, education campaigns designed to warn about the dangers of drug abuse; and

(5) to ensure that modern instruments and technological advances are provided in order to improve the efforts each country is carrying out in its jurisdiction to increase the effectiveness of the campaign to combat the trafficking of illicit drugs."

The working group is to report annually to the bilateral interparliamentary conference.

Appearance by Chairman Rangel on CBS Program "Face The Nation" Discussing International Narcotics Policy (May 6, 1984)

On May 6, 1984, Chairman Rangel appeared on the CBS news program, "Face the Nation," to discuss international drug control. Also appearing on the CBS program were the Foreign Minister of Colombia, Rodrigo Lloreda; the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Francis M. Mullen, Jr.; and drug abuse treatment expert Dr. Robert Baird of the Haven Clinic in Harlem.

Chairman Rangel said that the United States must "let foreign nations know that we mean business." He stressed that while we "respect their sovereignty," we should let them know that they should not expect military and economic assistance from the United States if they continue to ignore "our need for international

cooperation" on the narcotics issue. Mr. Rangel also reiterated the Committee's viewpoint that Secretary of State George Shultz must tell other nations that they are in "violation of international agreements" to control illicit narcotic producing crops.

When the program turned to the issue of the domestic control of narcotics, Chairman Rangel disputed Mr. Mullen's claim that domestically the Reagan Administration is doing a good job of catching drug traffickers. Mr. Rangel said that local police agencies are indicating that they "don't have the resources to prosecute narcotics cases and our jails are overcrowded."

ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES

Aviation Drug Trafficking Control Act

On July 24, 1984, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 1580, the Aviation Drug Trafficking Control Act. This measure was introduced by Aviation Subcommittee Chairman Norman Y. Mineta on February 22, 1983, in an effort to bolster the capability of the Federal Aviation Administration to sanction civil aviators and civil aircraft operators who traffic in narcotics and other illegal drugs. H.R. 1580 passed under suspension of the rules by a vote of 393–1. This bill, which was cosponsored by 10 members of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, contained the following provisions:

Revocation of one's airman certificate would be mandatory if the person was convicted of or knowingly engaged in a drug-related offense and was either acting as an airman or on board the aircraft in connection with the violation. The revocation can be as long as 5 years.

A person who knowingly and willfully operates an aircraft without an airman's certificate in connection with a violation of controlled substances laws becomes subject to a $25,000 fine and 5 years imprisonment.

An aircraft owner who knowingly permits an aircraft to be used for drug trafficking can have the certificate of registration revoked for at least 1 year, and possibly as long as 5 years. This revocation would apply to all the aircraft owned by this person.

The sale of fraudulent certificates of aircraft registration, and the possession of such certificates with the intent to use them, is made a criminal violation and if this violation occurs in connection with illegal drug trafficking, the penalty is a fine up to $25,000 and imprisonment up to 5 years.

The use of fraudulent aircraft registration certificates or fraudulent registration markings on aircraft in connection with an illegal drug transaction makes the violator subject to a fine of up to $25,000 and imprisonment for up to 5 years.

Chairman Rangel, in remarks in support of the bill, stated:

. . . This bill if enacted, would greatly enhance our ability to curtail narcotics smuggling by building on the existing regulatory jurisdiction of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for dealing with drug-related aviation violations . . . (the Bill) essentially allows the FAA to assist the Drug Enforcement Administration and The Customs Service by denying the privilege of flying and operating aircraft to those engaged in narcotics trafficking.

Mr. Rangel also pointed out in his remarks that statistics gathered over a number of years demonstrate the severity of the problem. The Customs Service estimates that 41 percent of all cocaine comes across our borders by private aircraft. This 41 percent represents $13 billion in street value. Additionally, in 1983, approximately 1.3 million pounds of illegal drugs entered the United States by private aircraft. Mr. Rangel also commented that the incident of airborne smuggling, once limited to the gulf and southern borders, is appearing in rapid frequency at all border areas.

Mr. Gilman also made a statement in support of the bill on July 24, 1984. He indicated that the use of aircraft to smuggle illicit narcotics into the United States is reaching epidemic proportions. Representative Gilman also stated that, "The legislation before us is indicative that this Congress is not going to stand by and watch the scourge of drug trafficking and abuse run wild. It demonstrates our determination to toughen existing laws, punishing those who seek to reap the profits of illicit drugs, while at the same time making the skies safe for legitimate aviation."

The Senate, in the first session of the 98th Congress, had passed its version of the Aviation Drug Trafficking Control Act, S. 1146 on September 27, 1983. After a conference on the bill, the House and Senate both passed the conference report which preserved all essential features of the House bill on October 2, 1984 and October 4, 1984, respectively. The bill was signed by the President on October 19, 1984, as Public Law 98–499.

Drug Crime Legislation

During 1984, Members of the Select Committee supported a number of legislative initiatives to provide additional law enforcement tools to fight drug trafficking and other drug-related crime. These individual measures adopted by the House dealt with forfeiture of drug criminals' assets, control of prescription drug diversion, money laundering, coordination of Federal drug enforcement efforts, and other drug related issues. Many of these proposals were incorporated in the comprehensive crime control provisions of Public Law 98–473, the fiscal year 1985 continuing resolution, although some were included in substantially different form from the individual bills passed by the House.

The Select Committee's support for these bills is discussed below.

Comprehensive Drug Penalty Act of 1984 (H.R. 4901)

Over the course of the 97th and 98th Congresses, Members of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control have sponsored and supported various measures aimed at improving the drug enforcement capabilities of Federal criminal and civil forfeiture provisions, particularly as they relate to drug trafficking offenses.

On February 22, 1984, Mr. Hughes along with Mr. Shaw, Mr. Smith, and Mr. Lewis introduced H.R. 4901, the "Comprehensive Drug Penalty Act of 1984." This measure was the result of hearings and proposals on forfeiture, crimes, and related issues by the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, which is chaired by Mr. Hughes, over the past two Congresses. H.R. 4901 was reported from the Committee on the Judiciary on June 19, 1984. Thereafter, the Committee on Ways and Means, which had jurisdiction over Title

II of the bill which related to the Customs Service, reported the bill on August 9, 1984.

H.R. 4901 contained several salutary provisions designed to increase the penalties imposed on drug traffickers, including the following:

Substantially increased the maximum permissible criminal fines in drug cases, generally tenfold from $25,000 to $250,000, and established a new alternative fine concept under which drug offenders can be fined up to twice their gross profits or proceeds from drug trafficking where the alternative fine would be greater than the fine specified for the crime itself.

Provided criminal forfeiture in all felony drug cases.

Established a $10 million forfeiture fund in the Department of Justice and the Customs Service to help defray escalating costs associated with forfeiture procedures and provide additional resources to be used for law enforcement in fiscal years 1985, 1986, and 1987.

Created a permissive presumption in criminal cases that all property acquired by drug offenders during the period of the violations or shortly thereafter is subject to forfeiture if no other likely source for such property exists.

Raised the Customs administrative forfeiture ceiling from the recent level of $10,000 to $100,000 for most articles, and by removing the ceiling entirely for prohibited merchandise and conveyances which are used to import, export, transport, or store any controlled substance.

Provided authority for the Secretary to transfer seized or forfeited property to State or local law enforcement agencies for forfeiture under appropriate State law, or transfer property already forfeited to any State or local law enforcement agency which participated directly in the seizure of the property.

On September 11, 1984, H.R. 4901 was brought up for consideration under suspension of the rules. In statements in support of the bill both Mr. Rangel and Mr. Gilman noted that the bill provides law enforcement agencies with new tools to apprehend and prosecute drug traffickers.

Mr. Rangel went on to remark that if the asset forfeiture funds established for the Justice Department and the Customs Service prove effective, consideration should be given to establishing a similar fund to help finance drug abuse treatment and prevention activities. The Chairman pointed out that most States are reporting an unmet need for treatment and prevention services, and that a survey by the National Association for City Drug and Alcohol Coordination found many cities reporting reductions in drug abuse programs, waiting lists and gaps in services, and existing programs that are heavily overutilized.

Pointing to the 40 percent reduction in Federal support for drug abuse prevention and treatment activities under the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Block Grant, Rangel noted that dedicating a portion of forfeited drug trafficking profits to help underwrite the costs of treatment and prevention programs is one way to alleviate 3 years of harsh budget cuts which the States have been forced to endure in their drug abuse service budgets. He stated in closing that "This is an idea that deserves future consideration

from the Congress." Mr. Gilman concurred in this concept and urged that it be considered.

H.R. 4901 passed the House under suspension of the rules on September 11, 1984.

Many of the provisions of H.R. 4901 were included as Chapters III and XXIII of Public Law 98-473.

Dangerous Drug Diversion Control Act of 1984 (H.R. 5656)

An issue of concern to the Select Committee in 1984 was prescription drug diversion. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration, during the period 1980-1982 between 60 and 70 percent of all controlled substance mentions involving deaths and injuries were attributable to drugs diverted from legitimate sources.

On May 15, 1984, Congressman William J. Hughes, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime, introduced H.R. 5656, "Dangerous Drug Diversion Control Act of 1984." Mr. Hughes is also a member of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control. The bill was referred to the Committees on the Judiciary, and Energy and Commerce, and was passed by the House of Representatives on September 18, 1984.

The aim of the legislation is to prevent prescription drugs which are capable of being abused from being diverted from legitimate channels of medical distribution and administration to illegitimate channels for purposes of abuse. H.R. 5656 also creates a procedure for emergency scheduling of substances which pose an imminent hazard to the public health and gives the Attorney General power to deny, suspend, or revoke the controlled substances registration of a practitioner if he proves that the registration is inconsistent with the public interest. In addition the bill raises penalties for drug law violations involving schedule II non-narcotic drugs and PCP (angel dust) from 10 years to 15 years for a first offense, and from 20 years to 30 years for a subsequent offense.

On July 23, 1984, Chairman Rangel wrote Congressman Henry Waxman, Chairman of the Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health and the Environment urging him to hold hearings on H.R. 5656. Mr. Rangel's letter noted that the bill contained several provisions which should prove useful in limiting the diversion of prescription drugs. Rangel noted that passage of H.R. 5656 would significantly increase the ability of the Drug Enforcement Administration to control the increasingly serious problem of prescription drug diversion.

Chairman Rangel supported passage of H.R. 5656 when it was taken up for consideration on the House floor on September 17, 1984. The increased penalties for diverted drugs under the bill would be the same as the highest penalties that apply for violations involving illicit drugs such as heroin, cocaine and marijuana, Mr. Rangel informed his colleagues. He also noted that the bill authorized the Attorney General to make grants to States and local governments for activities that will enable States to better control prescription drug diversion. Funds for this program would be authorized for fiscal years 1985 and 1986 at $6 million a year. Grant recipients would be required to provide at least a 20 percent cash match.

Provisions on prescription drug diversion were included as Chapter V of Title II of Public Law 98-473.

Money Laundering Penalties Act of 1984 (H.R. 6031)

The effectiveness of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act (P.L. 91-508), commonly known as the Bank Secrecy Act, has been the subject of continuous scrutiny by the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control since 1977. Through study missions, investigations, and hearings the Select Committee, in close cooperation with the Committees on Banking, Currency and Urban Affairs, and Judiciary, has long advocated amendments to the Bank Secrecy Act that would improve its usefulness in identifying the illicit profits of narcotics traffic and strengthen penalties for violation of the Act's requirements.

On July 26, 1984, Mr. Hughes, along with Chairman Joseph Minish of the Banking Subcommittee on General Oversight and Renegotiation, Representatives Smith and Shaw introduced H.R. 6031, the Money Laundering Penalties Act of 1984. This bill was reported from the Judiciary Committee on August 17, 1984, and contained the following provisions:

Increased from $1,000 to $10,000 the civil penalty that can be imposed upon a domestic financial institution, or an employee thereof, who willfully violates the Bank Secrecy Act, or a regulation prescribed pursuant to the act.

Raised the maximum criminal penalties for violations of the Bank Secrecy Act from the present level of $1,000 and 1 year imprisonment, to a maximum of $250,000 and 5 years imprisonment.

Eliminated the filing of many currency reports that are not useful to law enforcement by raising the dollar value of currency or monetary instruments from $5,000 to $10,000 that may be brought in or out of the United States without filing the requisite reports under the Act.

Permitted the Secretary of the Treasury to impose the duty to file an outbound currency report at some time prior to the traveller's point of departure from the United States.

Permitted Customs' agents to conduct warrantless searches of persons or conveyances entering or departing the United States when the agent has reasonable cause to believe that a monetary instrument is being transported without a report being filed pursuant to the Bank Secrecy Act.

Chairman Rangel in a statement in support of H.R. 6031 described the bill as "a well-considered measure that balances the need for effective investigation of money laundering, drug trafficking, and organized crime, and the need to protect the travelling rights of American citizens." Mr. Rangel described the salient aspects of the bill and how they would enhance drug law enforcement.

Mr. Gilman, in support of the bill, stated that the Select Committee "has long recognized the need for revisions in the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act to make it easier for law enforcement authorities to get at the enormous profits acquired in the illicit drug trade."

H.R. 6031 passed the House under suspension of the rules on September 10, 1984.

Many of the provisions of H.R. 6031 were included as Chapter IX of Public Law 98-473.

Drug Enforcement Coordination Act of 1984 (H.R. 4028)

The Select Committee's annual report for 1983 recommended enactment of legislation to establish a so-called "drug-czar"—a single, high-level Federal official with the clear authority to oversee the development and coordination of Federal drug abuse prevention and control policies. The Committee's recommendation was one of a number of renewed congressional calls for such legislation in the 98th Congress following President Reagan's pocket veto of an omnibus crime bill (H.R. 3963) at the close of the 97th Congress because it contained a "drug czar" provision he felt was unacceptable.

In 1983, Representative William Hughes, Chairman of the Judiciary Crime Subcommittee and a Member of the Select Committee, and Representative Clay Shaw, who also serves on both panels, introduced bills to strengthen drug policy coordination. Twenty Members of the Select Committee joined Mr. Hughes and Mr. Shaw in cosponsoring H.R. 4028, the measure ultimately approved by the Crime Subcommittee and ordered reported by the Judiciary Committee in October 1983. That bill established an Office of Drug Abuse Policy in the Executive Office of the President headed by a Director with broad authority to develop Federal drug policies, set priorities, and coordinate the performance of all Federal drug abuse functions, including efforts to control both the supply of and demand for drugs. The bill permitted the President to appoint the Vice President as head of the Office. It also required the President to appoint a Deputy Director for Drug Abuse Prevention and a Deputy Director for Drug Enforcement to assist the Director. The Committee's 1983 annual report said:

> The Select Committee believes H.R. 4028 provides a mechanism to elevate and focus drug policy in the Executive branch, to ensure that drug programs receive budgetary priority, to facilitate the resolution of disputes between agencies with drug abuse responsibilities, and to foster cooperation between all levels of government in combatting drug trafficking and drug abuse.

H.R. 4028 was considered by the House under suspension of the rules on September 11, 1984. The bill brought to the floor was an amended version of the bill reported from the Judiciary Committee. The amended bill was called the Drug Enforcement Coordination Act of 1984. It provided for the creation of an Office of Drug Enforcement Coordination in the Executive Office of the President headed by a Director. The Director was authorized to coordinate Federal drug supply reduction functions (i.e., drug law enforcement, interdiction and international narcotics control activities), but the authority to oversee Federal drug abuse prevention functions (e.g. treatment, rehabilitation, research, education) contained in the bill as reported was eliminated.

H.R. 4028 as amended was passed by the House with Mr. Hughes, Mr. Shaw and Judiciary Committee Chairman Rodino leading support for the measure on the floor. While expressing concerns that the bill failed to address the need for strong Executive coordination of a comprehensive Federal drug strategy encompass-

ing both supply reduction and demand reduction, Mr. Rangel and Mr. Gilman (the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, respectively, of the Select Committee) supported enactment of H.R. 4028 because of the pressing need to strengthen coordination among the many Federal agencies responsible for drug law enforcement.

H.R. 4028 was not considered in the Senate. Instead, a Senate proposal, passed by that body both as a separate bill (S. 1787) and as part of an omnibus crime control measure (S. 1762), was incorporated in the comprehensive crime control amendments to P.L. 98-473, the fiscal year 1985 continuing resolution.

Chapter XIII of title II of P.L. 98-473, entitled the National Narcotics Act of 1984, establishes a National Drug Enforcement Policy Board in the Executive branch to coordinate United States policy with respect to national and international drug law enforcement. The Board is chaired by the Attorney General, and its membership consists of cabinet officers and such other officials as the President may appoint. The chairman has the authority tc review and approve agency plans to reprogram funds affecting narcotics enforcement. He can also reassign Federal personnel, with the concurrence of the agency head involved, to implement U.S. drug enforcement policies. The Act also requires the existing White House Office of Drug Abuse Policy to insure coordination between the Board and the health issues associated with drug abuse.

The approach of the National Narcotics Act is substantially different from the House approach incorporated in H.R. 4028. The Committee hopes this new law will achieve the objective of improving Federal drug enforcement coordination and will also help insure that Federal policies take into account the relationship between drug supply reduction efforts and drug abuse demand reduction efforts. We intend to monitor implementation of the Act carefully.

Other Drug Crime Bills.

H.R. 5910, Contraband in Prisons. This legislation, which passed the House on July 30, 1984, amended title 18 of the U.S. Code to improve provisions imposing criminal penalties for contraband, including controlled substances, in a Federal correctional facility. The legislation imposes fines up to $250,000 for the introduction or possession of contraband in a Federal prison. This bill was supported by Members of the Select Committee who expressed concern about the high incidence of narcotics trafficking and abuse in Federal prisons. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-473) included a provision addressing the possession of contraband in Federal prisons.

H.R. 5846, Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984. H.R. 5846 passed the House on July 30, 1984, and was signed into Public Law on October 30, 1984 (P.L. 98-596). This bill increases criminal fines in an effort to deter future criminal conduct. The criminal fine is made a more attractive alternative to imprisonment through this legislation by enabling the judicial branch to exercise flexibility in the meting out of sentences and increased criminal fines. An important provision included in H.R. 5846 is the imposition of fines against drug dealers in the amount of twice the dealers' profit from the drug offense. The Select Committee supported this legislation.

H.R. 5919, Admissibility of Foreign Business Records. Members of the Select Committee supported H.R. 5919 which passed the House of Representatives on July 30, 1984. A similar provision was incorporated into the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. This bill facilitates the prosecution of criminals, particularly drug dealers, who use foreign banks for the laundering of profits and the evasion of taxes. This legislation makes foreign-kept business records admissible in criminal trials in U.S. Courts, and suspends statute of limitations deadlines to enable prosecutors to obtain foreign records.

The State and Local Narcotics Control Assistance Act of 1984 (H.R. 5990)

On June 29, 1984, Chairman Rangel introduced H.R. 5990, the State and Local Narcotics Control Assistance Act of 1984. The bill authorized $750 million dollars annually in fiscal years 1986 through 1990 to help States and localities increase their efforts to control drug abuse and drug trafficking. The funds were to be made available to States on the basis of demonstrated need, taking into account the severity of drug trafficking and abuse within a State and the availability of State and local resources to resolve these problems.

Mr. Rangel introduced the bill in response to the critically high and unacceptable levels of drug abuse and drug trafficking in the United States. In offering this measure, Mr. Rangel said:

> Our local police, prosecutors, judges, jails, and prisons have all been overwhelmed by a continuous surge of drug-related criminal defendants. The criminal justice system, as a result, has been forced to make the critical decisions of arrest, bail, probation, and sentence based on the size of the case load. Drug trafficking has forced our local criminal justice system to be concerned with the quantity of defendants, rather than the quality of justice.
>
> States and localities are also simply unable to meet the growing demand for drug abuse treatment and prevention services. This is especially true in many of our nation's large urban areas that are hardest hit by drug abuse. Over 94 percent of the States responding to a 1983 survey conducted by the National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors reported an unmet need for treatment and prevention services in their States.
>
> The inability of our diplomatic initiatives to control the production and trafficking of illegal drugs abroad, as well as the ineffectiveness of our Federal interdiction and enforcement efforts to restrict the entry and distribution of narcotics in our country, make it urgently necessary that the Federal Government come to the assistance of State and local agencies that are bearing the large burden of responding to drug abuse in America.

Specifically, the bill authorized grants to States for six general purposes related to drug law enforcement and drug abuse prevention. These purposes were:

—to increase apprehension of drug criminals by State and local drug enforcement units;

—to increase State prosecutions of narcotics violators;

—to increase support to help State courts handle narcotics cases;

—to increase State and local facilities for detaining convicted drug defendants and to establish and improve programs for treatment of drug-dependent State offenders;

—to increase State and local efforts to eradicate illicit drug crops; and

—to increase treatment, prevention and rehabilitation programs at the State and local levels.

Sixty-three Members of the House, including 21 Select Committee Members, cosponsored H.R. 5990. Senator Moynihan introduced a companion measure, S. 2866, in the Senate. The bill was endorsed by the National Association for City Drug and Alcohol Coordination, the National Association of Chiefs of Police, the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the International Narcotic Enforcement Officers Association as well as numerous governors, mayors and prosecutors. The 98th Congress adjourned without taking any action on H.R. 5990 or the Senate companion bill. The measure will be reintroduced in the 99th Congress.

The Compassionate Pain Relief Act (H.R. 5290)

On September 19, 1984, the House defeated H.R. 5290, the Compassionate Pain Relief Act, by a vote of 355–55. This highly controversial and emotional measure would have established a temporary program to provide injectable heroin to terminal cancer patients experiencing intractable pain. The program, which would have been administered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, would have made heroin available to hospital and hospice pharmacies for dispensing pursuant to the written prescriptions of physicians.

Members of the Select Committee played active roles in the consideration of H.R. 5290, both in opposition to and in support of the bill. On June 12, 1984, twelve Members of the Select Committee, including the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, circulated a "Dear Colleague" letter to all House Members strongly opposing enactment of H.R. 5290. The letter argued that the bill was unnecessary from a medical standpoint because the approval by the Food and Drug Administration of a new, higher concentration of the potent narcotic Dilaudid, called Dilaudid-HP, made available a drug that was more potent, faster acting and longer lasting than heroin. The addition of Dilaudid-HP, the letter said, vitiated the major premise of H.R. 5290 that heroin may offer therapeutic benefits not available from existing medications.

The letter also opposed the bill as unwise public policy because it would circumvent both the Controlled Substances Act and the procedures for approving new drugs for medical use provided in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The Members also pointed out that heroin was not a panacea to the problem of pain among terminally ill cancer patients. They said that what is needed is more education and understanding by physicians and other health professionals of the drugs that are available and how they can be used to manage pain effectively.

Furthermore, the Members noted that heroin's tremendous street appeal would pose severe enforcement and security problems if heroin were legalized. They expressed concern that the lives of pharmacists, cancer patients, their families, and others who would be handling legal heroin would be put in jeopardy for a drug that has no medical advantages over Dilaudid-HP.

Finally, the Members pointed out that the bill was opposed by the Administration, major health professions groups such as the American Medical Association and the American Society of Hospi-

tal Pharmacists, and the National Federation of Parents for Drug-free Youth.

Subsequently, the bill was scheduled for floor action on two separate occasions. Prior to each scheduled debate, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member sent another "Dear Colleague" letter reiterating their opposition to H.R. 5290. The first, on July 24, 1984, reemphasized that there was simply no reason to risk the adverse consequences of legalizing heroin for treatment of cancer pain when other equally effective medications were available. A copy of the previous June 12 "Dear Colleague" was attached. The second, on September 17, 1984, briefly restated the earlier arguments and included a position statement from the National Hospice Organization concluding that, "At this time there is no medical or scientific reason to support the 'Compassionate Pain Relief Act'."

During floor debate, Mr. Rangel and Mr. Gilman were joined by several other Select Committee Members in urging defeat of the bill. In addition to the arguments outlined above, they said the program proposed in H.R. 5290 was flawed in its details and lacked adequate controls. Mr. Rangel also said that enactment of H.R. 5290 would send the wrong signal to those foreign countries that the United States is trying to convince to control illicit opium production. He again urged the House to heed the advice of medical and health care professionals who overwhelmingly opposed the bill.

Proponents argued that the bill was a very limited, carefully controlled program. They said that, notwithstanding the opposition of organized medical groups, many doctors and other health care professionals believed heroin would help relieve pain in some few number of patients who did not respond to other medications. H.R. 5290 was needed, they said, to find out whether there was a medical demand for heroin. They also said that opponents' fears of diversion and other security and enforcement problems were greatly exaggerated.

The adequacy of controls in H.R. 5290 was a central issue in the debate. Mr. Hughes, a member of the Select Committee and Chairman of the Judiciary Crime Subcommittee, offered an amendment intended to strengthen the criminal and regulatory controls in the bill. In doing so, he said that he would not be able to support H.R. 5290 unless the amendment carried. Opponents argued that the Hughes amendment was not sufficient to remedy the bill's defects. The bill was defeated after the Hughes' amendment failed on a 232–178 vote.

Rescheduling Methaqualone to Schedule I Under the Controlled Substances Act (H.R. 4201)

This legislation banned all uses of the depressant, methaqualone, popularly known as "Quaaludes" by rescheduling it from Schedule II to Schedule I. Methaqualone was a substance widely abused, and its wide abuse led to the legislative decision to ban it in the United States.

H.R. 4201 had the support of the Select Committee, and passed the House on November 16, 1983. On June 29, 1984, the bill was signed into Public Law and is now Public Law 98–329.

Chairman Rangel and Ranking Minority Member Ben Gilman spoke in favor of this legislation, and stated that it was a necessary action to ensure that no Quaaludes were available for abuse. Previous to the ban, Quaaludes had been prescribed by doctors for legal use, since Schedule II certification indicates that the substance has an acceptable medical use.

Controlled Substances Registrant Protection Act of 1984 (H.R. 5222/ S. 422)

This bill addresses the serious problem of armed robberies of pharmacies by making this crime a Federal offense. The legislation imposes a $25,000 penalty/20 year imprisonment for individuals who rob pharmacies.

The legislation was supported by the Select Committee and the House version had been introduced by Congressman William Hughes, a Member of the Select Committee, and the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Crime. The bill was signed into Public Law on May 31, 1984, the Controlled Substances Registrant Protection Act of 1984 is Public Law 98–305.

The National Drug Education Act of 1984 (H.R. 4851)

In December, 1983, the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control held a hearing on drug abuse issues in Corpus Christi, Texas. That field hearing was hosted by Congressman Solomon P. Ortiz, a member of the Select Committee. The Corpus Christi hearing revealed that drug abuse was widespread in South Texas and along the Mexican border. Several witnesses at the two-day hearing focused their testimony on the adverse impact drugs have on the physical, psychological, and emotional development of young children. The witnesses also decried cuts in Federal social programs designed to assist the victims of drug and alcohol abuse.

As a result of this hearing and others he had participated in over the last two years as a member of the Select Committee on Narcotics, Mr. Ortiz on February 9, 1984, introduced H.R. 4851, the "National Drug Education Act of 1984."

The bill would authorize to be appropriated $10 million each for fiscal years 1985, 1986, and 1987 to State and local educational agencies for drug, alcohol, and tobacco education programs in elementary and secondary schools.

H.R. 4851 makes a finding that the total annual cost of drug abuse to society is estimated at $100 billion, of which approximately $15 billion is attributable to the impact of drug abusers on the health care system, the law enforcement and judicial system, the employment market, and the general social service system; another $70 billion to $80 billion is attributable to drug-related crime and corruption.

The purposes of H.R. 4851 are to:

(1) authorize the Secretary of Education to provide grants to States to assist local educational agencies in establishing and improving drug, alcohol, and tobacco education programs for elementary and secondary school students;

(2) provide that local educational agencies receiving Federal grant money from the State be allowed to maintain flexibility

and autonomy in developing drug education programs in their own school districts; and

(3) help prevent drug, alcohol, and tobacco abuse by requiring grant recipients to provide students with a thorough education on drug, alcohol, and tobacco use and abuse, including the physical, social and legal consequences.

Of the amount appropriated, the Federal Government would pay 75 percent of the cost of the drug, alcohol, and tobacco education program established under H.R. 4851. The States would pay 20 percent of the costs and local educational agencies would pay 5 percent of the costs.

Under the bill each State educational agency would:

(1) adopt standards consistent with minimum standards prescribed by the Secretary for monitoring the effectiveness of the education programs assisted under the Act; and

(2) give assurances that local educational agencies will retain autonomy and flexibility in planning and implementing drug, alcohol, and tobacco education programs in their local school districts.

H.R. 4851 also provides that each local educational agency receiving an allocation be required to develop a drug, alcohol, and tobacco education program that:

(1) contains an assessment of local drug, alcohol, and tobacco abuse problems and the current educational programs, if any, designed to address such problems;

(2) describes the programs and procedures that the local educational agency will use to assure that, in the establishment, development, and implementation of the drug education program, there will be active participation of classroom teachers, department administrators, health and guidance counselors, local school administrators, school officials, school board members, community leaders, special resource personnel, parents, and students;

(3) describes local, specific, objectively measurable goals that are to be achieved through the program developed and a local procedure for measuring, at least annually, the extent to which such goals are being achieved; and

(4) contains assurances that the program will meet any special needs of low income and minority students.

H.R. 4851 contains a provision authorizing participation on an equal basis by students in private schools in the drug abuse, alcoholism, and tobacco education program established under the bill. The Secretary of Education would also be required to prepare and submit to Congress an annual report on the activities assisted under this Act during the preceding fiscal year.

H.R. 4851 was cosponsored by 14 members of the Select Committee and referred to the Committee on Education and Labor. The latter, however, failed to act on the bill by the time of the close of the 98th Congress. Mr. Ortiz plans to reintroduce the National Drug Abuse Education Act when the 99th Congress convenes in January, 1985.

Support for Drug Abuse Treatment, Prevention and Research Funding

The Select Committee supported legislation in 1984 to provide funding for Federal drug abuse treatment, prevention and research programs.

The Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Services (ADMS) Block Grant, which went into effect in 1982, is the major source of Federal funds to assist State and local drug abuse treatment and prevention programs. This block grant required reauthorization in 1984. Similarly, the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), which has the primary Federal responsibility for drug abuse research, needed to be reauthorized in 1984.

In April, prior to the introduction of legislation to extend the ADMS block grant and NIDA's research authority, Chairman Rangel wrote to Chairman Waxman of the Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, which has jurisdiction over these two programs. Mr. Rangel urged the subcommittee to give careful consideration to a number of recommendations the Select Committee had included in its 1983 annual report based on its review of the ADMS block grant and NIDA. These recommendations included:

—reauthorization of the block grant with funding increases sufficient to restore Federal support for substance abuse services to the levels that existed prior to the block grant. Under the block grant, Federal funds for drug abuse treatment and prevention had been reduced by about 40 percent since 1980.

—enactment of new authority for a program of special financial aid to help cities that are heavily impacted by drug abuse problems. It was suggested that this assistance, to be based on demonstrated need, could be provided in a new categorical or block grant program for cities or by including additional funds in the ADMS block grant to be set aside for urban areas especially hard hit by drug abuse.

—authorization of funds needed to restore NIDA's research program to the level that existed prior to the block grant. Despite funding increases in 1983 and 1984, NIDA was able to fund only about 340 extramural research projects in 1984 compared to 423 in 1980.

—provision of additional Federal support, through the block grant or NIDA, to reestablish a uniform national data collection system on drug abuse clients in treatment, program funding and services. Under the block grant, requirements that States report such information to the Federal Government were eliminated, leaving significant gaps in the information needed to assess changing drug trends and manage resources effectively.

In May, Chairman Rangel sent a similar letter to Chairman Natcher of the Labor, HHS, and Education Appropriations Subcommittee. He urged the subcommittee to approve funding for the block grant and NIDA at the full amounts authorized by the House. He also reiterated the Select Committee's support for a greater Federal commitment in the area of data collection.

On June 11, 1984, the House passed H.R. 5603, the Alcohol Abuse, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Amendments of 1984, as reported from the Energy and Commerce Committee. The bill extended the ADMS block grant for three years, authorizing $532 million for fiscal year 1985, $564 million for 1986 and $598 million for 1987. The bill also provided a two year extension for NIDA research programs at $64 million for fiscal year 1985 and $72 million for fiscal year 1986. While the amounts included for these two programs were below those recommended by the Select Committee, they represented significant increases from the 1984 authorization levels. The bill also reinstated requirements for States to collect data on drug abuse using a uniform system prescribed by the Health and Human Services Secretary and directed the Secretary to collect and compile data submitted by the States. The bill did not authorize a program of assistance to urban areas hard hit by drug abuse as recommended by the Select Committee.

Although the bill fell short of the Select Committee's recommendations, both Chairman Rangel and Mr. Gilman, the Ranking Minority Member, submitted statements supporting its adoption by the House. Both urged an even greater Federal commitment in the area of drug abuse treatment, prevention and research. Mr. Fauntroy also made a statement in support of the bill.

On the appropriations side, the House passed H.R. 6028 on August 1, 1984. As reported by the Appropriations Committee, the bill did not include funds for the ADMS block grant because authorizing legislation had not been enacted. The bill did provide $63.5 million for NIDA research, an $8.9 million or 16 percent increase over 1984 funding. The Appropriations Committee's report also directed that a portion of the increase be allocated toward establishing a comprehensive data collection system. In a statement on the bill, Mr. Rangel supported the provisions with respect to NIDA and commended the Committee's recognition of the need for improved data collection on drug abuse, treatment capacity and utilization of treatment services. He, again, called for a stronger Federal commitment to drug abuse research.

The ADMS block grant and NIDA reauthorization measure ultimately signed into law (P.L. 98–509) extends the block grant for three years at $515 million in 1985, $545 million in 1986, and $576 million in 1987, somewhat below the House approved ceilings. NIDA research programs are extended for two years at $68 million in 1985 and $74 million in 1986, slightly higher than the House limits. The 1985 Appropriations Act for the Department of Health and Human Services (P.L. 98–619) provides $490 million for the ADMS block grant and $64.6 million for NIDA research.

Coast Guard Funding

Members of the Select Committee supported legislation in the House to authorize appropriations for the Coast Guard for fiscal years 1985 and 1986. In March, Chairman Rangel wrote to Chairman Jones of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee applauding him and the other sponsors of H.R. 4841 for recommending amounts for Coast Guard operating expenses and capital investment substantially above the Administration's budget request for 1985. Chairman Rangel urged the Committee to consider even

higher levels to improve the Coast Guard's ability to perform its many missions including drug enforcement.

In his letter Chairman Rangel noted that the Coast Guard's budget, over the last 10–15 years, had remained relatively stable in constant dollar terms but that the Coast Guard had been given many new missions to perform including drug enforcement. As a result, he said, the Coast Guard's resources were stretched to the limit.

In the area of drug interdiction, Chairman Rangel noted that through stepped up enforcement efforts in the Southeast United States, the Coast Guard had doubled the amount of marijuana shipments it was intercepting. Nonetheless, he said even this improved level of interdiction was far below that needed to make the illicit marijuana trade uneconomical. In addition, he said the concentration of Coast Guard resources in the South Florida region was causing smugglers to divert their operations to other, less protected routes, and he cited statements made to the Select Committee by Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Gracey that the Coast Guard could not mount major interdiction efforts outside the southeast area without additional resources.

Chairman Rangel said the Coast Guard needed additional personnel and equipment, such as helicopters, aircraft and cutters, to achieve a level of interdiction sufficient to deter trafficking. To help the Coast Guard make steady progress toward upgrading its drug interdiction capabilities, he recommended authorizations of $665 million in each of fiscal years 1985 and 1986 for Coast Guard procurement programs and $1.85 billion in 1985 and $2 billion in 1986 for Coast Guard operating expenses. He noted that the levels he recommended for procurement, an increase of about $300 million over the Administration's 1985 request, were consistent with congressional action in two of the last three fiscal years adding $300 million for Coast Guard procurement programs. With respect to operating expenses, Chairman Rangel noted the Coast Guard's original 1985 request to the Department of Transportation was $1.84 billion.

The House passed H.R. 4841 on March 29, 1984, authorizing funds for the Coast Guard at the levels recommended by the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. For operating expenses, the bill provided $1.8 billion for 1985 and $1.95 billion for 1986; for procurement, the bill included $550 million for 1985 and $650 million for 1986.

During debate on the bill, Mr. Gilman, the Ranking Minority Member on the Select Committee, spoke in support of the measure. In his statement, he emphasized that the Coast Guard had not been given resources commensurate with its responsibilities for drug interdiction. He, too, noted that although the Coast Guard's drug seizure rate had improved in recent years, "We have a long way to go before the Coast Guard is able to prevent the illicit drug trade from entering our shores." He also pointed out that testimony at the Select Committee's hearings showed that the diversion of Coast Guard resources to South Florida had left the Northeast, in particular, exposed to the drug trade. He called upon the House to meet its responsibility to provide the Coast Guard with the tools needed to do the difficult task Congress had assigned it. He urged

support of H.R. 4841 which he said would "go a long way" toward providing the funds needed for the Coast Guard to meet the dangerous challenge of drug trafficking.

In May, following House action on H.R. 4841, Chairman Rangel wrote to Representative Lehman, Chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Transportation which has jurisdiction over the Coast Guard. He urged the subcommittee to approve funding for the Coast Guard in fiscal year 1985 at the levels recently authorized by the House in H.R. 4841. In his letter, Mr. Rangel said:

> The amounts authorized by the House in H.R. 4841 provide substantial increases for the Coast Guard over the Administration's request for 1985. While I believe the Coast Guard could effectively use even greater amounts, the funds provided in the bill are a positive recognition of the Coast Guard's needs. Coupled with the additional $300 million appropriated for the Coast Guard in the 1984 Defense Appropriations Act, the funding levels in H.R. 4841 will allow the Coast Guard to continue to upgrade its drug law enforcement capability.

Public Law 98-557, the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1984, authorized funds for fiscal year 1985 and 1986 Coast Guard operating expenses and procurement at levels equal to or above those approved by the House in H.R. 4841. The House did not take action on the regular appropriations bill for the Transportation Department, including the Coast Guard. Unfortunately, Public Law 98-473, the 1985 continuing resolution which provides funding for the Coast Guard, falls far short of the authorization levels in Public Law 98-557, appropriating $1.74 billion for Coast Guard operating expenses and $344.5 million for procurement programs. These amounts are below the Administration's requests and basically provide only for continuing current services.

Mr. Rangel's letter to Chairman Lehman also urged the Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee to approve a 1984 supplemental appropriation request of approximately $6 million for the Coast Guard, including $1.8 million to support the Coast Guard's involvement in the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) and $200,000 for Coast Guard assistance to the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program. These funds were requested to help defray the costs of rent, office equipment and supplies, communications and other non-personnel support costs incident to the Coast Guard's participation in these two nationwide efforts to control drug abuse.

In addition, Mr. Rangel recommended that the subcommittee add approximately $3 million more than requested to the 1984 Coast Guard supplemental to fund the additional positions the Coast Guard needs to participate effectively in NNBIS and the OCDETF program. In support of this recommendation, Mr. Rangel said:

> While the Coast Guard has been given added responsibilities for narcotics suppression, it has not been provided with additional staff to do the job. Instead, the Coast Guard has been forced to "rob Peter to pay Paul," shifting personnel from other areas to staff the NNBIS and OCDETF initiatives. The increased supplemental I am recommending will support 116 new positions to meet the Coast Guard's requirements for NNBIS and the OCDETF program without disrupting other important Coast Guard missions.

Public Law 98-396, which provided fiscal year 1984 supplemental appropriations, included the $1.8 million requested for Coast Guard participation in NNBIS and the $200,000 requested for Coast Guard support of the OCDETF program. It did not include the $3 million

increase recommended by Mr. Rangel for additional personnel, most of which would have supported NNBIS requirements.

When the Administration first established NNBIS in March 1983, no additional resources were requested to provide staff and other support for this multi-agency effort. Rather, personnel and operating expenses for this highly touted drug interdiction initiative were to be supplied by the participating agencies out of existing resources. The Coast Guard was given the lead responsibility to coordinate NNBIS operations in three of the six NNBIS region established around the country. To carry out its additional reponsibilities, the Coast Guard dedicated over 100 positions to staff the NNBIS centers.

The Administration claims that NNBIS has helped to improve the coordination of drug intelligence and the deployment of resources available for interdiction. The Select Committee welcomes any improvements in this area and is supportive of activities that will achieve these gains against drug smuggling. We remained concerned, however, that the agencies involved in NNBIS have not been given the resources to do the job. We cannot expect to establish an effective program to interdict and deter drug smuggling unless the Congress and the Administration provide the resources to significantly increase the risk to smugglers of being caught.

Customs Funding—Fiscal Year 1985

The Administration's 1985 budget for the Customs Service called for the elimination of 923 permanent positions, including 452 inspectors. These proposed cuts represented more than ten percent of Customs force of inspectors, the front line of Customs defense against drug smuggling. The 1985 budget was the third consecutive year the Administration had proposed major cuts in Customs personnel. In 1983, Congress blocked the Administration's plans to cut 2,304 Customs positions, including 873 inspectors and 97 patrol officers. In 1984, Congress restored 1,600 of the 2,000 positions (including 820 inspectors and 98 patrol officers) the Administration wanted to eliminate.

The 1985 Customs budget also reduced funding for the Customs air interdiction program by $11 million. This cut was based on projected savings under the assumption that the Department of Defense would provide operating and maintenance support for aircraft and other equipment Defense had loaned to Customs.

On March 21, 1984, Chairman Rangel wrote similar letters to Chairman Gibbons of the Trade Subcommittee and Chairman Roybal of the Treasury Appropriations Subcommittee urging them to restore the cuts proposed by the Administration in the 1985 budget request for Customs. He also requested them to approve an additional 500 law enforcement positions—450 inspectors and 50 patrol officers—to help Customs meet the expanding threat posed by narcotics smuggling. He argued that in the case of drug interdiction at points of entry, there is no adequate substitute for having a trained law enforcement official on the scene, and he cited statistics compiled by the Customs Service showing that in 1983 Customs inspectors were responsible for making 70 percent of all Customs arrests, 20 percent of morphine and opium seizures, 57 percent of heroin seizures, 59 percent of cocaine seizures, 70 per-

cent of hashish seizures, and 80 percent of marijuana seizures. With respect to the 500 new positions he proposed, he noted that the House had already approved the addition of these new positions in action on the 1984 Customs budget, even though funds for the positions ultimately were not included in the 1984 continuing resolution that provided funding for the Customs Service. In urging the two subcommittees to restore funding for the Customs air interdiction program, the Chairman said he understood Defense had notified Treasury that DoD would not pay for the operating and maintenance costs as assumed in the budget request.

The House passed H.R. 5188 including the 1985 Customs authorization on May 1, 1984. The bill not only restored the positions the Administration had proposed to cut but also added funds for about 650 new Customs positions including some 450 inspectors, 50 patrol officers, and 150 import specialists. The bill also restored the proposed cuts in the Customs air program.

The Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 5798 including 1985 funds for Customs on June 7, 1984. As reported, that bill also restored the positions the Administration has proposed to eliminate and approved the addition of 650 new positions. The bill also included an extra $15 million for Customs air interdiction which the Administration had requested in a budget amendment after Defense refused to pay the operating and maintenance costs mentioned above. Unfortunately, when the bill came to the floor, all Customs funding was struck on a point of order that the funds had not been previously authorized.

Public Law 98-473, the fiscal 1985 continuing resolution, provides $687.9 million for the Customs Service, about $70.5 million more than requested. The funding is sufficient to restore the 923 positions proposed for elimination and add 100 new enforcement positions. For the air interdiction program, the continuing resolution includes the full amount of the Administration's amended request plus $12.4 million for certain program increases that were not requested.

Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, Department of State Funding—Fiscal Year 1985

On July 11, 1984, Chairman Rangel wrote to Chairman Clarence D. Long of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations concerning the status of the fiscal year 1985 budget request for the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM), Department of State.

In fiscal year 1984, $41.2 million was allocated for international narcotics control as part of Public Law 98-151, a continuing resolution for government agencies and departments whose regular appropriations bill had not enacted. This figure was approximately $9 million less than requested by the Administration for the programs and operation of the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters in FY84.

For fiscal year 1985 the Administration requested $50.2 million for the international narcotics control efforts of the Department of State. This figure for INM was approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee on June 26, 1984. In writing to Chairman Long

and asking that the full Administration request for its international narcotics control program be approved the Chairman stated:

During this Congress the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control conducted two study missions to the coca and marijuana producing nations of Latin America and Jamaica (August, 1983), and to the opium production and heroin smuggling nations of Asia and Italy (January, 1984). While the Committee found in its report, copy enclosed, that the State Department must elevate the priority narcotics control received in our foreign policy generally and in many narcotics producing and transshipment nations, the Select Committee also recognized that comprehensive narcotics control programs, once put in place and fully implemented by host and donor nations, can make a significant impact on the availability of narcotics. Past successes in Turkey, Mexico, and the recent substantial reduction of opium production in Pakistan, are clear evidence of this fact.

At the present time the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters has undertaken new narcotics control initiatives in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia as well as continuing its support to programs in Thailand, Pakistan and other narcotics producing and smuggling countries. I am concerned that if the full amount requested by the Administration for INM is not appropriated, not only will the programs INM has undertaken in various narcotics producing nations be adversely affected, but also that these nations may develop the belief that the Congress is not in support of our nation's narcotics control efforts. An important point that the Select Committee observed during its study missions is that narcotics source countries are more appreciative of the United States' demand for effective narcotics control if they perceive that the President, the Congress and the American people are all of one mind on this issue.

On September 13, 1984, the House Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. 6237, the fiscal year 1985 appropriations bill for foreign assistance and related programs. This bill contained the full amount requested by the Administration for international narcotics control, $50.2 million. A regular appropriations bill for foreign assistance programs, however, failed to pass the Congress for fiscal year 1985. Provision for such programs, including international narcotics control, was made part of a continuing resolution which was approved by the President, Public Law 98–473, on October 12, 1984. The full amount requested by the Administration for INM and approved by both the House and Senate Appropriations Committee was included in the continuing resolution.

It is the Select Committee's hope that with the full amount requested appropriated for international narcotics control, the State Department will be able to continue its important projects in Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Thailand, and Pakistan as well as to obtain commitments from narcotic producer nations to eliminate illicit crops.

Minority Concerns in the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration (H.R. 4728 and H.R. 4729)

On February 2, 1984, Mr. Fauntroy, a Member of the Select Committee, introduced legislation to increase the emphasis placed on Federal efforts to meet the alcohol and drug abuse prevention and treatment needs of minorities. H.R. 4728 established the position of Associate Director for Minority Concerns in the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA), and H.R. 4729 created a similar position within the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA).

Both agencies are components of the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA) within the Department of Health and Human Services. A precedent for the legislation Mr.

Fauntroy proposed already existed within ADAMHA. Title IV of the Mental Health Systems Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-398) established the position of Associate Director for Minority Concerns within the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), the third institute within ADAMHA. Mr. Fauntroy's bills simply provided parity for the other two institutes that comprise ADAMHA.

Blacks, Hispanics, Native Americans and other minorities are disproportionately affected by drug and alcohol related problems. Moreover, the risk of drug abuse among minority youth is expected to increase substantially in the years ahead because their numbers are projected to rise dramatically. Minorities are also underserved by existing programs, and they are underrepresented in Federal drug and alcohol policymaking and program planning.

The statutory creation of Associate Directors for Minority Concerns at NIDA and NIAAA was intended to establish a high congressional priority on the development of a strong focus on minority substance abuse problems at the two institutes. The Associate Directors were to be responsible for developing policies and programs to increase attention to minority needs and to increase minority representation in the areas of alcohol and drug abuse research, training and service delivery. The Black, Asian American, Native American and Hispanic communities, as well as women's groups, had each stressed to Mr. Fauntroy the need for this emphasis.

H.R. 4728 and H.R. 4729 were referred to the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment chaired by Mr. Waxman. On March 29, Representative Fauntroy wrote to Chairman Waxman urging him to include the substance of these two bills in legislation before the subcommittee to extend the authorizations for NIDA and NIAAA. Similarly, in his letter of April 4, 1984, to Chairman Waxman on the reauthorization of the ADMS block grant and NIDA, Chairman Rangel urged the subcommittee to report H.R. 4728 and H.R. 4729, either as separate measures or as amendments to NIDA and NIAAA extension bills.

The Health and Environment Subcommittee recognized the need Mr. Fauntroy's bills were designed to address. As reported from the Energy and Commerce Committee, H.R. 5603, the Alcohol Abuse, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Amendments of 1984, included a provision to enhance the focus on minority concerns within ADAMHA. Rather than create two new positions, however, the bill established within ADAMHA an Associate Administrator for Special Populations. This new position replaced the existing statutory position of Associate Director for Minority Concerns within NIMH.

The House passed H.R. 5603 on June 11, 1984. Unfortunately, the provision requiring ADAMHA to establish a new Associate Administrator for Special Populations was dropped in conference with the Senate. Instead, the existing position in NIMH was retained, but the title was changed to Associate Director for Special Populations to include women as a priority population.

Congratulating the Government of Colombia on its Efforts Toward Herbicidal Eradication (H. Con. Res. 275)

On May 1, 1984, the House considered H. Con. Res. 275, a Resolution designed to congratulate the Government of Colombia on its

use of herbicides to eradicate large coca and marijuana plantations, as well as commending them for their recent record seizure of cocaine. The Resolution also expressed the hope of the Congress that the comprehensive pilot program authorized by the Government of Colombia becomes a part of a sustained program to eliminate all illicit cultivation. The Resolution was passed by the House on May 1 and by the Senate on May 2.

For many years Colombia has been one of the major source countries for narcotics entering the United States. Over half of the cocaine, and approximately 85 percent of the marijuana consumed in the United States comes from Colombia. Early this year the Colombian Government took an important step. For the first time the Colombian National Council on Dangerous Drugs recommended experimental testing of herbicidal eradication methods which could be used to eliminate marijuana and coca cultivation. This step is an essential ingredient in controlling the flow of cocaine and marijuana into the United States.

In March, one of the largest drug busts in history took place in Colombia. The Colombian National Police seized 13.8 tons of cocaine, with a street value of $1.2 billion. This amount is equal to approximately one-fourth the annual cocaine consumption in the United States.

During its study mission to Peru, Bolivia and Colombia last year, Members of the Select Committee met with Colombia President Belesario Betancur and several of his cabinet members. The Select Committee urged President Betancur to wage a more effective battle in the efforts to eradicate coca and marijuana and the trafficking of drugs to the United States. While the Select Committee feels that the recent steps of the Government of Colombia are commendable, it also feels that more can and must be done.

It must also be noted that the Resolution also made mention of the tragic assassination the previous day of Colombian Minister of Justice Rodriguez Lara Bonilla. The Resolution deplored that brutal crime against the Government of Colombia, the family of Minister Lara, and indeed all nations of the world committed to the fight against drug production and trafficking. Mr. Lara set a fine example during his tenure as Colombia's Justice Minister by applying the full weight and authority of his office in his nation's fight against the illicit drug trade.

National Drug Abuse Education and Prevention Week (H.J. Res. 529)

Twenty-three members of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control joined in cosponsoring H.J. Res. 529, proclaiming "National Drug Abuse Education and Prevention Week."

The resolution, which was introduced by Congressman Charles E. Bennett (D-FL) on March 27, 1984, designated the week of September 23–29, 1984, as National Drug Abuse Education and Prevention Week. The resolution was referred to the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, passed the House of Representatives on August 8, 1984, and the Senate on August 10, 1984. H.R. Res. 529 became Public Law 98–385 on August 21, 1984.

The designation of this week to encourage drug abuse education and prevention activities in local communities was particularly ap-

propriate because it coincided with the third annual conference of the National Federation of Parents for Drug-Free Youth. This is the second consecutive year that Congress has passed a resolution setting aside one week to highlight the importance of drug abuse education and prevention activities. Combatting drug abuse requires a coordinated, comprehensive, long-term national strategy that attacks the drug problem on all fronts. The observance of National Drug Abuse Education and Prevention Week makes a valuable contribution to this strategy by increasing the awareness of drug abuse problems and promoting effective community responses.

National Drug Enforcement Officers Week (H.J. Res. 588)

On June 7, 1984, Chairman Rangel and the Ranking Minority Member, Mr. Gilman introduced H.J. Res. 588, to designate the week of October 7-13th, 1984, as "National Drug Enforcement Officers Week". The week would pay tribute to the International Narcotic Enforcement Officers Association (INEOA). The Association, which consists of 7,500 law enforcement officers from all levels of government throughout the nation and the world was founded 25 years ago. The INEOA held its first meeting in Albany, New York, in October 1960 and returned to that city during the week of October 7th to celebrate its 25th Annual International Conference. The Resolution received a total of 48 cosponsors, but was not considered by the House. Mr. Gilman delivered the keynote address to the Conference on October 7.

Bulgarian Drug Trafficking (H. Con. Res. 337)

A bill concerning Bulgaria's abuses of the Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods under Cover of TIR Carnets in facilitating the transportation of illicit narcotics, smuggled arms and terrorists. In an effort to address some of the concerns arising from Bulgarian involvement in international terrorism and narcotics smuggling, particularly Bulgaria's abuses of the TIR sealed trucks to transport narcotics, this legislation was introduced and considered by the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Congressman Ben Gilman, Ranking Minority Member of the Select Committee, and co-chairman of the International Narcotics Task Force in the Foreign Affairs Committee, was a primary co-sponsor of this resolution which passed the House in September, 1984 but was not reported out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

ONGOING OVERSIGHT ACTIVITIES

Drug Abuse in the Military

Uniformed Forces—Pacific and European Commands (January 1984 Study Mission to Hawaii, Asia, and Europe)

Since 1978 the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control has monitored the levels of drug abuse within the ranks of U.S. Armed Forces in the Pacific and European commands. The Select Committee's earlier studies of this vitally important national security issue revealed critically high levels of drug abuse within the uniformed services. These studies, as well as DOD independently contracted studies and a tragic jet fighter crash aboard the U.S.S.

Nimitz in May, 1981 in which evidence of illicit drug use was found in the autopsies of the pilot and deck crew killed, prompted the military establishment to impose stringent drug abuse testing, disciplinary, and treatment and prevention programs in Fall, 1981 and Winter, 1982.

As part of the Select Committee's study mission to Hawaii, Asia and Rome, the delegation was fully briefed by the Unified Commands in Honolulu and Rome, as well as by representatives of the drug abuse programs of the four services, as to the progress made in combatting drug abuse in the Pacific and European commands since the institution of the new programs.

The Select Committee is pleased to report that all service branches; Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and the Air Force have made substantial progress in reducing the abuse of all forms of narcotics and drug abuse within the ranks. Through the use of a number of programs; including urinalysis testing, peer pressure, strict enforcement of standards and penalties, and mandatory treatment and rehabilitation programs, and separation from the service where deemed appropriate, the services report that all indicators of drug abuse show a continuing downward trend.

While the Committee welcomed the military's report, the members raised a number of issues it hoped the Pentagon and the individual services would continue to examine. The Committee expressed concern over the recent controversy over the accuracy of urinalysis testing. The long-term validity of this program is of the utmost importance because in many respects is the underpinning of the entire detection/prevention program of all four services.

Concern was also expressed that while the services have done an effective job in reducing substance abuse, alcoholism and alcohol abuse remain a continuing problem in the ranks, affecting military readiness, productivity, and health and safety.

Lastly, members expressed the belief that the military justice system should attempt to identify all offenses that relate to substance abuse, and not just those that are identified through urinalysis or are directly related to the possession or sale of controlled substances. Military justice courts and tribunals should be in a position to account for all drug related offenses, violations, and incidents in the disposition of disciplinary charges.

A full report of the briefings given by the services in Honolulu and in Rome were made part of the Select Committee's international narcotics control study missions report, H. Rept. 98-951.

On-Site Inspection—Navy Substance Abuse Programs, San Diego and Long Beach, California (June 2-4, 1984)

Concerned by the alarming number of reports regarding alleged false positive urine tests among navy personnel from his Congressional district, Rep. Louis Stokes (Ohio), requested the assistance of the Narcotics Select Committee to join him in an onsight study mission of the Navy's substance abuse programs in San Diego and Long Beach, California. Three members of the Select Committee staff participated in this inquiry that was led by Mr. Stokes and conducted on June 2-4, 1984. During the two and one-half days in San Diego and Long Beach, the Codel visited the following Navy

drug-related facilities and were briefed by the following commanding officers and their staffs:

Navy Regional Medical Center, Capt. John E. Carr
Naval Drug Laboratory, Cdr. Galen Koehn
Alcohol Rehabilitation Service, Ms. Sharon Spellman, Director
Navy Drug Rehabilitation Center, Naval Air Station, Miramar, Capt. Gary A. Wells
Visit to the USS Acadia (AD–42), Capt. Parker T. Finch, Jr.
Navy Alcohol Rehabilitation Center, Capt. Steven Chappel and Cdr. Sidney Snyder
The Long Beach Naval Hospital, Capt. M. G. Moward and Capt. Ted Williams

The Codel also visited the Broaden Opportunity for Officers Selection and Training (BOOST) at the Naval Training Center in San Diego. BOOST, which is modeled after the Naval Academy Preparatory School (NAPS), is an affirmative action program for non-commissioned officers (NCO's) that provides upward mobility to selected enlisted Navy, Marine and Coast Guard personnel to acquire scholastic training at the college level, which could lead to an appointment (and commission) at the Naval Academy or at a college Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps. (NROTC) program. The Codel was briefed by Capt. Herschel L. Plowman, Commander of the Naval Training Center, Cdr. W. C. Robinson, Director of the BOOST Program, and BOOST Program officers, students and civilian educators.

Several findings and conclusions emerged from the Codel's visits and briefings to the Navy drug-related facilities:

1. We were impressed by the Navy's dedication and commitment to detect drug abuse among its personnel and to treat those individuals who have become addicted to alcohol and narcotic drugs.

2. The Navy Regional Medical Center at San Diego, which represents one of the largest military medical facilities comprising a staff of more than 3,500 in a campus-like environment of approximately 50 buildings, conducts, through its Drug Screening Laboratory, more than 30,000 tests a month for six categories of substance abuse: marihuana, opiates, cocaine, PCP, and certain stimulants and depressants. The accuracy rate of these tests is approximately 98 percent.

3. The drug laboratory at San Diego is one of five Navy drug laboratories capable of testing a total of 1.8 million samples per year at an annual cost of approximately $25 million. According to Navy personnel, marihuana use among junior enlisted Navy personnel (E–1 to E–5) was reduced from 47 percent in 1980 to 17 percent in 1982. Action to correct errors in the urinalysis testing programs, which had been given wide publicity by the media, has been taken to minimize administrative and technical errors. Among other corrective measures, the laboratories are inspected bi-monthly by experts from the Naval medical command.

4. Many of the patients at the Navy Drug Rehabilitation Center, a 210 bed facility for enlisted personnel, started using drugs at the ages of 13 and 14. Several of the patients admitted to the availability and ease in obtaining marihuana, cocaine, and prescription drugs such as Valium and Seconal. Several patients indicated a need for more treatment and rehabilitation centers. Many of the

drug patients are senior NCO's holding highly technical and classified positions.

5. The USS Acadia, (AD–42), a destroyer tender capable of repairing certain destroyers, cruisers and frigates, consists of 45 officers and 1,500 enlisted personnel. Two-thirds of the crew live off the vessel, thereby making it difficult to control the drug trafficking and consumption of the personnel.

6. Every standard investigative measure is taken to detect drugs being brought aboard the U.S.S. Acadia. Because of the constant movement of over 1,500 officers and enlisted personnel living on and off the vessel as it services destroyer type vessels at the U.S. Naval Station, San Diego, other than by 100 percent body searches on each re-entry aboard the ship, it would be extremely difficult to effectively ensure that no drugs are coming aboard the vessel. The Executive Officer of the U.S.S. Acadia stated that the urinalysis screening program will, if other controls fail, detect a drug abuser rapidly. In his judgment, no drug abuser could escape detection longer than six months. Since the U.S.S. Acadia is berthed in San Diego on permanent assignment and its personnel have regular access to the city, it is thought compulsive drug abusers would use drugs ashore and not carry them aboard to avoid the control system and possible detection. Here again, urinalysis screening is the ultimate detector whether an individual uses drugs aboard ship or ashore.

7. The Naval Alcohol Rehabilitation Center, a facility to treat 80 patients from all branches of the U.S. Armed Forces, has established a Navy Substance Abuse Prevention Program (NASAPP) for alcoholic, narcotic and compulsive over eaters. Its Institute in Substance Abuse Studies (ISAS) maintains one of the largest audio-visual drug film libraries and programs in the country and provides video facilities, equipment and personnel for in-patient group and psychodrama counseling. The Codel was impressed by its sophisticated operation and program to treat substance abusers.

8. At the Long Beach Naval Hospital, we found a shortage of drug counselors and social workers. There is also a shortage of funds to permit drug counselors to attend professional conferences for professional growth and to be informed of the latest developments in the fields of drug abuse prevention and treatment. There is also a need for computer support programs to follow up and to develop data regarding those patients who have been treated for drug abuse.

Meeting with Dr. William Mayer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (August 9, 1984)

With the departure of Dr. John Johns from his position as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug and Alcohol Abuse Prevention in spring, 1984. The Select Committee was concerned that there might be a shift in the Pentagon's drug abuse control efforts. In an effort to determine if such a shift was in the offing, Chairman Rangel and Ranking Minority Member, Mr. Gilman, met with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, Dr. William Mayer on August 9, 1984. Dr. Mayer had terminated the appointment of Dr. Johns and has overall authority for the drug and alcohol abuse prevention program in the armed services.

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Under Dr. Johns, the armed services had developed a comprehensive drug abuse control program that included urinalysis, strict disciplinary rules, and health promotion and behavior modification programs. In effect, Dr. Johns believed that drug abuse control was more of a behavioral and manpower function rather than just a health problem. The Select Committee believes that such an approach should continue to be part of the military's approach to drug abuse control.

In the meeting with Dr. Mayer, he addressed these and other issues. In terms of a shift in approach, Dr. Mayer expressed the view that there was in fact a difference of opinion between himself and Dr. Johns in terms of where drug abuse should be placed in the organizational scheme of the Department of Defense. Dr. Mayer went on to say that he believed that DoD's drug abuse programs should be considered a health function, but the total "behavioral" approach supported by Dr. Johns would continue to be part of the overall plan. Manpower and health officials would continue to meet in order to ensure that proper coordination of effort would continue. Congress has addressed this issue in the past and has consistently supported the concept of DoD drug abuse and prevention programs as a health function.

Another item of importance covered in the meeting was the fact that the DoD Worldwide Survey of Alcohol and Nonmedical Drug Use Among Military Personnel scheduled for 1984 had been canceled. Dr. Mayer assured the Committee that a cancellation was never considered. The postponement was the result of DoD's technical decision to maintain the interval of 30 months between surveys, as was the case between the surveys of 1980 and 1982. He went on to say that survey funds were limited in fiscal 1984. The survey is scheduled to begin in February 1985.

In studies done by the Select Committee in 1978 and 1981, critically high levels of drug abuse were found among the various branches of the military. The Select Committee's surveys, Defense Department contracted studies, a tragic jet fighter crash in May, 1981 aboard the aircraft carrier *Nimitz* in which unauthorized and illicit drug use was found in autopsies and other evidence of drug use in operational situations, prompted the military to impose stringent drug abuse testing, disciplinary, prevention and treatment programs in the fall of 1981 and winter of 1982.

Conclusion

It is the belief of the Select Committee, on the basis of briefing during the January, 1984 study mission, meetings with Defense Department drug abuse officials in Washington and Navy substance abuse program managers in California, and corroborated documents and records, that the drug abuse policies and programs initiated in 1982 have had meaningful and far-reaching impact in reducing the abuse of narcotic and psychotropic drugs in the military. However, notwithstanding this record of achievement by the military establishment, the Select Committee believes that there are a number of areas the Department of Defense and the Services must be cognizant of when monitoring and evaluating its substance abuse programs, as well as the subject of continuous Congressional oversight. These areas are:

1. The integrity of unrinalysis testing must be beyond question.
2. Alcoholism and alcohol abuse among military personnel must be further reduced.
3. The worldwide survey of alcohol and nonmedical drug use among military personnel must continue at periodic intervals.
4. Drug abuse treatment, rehabilitation and prevention programs should be widely available in the military.
5. The military's drug abuse prevention efforts must take into account both health and behavioral aspects of substance abuse.

A full discussion of these areas is contained in the section of this report entitled, Recommendations of the Select Committee to the House of Representatives—Drug Abuse in the Military.

The Select Committee's Survey and Research Program

Introduction

During 1983, the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control initiated a program in which surveys were used as oversight information collection tools. This program continued in 1984. Surveys of State Attorneys General, and of sheriffs in two states supplemented the Select Committee's hearings on the Cultivation and Eradication of Illicit Domestic Marijuana, which is reported on in the following section.

Surveys provided the base data for two Select Committee reports, one was a survey of State and local law enforcement, prosecutorial and treatment personnel on the efficacy of the Federal Drug Abuse Control Strategy. The other was a survey of Members of Congress on drug abuse in their districts. In addition two surveys investigating State and local law enforcement perceptions of Federal drug law enforcement efforts were undertaken to provide base line information for conferences with State and local officials held by the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control.

Efficacy of the Federal Drug Abuse Control Strategy—State and Local Perspectives

This inquiry sought opinions from 440 State and local police agencies, local prosecutors, State Attorneys General and State and City drug abuse coordinators concerning various aspects of the national drug abuse and control policy. Approximately 33% of the questionnaires were returned and analyzed with the following results:

All of the reporting groups perceived an increase in drug abuse over the past five years. The highest increase in substance abuse was cocaine, followed by marijuana and heroin respectively. This data is in direct conflict with the 1982 National Household Survey and the 1982 High School Senior Survey that showed a decline in current use of all classes of illicit drugs, with "the most appreciable drops occurring this year for marijuana, cocaine, amphetamines and sedatives." This contrasting data as supported by other witnesses testifying at a Select Committee hearing suggests that statistical documentation should be evaluated and a uniform and comprehensive system for collecting data should be implemented. This

system should be used by all Federal, State and local personnel involved in the drug problem.

The analysis of all questions dealing specifically with responsibilities, roles, policy, strategy and problem issues identified international and interstate trafficking as the major problem in drug law enforcement and in prevention and treatment. Controlling interstate and international drug trafficking should be the primary Federal role in drug law enforcement. The control of drug trafficking would reduce the supply and availability of illicit drugs, consequently decreasing the need for prevention and treatment.

Concomitant Federal responsibilities should include: (1) developing international policies that would eradicate the supply of illicit drugs; and (2) legislating and enforcing drug control laws that would be directed toward securing our borders and investigating and prosecuting the organized criminal.

The primary hindrance to drug law enforcement was felt to be the lack of cooperation and coordination of Federal agents with State and local governments. The Federal Government could promote coordination and cooperation with local and State agents via the "Task Force" approach. This approach would satisfy other needs and problems reported by the State and local governments in terms of providing training and technical assistance, and in combining manpower and equipment. This method consolidates the drug law enforcement team at a Federal level.

The Federal role in the domestic control of drug trafficking should include developing and implementing legislation for drug crop eradication and monitoring of prescription drugs.

The State and local governments would be responsible for eliminating the trafficking of drugs within their jurisdiction and would focus their attention on apprehending the mid-level and street-level criminal. They would cooperate and work closely with the Federal Government when investigations exceed their boundaries. This again could be accomplished via combined task forces.

Budgetary constraints have also presented major problems in drug law enforcement and in relation to funding is one of the basic needs of the State and local governments. Over the past five years, available funding for the drug abuse programs has been reduced by at least 25 percent. Allocations of funds are made directly to and controlled by the States. As a direct result of decreased funding, some prevention and treatment programs have been eliminated, while drug abuse has increased, and drug abuse investigation and prosecution have been highly curtailed.

The change in Federal funding strategies to the block grant has been a major concern. The responses to this question suggest that the perceived impact of shift to block grant funding has been negative because it resulted in decreased funding availability. Both political considerations and competition for block grant funds have been held responsible for decreased funding for prevention and treatment centers and for law enforcement and interdiction efforts.

With the exception of the State Abuse Program Coordinators, the reporting groups found the present policies ineffective. The primary reason given is a lack of implementation because of funding, manpower and equipment shortages.

There have been problems associated with the merger of the DEA and the FBI. The immediate consequences of the realignment have been seen as negative because of unresolved issues to which one is the true lead drug enforcement agency. This leads to conflicts among the field agents, confusion among the State and local agencies, and failures in coordination. A majority of the respondents project long range benefits if these problems can be resolved by a clear cut designation of the agency roles, preferably enforced by a strong central authority to direct the entire Federal drug abuse/control strategy.

The results of the portion of the survey that was concerned primarily with the National Drug Law Enforcement Policy are essentially the same as that of the survey conducted by the Director of the Office of Drug Abuse Policy in July 1977. It was concluded that the issues and problems identified by that White House survey remain unresolved.

A Survey of Members of Congress About Drug Abuse in Their Districts

Another important initiative the Select Committee undertook was to solicit the views of all House Members concerning the nature of drug abuse and drug trafficking within their Congressional districts. The results of this survey provided the Select Committee and the Congress with a national overview of the drug abuse situation from a Congressional perspective.

Twenty-one percent of the Members of the House of Representatives from 32 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia, responded to a questionnaire surveying the drug abuse situation in their districts. Over ninety-six percent of the respondents characterized drug abuse in their district as either severe or moderate with the reports equally divided between the two conditions. The most prevalent drugs, in order of frequency of mention, are marijuana, cocaine, stimulants, heroin and hallucinogens, all of which were reported by more than half of the responding Members. Marijuana is believed to be grown illicitly in over three-fifths of the reported districts, and illicit drug manufacture is believed to occur in nearly half of the districts.

Schools, streets and workplaces are seen as the primary locations at which drugs are abused; while schools, streets, parks and public facilities for entertainment, and sports are most frequently cited as trafficking locales.

Crimes committed by drug users and juvenile behavior problems are most often perceived as the major problems resulting from drug abuse. A large majority of Members responding state that their constituents appear to express the need for better drug abuse prevention/education programs and for improved drug law enforcement and prosecution capabilities. Most Members responding also stated that enhanced drug law enforcement, as well as expanded drug abuse prevention and education programs, should receive priority consideration in the allocations of Federal, State and local resources. Members generally also feel that the private sector should be most involved in improved or enhanced treatment/rehabilitation as well as prevention/education programs.

The results of the survey suggest the existence of general Congressional concurrence with the findings independently arrived at during Select Committee hearings. The survey results clearly indicate:

The continuing spread and increasing intensity of the drug abuse problem throughout the United States—in rural as well as in urban areas—with trafficking in a wide variety of drugs increasing at an alarming rate.

Almost all Members of Congress have had constituents express concern about drug abuse and drug trafficking and ask for Congressional action to combat both problems.

Strong Congressional support for enhanced drug supply reduction and drug abuse treatment and prevention appear to be indicated by the fact that a majority of the respondents stated that such programs should be given a priority for allocation of resources at Federal, State and local governmental levels.

A need for continuing Congressional oversight of the Federal and national effort to prevent drug abuse and drug trafficking.

Conference Surveys

Preparation for the Select Committee's South Florida Law Enforcement Conference on May 14, 1984, (see III, A,2) and the National Law Enforcement Conference on September 18, 1984, (see III, A,7) included the preparation of surveys sent to each invited participant with the request that the questionnaire be returned to the Committee in advance of the conferences. Preliminary analysis of survey results were provided to the participants for their information value and use during the conferences.

The South Florida Law Enforcement questionnaire was sent to 100 South Florida law enforcement agencies who were asked to evaluate Federal cooperation and assistance with respect to a variety of drug law enforcement operations. A similar questionnaire was subsequently sent to 100 major law enforcement agencies across the country for the State and Local Narcotics Law Enforcement Conference. The respondents in both surveys were asked to identify needs for improved assistance both from and to Federal agencies. The relevance of Federal drug law enforcement objectives to their own agency objectives was explored, and the respondents were asked to evaluate the impact of Federal and State cooperative efforts as well as their own solo drug law enforcement operations. The surveys also solicited the respondents' recommendations for improving drug law enforcement policies and strategies.

About 45 percent of the agencies responded to each survey, and the results are remarkably alike. The conclusions drawn from each are presented below, side by side for ease of comparison:

Conclusions: South Florida Narcotics Law Enforcement Conference Survey	Conclusions: State and Local Narcotics Law Enforcement Conference Survey
The Federal South Florida Task Force is considerably less cooperative with them than are the individual Federal law enforcement agencies and state and intrastate narcotics enforcement groups.	The Federal Organized crime Task Force (OCDE) and the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) are considerably less cooperative with them than are the individual Federal law enforcement agencies, and the agencies as a group are less cooperative than the state and intrastate narcotics enforcement groups and the DEA/State/local task forces.
South Forida law enforcement agencies feel most a need for improved cooperation and assistance in intelligence and information sharing. In turn, they believe that they have valuable information and intelligence of a localized or specialized nature that Federal agencies could make better use of..	The most pressing needs for Federal assistance to State and local agenices appear to be for funding to support drug law enforcement operations and for improved exchanges of information and intelligence. They believe that they have valuable information and intelligence of a localized or specialized nature that Federal agencies could make better use of.
Although some Federal agencies accept State and local information and intelligence, as well as other types of cooperation and assistance, the lack of feedback from Federal sources is a major irritant to the Florida agencies..	Although some Federal agencies accept State and local information and intelligence, as well as other types of cooperation and assistance, the lack of appropriate feedback from some Federal agencies is an irritant to the State and local agencies.
The respondents believe that the South Florida Task Force has had little, if any, positive impact for the attainment of their drug law enforcement objectives. The impact of individual Federal agency cooperation and assistance, as well as that from State and local agencies has had somewhat more of a positive effect; but agencies acting alone seem to have the most impact, albeit still on a rather low level.	The respondents believe that the new style Federal Task Forces have a moderately positive impact on their drug law enforcement operations. They have a clear advantage over Federal assistance, State/local cooperation and own agency operations when it comes to money laundering investigations. However, the Federal Task Forces have no greater impact than other options when pursuing the other enforcement objectives. Agencies acting alone have the most impact overall.
Florida priorities should be placed upon improvement of inter-agency intelligence and information communication, improved funding for law enforcement personnel, and technical support. There was a high level of agreement that use of the Florida National Guard for drug law enforcement suport should be a very low priority.	State and local priorities should be placed upon improvement of inter-agency intelligence and information communication, improved funding for law enforcement personnel, and technical support. There was a high level of agreement that use of the National Guard for drug law enforcement support should be either a very low priority or not considered at all.
Federal priorities should be to improve intelligence and information communication with State and local agencies; training State and local police and prosecutors in drug law enforcement and prosecution; technical and personnel support to State and local agencies; and increased priority for narcotic and narcotic-related prosecution.	Federal priorities should be to improve intelligence and information communication with State and local agencies; technical and personnel support to State and local agencies; and centralized coordination of all Federal/State and local drug law enforcement efforts.

Conclusions: South Florida Narcotics Law Enforcement Conference Survey	Conclusions: State and Local Narcotics Law Enforcement Conference Survey
Most agencies agree that they have insufficient budget and personnel to properly carry out their drug law enforcement responsibilities.	Almost all of the agencies agree that they have insufficient budget and personnel to properly carry out their drug law enforcement responsibilities.

Both surveys conclude that the new style Federal task forces and systems such as the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System are less cooperative with State and local agencies than are individual Federal agencies or the older DEA/State/local task forces. They agree that there is an unmet need for improved cooperation and information exchange, and that there is an unwillingness of the newer task force to utilize available State and local resources. Both surveys agree that State and local agencies acting alone have more impact on drug law enforcement objectives. The South Florida respondents feels that the Federal South Florida Task Force has had little positive impact on attainment of their own drug law objectives. The nationwide sample feels that the other Federal task forces have had a moderately positive impact, but a clear advantage over their own on Federal non-task force operation only in the area of money laundering investigations. The two survey results are in strong agreement concerning preferences for State, local and Federal drug law enforcement priorities, and that they are operating with insufficient money and personnel.

Domestic Marijuana Cultivation

Introduction

The issue of domestically cultivated marihuana continued to be a priority of the Select Committee during the second session of the 98th Congress. Increased production estimates, the continuing violence of the growers, and the increased availability of domestic marihuana mandated the continuing oversight of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control. While the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumer Center (NNICC), report indicated that domestic marihuana accounts for eleven percent of marihuana consumed by Americans, down from last year's statistic of fifteen percent, the Select Committee continued to consider the issue of domestic marihuana as a serious threat to the well being of Americans, in the areas of health and law enforcement.

In addition to the Select Committee's involvement in overseeing the Drug Enforcement Administration's levels of participation in eradication programs, monitoring State and local response to the growing marihuana threat, and obtaining additional Federal involvement and funding for eradication programs, the Select Committee also monitored the progress of the Environmental Impact statement (EIS) required by law for eradication programs on Federal lands.

The Select Committee visited the marihuana producing regions of California and Hawaii to ascertain the severity of the marihuana problem, and to obtain a local perspective on the issue. During

its field hearings in Redding, California in July, 1983, and during the International Study Mission's first stop in Honolulu, Hawaii during January, 1984, the Select Committee heard first-hand how the increase in marihuana production was creating unprecedented law enforcement problems, and how violence among growers had increased, particularly as growers sought to protect valuable sinsemilla marihuana plants. (Sinsemilla is a high potency strain of marihuana which is prized by growers and consumers alike.)

Cultivation and Eradication of Illicit Domestic Marihuana

Select Committee issued a report on the Cultivation and Eradication of Illicit Domestic Marihuana (SCNAC 98–1–9) in 1984, which provided an overview of the Federal marihuana effort conducted by DEA, the results of a survey sent to the 50 Attorneys General in the United States cocnerning the cultivation of marihuana, especially sinsemilla, and a summary of the July, 1983 hearings in Redding, California. Information is also presented on the Select Committee's findings from the 1984 trip to Hawaii.

Analysis of DEA's Eradication Efforts: The Select Committee report revealed that "While the Select Committee believes that DEA's cooperative program with the States is the most effective way to combat marihuana production, and the program developed by DEA has the potential of success, the strong effort by DEA to date has not been able to appreciably reduce the level of domestic production of marihuana in the country." The Select Committee agreed that the cooperative relationship that DEA has developed with 40 States participating in its marihuana eradication program was satisfactory, but recommended additional funding and equipment was necessary if the program was to be truly successful.

Components of DEA's eradication program include program guidance, funding to States, investigations, air support, intelligence sharing, training, technological support, public awareness and inter-agency cooperation.

DEA's total allocations of marihuana eradication in the States was $2.4 million for FY 1983, and $2.5 million for FY 1984.

Attorneys General Survey: Each Attorney General in the U.S. was sent a survey from the Select Committee designed to gauge the extent and seriousness of the marihuana problem in each of the fifty States. Specific goals of the survey were to determine whether a greater role existed for the Federal Government in the eradication effort, what problems were confronting local law enforcement officials, analysis of the marketing of the marihuana, and the level of violence associated with cultivators. Forty-four States responded to the survey.

In brief, the surveys indicated that 77% of the responding States had serious problems with marihuana, necessitating in their opinion, an increased Federal response to the problem. Personnel and training were cited as major needs, followed by requests for surveillance equipment, funding for buy money and for the purchasing of intelligence.

The surveys confirmed that Federal lands were being used in many jurisdictions for marihuana cultivation, and that greenhouses for indoor marihuana growing were becoming increasingly popular.

In addition to the Attorneys General surveys, the Select Committee sent questionnaires to the sheriffs in California's 58 counties, in an effort to obtain information on the extent of the marihuana problem in their county, the availability of law enforcement resources, arrest and prosecution patterns and the type of Federal assistance necessary to carry out their tasks. A majority of sheriffs indicated that marihuana cultivation posed a serious problem in their county, and a majority cited the need for additional resources and larger budgets to deal with the escalating marihuana problem. Federal assistance was deemed necessary to assist in the local eradication effort in the form of training, equipment and support from the National Guard. Arizona sheriffs were also surveyed, and they provided responses similar to the California answers. Complete details of these surveys are available in the report.

July 1983 Hearing in Redding, California: The report provides analysis of the issues which were discussed at the hearing in Redding, California, in which time many local, State and Federal witnesses appeared before the Select Committee, providing confirmation that the marihuana problem had grown more severe, and offering their opinion that the problem would worsen unless additional assistance was forthcoming. Major findings emerging from the hearing included evidence that the crop was increasing, the value of the sinsemilla plants was increasing, violence and lawlessness were on the rise, and much of the marihuana cultivation was taking place on Federal parklands.

Select Committee Investigation in Hawaii: During briefings received when the Select Committee made a stopover in Honolulu enroute to Southeast Asia, Members learned that Hawaiian officials consider the domestic cultivation of marihuana as the State's most acute crime problem. Like California, Hawaii was experiencing the nightmarish effects of growing violence associated with the marihuana business, and recent investigations had revealed that the U.S. Mails were being used as a primary means of transporting illicit marihuana to the U.S. mainland. National Parks were also being used in the Hawaiian Islands for illicit cultivation of marihuana, increasing the difficulties for detection and eradication.

The report concludes that "There appears to be little doubt that the illicit cultivation of marihuana in the United States is a problem of great magnitude. There is equally little doubt that the efforts to stop such enterprises leaves much to be desired." The major Select Committee recommendation is for the Federal commitment to domestic eradication to increase, specifically by providing States with more DEA funding for their eradication efforts.

1984 Follow-up Hearings (April 10, 1984)

This April 10th hearing provided local witnesses with an opportunity to update the Select Committee on developments—both positive and negative—in their regions since the 1982 Select Committee field hearings had taken place. Panels from the five field hearing sites—New York City, Redding, California, Honolulu, Hawaii, South Florida and the Gulf area in Texas—made reports to the Select Committee. Panelists from Redding and Honolulu were most concerned about the negative impact that marihuana cultivation was having in their communities.

The California Panel consisted of Congressman Gene Chappie (Member of the Select Committee); Randy Rossi, Director of Campaign Against Marihuana Planting (CAMP); Zane Smith, Jr., Regional Forester, Pacific Southwest Region, U.S. Forest Service; and Bruce Conrad, Deputy Director, Bureau of Land Management, California Office, Highlights of the panel's report follow:

Californians are concerned that marihuana is surpassing the Nation's top cash crops, and are concerned about the large law enforcement expenditures required to control marihuana.

The environment is being adversely impacted by the cultivation of marihuana since pesticides, herbicides and fires are posing severe threats to the forestland in California.

Violence has become a fact of life among cultivators. During the 1982 growing season, Rossi reported, 500 firearms were confiscated, 77% of the growers were armed or used booby traps to protect their crops, and 15 homicides occur per week in Northern California, which are directly related to marihuana cultivation.

36 California counties will be participating in the CAMP program, an inter-agency group responsible for the eradication of marihuana in California.

Federal lands continue to be used by cultivators of marihuana and a particular "hotspot" for the Forest Service was the Shasta-Trinity National Forest where violence and arson had virtually forced the Forest Service away from managing that tract of land.

New initiatives include the "New River Project" in the Shasta-Trinity National Forest, a program under which sheriffs have begun patrolling the area to discourage the illegal use of the land.

CAMP was in dire need of assistance from the Federal Government in order to accomplish the goals of eradication during the 1984 harvest season. Helicopters were badly needed to carry out the eradication program.

Panelists from Hawaii who reported to the Select Committee on the increasingly serious marihuana problem in the Hawaiian Islands were Congressman Daniel Akaka (Member of the Select Committee); Michael Lilly, First Deputy Attorney General of the State of Hawaii; and Lt. Charles Wakita, Commanding Officer in Charge of the Vice Section, Hawaii County Police Department. Their major concerns included the following:

Operation Pele, which took place on the "Big Island" of Hawaii was successful in confirming that many smugglers are

using U.S. Mails to ship marihuana to the mainland United States. Federal search warrants were issued to postal inspectors, and narcotics were found in many packages. In one Post Office, 132 packages were suspected to contain narcotics, and were set aside for inspectors; every one of them contained narcotics. $1.3 million worth of marihuana was confiscated on Operation Pele.

During Operation Green Harvest, which utilized Federal, State and local authorities to eradicate marihuana, the National Guard, DEA and the Hawaii County Police Department worked closely to eradicate marihuana.

Marihuana is surpassing pineapples as Hawaii's number one cash crop.

Experiments are underway to examine the effectiveness of using a specially designed diesel oil emulsion to kill marihuana plants—a system far less costly than manual eradication.

Campaign Against Marihuana Planting (CAMP) Funding

During the early part of 1984, the Select Committee was informed that the Campaign Against Marihuana Planting (CAMP) would be unable to repeat the successful eradication program of 1983 without some assistance from the Federal Government. During the 1983 harvest season, CAMP worked with the California National Guard, and used their helicopters in the eradication process. Because of the unique security situations arising from the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles, and the Democratic Convention in San Francisco, California's National Guard had been committed for security purposes, making the helicopters unavailable for the eradication program.

Congressman Gene Chappie, a Member of the Select Committee and representative from Redding, California, spearheaded the effort to obtain the necessary equipment or funding for CAMP's program. During the April 10th hearing in Washington, DC, Congressman Chappie and CAMP representatives told the Select Committee that the marihuana eradication program could not go forward without assistance.

CAMP estimated that leasing helicopters from the National Guard, a private firm or the U.S. Army would be impossible given the DEA contribution to California's program. CAMP agreed that leasing seven helicopters was necessary, and the process of finding additional funding was begun.

Chairman Rangel, Ranking Minority Member Ben Gilman, and Congressman Gene Chappie scheduled a meeting on May 3, 1984 and called together representatives from CAMP, California Congressional offices, DEA, the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, the Department of the Interior, the National Guard Bureau, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the California Governor's Office and the California Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement. The purpose of this meeting was to explore the various funding sources available to CAMP, and to see if the Department of Defense would be willing to provide some equipment to CAMP.

Lt. General R. Dean Tice, Director of the Department of Defense's Task Force on Drug Enforcement told the Select Committee that under the restrictions of posse comitatus and under the readiness obligations that DoD must meet, the lending of military helicopters to CAMP would be inappropriate. Members of the Select Committee took issue with the strict interpretation that was being placed on both the posse comitatus principle and on the readiness issue by DoD, but it was very clear to them that the Department of Defense would not agree to loan equipment to the State of California.

The Select Committee was also critical of the Drug Enforcement Administration's level of funding for California's marihuana eradication program. Of a total allocation of $2.5 million for the entire nation, DEA's cannabis eradication program provided only $310,000 to the State of California. $300,000 of this amount is directly provided to CAMP. Upon questioning, DEA stated that there was no additional funding for the marihuana eradication program in its budget.

Chairman Rangel and Congressman Gilman wrote to Ed Meese, Counselor to the President, in an effort to secure an additional $800,000 to enable CAMP to lease helicopters from a private firm.

"We find it very difficult to believe that funding cannot be made available to assist California in their effort to eradicate marihuana," said Rangel and Gilman. "The Federal Government has an obligation to ensure that State have the necessary resources based on the Federal obligation under the law and the Single Convention to eradicate marihuana wherever the Federal Government assigns eradication to the States. A funding source could be established by providing DEA with additional monies for this program on a need basis. There is a growing perception that the Administration is shirking its constitutional leadership and support role necessary to get the job done for reasons of misguided budgetary constraints."

Within a month, Chairman Rangel and Congressman Gilman were informed by the White House that arrangements had been made for the Drug Enforcement Administration to provide an additional $800,000 to support the CAMP initiative.

During the summer of 1984, meetings were held to evaluate the Draft Environmental Impact Statement which had been prepared by the Drug Enforcement Administration in conjunction with the Forest Service, Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land and Management and Fish and Wildlife Service, Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of State and the Department of Defense.

Included in the Draft was an examination of "political impacts on soils, vegetation, wildlife, endangered and threatened species, water quality and aquatic systems, human health and worker safety, air quality, socioeconomics, historic and cultural resources, visual resources, and noise levels." (from "Draft Environmental Impact Statement on the Eradication of Cannabis on Federal Lands and Intermingled Forests and Rangelands in the Continental United States.")

The final Environmental Impact Statement is scheduled to be released in January, 1985. DEA is also beginning similar scoping sessions and public comment periods on an Environmental Impact

Statement on environmental and health implications associated with DEA's efforts to develop alternative ways to eradicate and suppress cannabis production of non-federal and tribal lands in the continental United States and Hawaii.

DEA Briefing on Domestic Marihuana: 1983 and 1984

Members of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control received several briefings from the Drug Enforcement Administration on the subject of domestic marihuana eradication, and the DEA's 1983 and 1984 program. Thomas G. Byrne, Chief of DEA's Cannabis Investigation Section briefed the Committee in March, 1984, and subsequent informational sessions were held at the request of the Select Committee.

The DEA's 1983 budget for eradication and suppression programs was $2.4 million, and forty States were receiving assistance from DEA to eradicate marihuana in their States. During 1983, DEA conducted seventeen training schools which trained 624 State and local officers.

Totals for 1983 eradication include the destruction of 3,793,943 plants in 70,572 plots. 92% of the marihuana plants that were detected in the 1983 season were eradicated, and 99% of those plants that were eradicated were located in the States participating in the DEA program.

The 1984 eradication effort was considered successful by the DEA and by States participating in the program. A total of $3.2 million was allocated to 48 States during 1984 for assistance with their eradication programs. $3.2 million includes a special $800,000 addition to the California program, making DEA's marihuana eradication budget $2.5 million for the 1984 season. The only two States not participating in DEA's cannabis program were Rhode Island and New Jersey; it is anticipated that during 1985 these States will participate in the DEA program in some form.

The allocation of the 1984 DEA marihuana funding included assistance to the States for training, reimbursement to the States for airwing training, and seminars. 21 training schools were held during 1984, and 12 seminars were conducted by DEA for State and local enforcement agencies and individuals.

The interagency and cooperative nature of California's CAMP (Campaign Against Marihuana Planting) is considered exemplary by the Drug Enforcement Administration. CAMP involves the support and services of several local, State and Federal agencies in the eradication of marihuana in 37 California counties. During the 1984 harvest season, California leased seven helicopters from a private firm and logged 1600 hours of flying time, mainly transporting eradication specialists and in hauling the harvested marihuana. DEA also flew in support of CAMP missions, and contributed 1500 hours in flying time during the early stages of the CAMP 1984 activities.

77 agencies participate in CAMP efforts, and the CAMP program will probably run through the entire year during 1985 instead of its previous seasonal schedule. The State of California is beginning to explore means to obtain the necessary additional funding for the 1985 eradication effort, and hopes to secure funding from State

agencies in order to lease the private helicopters for next year's eradication efforts.

1984 statistics include the eradication of 12,981,210 million marihuana plants, more than double the amount of plants eradicated last year. This figure accounts for the eradication of 91 percent of marihuana detected, including 2,553 plots on U.S. Forest Service lands.

DEA estimates that each marihuana plant (non-sinsemilla) yields approximately three quarters of a pound of marihuana. The sinsemilla variety of marihuana plants yield one pound of marihuana per plant, according to estimates.

One aspect of DEA's statistical reporting includes figures on wild growth or "ditchweed" marihuana which comprises a large portion of the marihuana seized in States such as Indiana. This 'fibertype' of marihuana has a relatively low THC content (approximately .2% as compared with an average of 2% for drug type marihuana) and much of it grows in ditches or wild in fields. Despite its low THC content, this type of marihuana is abused, and is even used as filler or additive to higher quality marihuana imported from Colombia. There are reported instances of 'ditchweed' marihuana being trafficked to Florida from some midwestern States and used in a mixture with high grade marihuana. "Wild" marihuana accounts for 26 percent of the total 1984 eradication figures.

DEA has also explored some high-technology innovations which will assist in the detection of marihuana, including multi-spectral imagery (MSI) technology, computer searches and sophisticated aerial photography. These advances are expected to enhance DEA's ability to assist States and local agencies in future detection of marihuana plots, particularly on public lands.

There are several trends which have been reported during the 1984 growing season including the dramatic increase in indoor growing by both hydroponic and non-hydroponic methods. Washington State reported that 90% of the marihuana seized in that State was grown indoors.

The increase in violent incidents associated with marihuana cultivation is of great concern to law enforcement agencies and to the DEA. Poachers, hunters and recreationists continue to be targets for the cultivators' violence, and the continuing use of booby traps by the growers to protect their crops has spread to many marihuana locations. The East Coast is now experiencing the same types of violence in conjunction with crop protection as the West Coast has had for years. From Florida to Maine, reports of booby traps and injuries have begun to attract serious attention.

DEA anticipates that the 1985 marihuana eradication program will be similar to the 1984 program, and a budget of $2.5 million has been again proposed.

Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) Monitoring Process

The Drug Enforcement Administration began public hearings on the issue of the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement on the environmental and health impact of DEA's efforts to develop alternative ways to eradicate and suppress the cultivation of marihuana on Federal lands in the U.S.

Required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Environmental Impact Statement measures the potential effects of all methods of eradication of marihuana on Federal lands, including the health and environmental effects of the "no action" alternative. The Select Committee has been very active in the area of alternative eradication methods, and the Environmental Impact Statement sessions provided an opportunity to hear constituent and agency concerns about the various eradication methods available to DEA.

The 'scoping sessions' were planned by DEA to give the general public an opportunity to voice opinions about the scope and extent of the EIS. Four scoping sessions were held during 1984 in Atlanta, Spokane, Denver and Washington, D.C.

During the discussions of the Environmental Impact Statement, participants in the process stressed the need for the DEA to employ methods which took into account the special environmental needs of certain areas, and provided testimony on the strengths and weaknesses of various herbicides available to the DEA. Alternative methods of eradication which were being considered by DEA included manual, mechanical, chemical and "no action", and views on all these methods were solicited.

Chairman Rangel Appearance on the Phil Donahue Program To Discuss the Domestic Marihuana Issue

In August, 1984, Chairman Rangel was invited to appear on the Phil Donahue Show to discuss the growing problem of domestically cultivated marihuana. Appearing with Chairman Rangel were Steve Chapple, author of "Outlaws in Babylon" and Thomas Alexander, Editor of the magazine "Sinsemilla Tips", a how-to magazine for marihuana growers.

Chapple's book "Outlaws in Babylon" details the lives and work of several marihuana cultivators in the Pacific Northwest. Both Chapple and Alexander expressed their belief that sentencing for marihuana cultivation is excessive, and that violence will become a trademark of the cultivation business unless changes are made in the laws, and in some of the law enforcement tactics being used to force the growers into compliance with the law.

Chairman Rangel told the audience that the Select Committee considers the domestic cultivation of marihuana as a critical issue if our Nation is to achieve success in combatting drug abuse on all levels. Rangel provided Phil Donahue with some photographs which illustrated the methods that growers are using to cultivate marihuana, and to protect their crops including dangerous weapons and booby traps.

Rangel also stressed the need for parents not to be influenced by reports downplaying the harmlessness of marihuana, since studies continue to indicate that marihuana is the gateway drug which often leads to abuse of other, more addictive substances.

Conclusion

The Select Committee has examined the issue of domestic marihuana from a variety of angles, and concludes that:

1. The issue of domestic marihuana is growing more severe despite increased State and local efforts to detect and eradicate marihuana. Law enforcement problems continue to be a main concern of State and local authorities as lawlessness, homicides, thefts and the trafficking of marihuana continue to increase.

2. Sinsemilla, the potent variety of marihuana, continues to account for a high percentage of all marihuana grown in the United States. States such as Tennessee and Hawaii have reported that sinsemilla comprises 51% and 41% respectively of these States' entire marihuana crops.

3. The Federal Government does not place a high enough emphasis on the domestic marihuana eradication program. Despite the increase in the number of States participating in the marihuana eradication program sponsored by the Drug Enforcement Administration, the amount of funding for cooperative eradication efforts is paltry, and States such as California were in dire need of additional funding during the 1984 harvest season.

4. Not enough is being done to develop alternative eradication methods to expedite marihuana eradication efforts. The controversial spraying of paraquat and the subsequent court cases resulting from its use necessitate the exploration of alternative methods. The Select Committee has expressed interest in diesel oil emulsion eradication methods being used in Hawaii, and in a repellant/odorant being explored in Arkansas.

Federal Aviation Administration Employee Drug Abuse Policies

In 1983, the Select Committee initiated an inquiry into efforts by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to respond to reports of drug use by air traffic controllers. The Committee's review was prompted by these reports as well as by the obvious risks to public safety that such drug use creates.

The Committee continued its oversight of FAA employee drug abuse policies in 1984. Committee staff met on two occasions with FAA staff to review the agency's progress in developing effective strategies to deal with employee drug use.

Following these meetings, Chairman Rangel met with the new FAA Administrator, Admiral Donald D. Engen, USN, Retired, on September 12, 1984, for a report on the policies being implemented by the agency. The Chairman emphasized that the Select Committee was prepared to do whatever it could to help the FAA in dealing with this potentially serious problem. Administrator Engen said the agency was implementing a strong new employee drug policy stating unequivocally that the FAA would not tolerate any illicit drug use by agency employees. The policy distinguishes between employees in direct safety related positions, such as air traffic controllers, and other employees. If there is credible evidence of illicit drug use by an employee in a direct safety related position, the employee will be removed immediately from duty and offered assistance. The employee will not be returned to duty until the drug problem is resolved, and any recurrence of drug use will subject the employee to disciplinary action which could include dismis-

sal. In any case involving criminal drug activity by an employee, immediate disciplinary action will be taken.

Admiral Engen also told the Chairman that the FAA was moving ahead to implement a nationwide employee assistance program (EAP) for all FAA employees. The EAP will cover alcohol and drug abuse problems and will include training for supervisors to identify and refer employees whose performance may indicate a substance abuse problem.

One key issue that remains unresolved by the agency is the use of drug screening procedures, such as urinalysis testing, to detect and deter drug use by employees. At present, the FAA relies mainly on close, on-the-job supervision and agency investigations to uncover employee substance abuse problems. Urinalysis is used only when the agency has probable cause to suspect that an employee is using drugs. The agency is still considering whether and how to implement some type of routine urine screening program to detect employee drug use and is looking at a number of different options.

In our annual report last year, the Select Commitee said:

> The Select Committee believes the FAA should be given a reasonable opportunity to review its employee drug policies and consider alternatives to its current practices. The Committee is most concerned, however, that the agency develop, communicate, and enforce a clear, consistent policy on employee drug abuse that will protect the public from impaired air traffic controllers and help rehabilitate employees in appropriate cases.

We believe the FAA has moved deliberately and thoughtfully within the past year to address the problem of drug use among FAA employees, especially those in positions directly affecting public safety such as air traffic controllers. We remain concerned, however, about the adequacy of detection procedures used by the agency and will continue to monitor FAA's progress in this area.

Investigation of Alleged Medicaid Fraud and Drug Abuse in New York City

The staff of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control conducted an investigation of charges featured in a week-long series in the *New York Daily News* alleging unethical practices and Medicaid abuse by physicians and local pharmacies. The allegations charged that a select number of physicians were prescribing unnecessary prescriptions for medication and medical supplies that were then being sold on the streets of New York by drug addicts. Also that these same doctors were prescribing and pharmacies were filling prescriptions for Doriden and Empirin-3, when combined equals a heroin-like high. It was further alleged that these physicians were receiving kickbacks from the pharmacists for many of these prescriptions, or in fact have a financial interest in the pharmacies.

In its investigation the staff interviewed numerous New York State officials to discuss the seriousness of the allegations outlined in the newspaper articles. In addition, the Drug Enforcement Administration's Compliance unit officials were interviewed and were asked for their assessment of the Medicaid fraud problem in New York. The staff concluded that the Medicaid system is being seriously defrauded by the practice of physicians unnecessarily pre-

scribing drugs and medical supplies to narcotic addicts. The pharmacies involved are being paid by Medicaid for filling the prescriptions when they submit vouchers. The physicians, in turn, are either receiving kickbacks from pharmacies or, in fact, have a financial or ownerships' interest in the pharmacy involved. In either case the Medicaid system is underwriting the cost of these practices and paying for the unnecessary, and fraudulent prescription.

On October 3, 1984, Chairman Charles B. Rangel wrote Secretary Margaret Heckler, Department of Health and Human Services to inform her that the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control had recently looked into allegations by the New York Daily News of Medicaid abuse by providers in New York City.

The Chairman indicated that the staff had reviewed the Federal Medicaid regulations and have found that while the existing regulations require providers and financial agents to disclose a number of relationships (e.g., ownership or control interest in a provider, subcontractor or supplier; similar ownership or control by members of a provider's family; and significant business dealings between subcontractors and suppliers) the regulations are silent on the disclosure of any ownership, control or business relationship between physicians, pharmacists, and pharmacies. The Chairman's position is that this omission requires correction, and as such requested that the Department of Health and Human Services review this situation with a view to drafting and promulgating regulations requiring disclosure between physicians and pharmacy providers under medicaid.

Hawaiian Drug Enforcement Activities

The Select Committee's study mission to Asia and Italy in January, 1984 included a series of briefings in Honolulu on the status of Federal and State drug enforcement efforts in Hawaii. The Select Committee concluded that Hawaii serves as a major smuggling center for heroin entering the United States from Southeast Asia, as well as being a major domestic supplier of marijuana. To combat both of these threats, the Federal law enforcement presence in the State of Hawaii must be strengthened and cooperation with State and local law enforcement agencies enhanced.

Two major issues emanated from the January Honolulu briefings which the Select Committee continued to examine after its return to Washington. First, what steps can the Postal Service take to prevent the U.S. Mails from being used to transport marijuana from Hawaii to the mainland United States? Second, why did the Department of Justice order the dismantling of a successful statewide drug enforcement task force in the State of Hawaii?

Use of the U.S. Postal Service to smuggle marijuana from Hawaii

During the Select Committee's briefing in Honolulu on January 5, 1984, the U.S. Postal Service was identified as a frequently used channel to ship marijuana from Hawaii to the mainland United States. Postal inspectors who briefed the Committee stated that postal regulations generally prohibited the use of drug detection dogs in postal facilities to ferret out packages containing marijuana. The Postal Service indicated that this regulation was based on

court decisions which limited the use of detection dogs absent other probable cause to search.

On the Committee's return to Washington, Mr. Akaka, along with Committee legal staff, began meeting with the Postal Service to discuss ways in which the mails could be secure from drug trafficking. One method discussed was the increased use of drug detection dogs.

The Committee was informed that the Postal Service's policy is to use narcotic detector dogs only to sniff articles reasonably suspected of containing narcotics which have been temporarily detained for further investigation, and which cannot be opened without a search warrant. The Postal Service noted that the fact of the dog's "alert" to a package is used to support an application for a search warrant to open the suspected article to determine whether it contains illegal drugs. Postal Service representatives noted that although they have been urged to use drug detector dogs at "random" they believe there are sound operational and legal reasons underlying the present policy of using the dogs selectively.

Operationally, the Postal Service cites the heavy volume of mail it is required to move, and the mechanized nature of its operations, as the major reasons why it cannot freely use drug detector dogs at random in postal facilities.

Legally, the Postal Service cited uncertainties in the law of search and seizure for not deploying the random use of detector dogs. The Postal Service took the position that present law is unsettled as to whether mail which is sealed against inspection * is constitutionally subject to detector dog sniffing (1) only if a search warrant is issued; (2) without a warrant but upon reasonable suspicion and if the detention of the article is kept reasonably brief; or, (3) without a warrant and at random if the article is not detained at all.

The Supreme Court in *United States* v. *Place,* 462 U.S. 696 (1983) held that the exposure of luggage in a public place (an airport in the case fact pattern) to a sniff test by a trained canine did not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. However, the *Place* decision went on to state that a prolonged seizure is unreasonable because police conduct in such circumstances exceeds the bounds of a permissible investagatory detention. (See *Terry* v. *Ohio* 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).

In accordance with the *Place* decision, the Postal Service has followed the second view described above—using narcotic detector dogs to sniff mail articles briefly detained upon reasonable suspicion—because it supports the most reasonable and effective use of drug detector dogs consistent with sound postal operations and legal consideration. This was the technique used by the Postal Service, in conjunction with the Drug Enforcement Administration, in "Operation Pele," the results of which were announced in February, 1984. Pele was announced shortly after the committee returned from its study mission and while discussions were being held with the Postal Service concerning the smuggling of marijuana from Hawaii via the mails.

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* This is mail that cannot be opened without a search warrant and includes all first class mail.

Operation Pele was launched in fall, 1983 by a joint investigative task force composed of DEA, the Postal Inspection Service, and the Hawaii County Police Department. During this investigation Postal Inspectors segregated approximately 400 packages suspected of containing marijuana that had been deposited with postal facilities on the big island of Hawaii. The package segregation was based upon a profile developed by the Postal Inspection Service and DEA. The packages were sent to a central location where narcotic detector dogs of the Customs Service and County Police Departments sniffed the packages. The dogs "alerted" on almost all of the packages. Search warrants were obtained for the packages to which the dogs reacted and, when opened, were all found to contain marijuana. The net weight of the marijuana seized in Operation Pele was 700 pounds and valued at $1.7 million. Since this investigation, the flow of packages from Hawaii to the mainland United States containing marijuana has visibly slowed.

On March 1, 1984, Mr. Akaka met with Postal Service representatives who described "Operation Pele" to the Congressman. The postal officials indicated that they were pleased with the success of Operation Pele, particularly, with the fact that the mails have become a less-favored method of smuggling marijuana out of Hawaii. The Postal Service informed Mr. Akaka, however, that they have not examined the extent to which the mails may be used to transport marijuana in other areas of the country where marijuana is grown, nor had they determined the extend to which private delivery services may be unknowingly used to transport domestic marijuana.

The Select Committee commends the resourcefulness of the Postal Inspection Service and DEA for the implementation on Operation Pele. It is our hope that the Postal Service remains vigilant on the vexing problem of using the mails to ship marijuana from Hawaii, and utilizes investigations such as Pele during the marijuana harvest season, not only in Hawaii, but in all States where domestic marijuana cultivation is a significant problem. In this regard Senate Report 98–562, accompanying S. 2853, the Treasury-Postal Service appropriations bill for fiscal year 1985, directed the Postal Service to assist in a Federal narcotics task force in Hawaii. The Senate Appropriations Committee noted the past efforts of the Postal Service in Hawaii in working with other Federal agencies to combat drug smuggling and urged the Postmaster General to take an active role in bringing the Postal Service into a Federal Hawaii drug task force. The House conferees, in the conference report, H. Rept. 98–993, on the Treasury-Postal Service Appropriations bill concurred in this language. Mr. Akaka served as a House conferee on this bill.

Reestablishment of the Hawaiian Statewide Drug Enforcement Task Force

At the Select Committee's hearing on April 10, 1984, which updated the Committee's 1983–84 field hearings, Hawaiian First Deputy Attorney General Michael A. Lilly informed the Committee that in April, 1983, the Department of Justice abruptly terminated a statewide task force composed of all major law enforcement agencies in Hawaii. The task force, which was formed in September

1982, included the DEA, the United States Attorney's Office, the Hawaiian Attorney General, the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, local police departments, the Army Criminal Investigation Division, and the Naval Investigative Service.

Although informal, this task force was credited with a great deal of success. Operation Pele began as a result of this task force, and it enhanced equipment sharing between the agencies that culminated in a successful marijuana eradication program in the national parks on the island of Hawaii. The Task Force was provided office space and logistical support by DEA.

In April, 1983, DEA informed the Attorney General of the State of Hawaii that the task force would be terminated and requested a recall of all task force investigators to their parent agencies. DEA cited agency guidelines, administrative restraints, and "other mandatory tasks levied" on the Honolulu office as the reasons for ending the task force. Hawaiian Assistant Attorney General Lilly expressed his belief before the committee that the task force was disbanded because it did not fit into the scheme of Federal narcotics task forces that the Administration was putting into place around the country.

On May 21, 1984, Chairman Rangel along with Representatives Gilman and Akaka wrote to U.S. Attorney General William French Smith expressing their concern about the termination of the Hawaiian statewide task force. They wrote:

"Frankly, we are disturbed by the actions of the Drug Enforcement Administration disbanding a successful task force in Hawaii that was established by the agencies participating in drug enforcement on the islands themselves. While there may be some merit to the argument for the Justice Department to have some degree of uniformity in its drug enforcement efforts nationwide, to sever a program that is working, particularly one that had its genesis from within the Federal/State and local enforcement agencies working together in that State brings to mind the adage, "if it's not broken, don't fix it."

The Administration's actions are even more disturbing in the light of recent published statements by DEA Administrator Francis M. Mullen, Jr. that the Administration's NNBIS Program is a liability to drug enforcement. This raises a serious question in our minds whether the various drug enforcement reorganization plans that have been made by the Administration are truly beneficial to effective drug enforcement. The abolition of the Hawaiian task force does not appear to be a positive step."

On August 29, 1984, Associate Attorney General D. Lowell Jensen responded to the May 21, 1984, letter. He stated: "The task force you refer to in your letter was formed in September, 1982 after the Honolulu Resident Office determined that the marijuana eradication program should be enhanced by a cooperative enforcement effort . . . . The intelligence gained through the interim program indicated that domestic marijuana violators were engaged in substantial marijuana cultivation and were working to develop distribution networks." Mr. Jensen's letter then went on to describe "Operation Pele," as well as DEA's Domestic Marijuana Eradication Program in Hawaii. The Associate Attorney General, however,

failed to address the specific statewide task force program Representatives Rangel, Gilman and Akaka referred to in their letter of May 21, 1984, and why it was disbanded.

Mr. Akaka in his capacity as a member of the Committee on Appropriations, had the following language put in H. Rept. 98–802 which accompanied H.R. 5712, the Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1985:

> . . . the committee is also aware of DEA's recent decision to withdraw its support from the Statewide Hawaiian Task Force . . . The committee strongly believes that such decisions should not be made precipitously without full consultation with local authorities. Therefore, the committee directs DEA to coordinate closely with local officials and agencies before such decisions are made so that due consideration can be given to local drug enforcement needs . . .

Language calling for increased cooperative endeavors between Federal, State and local drug enforcement agencies in Hawaii was also contained in Senate Report 98–514, which also accompanied the Commerce, Justice, State Appropriations bill. The Conference Report on H.R. 5712 was passed by both the House and the Senate, and signed into law by the President on August 30, 1984.

The Select Committee on Narcotics concurs in the sentiments of the House Appropriations Committee. DEA's termination of cooperative activities with State and local enforcement agencies should only come after full consultation with all groups involved. Unilateral actions can only disrupt ongoing drug enforcement activities and signal a lack of commitment and concern by the Federal Government to local drug enforcement needs. The Select committee trusts that the Department of Justice will heed the directives of both the House and Senate Appropriations Committee and reestablish the Hawaiian Statewide Drug Enforcement Task Force as soon as possible.

Coast Guard Drug Enforcement Activity

Briefing on Coast Guard Drug Intelligence (April 4, 1984)

Several of the Select Committee's hearings in 1983 identified the need for more and better drug intelligence as a high priority concern among Federal drug law enforcement agencies. For example, in testimony before the Select Committee, Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Gracey repeatedly emphasized the importance of intelligence to the effective use of Coast Guard interdiction resources and said that the Coast Guard had undertaken several new initiatives to improve its collection and use of narcotics intelligence.

To obtain more specific information on Coast Guard drug intelligence collection capabilities and activities, the Committee requested the Coast Guard to conduct a briefing for members on the Coast Guard's drug intelligence program. The briefing was held on April 4, 1984. Because of the classified nature of the material covered, the briefing was held in closed session.

Chairman Rangel welcomed Admiral Gracey and the members of his staff back before the Committee. He also congratulated the Coast Guard for the leadership it provides in protecting our nation from the influx of narcotic drugs and assured the Coast Guard of the Select Committee's continued strong support.

The Coast Guard is the Federal agency primarily responsible for interdiction of maritime drug smuggling. Consequently, the Coast Guard's presentation to the Committee emphasized that the agency's most critical need is for timely, accurate information on the number, identity, location and destination of vessels involved in smuggling illegal drugs into the United States. The briefing outlined the steps the Coast Guard has taken since 1980 to expand its drug intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination capabilities. The briefing covered Coast Guard coordination with other Federal agencies including the intelligence community and the Department of Defense as well as traditional law enforcement agencies. It also reviewed Coast Guard cooperation with foreign governments on drug intelligence needs, Coast Guard participation in EPIC (the El Paso Intelligence Center) and NNBIS (the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System), and efforts the Coast Guard is taking to enhance the intelligence training of Coast Guard staff.

Admiral Gracey reported that the Coast Guard is now a full partner in the intelligence community and that the flow of information to the Coast Guard from the intelligence community is good. He also said the Coast Guard's enhanced intelligence capabilities have definitely improved the agency's interdiction results and noted that in 1983 49 percent of the smuggling vessels interdicted by the Coast Guard were based on prior intelligence.

Several members asked whether the Coast Guard has enough resources to take advantage of all the expanded intelligence the agency is now getting, or whether there are times when resources are simply not available to stop all suspect vessels identified through intelligence efforts. Admiral Gracey replied that obviously the Coast Guard could do more if given more resources. He cautioned, however, that how much more would depend on the interdiction strategy to be followed. He also questioned whether it would be cost effective to add more resources to interdiction, keeping in mind that the primary objective of the interdiction effort is to keep the heat on the smugglers while the rest of the Federal strategy has a chance to work. He said there is no way to stop smuggling solely through interdiction. Admiral Gracey also said the Coast Guard is in the process of making improvements in operations and acquiring new medium range search jet aircraft, new helicopters and new helicopter-carrying cutters in addition to other equipment. He said it is impossible to know what the impact of all these new additions will be on the Coast Guard's interdiction effectiveness and that it is premature to be seeking additional ships at this time. He also said it would take five years from the time of congressional approval of new procurement for the Coast Guard to acquire any new ships.

In a follow-up question after the briefing, the Committee asked Admiral Gracey to provide data on the number of times during the past year that the Coast Guard was unable to go after suspect smuggling vessels identified through intelligence because resources were not available. In his written reply, Admiral Gracey said that 84 suspect vessels were known to have passed through the Caribbean passages in 1983. Of this number, 39 were seized and 15 were either interdicted by another agency, boarded with negative results and evaluated as a possible decoy, or not located due to insufficient

intelligence. Of the remaining vessels, more than one-third of the total, Admiral Gracey said, "It is possible that some of them might have been seized given the availability of additional interdiction resources."

Members also questioned Admiral Gracey about Coast Guard's role in interdiction of drug smuggling by air and asked whether air interdiction could be readily integrated into current Coast Guard missions. Admiral Gracey said the Customs Service was primarily responsible for air interdiction and that the Coast Guard's role in this area was very limited. He admitted that the Coast Guard had the basic skills and infrastructure to fly an air search program, but he said the Coast Guard would be unable to handle the responsibility for air interdiction, if given that mission, without significant increases in resources, both human and financial. He also said he had great reservations about the efficacy of air interdiction unless it was carefully planned and thought out.

The Committee urged the Coast Guard to try to look ahead to what their future needs might be, and if they find they need more equipment and other resources to let the Committee know. The Committee remains concerned that the Coast Guard does not have the resources required to mount a sustained, aggressive attack against seaborne drug smugglers. The Coast Guard is unable now, due to lack of resources, to intercept all suspect smuggling vessels identified through its intelligence efforts. While the new vessels, aircraft and other equipment the Coast Guard is acquiring will undoubtedly enhance the Coast Guard's law enforcement capabilities, these new assets for the most part are replacements for older vessels and aircraft and will not increase the number of interdiction resources that can be deployed.

The Committee also continues to believe that Coast Guard assets should be more involved in air interdiction, at least in the detection of suspect aircraft. As Admiral Gracey acknowledged at the briefing, the Coast Guard has the skills and the infrastructure to conduct an air program. In addition, air smugglers frequently transit routes through areas the Coast Guard routinely patrols now in search of maritime smugglers and in the performance of other assigned missions. If properly equipped, Coast Guard aircraft and vessels could integrate detection of air smugglers into these other missions at a relatively marginal cost. This capability undoubtedly also would enhance the Coast Guard's ability to assist the military when such support is required. The Committee believes that strong consideration should be given to providing the resources needed for Coast Guard aircraft and vessels to be used more effectively in support of our air interdiction efforts.

On-site inspection of Coast Guard ship-tethered radar balloon, Clearwater Air Station (May 12, 1984)

In May, the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control attended a Coast Guard demonstration of the marine surveillance capabilities of a ship-tethered mobile radar balloon (aerostat). In addition to viewing the aerostat first hand, the purpose of the inspection was to review the results of the Coast Guard's evaluation of this device for detection of maritime drug smuggling through the Caribbean. The aerostat test was intended to find out how useful

these mobile radar balloons might be in increasing Coast Guard intelligence about suspect vessel movements, thereby enabling the Coast Guard to deploy its interdiction resources more effectively.

The demonstration and the Coast Guard's operational evaluation of the aerostat show that this mobile surveillance device can be a valuable tool in detecting maritime drug smuggling. The radar mounted on the helium-filled aerostat can detect and monitor small vessel traffic over a 70 mile radius. This range makes the aerostat particularly well suited for surveillance in the narrow Caribbean choke points along the sea routes favored by traffickers attempting to smuggle marijuana and cocaine into the southeastern United States from Latin and South America. One aerostat in each of the four major passages would provide almost shore to shore coverage of these vital sea lanes on a continuous basis. The expansive coverage and high visibility of the aerostat would also serve as a deterrent to smugglers.

The Coast Guard evaluation found that the aerostat was able to operate in adverse weather conditions, withstanding hurricane force winds. The aerostat is also economical, costing about one-tenth as much per hour to operate as a C–130 or E–2C aircraft, and it can be relocated as the smuggling threat shifts. Although the Coast Guard tested the aerostat for its effectiveness in aiding marine interdiction, the aerostat can also be outfitted with appropriate radar for detection of air traffic.

The conference report on Public Law 98–473, the fiscal year 1985 continuing resolution which provides funding for the Coast Guard, directs the Coast Guard to continue lease of the aerostat system used for operational evaluation, to negotiate the timely lease of one additional aerostat, and to procure three additional aerostat radar balloons. The costs of these leases and procurements, estimated at $20 million, are to be absorbed within available funds.

The Select Committee supports the acquisition of aerostat radar systems by the Coast Guard as directed in the continuing resolution. We believe these aerostat radars will significantly improve the Coast Guard's ability to detect, interdict and deter the massive illicit drug trade that has developed through the Caribbean to the United States. The Committee would also support a supplemental appropriation for the Coast Guard to pay for the mandated aerostat leases and procurements. The Committee does not believe the Coast Guard should have to absorb the cost of acquiring these much needed detection devices at the expense of other critical Coast Guard requirements.

The Committee also urges the Congress and the Administration to provide additional interdiction resources for the Coast Guard. Improvements in detection are not enough. The Coast Guard at present does not have enough resources to intercept all the suspect smuggling vessels identified through intelligence. With the increased detection capability the five aerostats will provide, the Coast Guard will certainly need more vessels and aircraft to check out the increased number of targets that will be spotted.

Opposition to Coast Guard Budget Cuts

The September 10, 1984, issue of the *U.S. News and World Report* reported that the Coast Guard was "high on the list" of

White House targets for budget cuts or slowed spending increases in fiscal year 1986.

In response to this item, the Chairman, Ranking Minority Member, and 18 other Members of the Select Committee wrote to Budget Director David Stockman expressing their strong opposition to cuts in the Coast Guard's programs. Noting the vital contributions the Coast Guard makes to our Nation's drug enforcement effort, the Members said:

> Administration officials, from the President on down, have repeatedly emphasized that drug enforcement is a top priority of this Administration. We certainly hope the story in the *U.S. News and World Report* * * * does not accurately reflect Administration plans for the Coast Guard in the 1986 budget. We cannot improve our drug enforcement posture by cutting the Coast Guard's budget.

In addition, Mr. Rangel and Mr. Gilman sent a copy of the Stockman letter to Vice President George Bush. The Vice President is in charge of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) in which the Coast Guard is expected to play a major role.

In his November 2 reply, Budget Director Stockman said the Administration does not intend to "hamstring" the Coast Guard with inadequate FY 1986 funding. Admiral Murphy's reply noted that the Administration has made "major commitments to improving Federal efforts against drug abuse and drug trafficking" such as NNBIS, and that the Coast Guard has "viable tasks to perform within NNBIS and the 1984 Federal Strategy." Admiral Murphy assured the Committee that the Administration's efforts in this area will continue.

The replies from Stockman and Murphy are less than firm assurances that the Coast Guard's budget will not be cut. Moreover, in recent weeks the Administration has endorsed the concept of an overall freeze on Federal spending in 1986 that would require cuts in a number of programs to offset increases in others, such as Defense and Social Security. The Committee plans to follow the Administration's 1986 proposals for the Coast Guard carefully.

Meeting Among Customs Officials and Sea and Air Carriers on Ways To Reduce Cocaine Entering the U.S.

On April 18, 1984, Select Committee staff attended a meeting at the U.S. Customs Service among Customs officials and sea and air carriers on ways to reduce the amount of cocaine entering the U.S. via private carrier Customs Commissioner William von Raab estimated that in calendar year 1983, 115,000 pounds of cocaine were smuggled into the U.S., and of this amount 20,000 pounds of 17.5% was seized by Customs. The purpose of the meeting was to enlist the support of sea and air carriers in spotting suspicious passengers and packages that could be carrying or contain cocaine.

Some of Customs' suggestions for limiting the flow of cocaine into the U.S. by private conveyance included:

(1) train issuing agents to recognize and report instances meeting narcotics profile characteristics;

(2) flag last minute cargo bookings prepaid in cash; notify appropriate Customs officers;

(3) conduct a thorough passenger facility survey jointly involving the carriers and operators security chiefs to ensure that appropriate safeguards and controls are maintained;

(4) reward employees, informants or others who provide useful information; and

(5) register industry dissatisfaction formally with leaders and governments in nations producing and exporting narcotics.

A representative of the Air Transport Association stated that the airlines were willing to cooperate with Federal law enforcement agencies in drug detection activities, but he stressed that the authorities must play the lead role in this area. Similar views were expressed by representatives of the shipping industry. Also, the feasibility of providing the Customs Service with a copy of the ship's manifest before it arrives in port was a key point of discussion between Customs' and shipping representatives. This would enable Customs to identify the cargo of incoming ships before they arrive in port and assist in identifying suspect vessels carrying contraband.

Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment

National Association for City Drug and Alcohol Coordination Roundtable (May 31, 1984)

The National Association for City Drug and Alcohol Coordination (NACDAC) is a consortium of city drug and alcohol program coordinators representing mayors of cities with major alcohol and drug abuse problems. The Association was formed in 1978 to effectively document, present and pursue the urban perspective in alcohol and drug abuse planning.

On May 31, 1984, members of the Select Committee staff attended a NACDAC Roundtable Discussion on Federal Substance Abuse Policy vis-a-vis Cities. The session was held as part of the Association's annual meeting in Washington, D.C. Representatives from the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA) and the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), both within the Department of Health and Human Services, also participated in the roundtable discussion as did representatives from the General Accounting Office and NASADAD (the National Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors). Cities represented at the meeting included Philadelphia, Boston, Detroit, New Orleans, Buffalo and Jersey City.

Discussion at the meeting focused on two major issues: the nature and extent of local government participation in State drug abuse planning under the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Services (ADMS) block grant; and the adequacy of Federal funding for substance abuse programs under the ADMS block grant. In the area of public participation, city representatives complained that they had not been given an adequate opportunity to participate in the development of State applications for ADMS block grant funds from the Federal Government. Nicholas Piccone, NACDAC Chairperson and head of drug and alcohol programs for the City of Philadelphia, told the group that Philadelphia had not been given a chance to comment on the State's alcohol and drug plan this year. Paul Robinson, city director from Boston, said that in the fall of 1983 he was invited at 4 p.m. one afternoon to attend a meeting at 7 p.m. that same day to comment on the State's block grant application which he had never seen.

An ADAMHA spokesman said public participation in the State drug abuse planning process under the block grant had been minimal. He said ADAMHA's role under the block grant is limited. The agency does not tell States how to meet the public participation requirements of the block grant but checks only to see that these requirements are met. He said ADAMHA had received only one complaint so far that a State had not held a public hearing on its plan as required under the block grant. In response to a question from Piccone, the ADAMHA representative said ADAMHA could act as a convener to bring together State and city agencies to review State block grant plans and city needs, but he encouraged NACDAC and its members to be more active at the State level in pushing for greater city participation in block grant planning.

With respect to Federal funding for drug abuse programs, city representatives said cuts under the ADMS block grant were taking their toll on local drug and alcohol services. Piccone reported that in a recent NACDAC survey of 50 of the nation's largest cities, 79 percent of those responding said they had suffered cuts in Federal support since implementation of the ADMS block grant. These cities said funding from other sources had not been adequate to compensate for the loss in Federal dollars. Piccone also said that funding cuts as a result of the block grant had begun to cut into the service coordination structure in some cities.

Representatives from GAO said the results of their recently concluded 13-State study of the block grant showed that 70 percent of local government units had more actual dollars for substance abuse programs in 1983 than 1981. GAO found that many State and local governments had obtained new funding from non-Federal sources, and the carryover of categorical funds available in the initial years of the block grant had softened the blow of Federal cuts under the block grant. Although GAO did not look at the impact of Federal funding reductions beyond 1983, many State and local officials said the impact of the block grant was yet to be felt. GAO did find that drug abuse programs took the brunt of cuts among the three programs included in the block grant, with 8 of 12 States reporting cuts for drug services.

Ken Eaton from NASADAD said carryover funding from the block grant was running out and that States would begin to feel the impact of Federal budget cuts unless new sources of funds were found. He said new strategies were needed to motivate increased support for substance abuse programs at the Federal level. He called for States and cities to work together, to educate each other, and to get governors informed and involved on what needs to be done.

Select Committee representatives said the cities' complaints were understandable. The Committee had documented a tremendous increase in drug availability and an increasing need for drug services at the same time that Federal funding for treatment and prevention programs was being reduced. Because the Federal Government was not doing enough to meet these problems, the Committee had urged the Congress to increase funds for treatment and prevention. The Committee spokesmen also urged the cities to be more aggressive in lobbying States, who control the distribution of block grant

funds to programs within their jurisdiction, and more vocal in communicating their needs to States and the Federal Government.

Discussion With the Greater New York Coalition on Drug Abuse

On June 25, 1984, Mr. Gilman participated in a round table discussion on the impact of drug abuse in New York City that was sponsored by the Greater New York Coalition on Drug Abuse Inc. and held at the Beth Israel Medical Center in New York. The Coalition is a non-profit corporation whose member organizations represent prevention, education, treatment and supportive services.

The discussion focused on efforts to prevent, treat and rehabilitate drug addicts, the use of methadone maintenance, and the need for the community to prevent drug abuse among the youth. As of July 1979, 31,400 drug abusers were enrolled in methadone maintenance programs in New York State. The need for long range national planning to prevent and control drug abuse, including drug education programs in the schools, was also discussed.

The 1984 National Strategy for Prevention of Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking, Appearance by Chairman Rangel on Cable News Network and the McNeil-Lehrer Newshour

On September 27, 1984, the day the Reagan Administration released its 1984 National Strategy For Prevention of Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking, Charles B. Rangel, Chairman of the House Select Committee on Narcotics, appeared on Cable News Network and the McNeil-Lehrer News Hour to critique the Administration's plan.

In his appearances, Mr. Rangel sharply attacked the strategy. First of all, he said he was very skeptical of any administration—Republican or Democratic—that released its strategy for narcotics control on the eve of a national election. He said that drug abuse and drug trafficking were too important to be used for political purposes.

Chairman Rangel noted that the five elements of the Administration's strategy—prevention, enforcement, international narcotics control, treatment, and research—generally followed the pattern of previous strategies that have emphasized efforts to control both the supply of and demand for drugs. He strongly criticized the Administration, however, for failing to implement a vigorous program to combat drugs.

He said the Administration had not made the control of illicit drugs from abroad a top foreign policy priority. He pointed out that in three and a half years, the President had not made a major public statement on the need for strong international efforts to halt narcotics production and trafficking. Similarly, he noted that our Ambassador to the United Nations had not once used that forum to address the narcotics problem. Referring to Secretary of State Shultz' September 14, 1984, narcotics speech before the Miami Chamber of Commerce, he said that for the first time, and again on the eve of the election, the Secretary of State had spoken out publicly on narcotics control. The Chairman said he was pleased the Secretary was finally addressing the issue, but he

thought the Secretary's speech would have been more appropriate if it had been made to the United Nations, not to a business group.

Mr. Rangel also pointed out that little progress had been made in obtaining firm commitments from foreign governments to eradicate illicit narcotics crops. He pointed out that production of opium, coca and marijuana in source countries is expanding, not decreasing, and said the Administration had failed to use the tools Congress had provided—namely, the ability to cut off foreign aid—to encourage greater cooperation from foreign source countries.

He charged that the Administration's strategy was a failure on the domestic front, too. He said that despite some increased Federal interdiction and law enforcement efforts, drugs continued to pour into our country at unprecedented rates, and trafficking flourished in the streets of our cities. He argued that until this flood of illegal drugs from abroad can be stopped, the Federal Government must recognize its responsibility to assist State and local enforcement agencies that are simply being overwhelmed.

He also said that as long as drugs continue to flow into our country, the Federal Government has a responsibility to help treat the victims and prevent new casualties. He pointed out, though, that the Reagan Administration had cut funds for treatment and prevention programs by 40 percent despite the increasing demand for drug abuse services. Commenting on the emphasis the Administration's 1984 strategy places on prevention efforts by the private sector, Mr. Rangel said he agreed that the private sector can make a substantial contribution to drug abuse prevention. But he noted that witness after witness had told the Select Committee that private resources could not fill the void left by the Federal Government's abandonment of the treatment and prevention field.

The bottom line, Mr. Rangel concluded, is that drug supplies are up and abuse is up. He said the Administration had not implemented the aggressive foreign and domestic policies needed to control drugs. He said it would be impossible to win the war against drugs until the nation makes the commitment and dedicates the resources to do the job.

Special Activities

Support for National Drug Abuse Prevention Activities

Initiative with the National Conference of Catholic Bishops

During the Select Committee's study mission to Hawaii, Asia, and Italy the delegation had a private audience with His Holiness Pope John Paul II, at the Apostolic Palace, Vatican City on January 29, 1984. The Pope had urged the delegation on this occasion to consider the needs of the family when developing a comprehensive plan of deterrence against drug abuse and narcotics trafficking.

Shortly after the Select Committee's return to Washington, the committee began a dialogue with the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) on Pope John Paul's suggestions. On March 31, 1984, committee staff met with Father William M. Lewers, C.S.C., Director of the Office of International Justice and Peace; and Mr. Ronald Krietemeyer, Director of the Office of Social Concerns of the Department of Social Development and World

Peace of the NCCB. This department is headed by Archbishop John J. O'Connor of New York.

The Committee urged the NCCB at this meeting to consider the promulgation of a pastoral letter by the Bishops strongly condemning drug abuse and advocating stronger public policy initiatives in the areas of international narcotics control, law enforcement, and drug abuse treatment and prevention. The committee also recommended that the pastoral letter urge all parishes to become actively involved in drug abuse prevention activities.

Father Lewers suggested that the Select Committee prepare a formal proposal of its ideas for consideration by the Department of Social Development and World Peace.

On May 7, 1984, Chairman Rangel transmitted to Father Lewers a proposal which called on the NCCB to issue a pastoral letter on drug abuse and drug trafficking. The proposal discussed the magnitude of the drug abuse problem in the United States and contained a series of public policy initiatives for the Bishops' support.

In June, 1984, the Select Committee's proposal was discussed at a meeting of the Advisory Committee of the Department of Social Development and World Peace. The Advisory Board agreed with the Select Committee's assessment of the seriousness of the drug abuse situation in the United States and that the NCCB should take some initiative as soon as possible. The Advisory Committee felt that a pastoral letter, as suggested by the Select Committee, would take too long to formulate. The AC proposed instead that a policy statement on drug abuse be issued by the Administrative Board of the NCCB at its December, 1985 meeting.

Meeting with National Substance Abuse Prevention Task Force of the Association of Lieutenant Governors (April 5, 1984)

On Thursday, April 5, 1984, the Select Committee met with Lieutenant Governor George H. Ryan of Illinois. Lt. Gov. Ryan appeared in his capacity as Chairman of the National Substance Abuse Prevention Task Force of the Association of Lieutenant Governors (Task Force).

Attending from the Select Committee were Rep. Gilman, Ranking Minority Member, as well as Rep. Oxley, Rep. Shaw, Rep. Guarini and Rep. Smith.

Lt. Gov. Ryan indicated in the course of the discussion that the Task Force was formed during the annual meeting of the National Lieutenant Governors Conference held in late 1983. At that time it was decided that a real need existed for a bipartisan effort aimed at drug and alcohol abuse prevention.

The first priority of the Task Force, was to survey all 50 States regarding their respective drug and alcohol problems, especially among the young. Survey responses have been received from several States with the goal being a complete and comprehensive view of the drug problem on a State-by-State basis by years end.

Lt. Gov. Ryan indicated that it was his belief that the root cause of the substance abuse problem lay in the failure to stress prevention. "We cannot shut off the supply, so we must turn down demand through educational efforts," said the Lieutenant Governor.

Lt. Gov. Ryan concluded the meeting by indicating his desire that the Select Committee and the Task Force coordinate their respective activities and conduct joint field hearings sometime in 1984. He expressed his hope too, that the Select Committee can continue its diligent efforts in the Congress toward stabilizing, if not increasing the budgets of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, NIDA, and those other organizations whose focus is upon prevention activities.

Article by Chairman Rangel in Justice Quarterly

The first issue of a new scholarly journal contained an article that recommended a national policy change which would abandon as futile the "War on Drugs" and replace it with a laissez-faire drug abuse policy that would accommodate drug abusers, addicts and suppliers. Chairman Rangel was invited to respond, and his article "Combatting Drug Abuse and Trafficking: Some New Directions" appeared in the June 1984 issue of *Justice Quarterly.* In that article Chairman Rangel declared that the need for a more aggressive drug abuse and control policy is now greater than ever before. He assessed the current Federal drug abuse strategy and outlined an alternative that calls for strong central direction to ensure balanced reductions in supply of and demand for illicit substances. Unless the balance is maintained, the strategy is not likely to succeed. Finally, Mr. Rangel called for a resurgence of the national spirit and dedication needed to win a war against drug abuse and drug trafficking.

Support for Community Action to Prevent Drug Abuse

Congressional Advisory Committee on Drug Trafficking and Substance Abuse and the Drug Resource Directory of Services

The Congressional Advisory Committee on Drug Trafficking and Substance Abuse, which consists of parents, students, teachers, health professionals, guidance counselors, clergy, law enforcement officers, treatment and rehabilitation specialists, school administrators, and business and labor leaders in New York's 22nd Congressional District, was created in the summer of 1981 to help raise the consciousness of the public regarding the dangers of drug abuse. The Drug Advisory Committee sponsors seminars and workshops, provides information to community leaders, and is a forum for community groups to meet to exchange information and to help community leaders act upon their local drug problems. The Advisory Committee is also a liaison with the New York State Division of Substance Abuse Services, Federal drug agencies, the House Narcotics Select Committee, and local drug-related community groups.

Assisted by the Narcotics Select Committee, the Drug Advisory Committee met on May 5, 1984, at the Spring Valley High School in Spring Valley, New York. The program, which was designed to help community leaders become more aware of drug abuse among youngsters, centered on a dramatic production entitled, "Halfway There", a story of five teenage drug addicts, four of whom manage to become drug free. Based upon actual evidence of substance abuse and performed by professional actors, the performance vivid-

ly captures the psychological underpinnings of why youngsters resort to drugs and the dynamics of being addicted to mind-altering substances. "Halfway There" is produced by Periwinkle Productions, Inc., a non-profit company located in Monticello, New York, that specializes in educational theatre for young audiences. The company has performed in such theatres as Washington's Kennedy Center, New York's Lincoln Center and Detroit's Institute for the Arts.

Following the production, the Drug Advisory Committee heard reports from the New York State Parents Teachers Association, DARE (Drugs, Alcohol, Rehabilitation, Education), CANDLE (Clarkstown Awareness Network for Drug Free Life and Environment), the National Council of Jewish Women, the New York State Drug Education Bureau, and concerned citizens.

Through the cooperation of the New York State Division of Substance Abuse Services and the Narcotics Select Committee, the Drug Advisory Committee also developed a Drug Resource Directory for the 22nd Congressional District. The Directory, which could serve as a model for other Congressional districts, identifies drug-related programs, facilities and centers, including drug treatment and rehabilitation programs and counseling centers. Hospitals, hotline telephone numbers, and a list of national drug organizations are also included in the Directory.

Jersey City Ecumenical Drug Conference (April 30, 1984)

On January 20, 1984 Representative Frank J. Guarini of New Jersey participated in the audience the Select Committee had with his Holiness Pope John Paul II at the Vatican.

Upon his return from this study mission, Representative Guarini met with a cross section of religious leaders in the Jersey City area to inform them of the Pope's message. Following that, an ecumenical conference was held at Hudson County High School in Jersey City on April 30, 1984, on the problem of drug abuse.

The conference was moderated by Representative Guarini as a member of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control and was attended by a large number of clerics in the area, including Auxiliary Bishop Jerome A. Pechillo of Jersey City; Rabbi Samuel A. Berman of Temple Beth-El; the Reverend Ralph E. Brower, president of the "Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance;" the Reverend E. Royden Weeks, pastor of Old Bergan Church; and the Reverend Ercel F. Webb, pastor of Monumental Baptist Church.

Representative Guarini in his remarks stated that this conference represents the first step in bringing greater community involvement to combatting the growing epidemic of drugs in our society. He expressed deep appreciation to Bishop Pechillo for arranging for the auditorium, his hosting a luncheon and his warm and meaningful welcome remarks to the participants.

Congressman Benjamin A. Gilman of Middletown, New York, the Ranking Minority Member of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, addressed the conference on the international nature of the narcotics problems, the work of the Committee in documenting the problem, and the need for much more in-

creased and intensified international cooperation if we are to succeed in controlling it.

Mr. Michael Tobin, the DEA Division Director for New Jersey, headquartered at Newark, briefed the conference on the availability of narcotic drugs in the area, the seriousness of the drug abuse situation, and efforts to suppress the smuggling and traffic of drugs in the area by the Federal, State and local authorities.

Richard J. Russo, Director of the Division of Narcotics Abuse and Control of the New Jersey State Department of Health at Trenton, described the critical drug situation in the Hudson county area and most parts of New Jersey. He was particularly concerned with the high rate of heroin and cocaine addiction in the northern New Jersey metropolitan area adjoining New York City. He described efforts of his office at drug abuse prevention and treatment and commended the community based approach to preventing drug abuse espoused by the conference. He offered the guidance and technical resources of his office to assist in community based initiatives.

John T. Cusack, Chief of Staff of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, described efforts to halt the increasing illicit production and traffic of narcotic drugs abroad affecting the United States and the fact that the problem was caused by about 14 major illicit drug producing countries. He pointed out at times when the provisions of the international narcotics control conventions were effectively applied, the supply of drugs and drug abuse diminished dramatically. He recommended more determined diplomacy by the United States as the key to motivating countries delinquent in preventing drug production and traffic; to bring about effective controls. He reported the situation was badly out of control and in the major producers not even a start has been made to achieve control. In the meanwhile he stressed the need, given the flood of narcotic drugs affecting the United States, for drug abuse prevention and treatment programs to help the victims and potential victims of drug abuse. He said that community based programs via the churches, schools and civic organizations of the local communities can be effective in this work and urged they be organized where they do not exist and intensified where they do.

Participation in the Coalition Against Drugs, New York, NY

In July, 1984, the "Coalition Against Drugs" (CAD) was formed in the city of New York. CAD is a community-based drug abuse prevention campaign composed of representatives of the business community, religious groups, civic organizations, health professionals, and media. The objective of CAD is to form a network of organizations that would target various aspects of the drug trafficking and drug abuse problem in New York (e.g. law enforcement, courts, schools, treatment services) and press for more effective programs and policies to address the impact of drug abuse in particular settings.

CAD had an organizational luncheon meeting on July 11, 1984, at the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company at which Select Committee staff represented Chairman Rangel, Mr. Rangel gave strong

encouragement to the work of the Coalition and agreed to serve on its advisory board.

On September 20, 1984, CAD held its first program. It was entitled, "Speakout on Drugs—Educating and Protecting our Schoolchildren". The Select Committee's Chief Counsel participated in this forum which was a lively and informative discussion of ideas and programs to prevent drug abuse in the schools.

Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments Narcotics Task Force (COG)

In an effort to maintain an ongoing dialogue between the Select Committee and various law enforcement and local government organizations, Select Committee staff have been attending COG meetings relating to narcotics enforcement and control during 1984.

In July, 1984 at a Narcotics Task Force meeting, H.R. 5990 was discussed and the Council of Governments was provided with information on how the State and Local Narcotics Control Assistance Act of 1984 would benefit local and State governments such as those represented at the COG meetings.

The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments sponsors an annual seminar for narcotic enforcement personnel in an effort to increase local narcotic unit effectiveness. During September, 1984, the Narcotic Officers Subcommittee sponsored a seminar titled "Cooperation: A Strategy for Success in Narcotic Law Enforcement" which sought to examine aspects of narcotics enforcement including the individual investigator's need to increase and maintain investigative skills and techniques, the administrator's need to learn about management tools and concepts, and the departmental concerns related to formulating policy and procedure.

The seminar's objective was to encourage an interdisciplinary approach to enhance narcotic enforcement in the Washington area, and at the September Conference, representatives from the judicial, legislative and executive branches of government reported on various aspects of narcotic enforcement. Represented at the seminar were Chiefs of Police and Special Agents from the Washington metropolitan area, the Drug Enforcement Administration, Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, the Air Force, and the FBI. Carlton Turner from the Office of Drug Policy in the White House was the featured speaker at the close of the Conference.

Issues under discussion by the seminar's participants included forfeiture issues, PCP, cocaine free-basing, maritime smuggling, an update of recent Supreme Court decisions affecting the narcotics area, interpretations of posse comitatus, and new technology advances in the enforcement area.

The staff of the Select Committee has always enjoyed a fruitful relationship with the Council of Governments, and intends to continue its participation in the vital work of the Narcotics Task Force. Through a continued dialogue with organizations such as the Council of Governments, Select Committee staff are able to learn first hand about the needs and concerns of State and local narcotic enforcement officers, and about narcotic trends and supply availability on the streets of a major metropolitan area.

D.C. Concerned Citizen Caucus, Inc.

On October 10, 1984, Mr. Richard B. Lowe, III, Chief Counsel of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control and Mr. John J. Capers, Chief Investigator attended a meeting of the D.C. Concerned Citizens Caucus, Inc. This meeting was sponsored by the Caucus' President, Mrs. Betsy Tibbs, for the purpose of organizing a rally in the District's Ward 5 to dramatize the urgent need for a Comprehensive Program to stem the flow of PCP in the area bordered by Kennedy Street and 5th Street, N.W., known to the PCP abusers as the "5th Street Corridor."

In 1983-1984, the Select Committee staff participated in the development of a five point plan of action to combat drug abuse and drug trafficking in the Shaw Community N.W., which was highlighted by a march through the Shaw area. The resulting success of the march and rally followed by police department blockades and drug sweeps caused a shift of drug trafficking to the 5th Street Corridor and surrounding streets.

The Select Committee was asked to lend its support in the development of a plan of action for a rally in Ward 5 which would serve as a base to inform the residents of the community and the assorted agencies of the D.C. Government that are mandated to combat drug abuse of the impending shift of PCP use to the 5th Street Corridor.

The Chief Counsel informed the Caucus group in attendance of all the steps that should be taken to arrange support for an upcoming rally. It was suggested that the Caucus should make every effort to incorporate into their rally the active participation of (1) the law enforcement community; (2) the school systems; (3) religious groups; (4) drug treatment programs; and (5) business and professional; all of whom are often impacted by the devastation of drug abuse in a particular community.

It was further recommended that the group contact the Mayor's Task Force on Drugs who had just recently developed information on the status and effectiveness of drug treatment centers in the Shaw area; and the Metropolitan Police Department, who had in place a special network through which concerned citizens could report specific incidents of drug trafficking to the police department and maintain anonymity.

Minority Members' Activities During the 98th Congress

In addition to the Members' Select Committee work, several Members conducted meetings in their Congressional Districts and communities to increase public awareness on the issues of narcotics abuse and trafficking. Community activities took the form of open meetings, television and radio programs, and the publication of directories of services for drug abuse treatment.

Congressman Duncan Hunter, the Representative from the 45th Congressional District in California sponsored a Narcotics Conference with local and community leaders in February, 1984. As a result of this conference, Congressman Hunter and the community leaders issued a report entitled "Congressional Report on Narcotics" which addressed narcotics issues including reports from panels representing the military, schools, local law enforcement, churches,

family programs and international law enforcement. The influx of Mexican heroin into the San Diego area was creating serious social and law enforcement problems, and the Conference, and subsequent report were aimed at gauging the extent and seriousness of the narcotics problem in the San Diego area.

Included in the report were recommendations made by the participants in the areas of social rehabilitation, judicial reform, local law enforcement policy, education and international policy. This report was circulated to all Members of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control.

Congressman Hunter also participated in the local Chemical People group during the national broadcast of the "Chemical People" program. After the Chemical People broadcast, Congressman Hunter continued his association with the Chemical People Chapter in his region, and during the summer of 1984, he led another conference to discuss the appropriate role of the Federal Government in the areas of narcotics abuse and trafficking.

Congressman Stan Parris, who represents Virginia's 8th Congressional District sponsored a Town Hall meeting on May 30, 1984 to discuss the growing problem of narcotics and alcohol abuse in the Washington metropolitan area. The panel included representatives from local and Federal agencies, including the Drug Enforcement Administration and the U.S. Department of State. Local, State and Federal perspectives of the narcotics problem were discussed and the role of the Federal Government in halting the influx of narcotics was examined.

Congressman Parris also published a special report to his constituents in the 8th District, which included an article on the issue of narcotics in State and Federal parks, an issue which has become increasingly troublesome for law enforcement officers and for the people who use the parks. In response to the need for action particularly in the Washington area, Congressman Parris met with the Secretary of the Interior to suggest the creation of a social narcotics unit. The unit was created and has significantly reduced drug activity in area parks.

In addition, Congressman Parris introduced H.R. 6363 which would give G.S.A. responsibility for the maintenance and disposal of property seized by Federal narcotics agents.

Congressman Tom Lewis hosted the Select Committee's South Florida Law Enforcement Conference on May 14th, 1984 at which time local law enforcement offficials and Federal representatives spoke candidly about the need for closer cooperation and information sharing. This Conference, and the subsequent creation of the Ad Hoc Drug and Law Enforcement Liaison Committee helped to bring about closer cooperation and coordination and increased the cooperation among the enforcement partners involved in the South Florida narcotics interdiction effort.

Congressman Tom Lewis also made several appearances on local television in Florida's 12th Congressional District, and conducted several radio interviews with Federal narcotics officials during the 98th Congress.

During interviews with Dr. Carlton Turner, Director of the White House Drug Abuse Policy Office, Francis Mullen, DEA Administrator and the U.S. Customs Service Commissioner, William

von Raab, Representative Lewis pressed Administration officials to intensify their efforts to interdict narcotics and to work towards better cooperation among the Federal, State and local agencies involved in the South Florida effort.

In November, 1984, Congressman Lewis appeared on WHRS TV in West Palm Beach with John Lawn, Charlie Hill and Greg Kenaston of the Drug Enforcement Administration. The program provided Congressman Lewis with an opportunity to address some of the improvements in cooperation and coordination which had been made in the South Florida area. As part of the program, viewers were invited to call in and question the panelists on recent developments on interdiction and seizures in the West Palm Beach area.

On November 9th, Congressman Lewis and DEA representatives met with local press at a breakfast meeting to discuss a range of narcotics issues including improved cooperation and international efforts to halt the cultivation and flow of narcotics.

On June 12th, 1984, Congressman Lewis presented Florida's Congressional Delegation's Distinguished Service Award for community service to Nancy Sayler and GATE South (Gain Awareness Through Education), a public awareness organization and prevention program in Palm Beach County, Florida, GATE South promotes positive attitudes and communication skills necessary in the pursuit of healthy alternatives for living and uses a variety of educational techniques to prevent juvenile drug abuse.

Congressman Lewis recommended GATE South and Ms. Sayler for the award because of the positive impact that this organization has had in the communities of South Florida.

Keynote Address at the International Narcotic Enforcement Officers Association

On October 12, 1984, the International Narcotic Enforcement Officers Association (INEOA), held its 25th Annual International Drug Conference in Albany, New York. Mr. Gilman delivered the keynote address at the conference, which simultaneously celebrated the INEOA's silver anniversary and paid tribute to John Bellizzi, founder, first president and current executive director of the association on his retirement from 40 years of dedicated narcotics law enforcement service to the City and State of New York.

In his address, Mr. Gilman discussed the growing linkage between the narcotics traffickers and the international terrorists and commented upon official government involvement in narcotics trafficking by Bulgaria, Nicaragua and Cuba. He also reviewed drug-related legislation introduced in the House of Representatives during the 98th Congress that was designed to help combat drug trafficking and drug abuse.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. DANTE B. FASCELL CHAIRMAN, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND HON. LAWRENCE J. SMITH

The annual report for 1984 of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control is a thorough and comprehensive review of the progress achieved and problems still facing the United States with respect to its domestic and international efforts to combat illicit production and traffic in narcotics.

We would like to take this opportunity to add some additional perspective to the report's findings and recommendations, particularly with regard to certain countries in the Caribbean and Latin America which were recently visited by House Foreign Affairs Committee staff task forces on international narcotics control and international terrorism and diplomatic security.

In our view, the major obstacle confronting the U.S. anti-narcotics effort in many of these countries is the endemic corruption embracing all levels of those governments. For example, the recently concluded Bahamian Commission of Inquiry identified local corruption as a major element in the Bahamian drug connection. Therefore, any effort to improve joint U.S.-Bahamian interdiction operations must take into account the probable complicity of Bahamian officials responsible for drug enforcement. Corruption also impedes the U.S. bilateral narcotics control program in Mexico, Panama, and Jamaica.

In those countries where corruption is not a significant problem, much more is required in the areas of training, equipment, maintenance, and effective coordination on the part of those elements of the host government responsible for narcotics enforcement. These deficiencies apply particularly to such countries as Costa Rica, Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador. Costa Rica, which is constitutionally prohibited from having an army, has a small, undertrained, ill-equipped Civil Guard force which is no match for the sophisticated narcotics traffickers who use that country for transshipment of cocaine and marijuana.

In the case of Columbia and Peru, the United States has relatively large anti-narcotics programs. However, in Columbia and increasingly in Peru, the emergence of the "narco-terrorista" threat endangers continuance of the programs. Furthermore, this insidious spectre has jeopardized not only the safety of DEA personnel but also the lives of U.S. ambassadors, their entire embassy teams, as well as American businessmen and tourists.

Finally, with respect to U.S. international narcotics control efforts, we believe that the application of the legislative penalties leading to the termination of U.S. assistance to countries failing to take adequate steps against narcotics must be weighed very carefully. Overriding foreign policy considerations can come into play with respect to some fragile democracies in the region. For in-

stance, the situation in Peru, which has experienced mixed success in its narcotics control program, would be exacerbated if all U.S. assistance were cut off at this time. Such punitive action on the eve of national elections could trigger social and economic chaos which would render narcotics enforcement virtually impossible. Moreover, such a step would give the Soviet Union's already well-established presence a freer hand in Peru.

Apart from the distinct foreign policy aspects of the problem, we are deeply concerned that the current Administration consistently has under-funded or diverted funds from programs that are designed to keep illicit trafficking from reaching the shores of the United States through South Florida. The Customs Service, DEA, and other agencies involved in the drug war are woefully understaffed, underfunded, and overworked. Moreover, other states increasingly are being used by the trafficers as points of entry and transit. Pursuant to existing law, greater use of U.S. military resources can and must be applied to the interdiction effort.

On a more positive note, we see some reason for optimism. In the past, drug abuse was viewed as a "North American" problem. Drug abuse has emerged in the producing and transshipping countries. Drug money threatens their internal stability. If these countries finally recognize their stake in this battle, they may become more inclined to seek and accept our help.

DANTE B. FASCELL.
LAWRENCE J. SMITH.

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